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ABSTRACT 
 The United States of America has never formally declared a cultural policy nor 
established a Cabinet-level department of cultural affairs, as many other nations have in the 
post–World War II era — depriving the American people a foundation and context for 
transparent, open deliberation over the nature and priorities of public cultural policy. The 
values that constitute our de facto policy must be discerned through the aggregate of 
specialized policymaking and action taken by federal, state, and local governments.  
Our reluctance to declare formal policy is partly due to the nation’s stance in 
conducting the Cold War — focused around an exaggerated Soviet threat —and its 
associated domestic anti-communist campaigning. In examining the historic record, 
“Collateral Damage” tells the story of anti-communism through much of the twentieth 
century, focusing on its cultural impact. The historical narrative follows from the first mass 
expression of anti-communist sentiment nationally, in the Red Scare of 1919, through its 
later expression in the “McCarthy era” of the Fifties, and its legacy since. Various 
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approaches to cultural policy emerge throughout; but I focus especially on the contrasting 
federal cultural programs of the New Deal and those of domestic cultural agencies 
established in the 1960’s.  
This story reveals how politicians and  policymakers relied upon religious values 
were for Cold War purposes, rather than crafting secular statements of national cultural 
values. The study identifies six other significant impacts of anti-communism on U.S. cultural 
policy since the Sixties: the primacy of the private sector; Euro-centric bias in defining the 
cultural field; an approach to cultural diversity that marginalizes voices from outside 
traditional fine-arts contexts; a proscription against engagement with social issues in the arts 
and humanities; the replacement of democracy with “free enterprise” as the driving spirit in 
cultural policy; and a U.S. stance in international cultural-policy deliberations that tends to 
interpret transnational cultural issues in terms of commerce and national security. 
 The study concludes with a suggestion of what a secular statement of national cultural 
policy might resemble, using First Lady Michelle Obama’s address to the Democratic 
National Convention in 2012 as an example. 
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PREFACE 
 The 2009 upsurge of political reaction, following Barack Obama’s election to the 
White House, convinced me of the urgent need for us Americans to find a way to talk 
intelligently and compassionately about cultural issues. Cultural policy, to my way of 
thinking, is not a specialist interest for cultural professionals — artists, teachers, or 
community organizers. It is the matrix of common concern for all citizens, from every 
cultural background, belief, and way of life, and in every community, geographic or 
otherwise. 
 I’ve always thought of this as “collateral damage” of the Cold War: ways in which 
our conceptions of public values and the pubic interest have been set by the ideological 
stance assumed by the most powerful U.S. economic interests, and encouraged upon us, 
though running directly contrary to the nation’s democratic values. Diversity demands that 
we discuss public issues in secular terms, yet we have been plagued by problems in doing so. 
The disproportionate power held by moralists interested in using state power to enforce their 
convictions upon others is rooted in Cold War constructions, never reexamined since the 
Cold War was presumably won. 
My research focused on the many obstacles and rationales behind our historic failure 
to welcome the other, as defined by nationality, race, or other cultural attributes or interests. 
For much of the past century, our fear of the other as been expressed in the lexicon of anti-
communism and manifest in periodic efforts to villainize forces cast as “un-American.” 
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These constructions aided powerful capitalists to work steadily to contain the democratic 
force of government and create a public cultural consensus that favored the interests of the 
richest Americans. Slowly and subtly, democracy has been replaced by an ideology of 
capitalism that has effectively become our national cultural policy. 
These past four years of fulltime study has been a very dark passage. Much more than 
I had previously realized, our confusion about national politics has been cultivated. Wild 
contradictions abound in predominant rightwing cries for freedom while urging greater state 
control. Having suppressed domestic public service functions of government for more then a 
generation, the corporate-driven agenda established in 1936 has substantially achieved its 
goal of destroying our collective faith in democratic government. Following the many 
interwoven strands of U.S. cultural history that have led us to this condition, and studying the 
work, thought, and action undertaken by domestic enemies of cultural democracy, has been 
profoundly challenging. I would not wish anyone else to have to plow through the ground 
I’ve been churning over, yet this history needs to be exposed and understood. I have 
attempted here to simplify the separate strands of this history, in order to illuminate the 
polarized political culture that holds sway at present. 
 I regret that I could not be more directly propositional on this occasion. My focus has 
been on elucidating how historic forces conjoined to lead us to our present situation. I hope 
that by more clearly understanding how our dilemma was set up, we will find our way 
forward as a whole people, dedicated to the dream of cultural democracy, more clearly and 
deliberately than in in any earlier stage in our national history. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Everything creative, fine, and imaginative in American 
thought has been splattered and soured by anti-communist 
vitriol. Anti-communism has narrowed the American mind and 
has been responsible for the incredibly shrinking American 
heart. It has polluted our discourse; destroyed our national 
credibility; vitiated our democracy. After decades of Red 
Scares and Red Squads, … we stand morally isolated before 
the world, … on the wrong side of every movement for human 
justice and national liberation … 
— Blanche Wiesen Cook1 
 Early in 1988, my consulting firm received a call for help from the chair of the 
steering group for a Harvard conference being planned for the following fall. The group had 
been working for well over a year; but so eager were its participants to discuss the subject, 
their meetings had effectively become rehearsals of the discussions that the host group — 
New York’s Institute for Media Analysis — wanted to take place at this milestone event, 
examining the impact of anti-communism on American life.  Suddenly, planning time was 
growing short: could we help? 
 By the end of a marathon weekend in a Greenwich Village apartment a few weeks 
later, the job was done: subjects enumerated, panels assembled, speakers chosen, and 
prospects assigned for eleventh-hour fundraising. That November, 1,300 people gathered in 
Cambridge to take part in dozens of plenary sessions and breakout groups to discuss various 
                                                
1 “The Impact of Anti-communism in American Life,” Science & Society, 53, no. 4 (Winter 
1989/1990), 470. 
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aspects of the subject.2 Between sessions, I stationed myself at the foot of a stairway to help 
participants find their next meeting room, where an aged woman approached me, grasping 
my hand in hers:  “I am so glad,” she wept, “that this conference took place in my lifetime!” 
 I will never forget that moment. This woman’s tearful words and trembling hands 
brought home to me the depth of pent-up feelings carried for so many decades by those who 
were already adults when the anti-communist fever reached its peak in the 1950s. For me, 
born the month after Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were executed at Sing Sing, anti-
communism had been a confusing, pervasive presence — overheard in inscrutable adult 
conversations — coloring the world into which I had awakened, hard to parse and rooted in a 
murky past. Like many in my generation, I rejected anti-communism with righteous 
indignation as a false threat; but I had not yet suffered its impact, nor would I ever, in the 
direct, devastating ways that older generations had. 
 One year after that conference, as jubilant crowds began tearing down the wall that 
divided Berlin since my childhood, I expected we would all turn back at last to assess the 
collateral damage of the decades-long Cold War. What emerged, as the Soviet Union finally 
collapsed under its own weight, has fallen far short of my apparently idealistic expectation.  
All too quickly, different kinds of terror took the place of Communism in our anxious 
imaginations. The mental and emotional damage to which Blanche Wiesen Cook, a 
participant in the Harvard conference and its planning group, referred in my epigraph (based 
                                                
2 “Anticommunism and the U.S.: History and Consequences — An International 
Conference,” Harvard University, November 11-13, 1988. See also Ross Gelbspan and 
Charles A. Radin, “Charges of communism cloud debate, conferees say,” The Boston Globe, 
November 14, 1988. 
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on her remarks at a conference panel on “The Rise of the American Empire”), remains 
largely unexamined to this day. What collateral damage did we suffer in the decades-long 
Cold War against communism? 
THE IMPACT OF ANTI-COMMUNISM ON U.S. CULTURAL POLICY 
 My present aim is to relate the history and to trace the impact of anti-communism on 
American cultural policy. Since these impacts are diverse, and culture is itself an all-
encompassing and multifaceted phenomenon, this story has many dimensions.  
Anti-communism was at work in both domestic and international arenas, in complex 
and often contradictory ways. The Cold War story challenges any neat divisions 
international-relations “realists” might like to enforce. Anti-communist vitriol was 
interwoven with other politically significant impulses: anti-alien feeling, for example, and 
efforts to defend the racist status quo. Both church and state, presumably separated in our 
constitutional regime, became implicated with each one other throughout the anti-communist 
crusade that defined and delimited so much of American life in the twentieth century. 
Though the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
seemed to end the Cold War, the fabric of consensus its strategists created remains central to 
Twenty-first Century American political fashion. For nearly a century, anti-communist 
influence has undermined democratic values and aspirations in favor of “national security” 
against one or another perceived threat. 
Cultural policy provides the missing framework for understanding the divisive forces 
that came into play in American anti-communism, in contrast to the unity and cooperative 
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spirit that policy might provide. The arts, uniquely revealing of cultural values, came not 
only to symbolize the cultural struggle, but also became a battleground for its opposing 
camps. In each arena — international and domestic, national and local — this battle has been 
waged in stages, with anti-communism coming to the fore at certain points, altering 
adherents’ strategies and responses, as well as the national cultural consensus, then receding 
into the background of our changed and changing national consciousness. 
 Fortunately for my purpose, history has left us with two contrasting comparative 
cases in cultural policy: the policies that inspired and guided New Deal federal cultural 
programs in the 1930s, and those of the federal cultural agencies that were created in the 
Sixties. There could not be any clearer examples of how the cultural policy of the United 
States was transformed and shaped by anti-communism.  
Patience is required to allow the story of Twentieth Century U.S. cultural policy to 
emerge. A great deal happened before and between the Thirties and the Sixties that was 
critical to the rise and fall of the New Deal programs and to the creation of the second, 
culminating in the Reagan era. A roadmap is required to help orient the reader for the journey 
ahead.  
THE HISTORIC ARC OF U.S. ANTI-COMMUNISM 
Our roadmap follows the arc of American anti-communism from World War I on. 
But because the idea is not well understood in this country, I will begin with a short 
definition of cultural policy. I learned early on in my own cultural development work, in the 
1970’s, that simply to speak in terms of cultural policy was considered un-American by the 
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U.S. cultural establishment. Cultural policy had been associated with alien influence, at best, 
in the post–World War II United States, and worse, with the evils of communism itself. This 
has short-circuited focused debate of the principles that our national cultural policy 
embodies. 
 From this brief definition, I will proceed with the story of anti-communism in the 
United States, starting with its first massive public expression in the Red Scare of 1919.3 Due 
to a lifelong obsession with racism, I already knew about the horrifying resurgence of violent 
racism in that year. Anti-racist activists and historians have long described the period from 
May through October as “the Red Summer,” in remembrance of 1919’s bloody race riots; but 
I had not previously appreciated the larger context of national hysteria from which that 
specific aspect of national unrest arose. It was in this fever that the armature of anti-
communism was built. 
  Our story quickly shifts, as the Roaring Twenties submerge the first Red Scare. 
Diverted by gadgets, fads, and new media — first radio, then film — and ignorant of the 
consequences of unregulated capitalism, the nation largely ignored the forces that would lead 
into the Great Depression. That national emergency inspired President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and the wider cultural movements that grew out of our struggle to 
understand and recover from national economic crisis. Among the innovations introduced in 
the Thirties were the first federal cultural programs, providing a benchmark for democratic 
values in cultural policy.  
                                                
3 Thanks to Dr. Max Skidmore for suggesting that I look into the Palmer raids, the Red 
Scare’s climactic event, in tracing the origins of American anti-communism. 
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These programs became the first victim of the primary Congressional vehicle for anti-
communist action, which eventually became known as HUAC, the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. This era also birthed a less visible but arguably more lasting effort to 
counter New Deal values, an ideological construction friendly to other anti–New Deal 
interests: the doctrine of “the American Way,” which I will also take up at this stage of our 
story. 
 Postwar events become considerably more complex, as the United States’ wartime 
alliance with the Soviet Union quickly collapsed into what we call the Cold War, locking the 
nation into a longstanding, bipolar global struggle. At this point, foreign-policy leaders’ 
cultural-policy thinking laid the foundation not only for international relations, but for 
subsequent domestic policy, too. In aid of their polarized vision of global struggle, Senator 
Joe McCarthy and various agents and agencies in both public and private sectors joined 
HUAC’s resurgent domestic campaign. The nation’s foreign-policy apparatus required some 
definition of what American culture might offer the world, beyond capitalism and its vast 
array of gadgetry. This story manifest most clearly (in the illuminated view made possible by 
later historic study) in the covert cultural activities of the newly created Central Intelligence 
Agency, as well as in the more public programs of the U.S. State Department. Ironically, 
these global campaigns wound up requiring domestic reform, to bring American cultural 
practice in line with our global propaganda. This was most notable in the realm of civil 
rights, where the realities of racial segregation undermined U.S. claims that our society 
offered equal rights for all. 
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 Finally, we will arrive at the contrasting example to the federal cultural policies of the 
New Deal, in the domestic cultural apparatus created in the 1960’s. Cold War definitions of 
American culture became the consensus that has defined the de facto policies of federal 
cultural agencies and their state and local counterparts since the establishment of the National 
Foundation on the Art and Humanities in 1965. The elites who shaped American cultural 
identity for Cold War purposes deployed these same values in creating our new federal 
cultural apparatus.  
Social movements since the Sixties have succeeded in enlarging our collective 
definitions of national culture, especially within institutional contexts like the academy where 
progressive forces have been able to hold sway. But the foundations of American cultural 
policy have not yet substantially changed. We have yet to articulate a cultural policy as 
generously democratic and inclusive as that of the New Deal.  
My purpose in examining this history is to restore perspective and an understanding 
of the choices that underlie cultural policy in the United States. Lest we be discouraged by 
weight of the Cold War’s collateral damage, I will close with a simple suggestion of what 
progressive cultural policy might look like today, drawing on Michelle Obama’s address to 
the 2012 Democratic National Convention. On that occasion, the First Lady made the kind of 
plain-English statement of democratic cultural policy needed to unify such a diverse society 
as ours.  
Can the West Wing learn from the East? Might a better collective understanding of 
cultural policy enable us to live up to the promise expressed in E pluribus unum — to 
become a nation more perfectly united in our diversity? This is my hope as our story begins. 
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But first we need working definition of cultural policy — the deep phenomenon we’ll trace 
as it emerges and is transformed through Twentieth Century U.S. history. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CULTURAL POLICY: BRINGING CULTURE IN 
 My favorite statement of the dominant attitude held by mainstream American 
political thinkers in the extended Cold War era wound up on a cutting-room floor. It was a 
strong opening statement meant to short-circuit discussion of the topic at hand in a 1982 New 
York Times editorial round-table on cultural policy. Right at the start, historian and librarian 
of Congress Daniel Boorstin asserted, “The countries that have cultural policies on the whole 
are, of course, totalitarian countries.”1 
 The fact is that no state operates without a cultural policy. Its aims and purposes 
might be obscured for strategic reasons, as has been consistently the case in the post–New 
Deal United States, but policy can still be discerned by examining the state’s actions. 
Through much of recorded world history, the tastes and interests of monarchs and ruling 
classes set the tone and established the priorities of cultural investment, direction, and 
restriction. As the modern nation-state began to emerge, more intentional statements began to 
shape national identity. These opened the way for explicit consideration of cultural policy.  
In fact, values and principles of state organization began to be articulated as ways of 
justifying innovations in the social order and of mobilizing constituencies for change. Such 
foundational national documents as the colonial Declaration of Independence, the Articles of 
                                                
1 Daniel Boorstin in an unpublished portion of the editors’ “NWR Culture Roundtable File,” 
March 17, 1982 (Institute for Cultural Democracy papers, Kansas City, MO), p. 7. The 
resulting article was published in the New York Times, April 25, 1982, 6-E. 
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Confederation and the Constitution of the newly independent United States, and the two 
Déclarations des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1798 and 1793, following the French 
revolution, can be understood as more or less successful attempts to formally articulate 
principles and describe processes of government that define some fundamental reordering of 
state arrangements and cultural policies. Similarly, the kinds of principles, aims, and 
objectives incorporated into countless acts of legislative bodies bring principled guidelines 
explicitly into the realm of state action. The less explicit traditions maintained in common 
law and oral tradition, and the evolving interpretations made in judicial systems can be — 
and increasingly have been — viewed, analyzed, and understood in similar terms since the 
nineteenth century. 
 Throughout this time, implicitly and explicitly, state policies have dynamically 
engaged with changing understandings of the values, roles, and relationships that underlie, 
guide, promote, and restrict action by non-state actors, including non-state institutions, social 
movements, cultural sub-groups, families or clans, and even individuals. The policies and 
actions of this wide array of non-state actors can also be examined and understood by similar 
lights and standards as public cultural policy can be. Though lacking the coercive authority 
of the state, private-sector stances wield substantial influence and even exert power in private 
terrains and contexts.  
These manifestations and ways of understanding the idea of “cultural policy” — 
combining the actions and interactions of state and non-state actors — are especially relevant 
to domestic political-science analysis as well as to what have recently been called 
“constructivist” understandings of international relations, in which transnational activism 
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matters — admitting the reality of non-state action and influence, even in realms dominated 
by nation-state interests. Though such positions will be taken up throughout our examination, 
my primary purpose here is to focus on the changes these have produced in public-sector 
cultural policy, where the power of the state has the potential to enforce principles and 
regulate action throughout the nation’s culture, with multiple impacts upon the private and 
personal. 
 More conscious consideration of public cultural policy, focused primarily upon 
nation-state apparatus, has arisen largely since the end of World War II, most formally 
through international discussion of the practical significance of one of the new rights 
enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948. Article 27 of that Declaration states, “Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community.”2 This ideal shone brightly against the stark 
backdrop of recently defeated fascist forces that had demonstrated all too well the horrors of 
its sinister opposite — the imposition of some singular idea about cultural values; but the 
practical meaning of this new way of thinking about cultural affairs in terms of public policy 
and action was not so clear. Its meaning was substantially clarified through international 
dialogue since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made. 
 The meaning, issues, and implications of this “right to culture” were pursued most 
actively under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO’s own constitution was adopted at a 1945 conference in 
                                                
2 M. Glen Johnson and Janusz Symonides, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
History of Its Creation and Implementation, 1948-1998 (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), 16. 
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London, and one of its early projects was drafting the UDHR. Over twenty years later, at a 
1970 Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of 
Cultural Policies in Venice, UNESCO’s director-general René Maheu observed, 
It is not certain that the full significance of this text, 
proclaiming a new human right, the right to culture, was 
entirely appreciated at the time. If everyone … has the right to 
share in the cultural heritage and cultural activities of the 
community … it follows that the authorities … have a duty … 
to provide him [sic] with the means for such participation. This 
is as true of what we call social rights, of which the new right 
to culture is one, as of political rights.  This is the basis and 
first purpose of cultural policy.3  
 Recognizing inequalities in cultural participation within and among nation-states and 
providing the means to correct and counterbalance them have fueled UNESCO dialogue and 
inspired member-state action ever since. Postwar liberation movements in former colonies 
and social movements addressing inequities among diverse cultural traditions present within 
multicultural states like the United States brought heightened international awareness of 
cultural diversity as an issue. How to undo the damage done by colonial suppression of local 
cultures and by racist or elitist cultural domestic authorities became perennial topics for 
international forums like UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of African 
Unity, as well as for our nation-states’ own executive, legislative, and judicial bodies.  
Postwar cultural policymakers also wanted to address and redirect the cultural forces 
that had so recently given rise to disasters of fascism. They focused in on citizen passivity, as 
against the active cultural participation that characterizes democratic communal life. Social 
                                                
3 Augustin Girard, Cultural Development: Experience and Policies (Paris: UNESCO, 1972), 
139-140. 
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phenomena being experienced throughout the postwar world, the cultural ministers agreed 
with some alarm, were exacerbating tendencies toward increasing passivity on the part of 
their nations’ citizens. Primary among these concerning global trends were the displacement 
of substantial proportions of the population by industrialization and war, urbanization, and 
the proliferation of mass-produced electronic-media products that increasingly absorbed 
leisure time formerly invested in participatory cultural activities. 
 By discussing these transnational trends, UNESCO’s definition of cultural policy was 
sharpened in the late 1960s, at first to facilitate cross-national comparison and international 
discussion of these issues, and then to support the efforts of state cultural policy–makers in 
countering these forces domestically. Out of UNESCO’s discussion came a fairly concise 
definition of the topic at hand as it related to the general social context:  
“[C]ultural policy” should be taken to mean the sum total of 
the conscious and deliberate usages, action or lack of action in 
society, aimed at meeting certain cultural needs through the 
optimum utilization of all the physical and human resources 
available at a given time. 
UNESCO soon offered this more focused definition of public cultural policy to focus its 
subsequent series of studies of the cultural policies of its member-states: 
“[C]ultural policy” is taken to mean a body of operational 
principles, administrative and budgetary practices and 
procedures which form a basis for cultural action by the State.4 
This definition informed an extended series of UNESCO documents summarizing the 
national cultural policies of its member nations, more or less accepting of how these policies 
                                                
4 UNESCO, Cultural Policy: A Preliminary Study, 2nd ed., Studies and Documents on 
Cultural Policies, no. 1 (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1969), 5, and 10. 
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were presented by the members themselves. The United States’ official contribution to 
UNESCO’s series on national cultural policies opened with this assertion, locating our 
disability (“almost”) in the Constitution’s construction of the federal system: 
“The United States has no official cultural position, either 
public or private” … This is simply a statement of fact 
affecting a federation form of government. It is not possible for 
the United States to adopt officially a policy to govern any 
social enterprise without enormous effort involving almost the 
modification of the Constitution.5 
To cultural policymakers in other countries, the suggestion that cultural policy could not be 
articulated without constitutional amendment would become just one laughable (or 
deplorable) aspect of the ill-informed U.S. non-participation in international cultural-policy 
dialogue — or domestic dialogue about cultural policy, for that matter. 
 I will use UNESCO’s working definition in analyzing New Deal and postwar cultural 
policy in the United States, so dramatically altered by anti-communism. But we must start 
farther back in time, to discover the roots of anti-communism in this country 
 
                                                
5 Charles C. Mark, A Study of Cultural Policy in the United States, Studies and Documents 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 
 The drama of American anti-communism originates with the Nineteenth Century 
emergence of communism itself. The first volume of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ 
milestone critique of capitalism, Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1867), appeared just 
as the United States was emerging from its Civil War and embarking upon what came to be 
known as the Gilded Age of capitalist expansion. Engels published The Circulation Process 
of Capital (1885) after Marx’s 1883 death, followed by The Overall Process of Capitalist 
Production (1894), the three volumes together comprising what we know as Das Kapital. 
Marx and Engels’ work, hugely influential as the textual, theoretical basis of socialism and 
communism, have provided critical tools for analyzing the significance of economic 
relations, even for those not subscribing to socialist ideologies. But Marxist influence failed 
to gain any substantial foothold in a United States surging ahead in its Nineteenth Century 
project of national expansion.  
 The agrarian revolt and the rise of populism in the U.S. of the 1890’s brought forward 
significant critiques of the predominant capitalist order, and these continued to gain traction 
into the twentieth century, even after the demise of the populist movement itself.1 Reflections 
of Marxist thought can be seen among American idealists, populists, and Progressives of the 
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era, who spoke to the many excesses associated with unbridled capitalist growth and helped 
lay on the first federal regulatory bridles before the Great War. 
 These late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century trends gave rise to the growth of 
socialist political formations, though these never achieved substantial numbers on a national 
scale, and therefore raised relatively little concern — at least until the nation entered World 
War I. The most successful of these early formations was the Socialist Party, founded in 
1901, whose members numbered just over 100,000 by 1912. In that year, 897,000 votes were 
cast for the Socialist presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs, whose defeat was accompanied 
by scattered electoral victories in state and municipal contests: by 1914, thirty Party members 
had been elected to the legislatures of twelve states, and more than a thousand Party members 
held various municipal offices.2 
 One historian of the American left saw the socialism of this era as being more 
involved with the “regenerating force of culture and the imaginative power of poetry” than 
with “the ‘science’ of Marxism,” labeling this first period of the American left’s political 
history as the “Lyrical Left.” 3 This spirit is exemplified by Max Eastman, self-described as 
an “American lyrical Socialist — a child of Walt Whitman reared by Karl Marx.” Eastman 
waxed rhapsodic about his bohemian socialist companions: 
Our eyes trained for every seeing, our ears catching the first 
murmur of a new experience, we ran after the world in our 
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eagerness, not to learn about it, but to taste the flavor of its 
being.4 
AWAKENING ANTI-RADICALISM 
 Despite this idealistic spirit, and however “soft” in comparison to later left ideologies, 
Socialists and others identified as “radicals” soon got into trouble for their opposition to 
American intervention in the European war that had broken out in 1914. As general 
isolationist feeling gradually came to be replaced by growing consensus to enter the war, 
The Socialists’ opposition to the war was universally regarded 
as irrefutable proof that they were either spies or pro-German 
and wanted the enemy to win. In view of their opposition to the 
war even before the United States intervened, these charges 
were utterly ridiculous. But under the influence of wartime 
emotionalism the public was not thinking clearly and the net 
result was vigorous repression. … Socialist headquarters were 
raided by mobs and sacked by soldiers, while individual 
Socialists were treated shamefully. …  
 From time to time, federal and state authorities made 
official raids … The postal department denied mailing 
privileges to many Socialist publications. The courts applied 
the Espionage Law so stringently in Socialist cases that only a 
few were decided in favor of the defendants.5 
 Similar repression arose during World War I against the other primary radical 
political formation of the opening decades of the twentieth century, the International Workers 
of the World (IWW), or “Wobblies,” as they were popularly known. Founded by William S. 
(“Big Bill”) Haywood in 1905, with encouragement and material aid from the Socialist Party, 
the IWW “suffered an even greater concentration of public wrath and created more fear than 
                                                
4 Ibid., 94. 
5 Murray, 20-21. 
  18 
did the Socialists. … Drawing together all the dissident elements within the American labor 
movement,” the IWW ascribed to an “anarcho-syndicalist philosophy with Marxist 
trimmings,” striving to organize “direct economic pressure to overthrow the capitalistic 
system.”6  
 The Wobblies’ “disregard for political activity and … professed belief in violence” 
provided an even more fearsome focal point for the “wartime emotionalism” described 
above, and the IWW was targeted in a series of federal raids in September 1917, through 
which most of its leaders were apprehended. Haywood and 165 other Wobbly defendants 
were convicted and sentenced for terms ranging from ten days to twenty years, and slapped 
with aggregate fines of $2.3 million. The IWW’s estimated membership fell by half, and the 
organization was effectively driven underground.7 
 But it was not until the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 and Russia’s 
subsequent withdrawal from the Great War that the United States had only recently joined 
that American alarm at the threat of communism (more commonly referred to at the time as 
“Bolshevism”) became significant, and true American anti-communism was born.  
The Bolsheviks’ 1917 seizure of power in Russia sparked new 
anti-radical hysteria. … In March 1919, the Bolsheviks 
established the Third International, the Comintern, to promote 
revolution throughout the world. This external menace, plus 
turmoil at home, stoked anxieties that culminated in America’s 
first Red Scare.8 
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 On the practical level of geopolitics, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 
meant the loss of Russia as an eastern-front ally, just as American troops were being 
deployed to Western Europe. That Germany had helped Lenin return to Russia from his 
Swiss exile further conflated wartime antipathy toward this enemy with U.S. concern over 
the eventual Bolshevik overthrow of the Kerensky government. Even worse, the victorious 
Bolsheviks “impertinently called for the immediate cessation of hostilities everywhere 
through universal proletarian revolution and the dissolution of all capitalistic governments.”9 
Thus was a global drama established that widened a breach already present within U.S. 
society. 
BOLSHEVISM AND PARTY REALIGNMENTS 
 Historian Robert K. Murray describes how the “October Revolution” (named for the 
November event’s position on the Eastern Orthodox calendar) catalyzed further polarization 
of domestic political conflict.  
[B]olshevism’s unyielding emphasis of the world-wide 
overthrow of capitalism and the complete abolition of private 
property … ran counter to all accepted American traditions of 
political philosophy and economy and struck terror into the 
hearts of the average American conservative. Already harassed 
by domestic radicals who advocated big changes, the nation 
viewed the emergence of Russian bolshevism with extremely 
grave concern and feared it might portend serious domestic 
consequences. 
The press fanned these flames, with “horror stories of every kind” (including a specious 
report of an electric guillotine that lopped off five hundred heads an hour), with editorial 
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cartoons to match. Domestic connections were drawn between Bolshevik rule as a 
“compound of slaughter, confiscation, anarchy and universal disorder” that writers depicted 
as “the paradise of IWW’s and the superlative heaven of anarchists and direct-action 
Socialists.”10 
 With the IWW itself already driven underground, the Socialist Party provided the 
primary stage upon which radicals battled over the relevance, significance, and strategic 
wisdom of defending the Bolshevik government against virulent mainstream American 
condemnation. Intentionally or not, response from its members and some other domestic 
radicals seemed to confirm the threat perceived in Bolshevik influence: 
American radicals … were enthralled by the events taking 
place in Russia. Persecuted on all sides for their opposition to 
the war and to capitalism … [t]he Russian experiment 
immediately gave the domestic radical movement all the things 
it currently lacked — a fresh idea, new enthusiasm, and an 
example of success. … The Bolshevik revolutionary 
philosophy contained the elements of a grand strategy … To 
the American radical, the very sweep of the program was 
breathtaking.11 
 Encouraged by the founding of the Third International in March 1919, after the Great 
War had ended, Socialist Party locals organized actively, bringing the number of members 
openly affiliated with the Left Wing faction to 30,000 by May and to 60,000 by the end of 
the summer, ninety percent of whom were affiliated with the Party’s foreign-language 
federations. The latter quickly fell into factional fights with the native-born, English-
speaking minority of the Socialist Party’s Left Wing, which held out for taking over the main 
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party rather than acting on the foreign federations’ wish to coalesce immediately into a new 
party. The foreign federations did decide over the summer to bolt the Socialist Party 
altogether, thus splitting the Party’s Left Wing, and resolved to meet separately in Chicago, 
at the same time as the Socialists planned to convene there, to form their own party.12 
 The Right Wing Socialists, ignoring the Debs’ pleas for unity from his federal prison 
cell in Atlanta, closed ranks against the native-born Left Wingers when the Party convened in 
Chicago’s Machinists Hall on August 30th, denouncing them as “anarchists” and ejecting 
them before any further business was undertaken. Undaunted, those ejected adjourned to 
another room in the Hall and immediately formed the Communist Labor Party (CLP), boldly 
declared themselves to be “in full harmony with the revolutionary working class parties of all 
countries” in accordance with “the principles stated by the Third International. … The 
Communist Labor Party proposes the organization of the workers as a class, the overthrow of 
capitalist rule and the conquest of political power by the workers.” Thus was the first actual 
“communist” party born in the United States, led by such native-born Socialist Left Wingers 
as John Reed, Benjamin Gitlow (former New York state legislator), and William B. Lloyd 
(millionaire son of the early muckraking journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd and Jessie Bross 
Lloyd, heir to the Chicago Tribune publishing fortune). 
Meeting separately in Chicago the next day, the foreign-language federation members 
formed a second new party, simply entitled the American Communist Party. Styled even 
more closely after the Third International, the ACP’s Manifesto declared it to be 
“fundamentally a party of action” that would “keep in the foreground its consistent appeal for 
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proletarian revolution, the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat.”13 
 Sapped of its left-wing majority, Socialist Party membership immediately plummeted 
from 108,000 to 30,000. Many leaders of the IWW also migrated to the Communist parties 
— including not only Bill Haywood, but also Earl Browder and James P. Cannon, who 
would figure prominently in communist life for decades to come. The two new communist 
parties, in contrast, numbered 70,000, with 10,000 in the Communist Labor Party and 60,000 
in the American Communist Party — still comprising in all less than 0.1 percent of the adult 
population in the U.S. at that time. “Under normal conditions,” Murray points out, “the 
existence of a radical minority such as was present in 1919 would not have caused public 
alarm.”14 
But conditions were hardly normal, and patterns emerged from the beginning of that 
year that anticipate patterns of response that would recur from the late Thirties through the 
Cold War, and arguably again in response to terrorist threats and the polarization of political 
culture in Twenty-first Century America. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RED SCARE OF 1919: “NO COMPROMISE!” 
 Writing in 1955, at the height of what has come to be known as the McCarthy era, 
historian Robert K. Murray concludes in his “Study in National Hysteria” — which he 
diagnoses as a “national psychoneurosis” —that “in probing into the causes” of the Red 
Scare of 1919, a thoughtful person  
is likely to discover one factor which more than any other that 
acts as the trigger mechanism that throws the whole complex 
reaction of stimulus and response into operation. By mid-1919 
there was one such factor in the American scene which did act 
as the prime mover  … the position of organized labor. 
It was not simply the “position” of the union movement itself at the time, which was 
profoundly and explicitly conservative, that was brought to forefront of public attention; but 
the fact that the public’s  
concern over domestic radicalism centered around organized 
labor. It was generally agreed that if domestic radicalism would 
succeed at all it would succeed first within the ranks of the 
laboring man; hence the activities of labor were watched 
carefully as a barometer to the real extent of radicalism in the 
nation. 
In these days before industrial unionism was more widely accepted, Samuel 
Gompers’ American Federation of Labor (AFL), extremely conservative and organized along 
craft lines, dominated the culture of the union movement. Contrary to the fears driving public 
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response, Murray notes, “Organized labor tried from the beginning to entrench itself in the 
public mind as one of the nation’s chief bulwarks against the philosophy of bolshevism.”1  
 It is important to emphasize Murray’s conclusion before proceeding to the succession 
of events through which the national hysteria of the Rec Scare was built, because so much of 
what followed effectively diverted attention away from the conditions against which labor 
was organizing and also away from its fairly conventional aims in doing so: to secure 
improved pay and working conditions for the AFL’s worker-members. 
 Detailed treatment of the events of 1919 lies beyond the bounds of my current 
enterprise, and my summary draws upon several accounts of what happened: Murray’s 
especially painstaking reconstruction provides chilling detail of the astounding sequence of 
events of that year. He argues convincingly that 
the Great Red Scare … provides us with a concrete example of 
what happens in a democratic nation when faith and reason are 
supplanted with fear. … [I]t demonstrates clearly how easily 
the seeds of excessive hate and intolerance, which for the most 
part have remained dormant in modern American society, can 
suddenly develop into dangerous malignancies that spread with 
lightning rapidity through the whole social system.2 
Through Murray’s account, three primary forces emerged to terrorize and sway the nation in 
its first fever of anti-communism: a sensationalist press, ambitious conservative politicians, 
and self-interested captains of capitalist enterprise. Together these dominant forces incited 
citizen mobs and created a polity ready to authorize — even to demand — antidemocratic 
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cultural policies that chilled everything remaining of the progressive movement, at least until 
the next great national emergency arose: the Great Depression.3  
POSTWAR ANXIETY AND THE SEATTLE GENERAL STRIKE 
 As our story so far suggests, the original Armistice Day did not find the people of the 
United States fully at peace. Wartime patriotism had already produced mobs of citizens and 
soldiers bent on quashing opposition to the War’s transaction, along with federal raids 
against those “radical” organizations that were seen as violating wartime espionage and 
sedition acts or otherwise perceived as constituting “a clear and present danger” to the 
nation.4 The press and politicians further inflamed fear of Bolshevism following the Russian 
revolution. Postwar economic pressures quickly produced an unprecedented wave of strikes 
across in the United States, though “communists remained on the sidelines, scorning the 
reforms demanded by workers.”5 Nevertheless, those who saw advantage in stirring up 
trouble themselves targeted Bolsheviks (as they continued to be known through most of 
1919, since the two American communist parties were not yet formed) as the key 
troublemakers. 
 The volatile climate and the reaction it inspired were quickly established in January 
1919, just two months after the Armistice, as local unions planned February’s Seattle General 
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Simon and Schuster, 2005). 
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Strike.6 Wartime shipbuilding had distorted Seattle’s local economy, dislocating normal 
industry and causing housing shortages, extremely high prices, and general discontent, 
especially as the war emergency ended. The decision by 35,000 shipyard workers (in a city 
numbering only 315,000) to strike for higher wages and shorter hours on January 21st 
attracted support from the Seattle Central Labor Council, headed by aggressive leaders 
schooled in the Pacific Northwest’s unusually radical regional labor culture influenced by the 
IWW. The Committee of Fifteen who spearheaded planning convinced Council members that 
the General Strike would be the fastest way to secure shipyard workers’ demands: one 
hundred local unions decided to join the effort on February 6th, bringing the total number of 
strikers to 60,000.  
 Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson, who “had an intense hatred for the IWW … declared it 
was not a strike at all, but a Wobbly plan to establish a soviet and start the flame of 
revolution” in the United States. He publicized his account of what was happening in Seattle 
through a telegram to the New York Times: 
The sympathetic revolution was called in the exact manner as 
was the revolution in Petrograd. Labor tried to run everything. 
… This was an attempted revolution which they expected to 
spread all over the United States. It never got to first base, and 
it never will if the men in control will tell all traitors and 
anarchists that death will be their portion if they start anything. 
Law and order are supreme … Let the national government 
stop pandering and conciliating the men who talk against it. Let 
us clean up the United States of America. Let all men stand up 
and be counted. If the majority of the people in this country are 
disloyal and owe superior allegiance to some other country, or 
some other cause, now is the time to find it out. We refuse to 
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deal with these revolutionists. Unconditional surrender are 
[sic] our only terms.7 
The mayor’s theme was immediately taken up by shrill coverage in local papers, amplified 
even further in the national press. Seattle’s Union-Record, the Labor Council’s press outlet, 
tried to reassure the public that strikers would ensure that food, childcare, medical services, 
utilities, and other essentials would remain available throughout the planned General Strike; 
but the paper’s account also attempted to rouse enthusiasm for the effort by trumpeting, “We 
are undertaking the most tremendous move ever made by LABOR in this country … starting 
on a road that leads — NO ONE KNOWS WHERE!” Together, the mayor’s warnings and 
press coverage electrified the city, and citizens stripped the shelves of local stores, laying in 
supplies for the coming siege. 
 Riding in a car draped by a huge American flag, Mayor Hanson personally led 1,500 
federal troops into the city on the first day of the strike, to supplement an equal number of 
police. He demanded the strike’s end within twenty-four hours, declaring, “The time has 
come for the people in Seattle to show their Americanism. … The anarchists in this 
community shall not rule its affairs.” Olson’s demand was echoed by nonunion newspapers’ 
headlines demanding “NO COMPROMISE! … Now — Or EVER!” National press coverage 
omitted any discussion of the local conditions that had inspired the strike, featuring headlines 
that screamed “REDS DIRECTING SEATTLE STRIKE — TO TEST CHANCE FOR 
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REVOLUTION.” Anti-radical national political voices joined the condemnatory chorus, 
explicitly identifying the action as “Marxian” and “Bolshevik.” 
 Having joined the shipyard workers in a show of solidarity, Strike Committee 
members began to back away from the enterprise in the face of a clearly frightened non-
union citizenry and under extreme pressure to do so by their more conservative national AFL 
overlords. Union locals ended the strike within days, and the shipyard workers were defeated. 
Though their decisions primarily resulted from union regrets at what even such a friendly 
historian as Murray, writing decades later, bluntly sums up as “an extremely stupid mistake,” 
Mayor Hanson claimed and was given full credit for defeating the strikers: he soon 
abandoned his $7,500 per annum mayoral post, saying he was tired of his municipal 
responsibilities and was “going fishing.”8 He made quite a catch on this euphemistic fishing 
trip, publishing his book Americanism versus Bolshevism in January 1920, then immediately 
embarking on a national lecture tour that netted him $38,000 in just seven months’ time.  
 Interpretations of the General Strike by politicians and the press at the time refocused 
national attention away from the inevitable postwar economic and social disruptions so 
strongly evident in Seattle in favor of anti-radical anxiety. Employers clearly took advantage 
of redbaiting tactics to suppress union pressure. And the national press found a sensational 
theme to replace headlines previously focused on the war. All three groups would continue to 
emphasize it as they tracked and amplified the series of extraordinary events that unfolded 
through January 1920. 
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SUSPICIOUS AND SPECTACULAR EVENTS 
 What followed throughout 1919 and continued into January 1920 was truly 
extraordinary — what Murray calls “a series of highly suspicious and spectacular events.” In 
February, someone the press identified as a “Bolshevik agent” wounded French Premier 
Clemenceau, and the Secret Service arrested four Wobblies in New York for “an alleged 
world-wide plot to kill Allied and American officials.” In March, short-lived Communist 
regimes arose in Bavaria and Hungary, arousing fear amplified by press warnings of 
“Communist gains” in France and Italy; meanwhile, in Russia, the Third International was 
declared.  
In late April came alarming reports of the delivery of two letter bombs: one merely 
leaked out on Mayor Hanson’s desk while he was away on a speaking tour in Colorado, 
appearing as the “Savior of Seattle”; but the other one exploded away the hands of former 
Senator Thomas Hardwick’s maid as she opened his letter in his Atlanta home, also burning 
his wife, who was standing beside her. Reading news accounts about these incidents on April 
30th, a postal inspector in New York got suspicious and found sixteen more packages being 
held for insufficient postage; eighteen more were retrieved from the mail, bringing the total 
to thirty-six. That this happened just before May 1st strongly implied a radical-worker 
connection, though no evidence was ever found, nor charges made.9 
 While this last news was breaking in the nation’s dailies, numerous angry mobs in 
several major American cities, notably Boston, New York, and Cleveland, attacked peaceful 
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but enthusiastic May Day workers’ demonstrations. In one such incident among several in 
New York City that day, four hundred soldiers invaded an indoor reception with seven 
hundred guests. The hundreds arrested nationwide on May Day were all drawn from among 
the worker-demonstrators who were first attacked, not their anti-radical attackers; and the 
press focused on the need to “curb bolshevism,” with editors like those at the Salt Lake 
Tribune warning that “Free speech has been carried to the point where it is an unrestrained 
menace.” Core cultural values enshrined in the First Amendment were thus sublimated to 
perceived threats to security, and victims were targeted for arrest instead of their attackers. 
 The extended sequence of events that ensued seemed to climax on June 2nd, when ten 
explosions occurred within a single hour in eight U.S. cities, killing two. The most publicized 
of these explosions damaged the Washington, D.C., home of Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer. (Assistant secretary of the navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, who lived across the street, 
put in the first police call.) Again, no clues were found nor charges brought, though Palmer 
reacted by readying his department for a frontal assault on radicalism. He appointed William 
J. Flynn of the Secret Service as head of the new Bureau of Investigation and assigned 
assistant attorney general Francis A. Garvan to head up all work connected with “ferreting 
out Reds.”10  
 On August 1st, 24-year-old J. Edgar Hoover was named to head up the Bureau’s new 
General Intelligence Division (GID), using his experience in working with the Library of 
Congress’s card catalog to create an elaborate system of over 200,000 cards to inventory 
radical organizations, associations and publications and listing over 60,000 “dangerous 
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radicals.” The GID also became the Justice Department’s propaganda bureau, a role 
increasingly emphasized after the two new communist parties were formed in September. 
Press mailings summarizing these new parties’ manifestos were issued by the Bureau, 
warning editors to be on the lookout for targeted groups and radical leaders, and explicitly 
connecting the summer’s race riots and fall strikes with communism.11 
LEGISLATING HYSTERIA 
 The legislative branches of government were also swept up in the national obsession 
with antiradicalism. Responding to press demands that the government investigate American 
radicalism, the Senate established a Judiciary subcommittee the day after the Seattle General 
Strike was announced, headed up by Senator Lee S. Overman. The Overman committee met 
speedily, from February 11th through March 10th, before issuing its 1,200-page report, based 
on testimony from two dozen witness, two-thirds of whom were “violently anti-Bolshevik.” 
The report described the Russian revolution as having been “conducted largely by former 
East-Side New York Jews,” on the one hand, and asserted that “Lenin was merely a tool of 
the Germans,” on the other. The committee’s proceedings generated substantial alarmist 
press coverage, emphasizing the immediacy of the threat.12 
 Just days after the Overman report was released, the New York State Legislature 
appointed Senator Clayton R. Lusk to “investigate the scope, tendencies, and ramifications of 
… seditious activities.” Originally scheduled to start on July 1st, the timeline accelerated after 
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the May and June bombings, and the Lusk Committee launched its work on June 12th. On the 
day of its first meeting, with the Committee’s sponsorship and at the suggestion of its 
assistant counsel Archibald Stevenson (whose shrill private report on the Bolshevik threat 
had already received extensive media attention), New York State police and federal agents 
jointly raided the Russian Soviet Bureau, seizing two tons of propaganda material, all placed 
at the Committee’s disposal.13 The draconian nature of the raid was criticized in the press, 
but Senator Lusk got more attention than criticism as he declared that the raid had established 
there to be at least fifty radical publications in New York City alone, spreading Bolshevik 
doctrine to “at least 500,000 adherents.” Though the Committee’s hearings had only begun, 
Lusk and Newton expressed to the press their conclusion that a Bolshevik revolution was 
definitely in the making. Additional Committee-sanctioned raids targeted the Left Wing 
Socialists, the Rand School  (a Socialist and labor college with an enrollment of 6,000), and 
IWW headquarters. The Committee began steadily feeding materials from these raids to the 
press, stating that Rand in particular was the nerve center of national Bolshevik activity to 
bring about “a complete bolshevizing of American labor,” and “to propagandize the Negro.” 
Senator Lusk’s pronouncements were in turn taken up by a “rigorous campaign of employer 
groups, patriotic societies, the Klan and the Legion,” in full swing by the summer of 1919.14 
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THE RED SUMMER: RACE AND RADICALISM 
 The Lusk Committee’s fear of “propagandizing the Negro” reveals the deep 
connection between racism and anti-communism. The linkage forged by racists and anti-
communists between civil rights activism and radicalism in 1919 would last for well more 
than a generation, even after Cold War propaganda considerations ironically compelled the 
federal government to protect civil rights activists under attack by local authorities in the 
Fifties.  
 Black servicemen returning from the Great War were acutely aware of racist policies 
of segregation and continuing racist violence. Such violence exploded in late July 1919 in 
Chicago, where five days of white-against-black violence was sparked by the drowning death 
of an adolescent black boy. But this was neither the only, nor the first such incident that year: 
[R]ace riots … bloodied the streets of twenty-five towns and 
cities in the six-month period from April to early October 
1919. One of these riots was a massacre, with an undetermined 
number of people slaughtered in rural Arkansas, and it is 
impossible to know how many died in race riots that summer. 
No fewer than 120 were killed in the rural Arkansas riots alone. The NAACP collected a 
statement from an Arkansas man who had paid death benefits for 103 black Masons killed in 
the Pine City area alone, and that he knew of another seventy-three blacks who were not 
Masons who had also died, and “fully 250 white men.” Thirty-eight (twenty-three of whom 
were black) died in Chicago’s racial violence, in which at least 537 were injured (342 of 
whom were black).  
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Civil rights leaders and scholars call this period the “Red Summer” not because of 
communist influence, but due to of the violent bloodshed resulting from racial incidents.15 
W.E.B. Du Bois, then editor of the NAACP’s The Crisis, counted seventy-seven lynchings 
that year, resulting in the deaths of eleven returned soldiers and (unusually) one woman: of 
these, fourteen of these mobs’ victims were publicly burned — eleven while still alive. Du 
Bois called 1919 “the worst experience of mob law and race hate that the United States had 
seen since Reconstruction.”16 
 As the terrible summer of 1919 turned to fall, the anti-Bolshevik Red Scare carried 
lynching across the racial divide, when a citizen mob stormed a jail in Centralia, Washington. 
The local American Legion routed its Armistice Day parade directly past one of only two 
surviving IWW halls in Washington state, created a tinderbox situation that ignited into 
gunfire when the parade unaccountably reversed course and approached the hall a second 
time. Who shot first remains contested, but three Legionnaires were killed, and an angry mob 
set upon the Wobblies, capturing all but one. That one, pursued by a posse, used his last 
remaining bullets to kill a fourth Legionnaire, then was beaten unmercifully and deposited in 
the jail with his fellows. Later that night, another angry mob dragged him back out of his jail 
cell to administer a second horrifying beating before he was thrown into a car and brutally 
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emasculated. Begging to be shot, rather than face further torture, the victim was instead 
hanged twice, unsuccessfully, from a bridge outside of town, before the lynch mob finally 
succeeded in their third attempt. Only then did the crowd shower their victim’s dead body 
with fusillades of bullets, before leaving it hanging from the bridge for several days. After a 
final display of the distended and abused body in town, in view of the jailed Wobblies, these 
inmates were ordered finally to bury it.  
The Centralia coroner ultimately ruled this death a suicide. Mob violence and raids 
spurred by the Centralia violence exploded in cities and towns up and down the West Coast. 
The following spring, two of the surviving Wobblies were acquitted and one declared insane, 
but the remaining seven were convicted for the Legionnaires’ killings and sentenced to 
prison terms of twenty-five to forty years. 
By the time these convictions were delivered, mob violence against political radicals 
had virtually disappeared. This was not so with racist violence: the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 
was a shocking two-day assault against that city’s black community by mobs of whites 
inflamed by rumors that a black man had threatened a white female elevator attendant on 
May 31st. National Guardsmen called in to quell the violence joined the mobs on June 1st in 
killing more than 300 African Americans and looting and burning more than thirty-five 
blocks to the ground, destroying 1,265 African American homes along with hospitals, 
schools, churches, and 150 businesses, arresting and detaining 6,000 black Tulsans while 
most of the rest fled the city. Writing in the first official query into the incident in 2001, State 
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Rep. Don Ross wrote, "The mob torched the soul of the city, an evil from which neither 
whites nor blacks have fully recovered."17 
“NO STRIKE AGAINST THE PUBLIC SAFETY” 
 Meanwhile, strike actions had continued to sweep the nation throughout 1919, all 
predictably interpreted in keeping with the anti-Bolshevik fever still building. Especially 
pivotal was a strike by the Boston police. Tension had built throughout the year, with police 
upset over low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions. In May, a $200 raise 
brought annual wages to a maximum of $1,600.18 Still unsatisfied, the toothless policemen’s 
association — tellingly named the Boston Social Club — sought clearance to create a union 
affiliated with the conservative AFL. Police Commissioner (and former Republican mayor) 
Edwin U. Curtis rejected this proposal out of hand early that summer. Angry Social Club 
members decided to defy his order, and the Commissioner responded by charging nineteen 
leaders of the unionization drive for the violation: they were convicted in late August, but 
received only suspended sentences. Meanwhile, Democratic Mayor Andrew J. Peters 
appointed a Citizen’s Committee that recommended an independent union be allowed, but 
not affiliation with the AFL.  
Curtis ignored the Citizen’s Committee’s recommendation and rejected any form of 
unionization. Supported by the press, he revoked the leaders’ suspended sentences and 
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summarily fired them. The police swiftly voted by the nearly unanimous margin of 1,134–2 
to walk off the job the next night. 
 The press exploded with accusations that the announced strike was “Bolshevistic.” 
The simple demand of AFL-affiliated unionization and the concrete issues of wages and 
working conditions both disappeared amidst charges that police-union promoters were 
“agents of Lenin.” Banks and businesses quickly mustered voluntary security forces to 
supplement the 427 officers who ultimately decided not to strike. Though the City made no 
plans of its own, Curtis told the press, “I am ready for anything.” But as soon as 1,117 of the 
City’s 1,544 police stopped work on Tuesday evening, September 9th, widespread 
lawlessness and rioting broke out in several sections of the city, involving bands of hoodlums 
and excited citizens.  
Commissioner Curtis got the blessing of Republican governor Calvin Coolidge to 
refuse any negotiation and take charge of the city, urging volunteers to support the remnant 
of the police force not on strike. Meanwhile, Mayor Peters held out for arbitration and called 
in 5,000 soldiers to support the volunteer force in keeping order. Two people were killed in 
machine-gun fire from inexperienced troops the next night, and additional rioting claimed 
one more life.19  
 By Thursday, September 11th, however, the City had quieted, and no significant 
further violence occurred. That night the Central Labor Council voted down a general-strike 
proposal, abandoning its earlier commitment to support police unionization. In all, the cost to 
the City was afterwards estimated at only $34,000, with three dead. Nevertheless, the tone of 
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national press coverage was suggested by the Wall Street Journal’s warning that “Lenin and 
Trotsky are on their way,” and by this Pittsburgh headline: “BOSTON STRIKE CAUSES 
GRAVE WASHINGTON FEAR — Senators Think Effort to Sovietize the Government Is 
Started.”20 
 With Boston’s Mayor and Police Commissioner still at loggerheads, Governor 
Coolidge took personal charge of the city on September 11th. Samuel Gompers, just returned 
from a European labor summit, realized the great liability the Boston situation represented to 
the labor movement and urged the strikers to return to work with his promise of mediation. 
The police voted unanimously to accept his request, and Gompers appealed to Peters and 
Coolidge to reinstate the strikers. But a majority of the national press called for no 
compromise, and on September 13th, Curtis announced there would be none. Governor 
Coolidge notified Gompers that the police chief had his backing, saying, “There is no right to 
strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.”  
 Flooded by 70,000 letters of support from citizens throughout the nation, Coolidge 
was thus catapulted to national fame, becoming what Murray describes as “a Jack-the-Giant-
Killer, … another Ole Hanson … the new savior of the country.” He was elected Vice 
President of the United States the following year, and moved into the White House after 
President Warren G. Harding’s death in 1923.21 
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STRIKING STEEL AND COAL 
 Just two days into the Boston debacle, a national steel strike was called for September 
22nd, ignoring President Wilson’s Labor Day call for “bettering the relationship between 
capital and labor,” and on the appointed day, 275,000 steelworkers abandoned their posts. By 
the end of the week, the number of strikers had swollen to 365,000, signifying to alarmists 
what one newspaper described as “another experiment in the way of Bolshevizing American 
industry.” As in Seattle, even supporters fed this popular perception, flushed with excitement 
over the recent formation of the two new Communist parties: “HALF MILLION WORKERS 
IN OPEN CLASS WAR,” exclaimed the Cleveland Socialist News in excited solidarity.  
 The steel companies deployed labor spies, purposefully arousing racial and inter-
ethnic tensions between strikers and strikebreakers. They employed black strikebreakers 
wherever possible, to excite racist opposition as well anti-radical sentiment. Brutal riots 
broke out, but politicians and press blamed the strikers, saying the companies were simply 
defending their interests. State militias and federal troops were called in to quell violence, 
and raids were directed against organizations identified as radical. Many of these 
organizations exacerbated the situation with further strident calls to support the strikers by 
resisting the troops.  
 The President’s National Industrial Conference, announced on Labor Day as part of 
Wilson’s effort to allay industrial unrest, convened in Washington on October 6th — the same 
day martial law was declared in Gary, Indiana, due to strike-related violence — but this 
conference broke down after two weeks, when public representatives decided to side with 
capital against the unions’ October 21st resolution that the right of workers to bargain 
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collectively be recognized, and labor walked out in defeat the next day. By this time 
President Wilson himself had been laid low by a disabling stroke, described by some 
historians as also involving a nervous breakdown. 
Amidst widespread charges of Bolshevism, a Senate committee soon released a report 
that accused the steel companies of industrial despotism, but also concluded that the strike 
had been backed by “a considerable element of IWW’s, anarchists, revolutionists, and 
Russian Soviets … as a means of elevating themselves to power.” A preliminary summary 
report on the steel strike issued at the same time by the Interchurch World Movement 
reached opposite conclusions, minimizing radical influence within labor and squarely 
blaming the steel companies for the violence, attacking their use of strikebreakers, spies and 
“undercover men.” The latter report, not released in full until the fall of 1920, was much 
closer to the truth than the Senate’s report, in historian Robert Murray’s view of the evidence 
available in 1955. But with only 100,000 workers still out on strike, steel production had 
already returned to seventy percent of normal. With twenty lives and $112 million in wages 
already lost, dispirited union members voted to end their strike on January 8, 1920, without a 
single demand met nor concession made by the steel companies.22  
 Six weeks into the steel strike, on November 1st, a strike began among coal-industry 
workers. The United Mine Workers (UMW), under leadership of the staunchly anti-
communist John L. Lewis, signed a wartime contract barring any wage increases until the 
war’s end, but no later than April 1, 1920. Despite widespread celebration of the U.S.’s 
allies’ victory in November 1918, the coal operators insisted that the war had not officially 
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ended, since not all the treaties had been signed. They declared that no new agreement would 
be negotiated until the April 1920 deadline. Wildcat strikes broke out immediately upon this 
announcement, with miners calling for nationalization of the industry.23 The UMW declared 
its contract ended with the start of the November 1919 strike, emphasizing that their sole 
object was to secure a fair wage and proper working conditions: “No other issue is involved 
and there must be no attempt to inject into the strike any extraneous purposes.”  
Lewis’s declaration could hardly have received a clear reading, with the steel strike 
already at its peak and public condemnation of strikers so widespread. The press was already 
swirling with charges of Bolshevism in labor, and with winter fast approaching, even 
moderate editorial writers registered concern about the disruption of a vital commodity. More 
typical, though, was the immoderate tone struck by the New York Tribune: “Thousands of 
them, red-soaked in the doctrines of Bolshevism, clamor for the strike as a means of 
syndicalizing the coal mines … and even as starting a general revolution in America.”24 
 A clear reading was especially unlikely in light of the campaign already being 
orchestrated by the coal operators. Industry spokesman T.T. Brewster’s press statements 
asserted that the strike was being undertaken under direct orders and financing from Lenin 
and Trotsky. Super-patriotic and anti-labor groups had been encouraged weeks in advance to 
inundate Congress with letters begging that the “Bolshevik revolution” threatening the coal 
industry be stopped. Politicians took up the cry of “radicalism,” charging in the 
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Congressional Record that radical labor had “a stranglehold upon the throat of the country.” 
President Wilson condemned the planned strike from his sickbed as “a grave moral and legal 
wrong.”  
RIGHTS AND ASSOCIATIONS 
 In an undocumented bedside meeting between the President and Attorney General 
Palmer on October 29th, “the Chief Executive reactivated the wartime Field Administration” 
(by which the federal government had taken control of the coal industry, through the Lever 
Act of 191725) so quickly that by the next day — October 20th — Attorney General Palmer 
was able to secure a federal court order from an Indiana judge enjoining the UMW from any 
participation in the proposed coal miners’ strike.26 
 This is a fascinating and mysterious sequence in federal policymaking. Murray states 
that the ailing President, at the insistence of his wife and doctor, was “permitting most 
domestic matters to be settled directly by the department head concerned.”27 That the coal 
strike would not have been understood as lying primarily within the domain of the Secretary 
of Labor, but rather within that of the Attorney General, implies that the situation was seen 
(at least by Palmer and an acquiescent president) as primarily an issue of radical threat than 
one of workers’ rights. Murray’s account of the coal strike skips over this question, though 
Murray does raise similar concerns in regard to the Justice Department attempts to deport 
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alien radicals over Labor’s objections later on in his account of the Red Scare. Murray does 
footnote his narrative, however, to mention objections raised by Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing to Palmer’s process in these two days, after the October 30th injunction against the 
UMW was announced as a fait accompli at a meeting of the full Cabinet held later that day: 
this meeting had been purposely rescheduled for that date so as to allow full Cabinet 
discussion of alternative responses to the impending coal strike. 
 Palmer’s end run is especially significant since the Secretary of Labor then in office 
was William Bauchop Wilson, a coal miner’s son who had served as a UMW official from 
1900-08. During the war, Secretary Wilson’s rulings that the IWW should not be 
automatically implicated or held accountable for the opinions or actions of any of its radical 
members had revealed a stricter interpretation of the law than that asserted by Attorney 
General Palmer after he took office at the beginning of 1919. Assistant Secretary of Labor 
Louis Post later spelled out his superior’s stance, in considering Palmer’s roles in the 
climactic events yet to come:  
Secretary Wilson was of the opinion that no member of an 
organization can be held responsible for the lawless acts of 
other members without proof of actual participation or guilty 
knowledge, unless the lawless acts are authorized, in general 
terms at least, by the organic documents of the organization. 
On the question of law here, he was in complete accord with 
Attorney General Gregory, Mr. Palmer’s immediate 
predecessor, who had been faced by precisely the same 
question under the espionage law. The enforcement of … this 
War-time law having become especially difficult on account of 
conflicting sentiments in different parts of the country as to the 
“I.W.W.” and similar bodies, Attorney General Gregory, 
declaring and holding to the principle that “guilt is always 
personal,” determined upon a policy under which “no person 
should be prosecuted or interned solely by reason of his 
membership in any such organization.” … 
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 After Secretary Wilson had announced his conclusion 
as to the law of 1917, the forest-region influences of the Pacific 
Northwest thrust through Congress the comprehensive law of 
1918 … [t]he private object of [which] was to compel the 
Secretary of Labor to deport aliens for mere membership in the 
I.W.W. without any proof of individual culpability.28 
This, in an inversion of the usual relationship among executive agencies in regard to 
enforcing evidentiary standards and constitutional rights, it was the Department of Labor that 
tried to insist that the Attorney General respect the need for “proof of probable cause as a 
condition precedent to … arrest under the alien-expulsion laws.” These positions suggest the 
enmity that would have caused Palmer’s avoiding Cabinet discussion of federal intervention 
in the coal strike. 
 Benefiting from hindsight as he wrote in 1923, Post observed that the Labor 
Department’s lonely defense of this legal principle “made little difference,” especially to the 
Bureau of Investigation: 
The detective auxiliary to the Department of Justice soon 
turned this Constitutional prerequisite into a farcical formality. 
Nor in doing so was there much difficulty. The proceedings 
were on a scale so monstrous, the details were so numerous and 
so confused and confusing, the arrogance of the detectives was 
so aggressive, that the Department of Labor … became hardly 
more than a mechanical toy for the Department of Justice. … 
[which] thrust aside all respect for lawful process, and … the 
difficulty of maintaining regularity and preventing oppression 
rose to the level of the impossible.29 
The monstrous events to which Post refers followed very quickly: the Palmer Raids. 
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JUSTICE AND THE PALMER RAIDS 
 Public agency participation in the Red Scare of 1919 peaked in the closing months of 
1919, bridging briefly into the new year of 1920, with the Palmer Raids. This nationwide 
police action was named for the Attorney General, but conducted primarily under the 
direction of the Bureau of Investigation’s General Intelligence Division. In fact, it could be 
said that the raids’ greatest long-term impact was the rapid ascendance of its young director: 
[J. Edgar Hoover’s] rise through the ranks was unprecedented, 
sparked by his leadership during the Red Scare of 1919. 
Hoover managed the Palmer Raids with a boldness and 
efficiency that stunned both supporters and opponents, staging 
the largest mass arrest in U.S. history and sending 249 radicals 
on a one-way trip to the Soviet Union.30 
 Federal police action first exploded into the headlines on November 7th — the second 
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution — when agents raided the headquarters and outposts 
of the Union of Russian Workers, in what are seen as among the first notable U.S. 
government actions fueled by anti-communist sentiment. Through raids conducted in eleven 
U.S. cities, 250 officers and members of the Union were arrested from its New York City 
headquarters alone: 200 men and women were “badly beaten” according to the New York 
Times and corralled into ill-equipped Justice Department headquarters downtown. Only 
thirty-nine of those seized in this first round of federal raids were finally detained, but some 
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were held for extended periods of time: in Hartford, Connecticut, some arrested Union 
members were held for five months before their first hearing.31 
 It cannot be said that these raids arose entirely at the initiative of the Justice 
Department. In fact, the Department had shown some restraint after the rounding up of aliens 
in February’s Seattle General Strike, arousing some concern in the press that the government 
might be “beginning to over-do it,” as Duluth Herald editors put it; or as the New York 
Herald warned, “To-day it is the IWW; tomorrow the Socialist Party” — making a 
distinction that many mobs, politicians, and journalists would overlook as the year wore on. 
Ultimately, of the fifty-four Seattle radicals shipped east to Ellis Island, only three were 
actually deported. 
But escalating public animosity toward perceived radicals eventually resulted in 
charges that the Department was not doing its job.  On October 19th, the Senate passed a 
unanimous resolution demanding that the Attorney General “inform the Senate whether or 
not the Department of Justice has taken legal proceedings, and if not, why not … for the 
arrest and punishment … of the various persons within the United States … who have 
attempted to bring about the forcible overthrow of the Government …”32 With the president 
sidelined by poor health, Palmer was apparently spurred to take a more aggressive stance in 
the series of raids that began in November. 
Realizing that in view of the cessation of hostilities with 
Germany it would be extremely difficult to proceed against 
radical citizens on grounds of either espionage or sedition, he 
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centered his efforts on the apprehension of radical aliens who 
would be subject to the deportation provisions of the Alien 
Law of 1918. … most expedient anyway since [Hoover’s] 
General Intelligence Division estimated that about 90 per cent 
of all domestic radicals were aliens … 
 Federal raids were quickly followed by similar state and local agency action. New 
York State’s Lusk Committee ordered raids the following day by 700 police against seventy-
three “radical centers,” arresting more than 500 people in that state and seizing further tons of 
files and literature. Of these hundreds, only thirty-five detainees were charged — all for 
violation of state criminal anarchy statutes. But all others who were aliens were handed over 
to federal officials, and from among these, 246 were judged to be deportable, mostly 
members of the Union of Russian Workers.33 
 Palmer’s raids immediately added the attorney general to the pantheon of saviors 
sought by the anti-radical public, alongside Seattle Mayor Hanson and Massachusetts 
Governor Coolidge. The Senate that had questioned Palmer’s bona fides in October 
applauded his response one week after the first round of raids. With the President sidelines, 
apparently dreaming only of a League of Nations, Palmer was “running the administration,” 
“a lion-hearted man [who] had brought order out of chaos,” bringing every American “thrills 
of joy.”34 
 More thrills were quickly delivered as federal agents raided the Russian People’s 
House another week later, reporting afterwards to the press that its agents had discovered 
“material for 100 bombs” — “the most deadly and dangerous assortment of explosives and 
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bomb ingredients … seen in many years.” (Quite a statement, so soon after the Great War.) 
The press then swarmed around the December 21st send-off of the Buford, an army transport 
laden with 249 alien deportees. When the deportees’ panicking wives and children tried to 
break into Ellis Island, attempting to join their husbands and fathers in their journey to 
destinations yet unknown, this was framed by headlines screaming “REDS STORM FERRY 
GATES TO FREE PALS.”35 
 This fast sequence from raid to deportation (albeit of detainees from earlier actions) 
gave Palmer the strategy for another round: he convinced pliant underlings of Secretary 
Wilson and Assistant Secretary Post in the Department of Labor who dissented from their 
bosses’ stance, instead ascribing to Justice’s anti-radical convictions and willing to order 
warrants at Justice’s command. Labor employees issued three thousand such warrants on 
December 27th, focused resolutely on the alien membership of the two new American 
Communist parties.36 
The advantage, from the Attorney General’s perspective, was that the Labor 
Department’s process was not considered a criminal proceeding, nor was deportation 
considered a punishment. No judge nor jury was involved in what was considered an 
administrative procedure, and the accused were not considered protected under the 
Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws: rules could be changed administratively and 
applied to anyone then in custody. Labor solicitor John W. Abercrombie revised his 
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department’s appeal procedures to accommodate Justice’s preferences: the accused 
individual was not entitled to see the warrant upon which he or she had been arrested until 
such point in the ultimate, post-detention hearing when it had produced enough facts “to 
protect the Government’s interests” — and only then “may he be represented by counsel.”37 
 With the standard for legitimate arrest thus lowered, the way was open for the Justice 
department’s Bureau of Investigation agents to descend upon more than four thousand 
suspected radicals in thirty-three American cities, in twenty-three states, on January 2, 1920. 
Virtually every Communist organization in the country was 
affected; practically every leader of the movement, national or 
local, was put under arrest. Often such arrests were made 
without the formality of warrants as bureau agents entered 
bowling alleys, pool halls, cafés, club rooms, and even homes, 
and seized everyone in sight. Families were separated; 
prisoners were held incommunicado and deprived of their right 
to legal counsel. According to the plan, those suspected 
radicals who were American citizens were not detained by 
federal agents, but were turned over to state officials for 
prosecution under state syndicalist laws. All aliens, of course, 
were incarcerated by the federal authorities …38 
Historian Robert Murray records that “The January raids dazzled the public.” One of 
the Justice Department’s press releases touted the discovery of four “bombs” — iron balls 
exhibited briefly to the press in a pail of water (presumably for their “disarmament”), but 
which disappeared without explanation and were never used for evidence nor referred to in 
testimony in any subsequent official proceeding.39 No other evidence of criminal intentions 
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was found in these aggressive and widespread raids, but “Palmer … [w]ith the aid of Flynn 
and Hoover, … intensified the department’s propaganda campaign until it reached its peak in 
late January 1920,” featuring distribution of ready-to-print antiradical articles and cartoons, 
as “Palmer vigorously continued his drive to secure some kind of peacetime sedition 
legislation … to give the federal government the power necessary to deal with citizen 
radicals effectively.” Palmer declared the government would soon conduct “at least 2,720 
deportations.”40 
IN THE PINK 
 Surprisingly, however, the national hysteria quickly began to dissipate as the new 
year unfolded. As Murray wrote in 1955, “The month of January 1920 marked the height of 
the Great Red Scare. … Then, suddenly, the crest of hysteria passed.” Why? Murray credited 
a number of factors: 
There was the dawning realization, for one thing, that there 
never had been any real cause for alarm … and a growing 
number of citizens, among them certain prominent and 
respected public figures, became increasingly disgusted with 
the excesses of the Scare hysteria and worked actively to bring 
it to a halt. For another thing, there was the localization of 
bolshevism in Europe.  Moreover, many domestic radicals had 
been so scared by the aggressive action of those like Palmer 
that they had lapsed into a sort of pinkishness that made them 
less conspicuous to a Red-conscious public. 
But Murray credits even greater importance to the fact that the “temper of war was giving 
way to the temper of peace.” Americans relaxed into a fascination with “new fads, fashions 
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and gadgets — radio, cars, sports, Prohibition-inspired crime, beauty pageants, mah-jongg, 
and numerous other popular passions associated with the Roaring Twenties.41 
 More concretely, wrenches were soon thrown into Palmer’s imagined deportation 
machine by the Labor Department. In late January, Secretary Wilson reversed Abercrombie’s 
rule revision — though too late to benefit those swept up earlier in the month. On these 
cases, already in the works, Assistant Secretary Louis F. Post’s later intercession became 
especially controversial. In a memoir of the experience published in 1923, Post describes his 
responsibility in the Palmer raid cases: 
I was [for] approximately two months, Secretary of Labor by 
operation of law for all administrative functioning; and as the 
solicitor did not return after the Secretary’s return, I was all the 
time without an official substitute for any purpose … I was 
plunged into responsibility for the aftermath of this crusade to 
the full.42 
Post reached a “probable estimate” that “somewhat within 6,000 warrants of arrest” had been 
issued by Labor “at the insistence of Department of Justice detectives,” from which 
“somewhat within 4,000 arrests were made”: “about 3,000 were cancelled after hearings, 
nearly if not quite all by myself.” Even so, Post ordered “more than 500” deportations.43 
 For his action, the House of Representatives impeached Post in April 1920. The 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, chaired by Albert Johnson of 
Washington state (later chief author of the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 and the 
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Immigration Act of 1924), accused Post of unlawfully undoing lawfully taken actions by his 
department. The House impeachment stirred what Post described as a “cyclone of newspaper 
misrepresentation,” but one that quickly cooled as the facts came to light and moderate 
voices, expressing concern at the extra-legal measures being used, began to be heard.44 In 
May, Post’s “forthrightness, wit, and intelligence … completely confounded his accusers” in 
his own defense before the House Committee, which abruptly dropped its impeachment 
effort. Labor Secretary Lewis declared that month that membership in the Communist Labor 
Party would not be considered a deportable defense. A federal court ruled in June to the same 
effect in Colyer et al v. Skeffington, but with much broader effect.45 
 Other events in 1920 focused greater attention on the damage being done to public 
institutions by Red Scare tactics. The Supreme Court ruled out evidence based on the illegal 
seizure of papers (Silverthorne v. U.S) in late January. Widespread public condemnation 
followed when the New York state legislature refused for the third time to seat popularly 
elected assemblymen belonging to the Socialist Party, which in this iteration began to be 
widely seen as a blow of the American principle of representative government: the thus-
disenfranchised citizens of their districts had, after all, confirmed their choice in three 
elections. At the same time, prominent citizens (Justice Holmes, Samuel Gompers, and 
leading clergy) and influential journals expressed opposition to newly proposed peacetime 
sedition laws, none of which were ever enacted.46 
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 The key event, however, was perhaps a non-event. Late in April, Attorney General 
Palmer issued stern warnings to state and local authorities that violent May Day agitation was 
being planned nationwide, Palmer’s warning prompted emergency mobilization of police 
forces and the military, but “not a single disturbance occurred in the entire nation.” Though 
claiming Justice’s warnings had helped head off such incidents, Palmer was ridiculed by the 
press and immediately fell under Congressional scrutiny, thus killing his presidential 
ambitions, even as Governor Coolidge’s star continued to rise. 
The most damaging bombing of the era actually took place months later — in 
September 1920, on Wall Street. Though Palmer and Flynn rushed to New York to proclaim 
that this was part of gigantic plot to overthrow capitalism, the press again merely ridiculed 
the notion. Clearly, the national hysteria had calmed. Senator Warren G. Harding, that fall’s 
victorious presidential candidate, carrying Coolidge on his coattails, called on this occasion 
for “not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy  … not surgery but serenity.” 
Ultimately, Murray concluded, “It was [growing] indifference that was the real key to the 
rapid decline in Red Scare hysteria.”47 
The Red Scare died down, but left a political landscape significantly changed as a 
result, as has been true at a number of paradigm-shifting historical moments in U.S. history. 
The pumped-up prosperity of Twenties and the minuscule political influence wielded by 
socialist parties after the Red Scare of 1919 relegated this concern to the bumper seat of the 
American political roadster — until the 1929 market crash and the ensuing Great Depression 
brought the entire nation more in line with the rest of the industrialized world.
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CHAPTER 5 
ENTR’ACTE: CULTURAL POLICY IN THE ROARING TWENTIES 
The Twenties are remembered as a roaring celebration of capitalism in the States. 
Though Prohibition had taken effect, it is a decade remembered more for flappers, 
speakeasies, and police agencies looking the other way than as a time of sober restraint. Anti-
communism receded from the foreground during this period, and so cannot be said the 
primary driver of policy formation. In this sense, it represents the first of two entr’actes in 
our dramatic story. 
Nevertheless, patterns important to anti-communism’s impact on U.S. cultural policy 
were established during this time in four realms: immigration policy; mass media — 
primarily comprising radio and film at the time; private philanthropy as the foundation for 
work undertaken for motives other than profit-making; and an emphasis upon private 
interests in international relations and foreign policy. Immigration carried the closest link 
with the Red Scare’s fears of alien influence. In mass media, the organization and drive of 
corporate interests elevated them above the early efforts of idealistic amateurs and numerous 
public-sector players. Private philanthropy emerged out of the federal income tax, originally 
seen (before World War I effectively ended the Progressive era) as a way to recoup some 
portion of enormous profits for the public good. And official isolationism left the foreign 
policy field open for exploration by wealthy American interests operating abroad. Patterns 
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set during Twenties in each of these realms remained in force for decades — in some 
respects, to this day. 
IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 
The anti-alien feeling generated during the Red Scare finally led to legislative action 
that had been discussed for decades without resolution, as “the United States loudly 
proclaimed to the world its determination to cease being a nation of immigrants.” At first — 
and during the Red Scare itself — immigration stood at a standstill: in 1919, most ships 
bound for America were loaded with returning troops, not immigrants; and for a time, over 
half as many foreign-born workers left the U.S. as arrived: having landed here before the 
War’s outbreak, they found themselves stranded in a country that was not to their liking. But 
in 1920, a quarter-million arrived from Europe, and in 1921, the number leaped to 652,364. 
While still substantially lower that the record level of 1.3 million who arrived in the peak 
immigration year of 1907, such alarmists as the immigration commissioner in New York 
warned that another ten-million were waiting to embark. Inflaming the spirit of alien fear so 
recently manifest in mob violence, the head of the U.S. consular service lent a frightening 
face to this abstract exaggeration, warning that these included rafts of Polish Jews who were 
“filthy, un-American, and often dangerous in their habits.” It was in defensive response to 
this perceived threat that legislative action in the Twenties would reduce the flow of 
immigrants into the United States to only 158,598 by 1929 — “merely one-seventh of the 
1907 level and a marginal one-tenth of 1 percent of America’s continental population. … 
[And] Asian immigration was in effect extinguished altogether…” This required the 
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institution of state apparatus within the U.S. to control movement across borders as well as 
measures in embassies and consulates abroad to discourage emigrants from leaving their 
countries of origin in the first place.1 
Popular opposition to immigration was heightened in the summer of 1920 by the first 
serious economic recession since the 1890s, which lasted through the spring of 1922. 
Representative Albert Johnson introduced the first “emergency” bill at the end of 1920.  
Legislation emerged from conference later that winter as the first comprehensive federal 
limitation on immigration based on national origin — capping permissible levels to five 
percent of foreign-born national enumerated in the 1910 census. A more severe measure — 
the Immigration Act of 1924 —reduced immigration levels even further, to two percent of 
the even-earlier 1890 census, before “undesirable” Eastern and Southern European 
nationalities began arriving in numbers. This regime remained in effect for four decades, 
until the Sixties.2 
Even as immigration declined, anti-immigrant feeling fed popular frenzy around the 
federal case brought against Sacco and Vanzetti, leading to their execution in 1927. And 
patriotic feeling such as that inflamed by the Red Scare showed up in resurgent popular 
movements led by prominent “civic” organizations whose charters enshrined many of the 
values epitomized by Red Scare mobs and official state action: prominent among them in the 
early Twenties was the Ku Klux Klan, whose own estimates of membership peaked in 1924 
                                                
1 Aristide R. Zilberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America 
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at more than four million, before the organization’s outrageous rhetoric and actions caused 
this number to shrivel to just 45,000 by 1930.3 
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 
 The Twenties brought the explosion of America’s first true mass media into public 
life, the commercial film industry and radio. Not since Gutenberg’s press had technology 
enabled the amplification and extension of particular voices and versions of reality and 
phantasm to such an extent. Unlike publishing, which required literacy, these new media of 
film and radio reached everyone with a ticket or a receiver. 
 This is not the place for an extensive history of film, but its exploding popularity in 
the Twenties is an important backdrop to our story for three primary reasons. First, audiences 
abandoned vaudeville and other live entertainment in favor of the movies, throwing many 
performing artists into a state of industrial unemployment, even before the Great Depression 
hit. This produced a considerable pool of unemployed professional workers that would 
become significant when New Deal programs to keep U.S. talent alive came forward in 
themed-Thirties. 
Second, Hollywood’s obsession with boffo box office made Hollywood honchos 
hypersensitive to anything that might alienate elements of the mass market — notably 
controversial politics or anything else that might be read as “un-American.” Emerging from 
Victorian assumptions that live theater was questionable and risqué, respectable commercial 
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interests avoided film in its early days; but the cinema’s emergence in an era of 
unprecedented immigration from Eastern Europe offered ripe commercial opportunities for 
outsiders to the American mainstream — especially a core group of Jewish 
entrepreneurs, who carried moving-image media out of sideshows and nickelodeons and into 
theaters. A critical mass of these entrepreneurs from the urban east colonized Hollywood and 
developed the industry along lines now familiar to audiences and competing national 
industries all over the world. The creation of production, distribution, and audiences for film 
was established almost entirely outside the public sector, and so came to be treated largely as 
elements of commercial policy.4 
And third, the film industry’s hunger for global markets made it the primary agent of 
what came to be called “American cultural imperialism.” The U.S. film industry — 
“Hollywood” — would play a unique role in global cultural politics after World War II, 
mainly as an opponent to any measures taken by foreign governments to shore up their own 
domestic film industries against the flood of cheap American product. It would also play a 
central part in Cold War propaganda campaigns, trimming its sails to suit the anti-communist 
wind blowing in the late Forties and Fifties. To this we will return. 
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 Broadcasting presented a special case, as it required the use of a common resource: 
the airwaves. Their unfettered use caused problems from the earliest days of radio. The Radio 
Act of 1912 was passed at the urging of the Department of the Navy, concerned with 
interference in its use of broadcast channels by growing numbers of amateur (or “ham”) 
operators, of which there were over a thousand even before World War I. By 1920, some 
15,000 amateur broadcasters were active, transmitting to a quarter-million receivers. These 
broadcasters bore little similarity to radio stations that would soon emerge. Fifteen times as 
many amateurs were transmitting as any other type of “broadcast entity”: these others 
included colleges and universities, often operating with state subsidy (over seventy such 
stations had been licensed by 1923); and municipalities had also entered the field, since radio 
was still imagined as a democratizing element in American life — multiplying and extending 
opportunities for information and entertainment, promoting mutual understanding among 
diverse regional and local cultures, and strengthening the social fabric.5 
 A confused flurry of national legislation was proposed during the 67th Congress 
(1921-23) — some twenty bills in all, attempting to tame the chaotic development of radio in 
its early days, including some proposing to nationalize radio development. But none of these 
passed, leaving the field open for the strongest commercial endeavors to prevail. Concerned 
about this vacuum, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover convened four national radio 
conferences from 1922-25 in an effort to focus the picture. After the second conference, in 
1923, Hoover proposed a three-tier hierarchy of stations: “clear-channel” stations with 
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maximum power and reach; mid-size regionals; and local stations. An important precedent 
was set when WEAF, an RCA station from New York was deemed “clear-channel,” while 
educational stations as a class were labeled secondary, “special-interest” entities.6 
Commercial interests at first assumed that radio equipment was where money could 
be made, not programming: the medium was still understood mainly a means of transmitting 
messages. Some measure of standardization was needed, which led to formation of the Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA) in 1919, a joint initiative of General Electric and 
Westinghouse (which manufactured receivers) and AT&T (which produced transmitters), 
underpinned by their agreements to share patents. Over time, the RCA family of corporations 
fell into jealous concern over AT&T’s power, as the provider of telephone links among 
commercial stations. AT&T’s early forays into business “sponsorship” of programs (not yet 
involving the concept of selling of time for advertising) triggered threats of Fair Trade 
Commission hearings. This was headed off by AT&T’s agreement to divest itself of WEAF 
and WCAP (a Washington, DC station) and by the formation of a new National Broadcast 
Corporation (NBC) to link stations owned by RCA, GE and Westinghouse, launched in 1926. 
CBS followed one year later, as did a piece of emergency, one-year legislation — the 
Radio Act of 1927 — that was renewed the following year. The Federal Radio Commission 
called into being by the Act issued General Order No. 40, allocating the national spectrum in 
a pattern worked out with the networks and the National Association of Radio Broadcasters, 
an advocate of commercial broadcasters established in 1922. Forty of the ninety available 
channels went to 50,000-watt broadcasters, while the remaining 600 stations shared the other 
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fifty, operating under low-power restrictions that kept them regional or local in reach. The 
Commission declared in 1929 that “There is no room in the broadcast band for every school 
of thought … each to have its own … mouthpiece in the ether.” By that time, advertising had 
also become the very foundation of radio economics, led by the aggressive pro-advertising 
policies of CBS’s president William Paley — though ads were banned from 7-11 p.m., now 
called “prime time,” but then still considered “inviolate family hours.” By 1933, NBC 
followed the CBS model and removed its bar against direct advertising. 
As public-media historian Ralph Engelman sums up this history, 
The radio trust was thus able to co-opt the amateur vision of 
how radio should be used, and to use the airwaves for 
commercial ends, … to promote cultural homogeneity, to 
…screen out diversity …, and to advance … consumer 
capitalism.7 
 Though the New Deal seemed to offer some hope for radio reform, the 
Communications Act of 1934 that created the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
won Roosevelt’s support contained no guarantees for educational or other noncommercial 
programming, which was reduced after 1934. In contract to the British model that in 1927 
foregrounded broadcasting in the public interest through the public British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC, financed by license fees from radio owners), Engelman concludes, “the 
state’s role in the American broadcasting system was to engage in regulation limited to 
ensuring an orderly marketplace” driven by commercial interests. The 1934 legislation 
“remains the fundamental law of American telecommunications,” he argues: “Never again 
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would a fundamental restructuring of American broadcasting be seriously considered by a 
government body.”8 
THE PRIMACY OF PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
U.S. government economics established a centerpiece of American cultural policy 
that was also not directly related to anti-communism, though in a sense it realized its ideal: 
enhancing private-sector discretion over public-sector action. Continuously since the tax-
deductibility of charitable contributions was incorporated into the federal income tax in 1917, 
public policy has effectively encouraged citizens with disposable income to contribute to tax-
exempt, not-for-profit organizations by making these contributions tax-deductible. This 
constitutes a kind of short-circuit on the public purse: each deduction from taxable income 
costs the federal government revenues it might otherwise have collected. The Congressional 
Budget Office estimate of federal revenues effectively diverted through personal 
philanthropy in 2006 was $40.9 billion. 
The donor’s tax savings reflect the “marginal rate” applied to upper echelons of 
income. When marginal rates have been set at 90 percent, a top-earner’s contribution of $1 
“cost” the donor just a dime, for the full dollar’s worth of personal appreciation and prestige 
associated with patronage. When top-earners’ rates drop to 28 percent — as they did under 
presidents Reagan and Bush from 1988-91 — each dollar represents an effective outlay of 72 
cents, arguably reducing incentive, though the windfall savings for upper-echelon earners of 
lower tax rates render the question largely moot for these richest Americans. 
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Except for a brief time in the mid-Eighties, the tax benefits of charitable donations 
have applied only to those taxpayers itemizing deductions, rather than taking the standard 
deduction (which was introduced during World War II), effectively focusing the benefit on 
wealthier citizens. People reporting incomes of at least $100,000 in 2008, fewer than 13 
percent of those filing tax returns, accounted for about 58 percent of taxpayers’ charitable 
giving.9 
For most of the history of the income tax, marginal tax rates have been quite high and 
applied only to those whose income was also quite high: in 1917, the top rate was 67 percent, 
for those earning astronomical incomes of more than $42 million; the top tax rate stood at 91 
percent from 1946-1963, for incomes ranging from $1.7–3 million or more, then was lowered 
to 70 percent from 1965-1981. The Reagan administration cut top tax rates to 50 percent in 
1982, then to 28 percent in 1988, simultaneously reducing the thresholds beyond which these 
rates would apply to $203,661 and $57,738 respectively, releasing those in the upper 
echelons of income from any greater obligation than those making much less, and reducing 
the practical benefit of philanthropic giving. Top rates have ranged from 31–39.6 percent 
since 1991, with income thresholds since 1993 of around $400,000.10 
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For the nonprofit cultural sector, emphasizing private donations privileges those 
institutions, artists and art forms favored by wealthier individuals. Apart from tax incentives, 
underwriting major arts institutions, universities, and philanthropies makes donors visible 
within their own society as well as to the general public, especially when their names are 
literally carved into their walls. Non-elite institutions, and those which serve lower-income 
communities, whose members often lack discretionary income, tend not to benefit from these 
policies. People’s contribution patterns also differ significantly, depending upon income: 
[A]mong households with AGI below $100,000, 67 percent of 
giving was directed toward religious organizations, and only 7 
percent went to institutions that focus on health, education, or 
the arts … Among households that reported at least $1 million 
in income, the situation was reversed: Just 17 percent of 
donations were made to religious organizations, and 65 percent 
were made to support health-, education-, or arts-related 
activities. 11 
Emphasizing private philanthropy in cultural policy thus privileges the interests, tastes, and 
connections of the wealthier element of society. 
Until the 1960s, the Great Depression was the only time when substantial, outright 
federal investments were made in cultural work. Policymakers considered the possibility of 
channeling public funds through existing cultural institutions, but rejected this option, Their 
rationale was that these institutions were, by definition, already taken care of by their private 
patrons, and that public funding should be directed toward those not involved nor served by 
these institutions. The public impact resulting from this policy was what drew the attention of 
the new House Committee on Un-American Activities in the first place. Postwar cultural 
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support would follow a radically different course — one in which the public sector would 
play roles largely subsidiary to private philanthropy. 
PRIVATE INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 American anti-communism was crucially involved with ideas about international 
relations, as we will consider the hectic third act of our anti-communist drama — the Forties 
and Fifties. The entr’acte of the Twenties set a tone that would explode on the main stage on 
anti-communism, however. International tourism, largely comprising the growing aggregate 
of trips taken by upper-income Americans, played the main part here. 
Improvements in steam-powered ships and rising discretionary 
income for upper- and middle-class Americans helped boost 
travel to Europe from 35,000 trips in 1870 to … a peak [of] 
359,000 trips in 1930. 
These private passages took on some public dimension — at least for the citizenry of France 
— when at the American Legion’s initiative in 1927 “thousands of World War I veterans 
descended on Paris for a pilgrimage that became famous for its raucous [Prohibition era] 
drinking and patriotic speeches.” Club life featured prominently in the significant Jazz Age 
expatriate community that sprang up there, as “the U.S. dollar rode high over European 
currencies weakened by World War I,” making American tourists a ripe plum for the French 
tourist industry — though also a target, as when a right-wing mob attacked a “Paris By 
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Night” entourage. Presumably more sober were the growing number of U.S. students taking 
advantage of the junior-year-abroad programs, which proliferated in the Twenties.12 
 Civic idealism also became a force in America’s private army of foreign diplomacy. 
The U.S.-based International Association of Rotary Clubs convened its first meeting abroad 
in Edinburgh in 1921, enthusiastically rechristening itself as Rotary International. Six years 
later, May 1927, four thousand U.S and Canadian Rotarians boarded six Cunard ocean liners 
in as “the largest [crossing] … since the launch of the American Expeditionary Force in 
1917.” They were joined by three thousand more at their June landing in Antwerp to make 
the symbolic return to Ostend, Belgium, a “chief victim of the Great War.”  Historian 
Victoria de Grazia offers such an excellent account of how incursions of civic organizations 
like Rotary International, corporate advertising, Hollywood, and U.S. chain stores, 
supermarkets and consumerism created an Irresistible Empire outside the bounds and 
officially beyond the reach of formal State Department apparatus.13 
 Not all Americans abroad had simple tourism or commerce as their motives. One 
such American bears special mention: Father Edmund Walsh, S.J., who ascended (like E. 
Edgar Hoover, at a tender age) to the directorship of Georgetown University’s new School of 
Foreign Service in 1918 became one of the most dedicated U.S. anti-communists. The SFS 
claimed to be the first academic program for the education of diplomats (though barely, as 
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several others started around the same time), inspired in part by the wish to establish 
Georgetown’s standing in the nation’s capital despite the widespread anti-Catholic sentiment 
prevalent at the time. Never schooled in politics or international relations, Father Walsh was 
immediately granted an honorary doctorate by Georgetown, as its customs required one for 
appointments at this level. From then on, Walsh routinely listed this Ph.D. behind his Jesuit 
suffix.14 
Walsh’s standing was enhanced by a 1922 assignment from the Vatican to examine 
the need for a special relief mission to the USSR, which he then returned to head up in 1923. 
He first set foot on Soviet soil just one month after the impoverished and famine-ravaged 
state had announced confiscation of all church property, allowing Father Walsh to witness 
the specter of troops stripping Russia’s churches of their possessions, hauling them off by the 
wagonload. Church confiscations were soon followed by the arrest and trial of Orthodox 
bishops, priests, and laity. Twenty-eight bishops and over 1,200 priests were murdered or 
executed in 1922 alone. Antireligious processions popped up, lampooning Christian liturgies, 
and plays were staged that attacked religion’s place in Russian life. (28) Though not under 
the Vatican’s authority, the fate of so many Orthodox adherents brought Walsh to “fear for 
the consequences in the economic, the political, the social, the religious, educational orders 
— of [the] entire world,” making Soviet communism “the most reactionary and savage 
                                                
14 Patrick McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics of 
American Anticommunism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 28 and 51-52. 
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school of thought known to history … a reign of terror that makes the French Revolution 
insignificant.”15 
Walsh’s initial characterization of the Soviet’s regime’s official stance vis-à-vis 
religion anticipated his later positions, in the darkest hours of Stalin’s dictatorship, but it was 
not an accurate depiction of official Soviet policy in the early Twenties, when he was there.  
The “Decree of Separation of Church from State and School from Church,” issued as a 
departure from the former Tsarist regime in 1918, had staked out a position no more radical 
that that established by the U.S. Constitution — privatizing, not prohibiting, religious 
observance.16 
 Quickly enough, however, Walsh’s worst fears were confirmed by measures taken in 
response to Roman Catholic resistance. By the end of 1922, Russian troops closed all of 
Petrograd’s and three of Moscow’s Catholic churches, striking at the center of the Vatican’s 
ecclesiastical authority in Russia. In 1923, a number of Catholic leaders were tried for 
obstructing the prior year’s confiscation and one — Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz — 
was summarily executed. Walsh wrote the Vatican, “The issue here is clear enough; it is 
atheism against Christianity.”17 
 Walsh returned to the U.S. as an active public critic of communism, not only through 
his offices as director of the School of Foreign Service, but in a wider public arena:  he 
delivered some 1,500 public lectures from 1924-52, visiting every state of the Union. He 
                                                
15 McNamara, 29. 
16 McNamara, 28. 
17 McNamara, 36. 
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lectured regularly at various military educational institutions and, from 1925-42, offered an 
annual public lecture series called the “Washington 10,” attracting an influential public in the 
nation’s capital. After the U.S. entered World War II, Walsh trained military and intelligence 
personnel in the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which brought 1,800 ASTP 
members to the Georgetown campus. Geopolitics thereafter became the centerpiece of 
Walsh’s curriculum.18 
 Father Walsh reappears in our story, at a legendary 1950 dinner that inspired Senator 
Joe McCarthy’s hallmark campaign of domestic anti-communism. But already in the 
Twenties, we find in this one American tourist an important architect and promoter of the 
ideology that drove domestic and international anti-communism for much of the twentieth 
century.19 
*    *    *    *    * 
What went up in the Roaring Twenties was apparently destined to come down, quite 
unhappily, in the Crash of 1929. The Great Depression shook the nation’s faith in unbridled 
capitalism, altering our cultural consensus for decades to come. Marxist thought suddenly 
came to the fore as a tool for understanding the dynamics that had not only brought 
capitalism to its knees, but also into disrepute as a simple prescription for securing the 
welfare of the nation.
                                                
18 McNamara, 54 and 113-114. 
19 McNamara, 159. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A NEW DEAL IN FEDERAL CULTURAL POLICY 
 The onset of the Great Depression and the arrival of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal offer a picture of federal cultural policy that for a limited time 
showcased the principal values of cultural democracy in the United States. 
Widespread perceptions of the “failure of capitalism,” and the peculiar reticence and 
ineptitude of the Hoover administration in meeting the challenge it represented, laid the 
foundation for Roosevelt’s 1932 election and the flotilla of experimental programs his new 
administration launched. FDR described the new political consensus that swept him into 
office in a 1932 campaign speech before San Francisco’s Commonwealth Club: 
[T]oday … equality of opportunity as we have known it no 
longer exists. … We are now providing a drab living for our 
own people. … [T]his calls for a re-appraisal of values. … 
Every man has a right to life; … a right to make a comfortable 
living. … [O]ur industrial and agricultural mechanism can 
produce enough and to spare. Our government … owes to 
every one an avenue to possess himself of a portion of that 
plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work. … [W]e 
must do so, lest a rising tide of misery engendered by our 
common failure, engulf us all. … [I]n the strength of great 
hope we must all shoulder our common load. 
Belief was suddenly widespread that the 600 large combines that owned two-thirds of the 
nation’s wealth had not been operating in the public interest and that a “new deal” was 
needed.1 Many American citizens and leading intellectuals turned to Marxist thought and 
                                                
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt,  “Every Man Has a Right to Life” in Howard Zinn, ed., New Deal 
Thought, The American Heritage Series (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), 48-52. 
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other political philosophies calling for new ways of regulating public affairs in order to 
achieve democratic ends. All were too easily cast as “radical,” if not Bolshevist, as they had 
been in the wake of the Great War. 
 The economically privileged new president was no socialist ideologue. Rather, the 
New Deal comprised a series of more or less successful experiments in public action — some 
notably failed and limited — that placed FDR more solidly in the tradition of American 
pragmatism. Still, the New Deal years to this day represent the high-water mark of socialist 
ideas of economic democracy upon the political thought of the general American population 
in the twentieth century. 
 As with so many moments of flooding in American political thought — the victory of 
suffragists over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on behalf of American women, 
for instance, the flood of racist violence around the turn of the century that led to Jim Crow 
policies of segregation, and the anti-radical violence of the Red Scare of 1919 — the New 
Deal shifted the political consensus in lasting ways. The United States reopened its eyes to 
values beyond capitalism: the wish to provide social security for Twentieth Century 
Americans, for example, lay beyond the means of simple market mechanisms. FDR’s stirring 
invocations that we not succumb to “the fear of fear itself” — effectively urging responses 
opposite to those that had incited the Red Scare — empowered civic idealism in meeting the 
challenges laid bare by the Depression. 
 The Roosevelt administration attempted many new initiatives from 1933 through the 
1938 Congressional mid-term elections, when anti–New Deal political forces came to the 
fore.  Desperate economic straits cleared the way for massive new programs of public 
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spending and regulation in these five years, the first round winning Congressional approval 
in the “Hundred Days” from March through June of 1933. These included the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act (FERA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA), followed in 
November by the Civil Works Administration (CWA), which employed millions of 
Americans then on the relief rolls in a wide variety of public-works and community-service 
projects. Among these public-service workers were thousands of artists. And among the 
idealists heading up these initiatives stood the creators of the New Deal’s cultural programs.2 
NEW DEAL CULTURE & THE BIRTH OF HUAC 
 The New Deal’s federal cultural projects remain unique in U.S. history. In the decade 
following Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, substantial public investments 
were made to employ artists in public projects conceived in the spirit of cultural democracy, 
embodying each primary aspect of this approach to cultural policymaking: 
1. They focused on the broadest possible audiences — the entire American public, not 
only an elite — incorporating popular and new forms of cultural creation and often 
addressing subjects of wide public interest. 
2. They focused on stimulating broad, inclusive, and active participation in community 
cultural life. 
                                                
2 Zinn, ed., New Deal Thought, xxxix. For more information on FERA, PWA and CWA arts 
projects, see Belisario R. Contreras, Tradition and Innovation in New Deal Art (Cranbury, 
NJ: Associated University Presses, 1983), 29-31. 
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3. They sought to include the widest possible diversity in American culture, at the same 
time consciously striving to identify and present art forms characteristic of the United 
States. 
4. And in addressing these goals, they sought to encourage decentralization of decision-
making, to accommodate regionalism and localism within broad national cultural 
aims.3 
 Among the earliest and longest-lasting of New Deal cultural programs was the 
Section of Painting & Sculpture (after 1938, simply the Section of Fine Arts) created within 
the Department of the Treasury in 1934.4 The “Treasury Section,” as it came to be known, 
commissioned many of the best-known works of public art from the Depression era, all in 
federal buildings, including the widely known Post Office murals. Treasury Section 
commissions were drawn from a fund comprising the one percent of construction costs 
already earmarked for the “embellishment” of federal buildings. Instead of focusing entirely 
on marble and other lavish construction materials, as federal administrators had previously 
done, artists were commissioned to create murals, sculpture, and other works of art. Unlike 
other New Deal programs, these artists did not have to be hired from relief rolls. Treasury 
Section director Edward Bruce instead oversaw a system that emphasized the quality of the 
                                                
3 Girard, 17-19, 129-131, 134-136, and 139-140. 
4 After 1940, this program was transferred to the Public Buildings Administration of the 
Federal Works Agency before it quietly ended in 1943, in the midst of World War II. 
  74 
artists’ work and the appropriateness of the proposed artwork for public commission and 
display.5 
 The largest, most visible, and best known of the New Deal cultural programs — and 
the most controversial politically — was not established until what became known as the 
“Second New Deal.” At this stage, earlier relief programs (FERA, PWA, and CWA) were 
replaced by the consolidated Works Progress Administration (WPA), established by 
Congress in April 1935 to provide public-service employment to millions still on the relief 
rolls. 
 The lion’s share of WPA funding was administered and disbursed through state and 
local governments, the main exception being Federal Project Number One — popularly 
known as “Federal One” — which comprised the Federal Art Project, the Federal Music 
Project, the Federal Theatre Project, and the Federal Writers’ Project, along with the smaller 
Historical Records Survey. These projects were nationally directed from their launch in fall 
of 1935 through June of 1939, though administered through regional, state and municipal 
WPA offices. After that time, the surviving projects were deprived by Congress of their 
national direction and fell to state and local authorities. Surviving programs were redeployed 
toward war priorities after Pearl Harbor, and finally terminated in 1943.6 
                                                
5 For detailed discussion of the Treasury Section, see Karal Ann Marling, Wall-to-Wall 
America: A Cultural History of Post Office Murals in the Great Depression (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982); and Marlene Park and Gerald E. Markowitz, 
Democratic Vistas: Post Offices and Public Art in the New Deal (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1984). 
6 For a succinct overview of Federal One overall, see Milton Meltzer, Violins & Shovels: The 
WPA Arts Projects (New York: Delacorte Press, 1976). 
  75 
 Federal One attracted a great deal of press coverage, much of it positive; but 
substantial press attention also went to allegations that the WPA was employing “Reds,” 
especially in its professional division, of which Federal One was the most visible part. The 
Writers’ Project, especially its New York City division, was attacked as a “hotbed” of 
Communist influence, both in the press and in hearings of the House of Representatives’ 
newly created Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities.7  But ultimately, 
only the Federal Theatre Project was terminated by Congress in June of 1939. The FTP 
therefore offers the best case both to represent New Deal cultural policies in action and to 
contextualize Congressional reaction against the federal cultural programs. 
The Federal Theatre Project 
 The Federal Theatre Project (FTP) was conceived and directed by a leading 
experimental theater person, Hallie Flanagan, who happened to have attended elementary 
school with WPA chief Harry Hopkins in Grinnell, Iowa. Announcing the new program at a 
national theater conference in August, Hopkins both posed a challenge and made a promise: 
I am asked whether a theatre subsidized by the government can 
be kept free from censorship, and I say, yes, it is going to be 
kept free from censorship. What we want is a free, adult, 
uncensored theatre.8 
                                                
7 Jerre Mangione, The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers’ Project, 1935-1943 (New 
York: Avon, 1972). See Chapter 5, “Manhattan Hotbed,” on the New York City project (153-
190) and Chapter 8, “Congress Sees Red,” on the HUAC hearings (287-326). 
8 Hallie Flanagan, Arena (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940), 28. Data and program 
summaries that follow come primarily from this source. 
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At Hopkins’ request, and after extensive consultation with the theater community in the 
spring and summer of 1935, Flanagan quickly conceived then launched a massive and varied 
national program built around locally based units. The FTP operated in thirty-three states and 
employed nearly 12,400 personnel at its peak in May 1936, just nine months after Flanagan’s 
plan was approved in late August 1935. 
 Required by the WPA’s enabling legislation to draw most of its personnel from relief 
rolls, the FTP was most active in regions where the greatest numbers of theater people lived 
and were unemployed. By far the largest concentration was in New York City, where in less 
than four years of operation, upwards of 3,–5,000 FTP workers (varying from year to year) 
presented nearly 19,000 performances before an aggregate audience of more than 12.5 
million people. Where theater workers were scarce, state units or smaller city units were 
launched: such units in California, Boston, and Chicago, Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York state, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania each produced in excess of 
1,000 performances. 
 Theater of every imaginable variety — including forms not previously imagined — 
came into being under Federal Theatre auspices. The rapid proliferation of film and radio in 
the Twenties had displaced large numbers vaudevillians and other performers formerly 
employed in live venues, so the plurality of WPA productions nationwide were “variety 
acts”: assemblages of mostly ageing performers, many impoverished, ill, and “rusty” from 
long-term unemployment. Flanagan and her state and city directors were challenged to 
rehabilitate these artists, all grateful for a means of earning their living once again, and FTP 
directors created entertainment formats to harness and showcase their skills. Touring 
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companies were assembled to present free performances in Civilian Conservation Corps 
camps, community centers, schools, public parks and playgrounds, hospitals and every 
conceivable gathering place. Marionette and minstrel shows were common, and a large and 
popular WPA circus based in New York City toured widely in the Northeast. 
 In larger cities and states, where theatrical talent was more diverse and numerous and 
underutilized resources more available (no more than ten percent of FTP labor funds could be 
used for sets, costumes, lighting and theater rental), actual theater companies were formed:  
their numbers and variety were in constant flux, as performing companies came and went, 
and new productions were planned. The quality and variety of FTP productions were most 
evident in such locales, and commercial producers picked up a substantial number of these 
shows for longer runs. (Over 2,600 FTP workers successfully attained private-sector 
employment and left the Project.) Some specialized troupes (all “units” in FTP parlance) 
concentrated on presenting theater classics, others on experimental work, others on new 
plays, and still others on musical theater. Foreign-language companies performed plays in 
German, Spanish, and Yiddish. 
 In addition to local units, several Federal Theatre initiatives based mainly in New 
York served audiences and WPA personnel nationally.  The main national performance 
initiative was the National Negro Theater, headquartered in New York, but operating 
separate companies in ten U.S. cities. Also based in New York was the Bureau of Research 
and Publication, which reviewed scripts and provided research support for FTP units and 
many other independent American theaters nationwide. A Federal Theatre Magazine was 
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published there, too: not just a house organ, the magazine served as a vehicle for criticism 
and discussion of public theater issues generally. 
 Federal Theatre Project activity was staggering:  two months before its sudden 
termination in 1939 — the last time a systematic statistical update could be made — over 
63,700 performances had been presented, reaching an aggregate audience of 30.4 million.9 
(The national population then stood at 120 million.) The FTP made itself visible not only 
through thousands of isolated local performances, but through a number of unique, high-
profile national theater events. The Theatre Project was able to stage simultaneous premieres 
of a number of plays in multiple U.S. cities, resulting in visibility and exposure to theater 
never equaled before or since. Sinclair Lewis’s It Can’t Happen Here — a new play on the 
dangers of fascism — was rushed into production by Flanagan’s agency, premiering 
simultaneously in twenty-one theaters in seventeen states, including one production each in 
Spanish and Yiddish. The obsessive Lewis was sequestered in a Manhattan hotel, feverishly 
rewriting the script two days before the nationwide opening. This further complicated the 
formidable production challenges faced by the twenty-one separate companies involved, but 
the show was a smashing critical and audience success. It Can’t Happen Here enjoyed 
extended runs, subsequent new productions in additional cities, and even wider public 
exposure through touring. Before the Federal Theatre was ended, the play had run a 
cumulative total of 260 weeks.10 
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  79 
 Many more multi-city feats were accomplished. Seventy-seven new plays were 
produced in more than one city. Complete cycles of plays by George Bernard Shaw and by 
American playwrights Eugene O’Neill, Maxwell Anderson, and Elmer Rice were staged in 
multiple cities. Seventeen new productions and twenty-eight pre-existing shows were 
mounted for touring. In all, some 830 major plays were mounted, in an estimated 1,200 
separate productions. And these figures did not include radio:  FTP producers averaged 3,000 
programs a year for three years, broadcast multiple times throughout the country, reaching an 
estimated audience of 10 million listeners every week.11 
 One wholly new form invented by Flanagan and her collaborating directors, also 
opening and running in multiple cities at once, epitomized the social engagement of the 
Federal Theatre: the Living Newspaper. Featuring huge casts and minimalist sets — mainly 
relying on the innovative use of lighting and sound, to keep production costs in line — these 
carefully researched, purpose-built shows focused on pressing social issues of the day. 
Mussolini’s invasion was the subject of Ethiopia, the first single-issue Living Newspaper, 
fully produced but never shown to the public. Despite Harry Hopkins’ original promise, 
Ethiopia was censored: shut down by the White House on the eve of its premiere, due to its 
unflattering portrayal of Italian fascism, years before war was eventually declared. 
 Subsequent Living Newspaper productions fared better, each produced by separate 
companies in five-to-ten American cities and addressing a range of subjects: Triple-A Plowed 
Under explored agricultural issues, following the Supreme Court’s termination of FDR’s 
Agricultural Aid Administration; Power focused on the need for affordable electrification; 
                                                
11 Ibid., 396, 431-433, 269. 
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One-Third of a Nation dealt with poverty in Depression-struck America, drawing its title 
FDR’s second inaugural address; and Spirochete drew unprecedented public attention to 
epidemic venereal disease. These innovative productions broke new ground both 
aesthetically and politically and, like most Federal Theatre productions, attracted wholly new 
and different audiences than those who had comprised theater audiences prior to the 
appearance of this grand national experiment in public theater.12 
 Summing up her programming philosophy as FTP director and that of her national 
policy board, Flanagan wrote, 
We had to bar out material which seemed inappropriate or 
dangerous for a public theatre to do. We did this constantly on 
questions of public taste and policy. But in this matter of 
selection we were motivated by the general principles of a 
theatre as vigorous and varied as possible, a theatre belonging 
to no one region or political party but to the country as a whole. 
We were never actuated by the thought of coming elections, 
national or local. Any theatre subsidized by public funds which 
had to concern itself with partisan politics might not end after 
four years as violently as did Federal Theatre, but it is probable 
that long before that it would die of yawning.13 
Far from putting people to sleep, the Federal Theatre awakened and activated an 
entirely new audience, quickly attracting widespread popular interest and enthusiasm. The 
groundbreaking quality of its productions won over the same influential school of leading 
professional drama critics who had been quick to express skepticism, disdain, and contempt 
when the Project was first announced, skeptically expecting that only bad theater would 
result from casting actors on relief. Local authorities and audiences also embraced their own 
                                                
12 Ibid., 65-67, 70-73, 207-222, and 390. 
13 Ibid., 289. 
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new professional theaters, and some began to build theater facilities and to make local funds 
available to help in their support. 
Congressional Opposition 
 But significantly, the Theatre Project began to attract attention from enemies of the 
New Deal in the press and anti-communists in Congress just as quickly as it was launched. 
Some charged that theater was being used by the administration as a means of propaganda. 
Most Congressional critics were responding to hearsay, press stories, and often merely to the 
implications of show titles listed in FTP reports rather than to the productions themselves, 
which most had never seen.14 
 New Deal themes were undeniably present in many productions, and unemployed 
actors naturally represented a workforce critical of capitalism-as-usual, however disengaged 
they might otherwise be from traditional politics, much less political economics. As their 
campaigning unfolded, Congressional opponents focused mainly on these theater workers 
themselves, as well as an even greater number of artists employed in other Federal One 
projects. They focused less on the content of the FTP’s work, instead becoming increasingly 
obsessed with charges that WPA cultural projects were a hotbed of Communist organizing. 
This eventually, but in fairly short historic time, carried the FTP to its early grave. 
 In 1938, Representative Martin Dies of Texas got himself appointed chair of a brand-
new Congressional committee, through a resolution calling on the Speaker of the House to 
                                                
14 Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1968), 45n. 
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create a temporary Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities. The Special 
Committee was to look into 
the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda 
activities in the United States; the diffusion within the United 
States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is 
instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed 
by our Constitution; and all other questions in relation thereto 
that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial 
legislation.15 
Renewed five times before being made permanent in 1945, HUAC16 became the centerpiece 
of Congressional anti-communist organizing through 1975, when it was finally terminated.17 
HUAC Targets Federal One 
 Commonly known in its early days as the Dies Committee, HUAC quickly set its 
sights on the Federal Theatre Project, the most highly visible expression of New Deal culture, 
and on the WPA’s Federal Writer’s Project, where Committee members found the greater 
supply of “friendly” witnesses. Committee member J. Parnell Thomas (later imprisoned for 
defrauding the United States government in a kickback scheme18) announced on July 26, 
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1938, that he would have these two projects investigated as soon as the Committee began its 
hearings, saying, 
It is apparent from the startling evidence received thus far that 
the Federal Theatre Project not only is serving as a branch of 
the communistic organization but is also one more link in the 
vast and unparalleled New Deal propaganda machine.19 
On August 12th, as HUAC’s closed hearings were about to begin, Chairman Dies delivered a 
press statement promising that  
this Committee is determined to conduct its investigation upon 
a dignified plane and to adopt and maintain throughout the 
course of the hearings a judicial attitude. … This Committee 
will not permit any “character assassination” of any “smearing” 
of innocent people … It is easy to “smear” someone’s name or 
reputation by unsupported charges or an unjustified attack, but 
it is difficult to repair the damage that has been done … 
[W]hen any individual or organization is involved in any 
charge or attack made in the course of the hearings, that 
individual or organization will be accorded an opportunity to 
refute such charge or attack. 
Dies warned reporters against labeling anyone un-American based merely on “an honest 
difference of opinion with respect to some economic, political or social question.”20 The 
Chairman clearly understood the damaging potential of rumor and innuendo. This was a 
potential the Committee realized relentlessly in decades to come, in its assault on democratic 
cultural projects in the name of anti-communism. 
                                                
19 “Theatre Project Faces an Inquiry; Representative Thomas Will Tell House Committee It 
Is ‘Communist Hot-Bed,’” New York Times, July 27, 1938. 
20 Goodman, 27. 
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 The Committee immediately proceeded to generate over 500 column inches of copy 
in the New York Times alone in its first six weeks of operation.21 After devoting its first day 
of hearings to the German-American Bund, a radical right-wing organization, HUAC moved 
to what would prove to be its primary subject, receiving three days of blunt testimony from 
an American Federation of Labor union president who cited the establishment of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations as a turning point in labor: “since then the Communist 
Party has become a definite factor in the American labor movement” and was training 
members “for the day when the signal for revolution is given.” He delivered a list of 284 
names. None were called before the Committee in their own defense.22 
 A parade of like-minded witnesses followed, publicized in ample press coverage, 
though journalists themselves privately questioned the fairness of the Committee’s process. 
A poll taken by two New York Daily News columnists of the eighteen journalists who had 
regularly covered the investigation — and they were the only outsiders permitted to enter the 
Committee’s closed chambers — revealed that only two thought the hearings had been 
conducted fairly; eleven thought their conduct unfair; and the remaining five declined to 
comment either way. Supporting evidence was not being requested, and challenges to press 
accounts trumpeted in Page One headlines “came late and were relegated to back pages.”23 
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22 “Communists Rule the C.I.O., Frey of A. F. L. Testifies,” New York Times, August 14, 
1938. 
23 Goodman, 29-31. 
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 A 1939 study of the hearings, based on the only accounts available — press coverage 
and the Committee’s own edited report — included a revealing description of HUAC’s 
primary witness from the Federal One payroll, Edwin P. Banta, who testified before a 
subcommittee meeting held in New York. His background casts doubt upon the complexion 
of the Committee’s main informants: 
Mr. Banta had secured a job on the Federal Writers Project in 
New York, and while there employed had joined the 
Communist Party. He appears to have been a member for about 
two years, until a short time before his appearance as a witness. 
His testimony contained very unusual passages, which received 
full publicity, to the effect that young women were used to lure 
men into serving in the army of the Spanish Government, and 
that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (its 
governing body) had ordered one of the writers to proceed 
post-haste to Jersey City “to bring on a state of revolution.” 
Mr. Banta’s testimony is, however, open to question … He did 
not join the Communist Party in order to protect his position, as 
he testified, but rather as an informer. For a number of years he 
had been active in the work of various Nazi groups in New 
York, and had contributed numerous articles to their 
newspapers and other publications. In fact, Banta was 
scheduled to address a large meeting of the German-American 
Bund in New York less than a week after he testified before the 
Committee. When it came time for the speech, however, the 
chairman of the meeting announced that Banta had been 
mistakenly scheduled to appear.24 
 Hallie Flanagan followed the Dies Committee’s hearings as closely as she could 
through press reports, the only source available to her. After reading in a New York 
newspaper that another former employee had asserted that “Federal Theatre was dominated 
by Communists,” and that “you had to belong to the Workers’ Alliance [allegedly a 
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Communist front organization] in order to get on the project,” Flanagan responded publicly, 
earning herself a scolding from her higher-ups in the WPA: 
I released an immediate and unequivocal denial. This was an 
infraction of the rule that only the WPA information division 
answered press stories. I was told by WPA officials that on no 
account was I to reply to these charges. It was the fashion at 
that time … to laugh at the Dies Committee; but it never 
seemed funny to me.25 
 Such charges continued appearing in the press throughout the summer and fall of 
1938. Growing increasingly concerned for the welfare of her program, Flanagan wrote 
directly to Chairman Dies to ask that she and FTP National Policy Board members be given a 
hearing by the Committee. She pointed out that the half-dozen witnesses addressing the FTP 
to date had not been in a position to know about the “broad sweep of project operation or 
administration” and “were making statements which, as the Committee could easily 
ascertain, were biased, prejudiced, and often completely false.” Her letter to the Chairman 
went unacknowledged and unanswered, as did a second one she sent a few months later. 
Flanagan recorded her growing anxiety as time wore on: 
The WPA still refused to take the continued attacks seriously. 
Many people believed that this was because the organization 
had already decided that the Federal Theatre Project was a 
political liability and wanted to end it before 1940 [the next 
presidential election year]. I do not think, however, that the 
appeasement policy, in the air on Washington in the spring and 
summer of 1939, started as early as this.26 
                                                
25 Flanagan, 335. 
26 Ibid., 336. 
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 Finally, in November 1938, WPA officials themselves became concerned about the 
level of press being generated by HUAC hearings and asked that Flanagan appear before the 
Committee. She prepared affidavits responding to allegations reported in the press, including 
a comprehensive summary of FTP programs to date.27 In December, the day before her 
scheduled hearing, Flanagan and Writers’ Project director Henry Alsberg were called to a 
meeting in the office of Ellen Woodward, director of the WPA’s Women’s and Professional 
division, where Project One was housed. There, David Niles of the WPA’s information 
division announced that only Mrs. Woodward would be allowed to speak for the projects. 
After expressing heated objections, Flanagan and Alsberg briefed Woodward as best they 
could. 
Federal One Responds 
Mrs. Woodward appeared before the Committee the next day. She angered 
Committee members by calling their procedures themselves “un-American” and making an 
unfortunate additional reference to the “capitalistic” press, which Chairman Dies pointed out 
to his presumably perplexed colleagues was “a Communistic term.” Ultimately, a rattled 
Woodward couldn’t answer Committee members’ questions, and Flanagan herself was 
finally asked to appear late the following morning. From her account: 
I wanted to talk about the Federal Theatre, but the Committee 
apparently did not. Wasn’t it true I … went to Russia [as a 
1926 Guggenheim fellow while on Vassar’s faculty]? … 
Praised the Russian theatre? … Was it true that we “couldn’t 
get any audiences for anything except communist plays”? … 
                                                
27 Flanagan’s report, never published by Congress, appears as an appendix to Arena, 375-
436. 
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Was I in sympathy with Communistic doctrines? I said: “I am 
an American and I believe in American democracy. … I 
believe the Federal Theatre … is honestly trying in every way 
possible to interpret the best interests of the people of this 
democracy. I am not in sympathy with any other form of 
government.”28 
More questions followed about Workers’ Alliance membership among FTP workers in New 
York, which Flanagan explained she could not answer, since WPA regulations forbade 
Project administrators from asking. She assured the Committee that it was in any case 
decidedly a minority, since each of the dozen or so professional entertainment unions 
involved with the WPA had forbidden FTP workers’ membership in any other workers’ 
association. Her fleeting mention of Christopher Marlowe spurred Representative Starnes of 
Alabama (who’d bullied Woodward the day before for calling the Committee’s process “un-
American”) to ask, “Is he a Communist?” Flanagan’s explanation that said Marlowe was an 
English playwright who lived just before the time of Shakespeare drew gales of laughter. 
 Having maintained equanimity throughout her grilling, Flanagan was speedily 
dispatched by Committee members in favor of lunch and then was not invited back into their 
chamber, despite her pleas not to be dismissed before delivering her prepared presentation. 
Congressional and WPA staff assured the FTP director that her full affidavit would be 
entered into the record and distributed directly to five-hundred senators and representatives; 
but neither ever happened. When the Committee’s report was issued in January 1939, much 
attention went to condemning the Writers’ Project, but only this single, short paragraph, 
bereft of any supporting evidence, mentioned the Theatre Project: 
                                                
28 Flanagan, 341-343. 
  89 
We are convinced that a rather large number of the employees 
on the Federal Theatre Project are either members of the 
Communist Party or are sympathetic with the Communist 
Party. It is also clear that certain employees felt under 
compulsion to join the Workers’ Alliance in order to retain 
their jobs.29 
 Four months later, in May 1939, hearings on the Federal Theatre were held by House 
Appropriations Committee chair Clifton Woodrum of Virginia, who had publicly stated he 
was going to put the government out of show business if it was the last thing he ever did. 
Woodrum’s Committee did little fact-finding, relying instead on hearsay by then widely 
circulated in HUAC’s press coverage and the one-paragraph conclusion in its report. On June 
14th, with funding set to expire in just over two weeks, Woodrum declared from the floor of 
the House that “every theater critic of note has expressed his disapproval of projects of this 
type.” Woodrum’s assertion was immediately refuted by leading New York and national 
theater critics in a collective telegram expressing their emphatic contrary belief in the Theatre 
Project’s “great value to the life of the community.” Nevertheless, in a June 20th vote, the 
House recommended full funding for the WPA — $1.78 billion — but specifically banning 
the use of federal money for theater projects. The restriction could not have been based on 
fiscal grounds, since theater projects were budgeted at just $17 million, less than one percent 
of the total WPA budget.30 With the close of the fiscal year rapidly approaching, and the 
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in the WPA, see James E. Sargent, “Woodrum’s Economy Bloc: The Attack on Roosevelt’s 
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entire WPA appropriation hanging in the balance, the House decision was immediately 
conveyed to the Senate. 
 The national theater community and other civic and political groups, mobilized 
throughout House proceedings, had little time to appeal to the Senate. Nevertheless, its 
Budget Committee voted that same day to overrule the House’s abolition of the FTP, though 
reducing its appropriation to no more than 0.75% of the budget ($13.3 million). For a 
moment, it seemed the Theatre Project might be saved, but that moment quickly passed. 
Writing of the joint conference committee convened the following day, a Senate conferee 
later confided to Flanagan, 
I was somewhat surprised at the attitude of the House 
conferees. … For some reason or other, regardless of political 
or economic views, they were all most determined to eliminate 
the theatre projects. The theatre project was the last concession 
made by the Senate conferees … made only as the last resort to 
secure an agreement. It really seemed that if the Senate refused 
to yield in its efforts to protect the eight thousand employees 
on theatre projects, that we would have the entire two and a 
half million WPA relief workers thrown out of employment. 
Federal funding was thus explicitly denied “after June 30, 1939, for the operation of any 
Theatre Project.”31 
 The WPA was rechristened with the less stirring name, “Work Projects 
Administration” and placed under the federal administrative oversight of the Federal Works 
Agency. The surviving components of Federal One — the art, music, and writers’ projects 
and the historical records survey — continued on under the FWA’s bureaucratic umbrella, 
but were deprived of professional direction at the national level. After Pearl Harbor, the 
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WPA was redeployed to serve war priorities, producing local recreation guides for 
servicemen in military training centers, for instance, before being officially terminated in 
1943. 
The most telling indicator of how far the program veered from its national leaders’ 
original visions, however, is the agency’s largely unrecognized role in planning, building, 
equipping, and staffing relocation centers and internment camps for the Wartime Civilian 
Control Agency, which detained 120,000 Japanese American citizens and resident aliens 
during World War II. The WPA contributed more to the cost of internment than the Army or 
any other civilian agency. In drawing attention to this largely unacknowledged legacy of the 
WPA, scholar Jason Scott Smith disputed the common contention that 
World War II witnessed a weakened New Deal state that 
crumbled and gave way to a vigorous wartime state. Rather, the 
role played by the WPA in internment illustrates the 
considerable strengths of the New Deal state while at the same 
time calling into question its potential always to act as a force 
for social justice.32 
Clearly, the nation’s New Deal commitment to the policy goals of cultural democracy was 
shallow and contingent, to say the least. 
The HUAC Playbook 
 The confrontation between the Dies Committee and the Federal Theatre is rich in 
paradox and contradiction, providing a dress rehearsal for what was to follow from HUAC in 
the late Forties and early Fifties. The first and still most extensive effort to create a genuinely 
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American national theater had become the target of politicians interested in constructing a 
realm they could label un-American by alleging a communist connection. A Congressional 
body created to investigate situations that might call for legislative action instead conducted a 
kind of trial behind closed doors, freeing itself not only from judicial rules of evidence, but 
even those that might govern conduct in an open public hearing. Inside its chambers, the 
Committee’s line-up of selected witnesses found a stage for expressing personal opinion and 
feeling to an audience of decision-makers that in many cases offered not only receptive 
attention, but encouragement — even goading. 
 Advocates of the Federal Theatre meanwhile found themselves deprived of any 
effective voice, and those accused by Committee witnesses were prevented by procedural 
rules and Congressional immunity from responding to charges made. Presumption of guilt 
accompanied accusation, the burden of proof landing heavily on the accused, who were 
effectively convicted in newspaper headlines. None were granted any recourse in the 
Committee’s chambers, nor could they find any in the court of public opinion.  
 Thus was the pattern set for even more public witch-hunts to come. 
ANTI-COMMUNISM & RACE IN THE THIRTIES 
The linkage between radicalism and race forged in 1919 reappeared in the Thirties. 
Reading the words and considering the identities of early HUAC leaders in the late Thirties 
reveals the resonance of anti-communist and racist rhetoric, though race was not 
foregrounded in most historical accounts of their reaction against the New Deal cultural 
projects. The New Deal itself has been criticized for its silence and inaction on racial issues 
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in recent decades’ historical examination; but recent historiography has also exposed 
HUAC’s racist nature, both in its criticism of the cultural programs and of the New Deal in 
general. 
Since the Civil War and Reconstruction, American blacks had identified strongly with 
the Republican Party — the party of Lincoln, as it was frequently called. The long period 
between what is known in some parts of the South as “The Redemption” — the end of 
Reconstruction, when white power structures reasserted themselves throughout the South — 
brought countless horrors and relentless suppression to black communities in the United 
States. Political disenfranchisement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
resulted in making this Republican identification more theoretical and sentimental than 
effective. White racist activism created a pervasive pattern of cultural segregation throughout 
the South and in other parts of the country that came to known as Jim Crow. The project of 
racial division was effectively completed with President Wilson’s segregation of federal 
government facilities and programs.33 
This historical alignment of black voters with the Republican Party began to shift 
significantly during the New Deal, however. Historian Harvard Sitkoff addressed both the 
profound impact of the Great Depression, and the relative lack of political attention in 
response to it, when he wrote, 
                                                
33 See Harvard Sitkoff’s summary of this era in Chapter One, “The Dusk of Dawn,” in A New 
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Neither the Great Depression nor the New Deal initially 
innervated [sic] the struggle for black rights. The continuity of 
racism in American life and thought early in the 1930s 
overshadowed any portents of change. The plight of Afro-
Americans, however, did change — for the worse. The 
depression dealt a staggering blow to blacks. It magnified all 
their traditional economic liabilities. It created newer and 
harsher ones. No group could less afford the precipitous 
decline that followed the stock market crash of 1929. None 
suffered more from it.34 
Nevertheless, the traditional connection blacks felt with the Republican Party remained 
undisturbed in the 1932 Presidential election:  “… most blacks who could vote … rallied 
around the slogan ‘who but Hoover.’ The GOP still appeared the lesser evil.”35 Southern 
Democrats had been a dominating force in the Democratic Party, and Roosevelt’s 
disinclination to disturb his Party’s status quo offers the most charitable interpretation of his 
administration’s failure to address racial issues. 
In fact, few concrete benefits were extended to black Americans through most early 
New Deal programs, due largely to their reliance upon local delivery systems. This failure 
encouraged radical analysis, in the spirit of the times. Ample criticism flowed in a 1935 
Washington conference on “The Position of the Negro in the Present Economic Crisis,” in 
which John P. Davis’s keynote “focused on capitalism as the root of the problem and on the 
necessity of discarding the existing economic system to give blacks a truly new deal.” A. 
Philip Randolph essentially agreed, as did Ralph Bunche, chair of Howard University’s 
political science department, who said that FDR’s “state capitalism,” like Italy’s and 
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Germany’s under fascism, “can at best only fix the disadvantages, the differentials, the 
discriminations, under which the Negro population has labored all along.” Clearly, these 
black intellectuals’ remarks provided plenty of material for anti-communists, though 
according to Sitkoff, “few Negroes, or their leaders, accepted such left analyses and 
prescriptions.” Still, “far fewer disagreed with the overall conclusion that discrimination ran 
rampant through the New Deal.”36 
Civil Rights Progress During the New Deal 
Nevertheless, Sitkoff traces significant lines of change in the larger story of civil 
rights activism in the Thirties. He attributes much of the leadership to such key New Deal 
figures as Mary McLeod Bethune, Harry Hopkins, and WPA director assistant Aubrey 
Williams, but most especially to the First Lady. Sitkoff credits Eleanor Roosevelt with 
influencing the FTP’s Hallie Flanagan as well as top officials the U.S. Housing Authority, 
the Rural Electrification Administration, and the Farm Security Administration to undertake 
special efforts to serve black Americans. 
Harold Ickes, as Interior secretary, officially announced the end of segregation in his 
department, required hiring in PWA construction projects proportional to the population, in 
skilled as well as unskilled categories This led to similar quota systems in the Housing 
Authority, the Federal Works Agency, and the President’s Committee on Fair Employment 
Practices. “Because of Ickes, Negroes occupied at least one-third of all the housing units built 
by the PWA,” and the Secretary also began desegregating national parks in the South. Ickes’ 
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leadership made him a frequent target as anti-communism took shape toward the end of the 
decade. 
Spurred by such administration action, Northern Democratic congressman wrote into 
more than a score of New Deal statues the stipulation barring any “discrimination on account 
of race, creed or color,” enforced by fines as high as $2,000 and prison terms of up to two 
years. Sitkoff observes, “the half century–long tradition of congressional indifference to 
white racism in the administration of federal programs had begun to end.”37 
 The cultural diversity described earlier throughout WPA cultural programs must be 
understood as a hallmark expression of this new trend in New Deal administration, which 
began around 1934. “By mid- 1935, about forty-five blacks had taken posts in most of the 
cabinet departments and New Deal agencies,” Sitkoff reported, and this trend accelerated 
with the “Second New Deal,” following FDR’s 1936 re-election. In that year, a group of 
these appointees began meeting every Friday night along with representatives of the Urban 
League and the NAACP at Bethune’s home, designating themselves the Federal Council on 
Negro Affairs — usually called the Black Cabinet or the Black Brain Trust by the press. The 
Black Cabinet began to focus awareness on civil rights issues throughout the government and 
focused fresh attention to political issues in the wider black community, forging links 
between the government and the civil rights movement.38 
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Racial Realignment 
As the Thirties wore on, voter registration increasingly became a priority within the 
black community and in the civil rights movement generally. Organizers emphasized the 
importance of independent voting to assure party response, after the GOP rebuffed overtures 
made early in the decade. Defections from the Party of Lincoln accelerated in the 1934 
election, and in 1936, both national parties began trying to attract support from the estimated 
1 million black voters. (The national back population was estimated at 4 million at the time.) 
The Democratic Party responded much more favorably did than the GOP, admitting black 
delegates to its nominating convention for the first time in history. The First Lady 
campaigned actively, and the consciousness raised of federal issues by the Black Cabinet 
resulted in Roosevelt winning seventy-six percent of the black vote in the North, an epochal 
shift in black voting. The Crisis, the NAACP’s house organ, explained this as reflecting “a 
feeling that Mr. Roosevelt represented a kind of philosophy of government which will mean 
much to their race.” Black activism was stirred even in the South, where voter registration 
drives doubled the number of black voters in more progressive cities like Raleigh and 
Atlanta. Still, even by 1940, only about 250,000 black voters cast ballots in the eleven states 
of the former Confederacy, just five percent of the voting-age population. Renewed interest 
in the issue of voting rights nevertheless helped prepare the ground for postwar civil-right 
activism.39 
 These developments predictably drove a wedge between Southern Democrats, whose 
states had actually benefited disproportionately from New Deal programs, and those in the 
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North. This began the decades-long transition in regional party politics that culminated in 
Reagan’s election in 1980. 
In 1937, the first hints of a conservative coalition of 
Republicans and anti–New Deal Southern Democrats took 
shape around issues of increased federal power, opposition to 
labor unions, and welfare spending. This cooperation was 
sparked by FDR’s controversial “court-packing” scheme. … In 
response, a small group of senators from both parties who had 
been meeting privately to discuss what they considered 
excesses of the New Deal created what became known as the 
Conservative Manifesto.40 
A sense of threat sharpened among Southern Democrats. Southern opposition to New Deal 
programs increased, and FDR’s grew frustrated with their abandonment of the national 
Party’s liberal platform. Even when they ultimately voted in the affirmative, Democrats from 
the South  
fought against [Roosevelt’s] program in their respective 
committees, in conference committees, in supporting crippling 
amendments, in maneuvers to block consideration of certain 
measures, and in their private attempts to put pressure on the 
White House.41 
As Democrats in the North continued to cultivate support among black voters, union 
members, Jews, and other constituencies outside the white-supremacist order prevailing in 
the South, this cleavage widened. In the run-up to the 1944 election, Southern politicians 
began to speak openly about the possibility of abandoning the national party.42 
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 This fusion of economic and racial justice issues among Southern Democrats 
strengthened a linkage already present during World War I and the Red Scare of 1919. 
Sitkoff documents the process through which “by the end of the [Thirties] racism and 
economic reaction had become interwoven.”  Generally, however, “when [Southern 
Democrats] did make their aversion to the New Deal public, they resorted to racial and 
sectional rhetoric” rather than invocations of anti-communism per se — referring to the 
“nigger-loving New Deal,” “race-meddling,” and “the rights of States”: they “preached 
states’ rights as the ark of their covenant, the Tenth Amendment as their First 
Commandment.” References to international politics in fact sometimes veered in an opposite 
direction.  “The Man Bilbo,” as he stiltedly referred to himself — Senator Theodore Bilbo of 
Mississippi, formally and officially a Klansman, who introduced an amendment to the relief 
bill in 1938 to deport all American blacks to Liberia — delivered this sinister perspective on 
“cultural development,” in defense of America’s racist status quo and its relation to European 
fascism: 
Race consciousness is developing in all parts of the world. 
Consider Italy, consider Germany. It is beginning to be realized 
by the thoughtful minds of our age that the conservation of 
racial values is the only hope for future civilization. It will be 
recalled that Hitler … gave as the basis of his program to unite 
Germany and Austria “German blood ties.” The Germans 
appreciate the importance of race values.43 
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History has certainly proven Bilbo right about our recollections of Hitler and Germany, 
though it is not for their thoughtfulness that we remember the European fascists.44 
To demonstrate the suddenness and biliousness of the split between Southern 
Democrats and the rest, Sitkoff contrasts the filibusters imposed by Southern opponents in 
two debates over proposed anti-lynching legislation. He describes these as a revealing 
indicator of “the epidemic of Bilboism contaminating North-South congressional relations 
after 1937” — laughed off by liberal wags as the “Bilbonic Plague”: 
The 1935 talkathon had been a gentlemanly tea party. Neither 
Northern nor Southern Democrats considered civil rights 
important enough to risk splitting the party or jeopardizing 
Roosevelt’s program. … It ended calmly after six days. But not 
in 1938. For nearly seven weeks the Northerners refused to 
give in … Almost every Southern senator took the floor to 
blame Roosevelt for alienating the South from the Democratic 
party and to link the demands for civil rights legislation with 
the pro-leftist, pro-CIO, and pro-Negro forces that had 
supplanted them in the party hierarchy. Not since the filibusters 
of the 1890s had the Senate witnessed such a barrage of 
explicit, overt Negrophobia. 
And here, the linkage between racism and anti-communism reappears with real vengeance. 
Sitkoff singles out Chairman Dies of HUAC as the personification of this fusion, noting his 
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committee’s emphasis on communist linkages not only to the New Deal cultural programs, 
but also to the New Deal as a whole, as well the labor and civil rights movements.45 
The proximate cause of division in the Democratic Party — the threat posed to the 
white-supremacist order of the South — would not to come to a head until after World War 
II, and well will revisit this element of our story later. But a powerful valence was already 
well established between agitation for racial justice and the threat perceived from 
communism. 
THE TROJAN HORSE IN AMERICA 
 One year after the demise of the Federal Theatre, and just months before Roosevelt’s 
1940 election to his third term, Martin Dies published The Trojan Horse in America, ghost-
written by HUAC research director J.B. Matthews.46  Entirely free of front and back matter, 
and featuring only one footnote (identifying the source of a cozy chat between Hitler and an 
unnamed lieutenant) in its 366 increasingly histrionic pages, this book maps the mental 
landscape of the man who had engineered the Federal Theatre hearing process, also 
providing a postwar playbook for HUAC’s continuing witch-hunts.   
 Hardly a paragraph goes by without mention of Dies’ (and Matthews’) central motif: 
the image of Trojan Horse organizations rolled into our midst and unlocked by insinuating 
outsiders, posing as friends at the clever design of Hitler and Stalin (more threateningly, the 
latter). The author opens with reasoned, calming reassurance: 
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 It is of vital importance that we neither exaggerate nor 
underestimate the menace of the dictators’ declared intentions. 
The Trojan Horse may be viewed with hysterical alarm. Such 
an attitude is both dangerous and ineffective. On the other 
hand, the Trojan Horse may be viewed with indifference or 
complaisance. That is equally or more dangerous. Between 
undue excitement on the one hand and calm acquiescence on 
the other, we must follow a course of prompt and courageous 
action to guard against the extension of totalitarian rule on our 
shores. 
 First, let us look at the facts. … 47 
The authors’ enumeration of these facts begins with a set of eighteen criteria to help the 
reader identify “stooges,” “dupes,” and knowing conspirators in our midst.48 These criteria 
include the use a particular, named New York City printing firm; renting office space in one 
of several specific Manhattan buildings, listed by street address; or including the singing of 
particular patriotic songs at organizational events. Having First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt or 
Secretary of the Interior Ickes speak at your convention was an especially reliable indicator 
of groups with sinister intentions, the author(s) warned. 
 The catalog of facts that The Trojan Horse mainly comprises then begins to unfold. 
The book is mainly a tedious list of named suspects, each name accompanied by an inventory 
of past and present personal connections to Trojan Horse organizations. The reader trudges 
through chapters focusing on youth, the unemployed, the courts, Negroes, and labor unions, 
amplified with unsubstantiated implications that Moscow ran the show in each arena, 
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preaching violence and perpetrating crimes as severe as treason. Communism, we are 
informed, is a Big Business distributing “the Opiate of the People.” 
After nearly three hundred pages of increasing avoidance of “calm acquiescence,” we 
arrive at this excited summary of “The Trojan Horse in Government,” where once again the 
WPA —and the Federal Theatre especially — provided a stocked pond for Chairman Dies to 
take a metaphorical fishing trip: 
 Stalin baited his hook with a “progressive” worm, and 
New Deal suckers swallowed bait, hook, line, and sinker. … 
Several thousand federal government officials and employees 
have been involved in the support of Communist Trojan Horses 
in recent years. … W.P.A. was the greatest financial boon 
which ever came to the Communists in the United States. … 
Relief projects swarmed with Communists … entrusted by 
New Deal officials with high administrative positions … In one 
Federal Writers’ Project [sic] in New York, one third of the 
writers were members of the Communist Party. … Several 
hundred Communists held advisory or administrative positions 
… All over the United States, the Federal Theatre Project 
produced plays which were nothing but Communist 
propaganda. … [S]cores of plays … freighted with Moscow’s 
propaganda were what the American people spent millions of 
dollars to produce. … The situation became so intolerable that 
the Congress of the United States stepped into the picture and 
made an end of the whole shameful use of the taxpayers’ 
money to spread Communist propaganda. The Communists and 
their fellow travelers are, of course, clamoring for the 
restoration of the Federal Theatre Project. Naturally they want 
the feed-bag put back on the mouth of their Trojan Horse, but 
they also want the Government of the United States to pay for 
Stalin’s propaganda. … Fifth columnists … have already 
landed in the federal government. They await the “zero hour” 
when Stalin will give the command to attack. … [T]heir 
present duty [is] to work at the “softening process” on our 
national spirit and determination to preserve American 
institutions from their planned assault.49 
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Thus climaxes the author’s discourse on domestic Communism. A relatively slim forty-two 
pages of material on the fascist threat of Hitler and Mussolini follow, before the reader is 
urged to awaken to the threat and drive these Trojan Horses out. 
 The Trojan Horse in America prefigures the tone of the better-known McCarthy era 
yet to come. Chairman Dies and his Committee can be said to have invented its method. 
Primary attention went to generating front-page headlines in newspapers across the land. 
Hidden away in the Op-Ed pages inside, and in political journals and forums, were reasoned 
statements expressing concern about the dangers perceived in the Dies Committee’s methods.  
Typical of the latter was this statement by Representative Horace Jeremiah “Jerry” Voorhis 
of California, the one-man minority of HUAC itself, officially recording his dissent to a 
majority report railroaded through the committee with no prior notice in June 1942: 
The Dies committee is supposed to investigate subversive 
activities. … Once the committee undertakes to accuse people 
of un-American activities because they criticize certain features 
of our economy or say unkind things about finance capitalism, 
or because they come out for a greater degree of cooperation in 
our economic life, it is in danger of becoming an agency that 
arrogates to itself the right to censor other people’s ideas. That 
in itself is un-American.50 
 Widespread press and political concern about these methods is summarized in 
William Gellerman’s 1944 book Martin Dies, which the author introduces with his own 
conclusion, having weighed the facts: 
There is little evidence in this man’s public career that he either 
understands or believes in American democracy. On the 
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contrary, the evidence indicates that he is a spearhead of a 
native American reaction. 
The essence of totalitarianism is the conception that there are 
certain areas of human thought in which there are “right” 
answers which should be accepted by all as above and beyond 
criticism. Having dignified his own peculiar social philosophy 
as “Americanism,” Dies demands that all others accept this 
creed, or be accused of “un-Americanism.” This is 
diametrically opposed to the pluralism of American 
democracy…51 
 The connection between the Dies Committee of the Thirties and HUAC in the 
postwar era was direct. Very soon after World War II ended, the Committee produced a 
public information piece that invoked the reality of “Trojan Horses” already situated in the 
United States government, amplifying what they had written at the time of the Federal 
Theatre’s termination into the following presentation of “facts” about Federal One: 
Immediately upon recognition of Soviet Russia[,] Communists, 
fellow travelers, and front agents promptly flooded 
Washington, and began to worm their way into the 
Government of the United States. … The Federal Arts [sic] 
Project, Federal Writers’ Project, Federal Theatre Project, and 
such organizations introduced them in large numbers. … How 
did the Communists use the federal theatre, writers, and other 
such projects? To present Communist propaganda plays, to 
feature Communist actors, to distribute Communist propaganda 
in Government books, pamphlets, and art work. … In 
numerous communities, after post offices and other federal 
buildings had been decorated at considerable expense to the 
taxpayers, paintings were covered over or removed upon public 
demand. Communist-corrupted art work, however, can still be 
found in many public places to this day.52 
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Thus were Dies Committee’s paranoid conclusions inflated and reintroduced into the postwar 
period of domestic witch-hunting. 
INVENTING THE “AMERICAN WAY” 
 Historian Wendy Wall has looked back to the time of the Dies Committee’s first 
bombardments on the un-American to trace the roots of a parallel, but apparently opposite 
campaign: the invention of the “American Way.”53 More diverse in its constituency, content, 
and impacts than overt anti-communist crusading, this ideologically constructive effort 
clearly complemented HUAC’s attacks on its accused un-American outliers. In its less 
alarmist and dramatic nature, this campaign was far more subtle and seemingly positive, 
though no less profound in its effects. In the climate that was to emerge by the time it 
reached full flower in the late Forties and Fifties, the American Way campaign proved 
impossible to counter without singling oneself out as “un-American” at one of the riskiest 
times to do so in the United States’ cultural history. 
 The emerging field of “public relations” and the slippery science of opinion polling 
formed the foundation of this initiative. In the Twenties, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, Edward 
Bernays — who had participated in the Wilson administration’s Committee on Public 
Information (CPI, also known as the Creel Committee, after its chairman, George Creel) —
argued that that “corporate leaders and other elites could discreetly manipulate public 
                                                                                                                                                  
and on our government” (1948), 
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53 Wendy Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New 
Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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emotions using slogans, symbols and images.” Aided by the rapid proliferation of broadcast 
media that could reach even the illiterate, beginning with radio in the Twenties, pioneers in 
the field began to use the tools previously negatively associated with “propaganda” to sway 
public opinion not only on behalf of government, but for corporate clients.54 
 Wall pays scant attention to the Federal Theatre Project saga: her only mention of it is 
a fleeting reference to an Earl Robinson song, “Ballad for Americans,” written for an FTP 
musical review,55 whose use in political rallies is cited as point eleven in The Trojan Horse’s 
eighteen danger signs of Stalinist influence.56 Nor does racism figure as a central tenet of 
belief here: indeed, the corporate liberals involved worked actively to replace the widespread 
popular anti-Semitism of the time with a “Judeo-Christian” consensus.57 The ideological 
construction she describes might be called “affirmative action” initiated during the New Deal 
by economically privileged players with a diverse audience in mind. 
The intellectual leadership that created this corporate coalition came from McGraw-
Hill, publisher of Business Week and various trade publications, which surveyed the various 
industries it served in the wake of the 1936 landslide re-election of a president who had 
attacked “economic royalists,” concluding that the public was “bewildered and confused by 
the efforts industry was making to tell its story and to defend itself” against charges that it 
did not respect the public interest. The publishing company convened a series of “Public 
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Relations Forums” around the country to “give industry a common approach to the problem.” 
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) quickly emerged as the primary vehicle 
for a multifaceted media campaign built around consensual concepts favorable to corporate 
interests — notably “free enterprise” and the “American way of life.” These were the core 
concepts that drove the ensuing decades-long campaign. Wall characterizes this campaign as  
a broad-based defense of laissez-faire capitalism … to 
convince the American public that their interests and those of 
the nation’s largest corporations were virtually 
indistinguishable … emphasizing individual rights and the 
libertarian dimensions of “freedom.”58  
Implicitly challenging the democratic notion of competing interests, their messages 
emphasized the notion of social harmony, arguing that “Prosperity Dwells Where Harmony 
Reigns,” asserting a “loyal partnership” among labor, management, and capital, and 
depicting laborers friendly with limousine-driven executives (“I knew him when he pushed a 
wheelbarrow”). (55) Their messaging was often explicitly anti-government, as in this NAM 
pamphlet: 
When we give any Government increasing power to regulate 
our daily lives we are giving away one of the most sacred 
liberties any American can possess. Governments love power! 
Don't give any Government the right to dictate where you shall 
work, when you shall work and what your wages shall be!59 
As World War II approached in Europe, NAM campaign staff saw an opportunity to 
strengthen allegiance to their “free enterprise” concept through association to growing 
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patriotic concern over the preservation of democracy. This was spelled out in a strategic 
think piece: 
Free enterprise [will not] be saved as the result of appeals in 
the name of free enterprise alone … The public must be 
convinced that (58) free enterprise is as much an indivisible 
part of democracy and the source of as many blessings and 
benefits as are our other freedoms of speech, press and religion. 
[If the NAM’s program can] emphasize effectively the 
inseparability of “democracy” and  “free enterprise,” it may 
well be that the wave of enthusiasm and support for the former 
will carry the latter to unprecedented heights in public esteem. 
Corporate executives’ nervousness about the idea and implications of democracy was 
handled by NAM staff’s insistent use of “representative democracy” in its campaigns.60 
The replacement of democracy — a political idea — with “free enterprise” — having 
more to do with economics, albeit political economics — is itself a crucial piece of what 
would become Cold War collateral damage. Anti-communist campaigners rarely referred 
cleanly to there being distinct left-right contests between communism and capitalism in the 
economic reclaim, and between democracy and authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) in the 
political one. Instead, the distinct, though related spheres of economics and politics were 
consistently collapsed into a single contest between communism and “freedom,” 
complicating the possibility of intelligent discussion. 
 The National Association of Manufacturers’ pre-war message matured and 
crystallized in a 1939-41 campaign entitled “The Tripod of Freedom,” whose three 
inseparable legs were “representative democracy,” “civil and religious liberties,” and 
“economic freedom, the institution of private enterprise.” Of these, the third leg was 
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presented as the most vulnerable of all. NAM president H.W. Prentis, Jr., explained why, in 
touting the campaign to an audience of manufacturers: 
Even the Communist and Fascist and Socialist groups among 
us prate about their devotion to representative democracy and 
insist upon the preservation of civil and religious liberties, at 
least so long as they themselves are not in power. … The attack 
always is against that other leg of the tripod, economic 
freedom.61 
Issues of cultural policy are complicated here. Wall argues that  
The NAM’s emphasis on individual freedom … contrasted 
sharply with the vision of Americanism offered by both the 
CIO and New Dealers. Although neither the CIO nor FDR 
neglected individual freedom, both put their faith in 
majoritarian democracy and saw the greatest danger to 
America coming from a selfish and powerful minority.62 
NAM’s messages may thus have appeared to respect cultural minorities still marginalized 
under the New Deal regime’s majoritarian will. But its imagery, viewed from the 
multicultural perspective of today, clearly did not. In fact, the contradiction between NAM 
rhetoric and Great Depression reality was eloquently captured in Margaret Bourke-White’s 
famous image of black Americans displaced by a flood lined up in front of a NAM campaign 
billboard in hopes of securing public benefits. That rhetoric repeated as the NAM-originated 
campaign wore on, transferred first to the War Advertising Council, rechristened later simply 
as the Advertising Council: “[M]anufacturers, not politicians, were the working people’s true 
friends.”63 
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National unity became an important theme as the Thirties drew to a close. This issue 
linked capitalist concerns with those of social commentators from farther to the Left, who 
were disturbed at a trend they saw in U.S. political culture: 
The Depression intensified social divisions in the U.S. and 
called into question many of the verities that had long guided 
American society and policymaking. The New Deal united 
millions of Americans in a sweeping reform coalition, but it 
also triggered intense ideological debates about the proper 
contours of the nation’s political economy. Strains or open 
hostilities between the ancestral homes of millions of 
Americans amplified group tensions in the U.S. as well. 
Finally, the challenge posed by the “alien” ideologies of 
fascism and communism intensified Americans’ sense of 
unease.64 
Wall’s analysis demonstrates the ambivalent sources and significance of these 
concerns as they manifest in the late Thirties and early Forties. Driving fears on the left were 
upwellings of nativism, red-baiting, union-busting and anti-Semitism, which figured 
prominently in the speaking and writing of anthropologists like Margaret Mead, cultural 
commentators like Louis Adamic and Horace Kallen,65 and sociologists like the Myrdals, 
who all focused increasingly on the need for unity. From the other end of the political 
spectrum, Wall asserts that 
Economic conservatives, meanwhile, worried that the New 
Deal and the amorphous left-wing movement that supported it 
foretold the arrival in the U.S. of “state socialism.” … 
[I]ndustry, public relations, and advertising executives worked 
to reassert the authority of business, to halt or roll back the 
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New Deal, and to restore a political culture conducive to the 
exercise of corporate power with minimal government 
control.66 
Noting the conflicting roots of the decades-long construction project she describes, 
naturally still embryonic in the late Thirties, Wall notes that  
Diverse as they were, all these individuals and groups invoked 
national unity and shared values, largely rejecting the language 
of progressive struggle that had propelled social movements for 
decades. For divergent reasons, they also emphasized 
individual freedoms rather than majoritarian democracy. 
Business groups stressed individual rights in order to shore up 
free enterprise, while many intergroup liberals did so to protect 
religious and ethnic minorities …67 
Despite this diversity of impulse, Wall argues that the ultimate outcome favored corporate 
interests, who successfully reinvented their own image during and after World War II 
through the American Way initiative. Their message, broadcast widely through “public 
service” media campaigns, advertising, and public organizing, was intensified by the 
complementary headline-grabbing anti-communist crusade: “By marginalizing dissenters — 
by casting those who disrupted national unity as somehow un-American — they shored up 
the social, economic and political status quo.”68 They also produced the bland, banal pictures 
— quite literally — of the typical “American”: the iconic Anglo-American family of father, 
mother, son, and daughter (in order of their perceived importance at the time) that has 
embodied status quo perceptions of American national identity ever since. This was not a 
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“natural” picture, however, even at the time of its creation, but one crafted in the emergent 
“consciousness industry” of Madison Avenue and Hollywood.69 
CULTURAL POLICY AND AMERICAN IDENTITY 
 The social forces and phenomena described here were undeniably real, as the intense 
conflicts around New Deal cultural programs and civil rights demonstrate. Such conflicts are 
inherent in a free, diverse, democratic cultural milieu, and therefore are to be expected by the 
cultural democrat to appear as signs of success and progress in cultural development. But the 
political Right, the timid Center, and even much of the theoretical Left view these same 
developments with alarm — in the Thirties as in the twenty-first century. 
Part of the romance of the Depression era, for its survivors as well as for many of the 
post-Sixties scholars who have exhumed its history, is the tremendous ferment that 
characterized national cultural life at that time. The success of New Deal cultural projects in 
harnessing these forces was precisely what created the backlash that was used to suppress 
these movements, most obviously in the case of the Federal Theatre and the WPA as a whole, 
as anti-communism and militarism kicked in. 
The American Way campaign embodied a more reasoned and reasonable approach; 
but from a cultural-policy point of view, this corporate-financed campaign posed no less 
serious a threat to the goals of cultural democracy than did naked political repression, once 
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opposing categories of thinking and expression came commonly to be designated as “un-
American.” 
  The idea that a unified and unifying national culture can be identified is not incorrect. 
Indeed, cultural policy requires and at least implicitly constitutes a statement of national 
identity. And in relation to issues of racism, the American Way campaign was not with 
progressive utility, since it undermined the idea of that acceptance of social divisions among 
U.S. citizens had any validity. But he images it presented in advertising campaigns were not 
explicitly anti-racist; and to contrary effect, the American families depicted in campaign 
materials and normalized by them were uniformly white. 
 As the frenzy of anti-communism faded in the later Fifties, it was the deeper, more 
general brainwashing program devised by corporate interests — extolling the generally 
unspecified sanctity of “being American” by participating in a free enterprise system — that 
was to shape postwar consciousness of national identity. We will return to this enterprise in 
discussing postwar cultural policy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ENTR’ACTE: WORLD WAR II & THE EMERGENT POSTWAR ORDER 
 In what other historic study would World War II be relegated to the status of an 
entr’acte? World events diverted audience attention in the United States from domestic 
cultural politics for a time, providing an intermission in the domestic drama Dies and his 
fellow travelers had been crafting. 
The Hitler-Stalin Pact had shaken U.S. support for Stalin’s Soviet Union all across 
the political spectrum; but Hitler’s later brutal Eastern Front invasions and the subsequent 
Japanese air raid on the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor transformed the Russian state into a 
beleaguered wartime ally. This standing was not to last, yielding quickly to suspicions that 
created a chilling bipolar perception of global power, carrying the United States into a Cold 
War more perennial than the hot one of World War II. 
WORLD WAR II’S GRAND ALLIANCE & MULTILATERALIST VISIONS 
 Wartime exigencies crowded out attention to postwar planning until quite late in the 
War. Nevertheless, U.S. citizens invested in FDR their hopes for a new, more stable, and 
peaceful postwar order. In what proved to be his final inaugural address in 1944, President 
Roosevelt voiced this hopeful vision: 
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We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our 
own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other 
nations, far away. … [The American people] have learned to be 
citizens of the world, members of the human community. We 
have learned the simple truth. As Emerson said, that, “The only 
way to have a friend is to be one.”  
Citing this passage, historian Elizabeth Borgwardt describes this promise as a “New Deal for 
the world”:  “Here was the promise not only of a new American foreign policy but of a new 
vision for the world.”1 Her studies led her to conclude that there were 
connections among foreign policy, national culture, and public 
opinion in a democracy, in the specific historical context of 
mid-1940s America … [that] worked in tandem to effect a 
particular kind of transformation, linking a new, integrated 
definition of human rights to the realization of a fuller, more 
robust vision of the national interest. … [W]e might define the 
national interest in terms of values — including the values that 
we now group under the rubric of human rights.2 
Borgwardt argues that this new, multilateralist perspective inhered in a number of 
U.S.-promoted initiatives undertaken by the Roosevelt administration during World War II, 
pursuant to the Atlantic Charter declaration3 made by FDR and Winston Churchill to define 
their aspirations in its conduct and intended outcome: 
The ideology of the Atlantic Charter blueprint represented a 
new articulation of US national interests in the 1940s, 
expressed concretely through three sets of contentious 
international negotiations. The policy architecture of the United 
Nations, the IMF and World Bank, and the Nuremberg trials 
was designed both to manage the transition from war to peace 
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and to shape the postwar world. These institutions set up 
mechanisms for promoting collective security, for stabilizing 
and coordinating international currency transactions and 
economic development, and for advancing ideas about 
international justice. … 
After Nuremberg, individuals would be held directly 
accountable to the international community, at least in theory. 
After the founding of the United Nations, the IMF, and the 
World Bank, the international community would in turn be able 
to reach back through the boundaries of state sovereignty to 
protect individuals or impose norms. The crushing impact of 
the war had reconfigured two of the most enduring 
constructions of the Enlightenment, the individual and the 
nation-state. Not only were traditional boundaries blurred, but 
new international entities would mean more players and a 
different playing field, as well as new rules and new goals.4 
Borgwardt concludes that such new articulations of purpose 
helped the major multilateral institutions of the World War II 
era garner the legitimacy they needed to challenge traditional 
conceptions of state sovereignty.5 
 These very challenges were soon to undermine FDR’s multilateralist vision in the 
darkening days after his death in April 1945. Among the “new players” in the international 
dimensions of U.S. cultural policy were domestic political interests who saw these emerging 
international institutions and values as threats to sub-national “states’ rights.” These fears 
were fanned by perceptions that Stalin’s Soviet Union and Communism generally continued 
to be  central domestic threats. 
 Just as the Federal Theatre embodied the height of New Deal achievement in 
domestic cultural policy, this emerging international architecture proved to be the high-water 
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mark of democratic vision in global U.S. cultural policy. How it came undone — 
transforming from multilateral vision, to bipolar threat, then unilateral action — is a story 
worth exploring in some detail, as it created a false perception of threat that warped 
American cultural policy in both national and international contexts, defining the Cold War. 
STRAINED BEDFELLOWS: RESURRECTING THE SOVIET THREAT 
 Much has been written of the reemergence of strained relations among the World War 
II Allies as attention began to turn toward postwar planning. The dissolution of the 
Comintern during the War had reassured many that Stalin was abandoning earlier ambitions 
of promoting international communism: his wartime expressions of concern that Eastern 
European governments bordering on the Soviet Union be “friendly” seemed rational to 
Western leaders, in light of the Soviet Union’s recent history of repeated invasions, and not 
incompatible with reasonable allowance for self-determination along Western lines. 
 By the end of 1945, however, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was writing 
Walter Lippman of his concern regarding a report he had commissioned on the question of 
“whether we are dealing with a nation or a religion” in the case of the Soviet Union. His 
report, delivered early in 1946, was inconclusive. Less than a month later, in February 1946, 
Stalin delivered what historian John Lewis Gaddis describes as “a rare public speech in 
which he stressed the incompatibility of communism and capitalism,” setting off a public 
round of speculation in the U.S. press and political circles. Optimists averred Stalin was 
simply trying to build support in his own country for the three new Five-Year Plans he called 
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for in the same speech, so that “our [will] be insured against any eventuality.”6 Others were 
less sanguine about Stalin’s intentions. 
Fearful interpretations were supported by news reports one week after Stalin’s speech 
that Canadian authorities had made twenty-two arrests in an alleged case of espionage to 
convey A-bomb secrets to the Soviets. J. Edgar Hoover confirmed these reports before a 
Senate committee a few days later, and a fresh fever of anti-communist feeling followed. 
George Kennan’s famous cable from Moscow — his “long telegram” — arrived at the State 
Department another week further on, misread in Kennan’s later view in the passionate 
atmosphere of gathering anti-Soviet feeling.7 
 Gaddis tracks the sobering denouement in American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
in the remainder of 1946, a crucial turning-point year in Cold War history. Underlying the 
shift in administration policy was a deeper one in American public opinion: Gaddis cites a 
Fortune poll in September 1945, in which fewer than twenty-five percent expected the 
Soviets to try to spread communism in Eastern Europe, in contrast to the results of one 
conducted in July 1946, when more than half believed the Kremlin wanted to dominate as 
much of the world as possible.8 By March 1946, seventy-one percent of those polled 
expressed disapproval of the policy they saw the Soviet Union as pursuing in world affairs.9 
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 This shift in public opinion occurred as U.S. Foreign Service officials hardened their 
positions to wards Moscow, after Kennan’s “long telegram” arrived. Soon after, Secretary of 
State Byrnes expressed a more militant stance in defending the U.N. Charter’s proscription 
against “force or the threat of force,” “station[ing] troops,” “seiz[ing] enemy property before 
reparations agreements had been made,” and other actions ascribed to the U.S.S.R. in 
Byrnes’s February speech before the Overseas Press Club in New York. The Secretary 
warned his audience, “If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in 
order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.”10 
Byrnes’s speech was widely interpreted as a response to mounting Republican 
criticism of Truman’s foreign policy, articulated most energetically by Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, who by July 1946 was claiming to be “the major influence in changing the 
American attitude from ‘appeasement’ to firm resistance.” But Gaddis locates the origins of 
this shift within the administration itself, stemming from the Moscow Conference of 
December 1945 and extending into March of 1946. 
The period of late February and early March, 1946, marked a 
decisive turning point in American policy toward the Soviet 
Union. Prior to this time, Washington officials had frequently 
resisted Russian demands, but not on a consistent basis. As late 
as December, 1945, Byrnes was still operating on the 
assumption that Russia and the United States shared a common 
interest in settling outstanding difficulties. But by March of 
1946, widespread criticism of “appeasement” had made it clear 
to the Truman Administration that further compromises with 
Moscow would mean political disaster at home. … 
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Contemporary observers clearly saw the period as a pivotal 
one.11 
By the summer of 1946, internal efforts to reorient U.S. strategies had defined a new 
consensus laid out in the “Clifford memorandum,” which weighed in at a hefty 100,000 
words compared to only 8,000 in Kennan’s “long” telegram. Issued by presidential counsel 
Clark Clifford, the memorandum outlining a policy that reflected the hardline “realist” 
orientation that was to prevail throughout the Cold War era: 
The language of military power is the only language which 
disciples of power politics understand. The United States must 
use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that 
our government is determined to uphold the interests of its 
citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and 
concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of 
weakness and they are encouraged by our “retreats” to make 
new and greater demands.12 
Truman’s new policy came to be called “patience with firmness,” and his administration 
focused extensive diplomatic efforts through the balance of 1946 to securing postwar treaty 
agreements for Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland and to asserting a strong U.S. 
position in conflicts with the U.S.S.R. over its naval presence in Turkey and the eastern 
Mediterranean and occupation policies in Germany. 
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GETTING TOUGH WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
 Meanwhile, Kennan was trying to get the administration’s attention to what he saw as 
official Washington’s overblown interpretation of Soviet motives and of his own 
recommendations about U.S.-Soviet policy, in his not-long-enough telegram. As he wrote in 
an October 1946 to Admiral Harry Hill: 
I think it is a mistake to say that the Soviet leaders wish to 
establish a Communist form of government in the ring of states 
surrounding the Soviet Union …  What they do wish is to 
establish … governments amenable to their own influence and 
authority. The main thing is that these governments should 
follow Moscow’s leadership. … In certain countries which are 
already extensively under Soviet influence, as for example 
Poland, there has been as yet no effort to establish what we 
might call a Communist form of government. … It should 
always be borne in mind that for the Communist leaders, power 
is the main thing. Form is a secondary consideration. 
This memo — Kennan’s effort to clarify his earlier analysis — never reached the large, 
attentive, influential audience that attended to his famous telegram; and even more 
unfortunately, no such clarifications were incorporated into the most widely read version of 
his original analysis, the article attributed mysteriously to “X” when it was published later 
on, in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. Gaddis’s later assessment was that “[Kennan’s] 
lack of clarity had the effect … of confirming the growing suspicion in Washington that 
Stalin, like Hitler, would not stop until he dominated the entire world.”13 
 Domestic controversies surrounding the “get tough” policy led to conflict between 
Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, who criticized the stance, and Secretary of State 
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Byrnes, who supported it, leading to Wallace’s dismissal by Truman.14 Widespread feeling 
that the United States should effect “a return to small government, low taxes, and 
noninvolvement in events overseas” endangered Truman’s internationalist ambitions, 
inherited from FDR, and fed a Republican resurgence in the 1946 Congressional mid-term 
elections. State Department chief of public affairs Joseph Jones sent a memo to Assistant 
Secretary Benton late in February 1947 expressing his worry about the constraining actions 
of the new Republican Congress and calling for an immediate program “to inform the people 
and convince the Congress adequately with respect to today’s crisis … [T]he danger should 
be described fully and the cost of both action and inaction estimated.”15 
 Paradoxically, those closest to Truman found him energized, not deflated, by the 
apparent electoral setback of 1946. He seemed to dive into his official obligations with new 
vigor. Byrnes’s replacement as Secretary of State by General George Marshall also released 
pent-up frustration and lifted morale among many State Department subordinates who had 
felt Byrnes ignored them. But early in 1947, when Britain announced it could no longer 
adequately aid Greece and Turkey, Truman was challenged to step up personally. 
Congressional leaders were convened at the White House to be convinced that the 
U.S. should step into the breach. General Marshall’s dry depiction of the crisis failed to 
excite concern. Only Undersecretary Dean Acheson’s more impassioned impromptu plea got 
their attention — at least enough to convince them to invite the President to lay out an 
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acceptable public justification for U.S. action before the entire Congress: if he could, they 
might fall in line. 
[H]is advisors and Republican congressional leaders alike 
warned him that only a rousing, heavily rhetorical speech 
would win over wary legislators. As Republican Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg put it, Truman would have to “scare hell 
out of the American people.” Truman did just that … on March 
12, 1947.16 
TRUMAN’S DOCTRINE 
 This was the atmosphere in which Truman came to deliver the Congressional address 
that declared the “Truman Doctrine.” To prepare the president for the occasion, Marshall and 
Acheson set the State Department to work, convening information officers from State, War 
and the Navy to concoct the best case for military aid to the two states in question: the 
resulting paper recommended that Truman proclaim it to be “basic United States policy [to] 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures.” A media campaign was proposed “to bring about an understanding by the 
American people of the world strategic situation.” A few White House personnel raised 
concerns that “there has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which 
serves as an adequate pretext for [an] ‘all-out’ speech.” Gaddis also reports that “the draft 
appalled Kennan … [who] objected to placing it ‘in the framework of a universal policy 
rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a specific set of circumstances.’”17 
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 Thus was launched a formal public-education process that led generations of 
Americans and others around the world to view international relations in radically binary 
terms. Truman opened his Congressional address by depicting the world situation in terms of 
a bipolar struggle that would sustain the Cold War for more than four decades to come — 
foreshadowing even the post–Cold War “War on Terror”: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation 
must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice too 
often is not a free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, 
free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of 
speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. 
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and 
oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and 
the suppression of personal freedoms. 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to 
support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities of outside pressures.18 
Gaddis describes his sense that the die were cast at this crucial crossroads in U.S. foreign 
policy: 
By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an 
ideological conflict between two ways of life, Washington 
officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which 
was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an 
ideological straitjacket almost as confining as that which 
restricted Soviet foreign policy. Trapped in their own rhetoric, 
leaders of the United States found it difficult to respond to 
conciliatory gestures … following Stalin’s death and, through 
                                                
18 Ibid., 351, citing Truman Public Papers: 1947, 178-179. 
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their inflexibility, may well have contributed to the 
perpetuation of the Cold War.19 
 In fact, winning specific appropriations for Turkey and Greece required assurances 
that the Truman Doctrine was not to be a blanket rule: the U.S. government would not thus 
be obliged to support every people, everywhere, without reference to specific national 
interests, State Department witnesses promised. Support was being withheld from Chiang 
Kai-shek, after all. But Gaddis notes that the “fall” of China in 1949, the outbreak of the 
Korean War in 1950, and “the domestic onslaught of McCarthyism, would make it politically 
impossible for Truman and his successors to continue making such fine distinctions in 
formulating American foreign policy.” Instead, the public came to understand postwar 
geopolitics as involving an “ideological conflict between two ways of life, … a simplistic 
view of the Cold War which was … to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological 
straitjacket …”20 
THE HEGEMON INVENTS BIPOLARITY 
In 1945, Winston Churchill deployed classic British plural construction of the union 
in saying, “The United States stand at this moment at the summit of the world.” Where the 
Soviet Union was devastated by loss of life and the lion’s share of its industrial capacity, 
U.S. industry was primed by having supplied armaments to the allies and enjoyed truly 
hegemonic power. Historian David M. Kennedy described the nation’s standing at war’s end: 
                                                
19 Ibid., 352. 
20 Ibid., 352. 
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Americans commanded fully half of the entire planet’s 
manufacturing capacity and generated more than half of the 
world’s electricity. America owned two-thirds of the world’s 
gold stocks and half of all its monetary reserves. The United 
States produced two times more petroleum than the rest of the 
world combined; it had the world’s largest merchant fleet, a 
near monopoly on the emerging growth industries of aerospace 
and electronics, and, for a season at least, an absolute 
monopoly on the disquieting new technology of atomic 
power.21 
In stark contrast, the Soviet Union had weathered a devastating Nazi invasion, leaving much 
of its industrial capacity in ruins and its population depleted by millions of casualties, 
compounded by millions more lost to Stalinist purges that had not yet come to light. 
 Only years later would the true facts of comparative power become known. The 
Soviet threat was an act of stagecraft. Nikita Khrushchev’s son Sergei, a rocket engineer, 
later revealed, “We threatened with missiles we didn’t have.”22 Gaddis revealed decades later 
that the Soviets could effectively launch only six missiles, a fact that came to be known to 
U.S. policymakers in the early days of the Kennedy administration; but since closing the 
fictitious “missile gap” had been a centerpiece of Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign 
(challenging Eisenhower’s assertions during the campaign that no such gap existed), its 
disavowal was rendered impolitic, though the truth was that Soviet nuclear capabilities “had 
never come close to surpassing those of the United States.”23 
                                                
21 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 
1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 856-857. 
22 Ibid., 69. 
23 Ibid., 73-74. 
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Gaddis speculates about the misunderstandings and misinterpretations that became 
the underpinning of four decades of belief in global bipolarity. 
It seems likely that Washington policy-makers mistook Stalin’s 
determination to ensure Russian security through spheres of 
influence for a renewed effort to spread communism … But the 
Soviet leader failed to make the limited nature of his objectives 
clear. … 
The United States had … a monopoly over the world’s most 
powerful weapon … Convinced that technology had given 
them the means to shape the postwar order to their liking, 
Washington officials assumed that these instruments would 
leave the Russians no choice but to comply. … The Russians 
… refused to be impressed … 
Frustrated … American leaders embarked on a new Russian 
policy during … 1946 … rebuilding its military forces … 
launch[ing] an ambitious program of economic assistance to 
nations threatened by communism. Administration officials 
found it necessary to exaggerate the Soviet ideological 
challenge in order to win support for these projects … 
That significant differences existed between the United States and the Soviet Union is 
undeniable. Gaddis lays these out quite clearly in The Cold War. The American Revolution 
“reflected a deep distrust of concentrated authority. Liberty and justice … could only come 
through constraining power.” In contrast, “The Bolshevik Revolution … involved the 
embrace of concentrated authority as a means of overthrowing class enemies and 
consolidating a base from which a proletarian revolution would spread throughout the 
world.” These opposite impulses led Gaddis to describe the United States as “plausibly … 
the freest society on the face of the earth” and the USSR as “the most authoritarian society on 
the face of the earth” at the end of World War II.24 
                                                
24 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 7-8. 
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 Gaddis summarizes the sequence of world events that seemed to support perceptions 
of Communist threat in world affairs after the Truman Doctrine had been declared: the Czech 
coup, Tito’s assertion of independence from Moscow, the Soviets’ acquisition of nuclear 
capability, and Mao’s victory in China, revelations of espionage in the United States, and 
North Korea’s invasion of the south.25 This short account portrays what Gaddis calls “an 
ever-deepening whirlpool of distrust” that caught national leaders whose “suspicions become 
self-reinforcing.”26 
Gaddis’s account emphasizes the importance of domestic politics in shaping foreign 
policy on both sides of the ideological divide: 
Internal influences in the Soviet Union — the search for 
security, the role of ideology, massive postwar reconstruction 
needs, the personality of Stalin — together with those in the 
United States — the ideal of self-determination, fear of 
communism, the illusion of omnipotence fostered by American 
economic strength and the atomic bomb — made the resulting 
confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers 
sought peace, but in doing so yielded to considerations which, 
while they did not precipitate war, made a resolution of 
differences impossible. 27 
 Like everyone else, Gaddis could not foresee the ultimate end of the Cold War from 
his 1972 desk. But by time he published his 2005 book, The Cold War, a certain measure of 
perspective had become possible: here, he concludes that the bipolar world order that had 
come to define the Cold War era was a politically expeditious fabrication. 
                                                
25 Ibid., 32-46 
26 Ibid., 27. 
27 Ibid., 355-356, 361. 
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THE SHADOW OF DEATH 
 The United States had of course unleashed a final, fatal terror in World War II that 
forever changed world culture: the mushrooming cloud of atomic weaponry that rose over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In its shadow blossomed bottomless fear, eroding whatever 
confidence might have arisen from the defeat of Asian and European fascism in World War 
II. Returning from a tour of ruined Berlin, Frankfurt and Darmstadt, and a presidential 
flyover of other devastated German cities, Truman spoke to the nation over the radio about 
the anxiety that his trip and fingering the atomic trigger had awakened in him: 
It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank 
God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we 
pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His 
purposes.28 
Even before the proliferation of these terrifying weapons lent it credibility, the nuclear threat 
seized humanity’s darkest imagination. As historian Paul Boyer observed, 
This awareness and the bone-deep fear it engendered are the 
fundamental psychological realities underlying the broader 
intellectual and cultural responses of this period. This primal 
fear of extinction cut across all political and ideological lines 
… [and] pervaded all society …29 
But this enormous anxiety remained ungrounded without some convincing enemy. 
Boyer cites theologian Reinhold Neibuhr’s argument, expressed in October 1945, well before 
fallout had become engrained in the nation’s lexicon, that the attempt to panic people into 
                                                
28 Harry S. Truman, “Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference,” 
August 9, 1945. Downloaded from the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, 13 March 
2013, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=104. 
29 Boyer, 15. 
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support for internationalist solutions was “a serious misreading of human nature.” As 
Niebuhr wrote, “ultimate perils, however great, have a less lively influence upon the human 
imagination than immediate resentments and frictions, however small by comparison.”30 
Requiring a earthly enemy, 
powerful figures in government, the foreign-policy elite, the 
media, and ultimately the American people succumbed to an 
intense and all-pervasive anticommunist ideology that 
perceived communism as a monstrous and monolithic global 
conspiracy centered in Moscow and bent upon world 
domination.31 
TIME FOR JOHN FOSTER DULLES 
Even while the White House continued to pursue the “Baruch plan” — an idealistic 
proposal to hand America’s nuclear secrets over to an international entity in the newborn 
United Nations structure — Cold Warrior John Foster Dulles’s two-part article in Life 
magazine focused U.S. readers’ attention on his notion of a Russia bent on world domination, 
driving a stake into the heart of the multilateralist Security Council at whose table this devil 
sat. Life publisher Henry Luce wrote the future Secretary of State, 
I can think of no articles in my experience in journalism which 
so definitely accomplished a job. For a great many people, 
directly and indirectly, your article ended all doubts as to the 
inescapable reality of the Russian-Communist problem.32 
                                                
30 Ibid., 72. 
31 Ibid., 101. 
32 Ibid., 102. 
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The devil dwelt in the mysterious, devastated plains of distant Russia. Might Americans 
withdraw to an older stance of isolation from the fearsome postwar world? Somehow, the 
threat required cultivation closer to home. 
This climate of perception provided the backdrop against which Senator Joe 
McCarthy would make his first forays into anti-communist campaigning. Here we find the 
emergent force within America’s own heart against which George Kennan, the architect of 
containment, warned in a 1947 address to a War College audience:  
[T]here is a little bit of the totalitarian buried somewhere, way 
down deep, in each and every one of us. It is only the cheerful 
light of confidence and security which keep this evil genius 
down. … If confidence and security were to disappear, don’t 
think that he would not be waiting to take their place.33 
This erosion of confidence and security among the American people was the centripetal force 
of the Cold War.
                                                
33 Ibid., 46. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DOMESTIC ANTI-COMMUNISM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 
Domestic anti-communists did not wait for foreign policymakers to conclude that the 
Soviet Union or international communism posed a threat to the United States. As mentioned 
earlier, what had been known as the Dies Committee in the Thirties was made a standing 
committee of the House of Representatives in 1945, and the House Un-American Activities 
Committee was thus poised to carry out its best-known work. 
Significant among those in Washington who had never been duped by the U.S.S.R.’s 
elevation to World War II’s Grand Alliance was J. Edgar Hoover. 
He remained fixated on Communists rather than Nazis even 
during the darkest days of the war, and as Americans braced 
for ideological conflict with Communism after 1945, his mania 
began to look more like vigilance. … Convinced that the battle 
would turn on public opinion, he used the FBI to fight a war of 
information. The Bureau trained its field agents to cultivate a 
nationwide anti-Communist consensus by working with local 
media groups. It leaked intelligence estimates to anti-
Communist allies like HUAC and established liaisons with 
Hollywood studios, who subsequently reintroduced the image 
of the heroic, anti-Communist G-man to American moviegoers. 
Hoover and HUAC did briefly bide their time, however, before coming together formally. 
Their patience eventually wore out as the White House and State Department continued to 
worry about postwar strategies. Hoover finally arranged an appearance before the 
Congressional committee on March 26th, 1947: 
Upset by what he perceived as Truman’s unwillingness to take 
the Communist threat seriously, Hoover decided to appear 
before some of the president’s archenemies in Congress. … 
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The testimony proved well timed and influential, forming a 
blueprint that other anti-Communists followed well into the 
1950s … Communism, he informed them, was a psychic and 
spiritual disease capable of quick transmission. Like a virus, it 
would infiltrate the American host and destroy it from the 
inside.1 
In fairly short order, HUAC produced a series of propaganda pieces alerting teachers 
and civic leaders of the domestic threat of Communism through its “influence in this country 
as a whole, on religion, on education, on labor, and in our government.” The Committee 
showed its strategic hand by warning of Communist efforts to “tilt public sentiment their way 
by propaganda in art, literature, and music,” though pointing out “it was only a sideline to 
their main job. … Espionage.”2 
 The following year, HUAC produced a set of five pamphlets — the first entitled “The 
100 Things You Should Know About Communism in the U.S.A.,” followed by four more 
focusing on religion, education, labor, and government. The fifth issue in the series opened 
with a stark warning: 
Our government is under attack. The enemy is Communism. If 
Communism were to win, there would be no United States 
Constitution, Courts, President, or Congress. 
This pamphlet’s Congressional authors promised “the facts on what Communism has already 
done to, and aims to do to, the Government of the United States.”3 HUAC produced a 
                                                
1 Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle against 
Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 85-86. 
2 U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities, Ibid., 10. 
3 House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, “100 Things You Should 
Know About Communism and Government” (1948), accessed at 
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complementary 144-page pamphlet listing Communist and Communist Front organizations.4 
Answering its own Question 36, the Committee called November 16, 1933 — the date of 
Roosevelt’s formal recognition of the Soviet government — as the turning point “when 
[Communists within and without began] to invade OUR government,” which “ended the 
futile first phase of Communist activity in this country and a second far more deadly 
development got underway.” Proceeding directly to the Committee’s own leading question 
37 — “What was that?” — HUAC’s pamphlet reflects Martin Dies’ earlier work by referring 
to “The famous ‘Trojan Horse’ or ‘United Front’ program” that encouraged Party members 
to avoid references to violent revolution and instead to “DO more toward corrupting from 
within.”5 
 With such marching orders as these, domestic anti-communists launched multiple 
campaigns that would forever change the course of American culture and history and that of 
the world in which the United States held hegemonic power. Their furious effect was felt 
quite quickly. As Boyer wrote decades later, 
… [T]he horror of the atomic bomb had given way to an 
interval of diminished cultural attention and uneasy 
acquiescence in the goal of maintaining nuclear superiority 
over the Russians. … With Washington setting the pace, 
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4House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, “Citations by Official 
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political paranoia swept the nation. Views that seemed in any 
way deviant or heterodox became suspect, if not downright 
dangerous. Hollywood writers were blacklisted; professors 
were forced to sign loyalty oaths. (Over 150 faculty members 
at the University of California were fired in 1949 for refusing 
to sign.) The National Education Association voted that no 
Communist should be permitted to be a teacher. “Labor 
leaders, liberals, Democrats, Republicans, and leading 
newspapers,” writes historian James Gilbert, “all contributed to 
defining rejected ideas as treasonous acts.” … Well before 
1950 — the year the notorious Internal Security Act, the 
Rosenberg trial, and the emergence of Senator Joe McCarthy 
— what David Caute calls “the Great Fear” — not of nuclear 
destruction, this time, but of communism — held the nation in 
its grip. … In September 1948, HUAC announced plans to 
investigate atomic scientists, Hollywood, and black leaders.6 
WITCH-HUNTERS HIT HOLLYWOOD 
 HUAC’s first target for show-trial treatment was the popular art of commercial 
cinema. With John E. Rankin of Mississippi as its chair, HUAC “began a cautious ‘probe’ of 
Hollywood” that continued under his successor, J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey. 
Hollywood was not the committee’s sole target, however: HUAC also attacked Roosevelt 
and Truman and their “New Deal bureaucracy,” singling out the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission, the Office of Price Administration, and the Department of Agriculture for “pro-
Russian propaganda.”7 Thus pressured, Truman issued Executive Order 9835 on March 22, 
1947, creating the federal Loyalty Review Board, which required all federal employees to 
                                                
6 Boyer, 103-104. 
7 Alvah Bessie, Inquisition in Eden (New York: Seven Seas Books, 1967), 186. 
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make a loyalty oath.8 Questioning loyalty became HUAC’s most important weapon in its war 
against the movies. 
Committee investigators traveled to Hollywood that May to question various figures 
in the film community about the loyalty of industry personnel. Studio honcho Jack L. Warner 
was alleged to have “named names” of potentially subversive personnel in an executive 
session at the Biltmore Hotel. Within a few days, Chairman Thomas announced that the 
Roosevelt administration had required “patriotic” film stars to appear on “pro-Russian” films 
during the war, charging that the film industry had become a “Red propaganda center” 
through the liaison of Joseph E. Davies, former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. The recently 
created Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals — which had only 
recently been “resoundingly condemned in public meetings by representatives of most of the 
studio unions as being not only anti-Semitic and anti-labor but Fascist” — called for an 
investigation of Hollywood. HUAC quickly obliged.9 
 Nineteen Hollywood professionals were summoned before Thomas’s committee in 
late October 1947. The HUAC playbook was in full force, though in this case (unlike that of 
the Federal Theatre) the hearings themselves were not only open to a public audience, but 
also heavily covered in the media, thanks in part to the appearance of such luminaries as 
Lauren Bacall and Humphrey Bogart. Only eleven of those subpoenaed actually testified: 
playwright Bertolt Brecht and ten others who quickly became known as “The Unfriendly 
Ten,” and later more simply as “The Hollywood Ten.” “Friendly” witnesses had already 
                                                
8 Fried, 68. 
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alleged that the Screen Writers’ Guild was Communist-dominated. Since the Committee had 
further stated that the Communist Party was not a political party, but rather a Moscow-
directed international conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government by force and violence, 
these charges took a treasonous twist. 
The “unfriendly” Ten, after extensive legal consultation and strategizing through the 
summer and fall, decided that the Committee’s investigation into film artists’ union and 
political affiliations should be attacked as an unconstitutional breach of their First 
Amendment freedom of association and that they would not answer any of the Committee’s 
questions about their affiliations. Long after all of the Hollywood Ten had served time in 
federal prisons for contempt of Congress, writing about the experience and its fallout in 
1965, long screenwriter Alvah Bessie observed, 
When I think back today, it occurs to me (as it has many times 
in the last seventeen years) that very few people … understood 
the position we took before that Committee, despite the endless 
statements we issued during the years 1947-1950 … The 
assertion has often been made, for example: “Any American 
should be proud to stand up and say what he believes in,” and 
the assertion has a certain specious cogency. … But we had 
decided to challenge, for the first time in its sordid history, the 
very basis of the Committee’s existence and the validity of its 
mandate. 
It was the Hollywood Ten’s audience that proved most unfriendly. Bessie remembered that 
“the Committee was not in the least interested in anything we had to say. It was interested in 
intimidating — and controlling — the motion-picture industry, and it succeeded.”10  
                                                
10 Bessie, 16-17 and 193-194.  
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 HUAC’s hearings triggered the era of the Hollywood blacklist. Beyond the 
imprisonment of the Hollywood Ten (after expensive, unsuccessful appeals), no government 
action was required, for the industry itself had already quickly closed ranks in order to escape 
any public controversy over its being perceived as “un-American.”11 Major film producers 
and financiers gathered in a secret meeting of the Motion Picture Association of America in 
November at New York City’s Waldorf-Astoria, on the very day that Rep. Thomas secured 
contempt of Congress citations for the Hollywood Ten (by a lopsided House vote of 346-17) 
for their invocation of the First Amendment in refusing to identify their associations. The 
MPAA’s public statement the next day was simultaneously an assurance of punishment, an 
acknowledgement of the cost of censorship, a commitment to self-police nevertheless, and a 
denial of the problem: 
We will forthwith discharge or suspend without compensation 
those in our employ, and we will not re-employ any of the ten 
until such time as he is acquitted, or has purged himself of 
contempt, and declared under oath that he is not a Communist. 
… We are frank to recognize … the danger of creating an 
atmosphere of fear. Creative work at its best cannot be carried 
on in an atmosphere of fear. To this end we will invite the 
Hollywood talent guilds to work with us to eliminate any 
subversives. … Nothing subversive or un-American has 
appeared on the screen.12 
                                                
11 The irony, in the context of international cultural policy, of the motion-picture industry 
being identified as “un-American” could not be any thicker: it is considered abroad to be a 
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“Reagan & Unesco: Freedom & Culture,” Cultural Democracy 25 (Baltimore, MD: 
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12 Bessie, 246 and 248-249. 
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Despite their denial of any wrongdoing, and their commitment to avoid fostering an 
atmosphere of fear, the producers confirmed HUAC’s version of present danger and enlisted 
all of Hollywood in rooting out subversion. The witch-hunt was on. 
 Meanwhile, as the Hollywood Ten exhausted their right to appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sidestepped the First Amendment issue their squadron of lawyers raised, voting 6-2 not 
to hear their cases, despite the filing of more than thirty amicus briefs. (According to an 
associate of Bessie’s friendly with the justice, Felix Frankfurter commended these briefs 
privately as “brilliant and erudite.”) The Hollywood Ten were speedily dispatched to various 
federal penitentiaries to serve dulling, stigmatizing terms ranging from six months to a year. 
Ironically, HUAC Chairman Thomas soon found himself imprisoned with two of the Ten — 
Lester Cole and Ring Lardner, Jr. — in Danbury, Connecticut’s Federal Correctional 
Institution. Unlike any of the Ten, however, Thomas received a full pardon before President 
Truman left office.13 
The Supreme Court eventually did restore a measure of respect for the First 
Amendment. In 1957, the Court heard the case of John T. Watkins in a similar contempt-of-
Congress conviction. Chief Justice Earl Warren finally wrote, 
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of 
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of 
Congress. … Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial 
agency.  … No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to 
and in furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress, 
Investigations conducted solely for the aggrandizement of the 
investigators or to “punish” those investigated are indefensible. 
… The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all 
forms of government action.” 
                                                
13 Ibid., 273. 
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The stinger in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion came in the form of an apparently rhetorical 
question: “Who can define the meaning of ‘un-American’?”14 
But by the time of the Supreme Court’s 1957 ruling, a great deal more water had gone 
under HUAC’s bridge, to enormous and ultimately incalculable effect. The Committee 
conducted further investigations of film and theater professionals, writers, professors and 
teachers, political organizers, and many others in the cultural professions. State and local 
witch-hunts, mirroring those on display in Washington and aided by business and nonprofit 
institutions, cost innumerable American families their security and livelihood throughout this 
feverish time. HUAC was to remain active into the 1970’s, changing its name to the House 
Committee on Internal Security before its ultimate demise in the post-Watergate period. 
Taking a visible stand against communism became popular among members on 
Congress: in 1953, 185 of 221 Republicans taking office requested HUAC membership. And 
HUAC was not alone, even within Congress, in its attempts to enforce a domestic Cold War 
agenda. Many more initiatives were undertaken: in the 81st Congress, twenty-four probes into 
the influence and impact of communism were launched; in the 82nd, thirty-four; and in the 
83rd, fifty-one. Ironically, HUAC itself faded in the fever heat, shoved into the background of 
media attention by a master manipulator. 
“TAILGUNNER JOE“ 
Chief Justice Warren’s 1957 invocation of the “aggrandizement of the investigator” 
must certainly have been understood by then, as now, in reference to the by-then-deceased 
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Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy. McCarthy’s name has ever since been 
used to characterize not only this era of unbridled anti-communism, but also the phenomenon 
and technology of witch-hunting in general. Contemporary observer Richard Rovere, writing 
in 1959, could barely contain his vitriol in characterizing McCarthy as the master of Multiple 
Untruth and documenting the actions by which he earned this epithet. 
Though some have disputed this version of McCarthy’s “conversion experience,” 
Rovere recounts a generally accepted creation myth of Joe McCarthy’s anti-communist 
crusade: McCarthy asked a convivial group of fellow Catholics at a dinner in Washington’s 
Colony Restaurant in January 1950 to help him identify a signature issue for his 1952 re-
election campaign. One fellow diner suggested the St. Lawrence Seaway, apparently too 
boring. But gold was struck by another — Father Walsh, founding director of Georgetown’s 
School of Foreign Service, arguably the capital’s most influential and longstanding anti-
communist — who expressed his decades-long concern over the dangerous power of 
international communism. It was his own idea of communism’s domestic threat that instantly 
got McCarthy lathered up, though. In Rovere’s reconstruction, based on an anonymous 
participant’s account, McCarthy exclaimed, “That’s it. … The government is full of 
communists. … We can hammer away at them.” Reportedly, once the dinner party adjourned 
to one of the participant’s offices, “McCarthy was warned of the dangers of an irresponsible 
approach to these matters. … Within a matter of months, all three of his companions on that 
evening felt called upon to repudiate him.”15 
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 McCarthy famously spared neither hammer nor sickle in his careening assault on the 
communist bogeyman. Barely one month after the Colony Restaurant dinner, he spoke first 
to a Republican ladies club in Wheeling, West Virginia, then immediately flew to gatherings 
in Salt Lake City and Reno. In all three settings, he referred to “having a list” of insiders 
conspiring against the U.S. government. He bandied about different numbers on each and 
every occasion, and in every confrontation with the press. McCarthy quickly brought his 
enthusiastic condemnation back to Senate floor — still less than two months after that dinner 
— inciting his fellow senators to launch an investigation as to “whether persons disloyal to 
the United States are or have been employed by the Department of State.”16 
 Rovere’s contempt for McCarthy’s penchant for lying, which he depicts as a lifelong 
pattern, could hardly have been more profound. McCarthy had won his Congressional seat 
with tales of wartime bravery, using the campaign moniker “Tailgunner Joe” though he never 
operated a tail gun. Rovere shored up his conclusion with inventories of others who shared 
his distrust. McCarthy’s undistinguished and questionable performance in the Senate, Rovere 
argues, had repelled such potential anti-communist allies as senators Karl Mundt, Owen 
Brewster, Robert Taft, Kenneth Wherry, and Richard Nixon, as well as crusading journalist 
Eugene Lyons. But as McCarthy’s bizarre public proclamations won headlines, this aversion 
to the junior senator rapidly changed: 
McCarthy was, within a matter of weeks, to become pure gold 
— a partisan with a bipartisan following. … He was crude, he 
was unwashed, he was unversed in the [veteran anti-
Communist] theology, but what did this matter in so long [sic] 
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as he had the ear of the people and was able to be heard when 
he said the stables needed cleaning? 
 In almost no time, it became evident that he did have 
the ear of the people.17 
  In response to McCarthy’s tirade on the Senate floor, Millard Tydings of Maryland, 
Democratic chair of the Committee on the Armed Services, quickly launched a Senate 
investigation that stretched on from March to July of 1950. McCarthy was sworn as the 
subcommittee’s first witness on March 7th and devoted a day-and-a-half to a single case 
against a State Department employee — a woman who had in fact never worked there: Judge 
Dorothy Kenyon of New York, a tireless joiner of organizations, including a number of 
“Communist front groups,” each of which she had left (though McCarthy never said so). In 
four more days, he named ten more people, citing no evidence. Tydings pressed him to make 
formal charges, so evidence could be procured; but McCarthy replied, “I am not making 
charges. I am giving the committee information of individuals who appear by all the rules of 
common sense as being very bad security risks.”18 
Senator Tydings implored President Truman to release federal personnel files on 
those accused by McCarthy, despite an executive order forbidding delivery of any such 
records to Congress. Truman relented, but McCarthy charged that Truman’s delivery was “a 
phony offer of phony files” that had been “raped and rifled.” J. Edgar Hoover himself 
attested to the files’ integrity; but by this time, McCarthy had already changed his tactics, 
promising on Friday, March 10th that he would bring evidence against someone in “an 
                                                
17 Ibid., 136. 
18 Ibid., 148-149. 
  145 
important post” the following Monday. McCarthy tried to avoid that hearing, but pinned 
down by the Committee, told its members he had come with four names: one in the Navy, 
two in State, and one — Owen Lattimore — a professor at Johns Hopkins University 
(“probably the most celebrated of all of his cases”). But still, McCarthy brought no evidence, 
and no formal charges were made: only McCarthy’s assertion that Lattimore was “an 
extremely bad security risk.” Rovere outlines the pattern of innuendo that followed, taking 
advantage of Lattimore’s interest in Communism (though he had not been a Party member 
himself) and the fact that his writing on Far Eastern affairs was well-known to State 
Department personnel (as it was to anyone else interested in the subject at the time, as many 
were): this was styled by McCarthy as making Lattimore “the chief architect of our Far 
Eastern policy.” Through mere repetition, despite the lack of evidence or specificity, Rovere 
holds that McCarthy’s charges “acquired a validity.”19 
 Nevertheless, the Tydings Committee issued an “interim” report in mid-July that said 
McCarthy had imposed a “fraud and a hoax” upon the Senate. Was this McCarthy’s day of 
reckoning? Rovere calls it merely “a brief eclipse,” with all of Washington and the nation 
distracted by the start of the Korean War: 
Starting with nothing, Senator McCarthy plunged headlong 
forward, desperately seeking to develop some information 
which colored with distortion and fanned by a blaze of bias 
would forestall the day of reckoning. 
                                                
19 Ibid., 150-153. 
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The Tydings committee’s report gave the State Department a clean slate, but the 
Committee’s two Republican members refused to sign it.20  
 McCarthy soon won revenge, however, working behind the scenes to assure that 
Tydings was defeated in that fall’s mid-term election, through a campaign on behalf of his 
opponent, John Marshall Butler.21 A phony photograph was produced, showing Tydings in a 
fictional tête-à-tête with Communist Party leader Earl Browder. McCarthy staff member 
arranged to have a half-million postcards handwritten by Baltimore housewives mailed to 
Maryland voters: the $11,000 price tag, violating a Maryland law limiting campaign 
expenditures to $5,000, later drew censure by the Rules Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Privileges and Elections; but by this time, Butler had already taken Tydings’ seat.22 
 By the fall of 1950, McCarthy returned enthusiastically to public-accusation mode, 
demanding Dean Acheson’s resignation and Harry Truman’s impeachment, and peddling 
false accusations of former-Communism to derail the appointment of one Anna Rosenberg as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense. (Her accusers had confused the accused New Yorker with a 
woman of the same name on the West Coast who’d attended a Communist literary gathering 
twenty years earlier.) McCarthy physically assaulted Drew Pearson, which led to further 
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feuding and grew into a highly publicized libel suit. But time and again, Rovere documents 
McCarthy’s ability to turn potentially bad press into useful publicity, taking advantage of a 
press that preferred “fact” to “truth,” and argues that McCarthy excelled at using the “fact” of 
his allegations to mask the reality that they were not true. Rovere quotes Elmer Davis on the 
problem of keeping up with McCarthy’s fact-free — that is, untrue — improvisations: “I 
can’t afford a full-time specialist to keep up with what McCarthy has said.” That McCarthy 
had said something became all the facts that any press would print and was certainly 
considered “news” worth headlining. 
 In 1951, McCarthy boldly attacked General George Marshall, then serving as 
Secretary of State, and regarded by some as the “greatest living American” of the time, due 
to his military leadership during World War II. McCarthy’s “speech” to the Senate was never 
actually delivered — Rovere questioned whether McCarthy had ever read it — but arrived on 
its secretary’s desk as a whopping 60,000-word manuscript, then entered the Congressional 
Record. (It was later published and widely circulated as a book, America’s Retreat from 
Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall.) Rovere characterizes this assault as a 
massive Multiple Untruth, a revisionist history indicting Roosevelt for recognizing the 
U.S.S.R. in 1933 and not focusing single-mindedly on stemming Soviet power. President 
Truman did not defend Marshall, who resigned from public life by the end of the year. 
Rovere notes that in the atmosphere of the time, “Marshall was no longer unassailable. No 
one was.”23 
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 The years from 1951 to 1954 represent the zenith of McCarthy’s careening career. 
After the Republican victory in 1952 — which McCarthy celebrated by saying, “It will no 
longer be necessary for me to conduct a one-man fight” — wary Senate leaders sought to 
contain him with an assignment to Government Operations, rather than naming him chair of 
HUAC’s main Senate collaborator, the Internal Security Committee. The tactic failed, 
though, as McCarthy’s personal bully pulpit proved both portable and resilient: he effectively 
abandoned his own chair in favor of concentrating on a subcommittee he created to 
investigate homosexuality and communism in government. McCarthy hired Roy M. Cohn 
(not incidentally a closeted homosexual) as Chief Counsel to the subcommittee and 26-year-
old David Schine (scion of a hotel fortune, since immortalized in Tony Kushner’s Angels in 
America) as its Chief Consultant. Cohn and Schine essentially ran the subcommittee in 1953, 
starting with an investigation of the Voice of America, left hanging as the two conducted a 
notorious European junket, visiting International Information Administration reading centers 
and consorting with an odd cast of international Cold War characters.24 
Two months later, back home from Europe, Schine was drafted into the Army, and an 
irritated McCarthy began agitating for preferential treatment, demanding that Schine be 
assigned back to his Senate staff position: this tactic eventually succeeded. But the conflict 
led to what Rovere described as “the revenge that Cohn and McCarthy took on the Army”: 
the fateful Army-McCarthy hearings.25 
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 These televised hearings attracted an overwhelming and unprecedented twenty 
million viewers. This national stage provided the occasion for Senator McCarthy’s undoing. 
The climactic moment came when Army counsel Joseph Welch, frustrated by McCarthy’s 
badgering attacks on Fred Fisher, a young lawyer in Welch’s own Boston firm — and 
admittedly once a member of the suspect National Lawyers’ Guild — complained, “Have 
you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?” Spontaneous 
applause burst out from the audience in the chamber. The fever had apparently somehow 
broken. 
The Army-McCarthy hearings snapped shut on June 17th with results inconclusive. 
The Senate took its time to construct a proper repudiation of its junior member from 
Wisconsin, but finally took action on December 2nd, voting 67-22 to “condemn” McCarthy 
for “obstructing the constitutional processes of the Senate.” Facing a similar vote at the 
beginning of 1954, only William Fulbright had dared be counted against McCarthy. Clearly, 
the climate — in the Senate at least — had rather suddenly changed.26 
 After his censure, McCarthy made a “public apology … to the American people” — 
not for his witch-hunting campaign, but for supporting Eisenhower in the 1952 election. 
Rovere abandons detailing McCarthy’s story at this point, as did the nation, in favor of 
summary statement: “In the two and half years that remained of his life, he made only a few 
spiritless, irresolute attempts at a comeback,” finally dying in 1957 of “hepatitic failure.” 
Rovere concludes that “his last drinking bouts, … which were said to be formidable, were 
fatal,” then passes his final judgment: that his collapse after 1954 revealed that “McCarthy, 
                                                
26 Ibid., 219, 221-222, 229-230, and 237. 
  150 
though a demon himself, was not a man possessed by demons. His talents as a demagogue 
were great, but he lacked the most necessary and awesome of demagogic gifts — a belief in 
the sacredness of his own mission.”27 
THE MAN & THE MOVEMENT 
 McCarthy’s humiliation emboldened critiques by numerous contemporary 
commentators. Rovere conveniently summarizes a number of their theories as to why such a 
man as he could ignite such excitement in the American polity, arguing that he embodied 
several complementary movements impulses at work at that moment in U.S. history: 
Obviously, it was a product of “forces” — not a single living 
creature. “McCarthyism was a by-product of the Cold War,” 
Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote. “McCarthyism is both a 
movement supported by certain vested-interest elements and a 
popular revolt against the upper classes, Talcott Parsons … 
explained. “McCarthyism is the revenge of the noses that for 
twenty years of fancy parties were pressed against the outside 
window pane,” Peter Vierick wrote … Walter Lippmann and 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., saw it as a resurgence of the 
isolationism of the thirties. Samuel Lubell saw it as an attempt 
to punish those whom many Americans held to be responsible 
for a whole host of rights and wrongs, going back to our 
intervention in World War I. Richard Hofstadter felt that the 
roots went back to Midwestern and Southern populism of the 
[nineteenth] century. … Edmund R. Murrow summed up what 
was common to all these analyses: “Cassius was right: ‘The 
fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves.’” 
As to why this terrifying “tail gunner” could bring such forces into focus, Rovere explains, 
“When a demagogue finds a grievance of a fault, he exploits it. That is the nature of the 
beast. … The grievances and discontents were all there before he came along. … The fault, 
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we must surely know, was always in ourselves, but he was close to being a genius in bringing 
it out.”28 
 Rovere quotes one other commentator, Norman Thomas, who celebrated his 70th 
birthday in November 1954 with his own reflections on what he hopefully thought had been 
the end of the McCarthy era: 
In spite of all this, there has been a saving common sense about 
our democracy. … [The] end has always been victory for 
comparative reason and decency. The struggle against 
demagoguery scarcely fits the St. George-against-the-dragon 
myth. … Our democratic St. George goes out rather reluctantly 
with armor awry. The struggle is confused; our knight wins by 
no clean thrust of lance or sword, but the dragon somehow 
poops out, and decent democracy is victor. 
That there was no bold, clean resistance to McCarthy is clear, and Rovere’s account 
captures the difficulty in getting a grip on such a slippery character. But ultimately, Rovere is 
left to speculate about the reasons for his demise, suggesting only that “McCarthy may have 
suffered an interior collapse because he sensed futility.”29 At long last, he might finally have 
shared that enormous hopelessness he so successfully engendered in his countless, helpless 
victims. 
The televisual record makes attorney Joseph Welsh appear more the sensible 
Everyman than Norman Thomas’s imaginary Saint George, suggesting that the drunken 
dragon finally felt he could lie no longer, much less breathe fire. Perhaps the unprecedented 
televising of the Army-McCarthy hearings gave TV’s emerging mass audience a glimpse of 
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this sinister, blue-faced bully that even a child could understand. (This is perhaps my own 
earliest TV memory.) Recalling the credit given to bad makeup and a less than charismatic 
appearance in the televised Kennedy-Nixon debates not long after, one wonders if the 
American Right was thwarted more by not-enough-pancake — a problem now partially 
surmounted by the Fox News make-up department and better-looking running mates. 
WITCH-HUNTING BEYOND THE SPOTLIGHTS 
 However large he loomed over the landscape of American anti-communism, Joe 
McCarthy was unfortunately not alone. In fact, what made McCarthy so singular was his 
choice to step into the bright light of media attention. More often, witch-hunters operated 
more covertly, avoiding detection, spreading rumors in lieu of calling press conferences. 
McCarthy was not the only anti-communist senator, nor was HUAC the only House 
committee to catch the anti-communist bug. They had their own fellow travelers in state 
legislatures and city and county councils throughout the land, as well as in countless library 
and school boards, churches and religious associations, and colleges and universities. Many 
limited their bullying to community rooms and meeting halls where simple stage fright 
silenced their neighbors, fearful of the consequences even of truth-telling after reading of 
scriptwriters being imprisoned and suspected spies electrocuted. 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation offers the clearest example of more covert 
executive action in the domestic cultural arena. Hardly telegenic, J. Edgar Hoover was the 
gruff police chief in charge, networking and securing the cooperation of police agencies in 
every state, city, and rural region in the country. Other federal executive agencies played a 
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huge role in decentralizing the witch-hunting challenge. Though some blamed populist 
legislators for their acquiescence — Truman, for instance, reportedly called HUAC itself un-
American — acquiesce they did, not infrequently even initiating anti-communist action. 
Indeed, many campaigned on its platform. 
Promising Loyalty 
Perhaps the mightiest instrument of cultural enforcement in postwar American anti-
communism was the loyalty oath. This ritual of acquiescence quickly became de rigueur 
after President Truman required it of federal employees. The requirement may sound trivial 
— why not sign of an oath promising not to overthrow the United States? — but much more 
than this simple promise was involved. Here we find what historian Richard M. Fried 
described as the “bureaucratic component” of anti-communism, which “coursed with inner 
potency.”30 
In an unchecked and arbitrary executive process, the Justice Department created lists 
of organizations considered suspect, required employees to disclose their memberships and 
affiliations, then worked off these lists to identify and discharge individuals whose 
affiliations rendered them suspect. The requirement to disclose one’s associations was later 
ruled unconstitutional, but not until after the fever of anti-communism had somewhat 
subsided. As long as these requirements were in force, however questionable their 
constitutionality and the fairness of their enforcement, failure to disclose one’s associations 
constituted perjury, a time-tested legal offense. 
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The administration of loyalty oaths, widespread during World War I, had been 
exhumed in response to anti-communist reaction to the New Deal, then reinforced by the 
national-security necessities during World War II. The Truman administration did not refrain 
from bringing wartime oaths forward in peacetime, in reaction to growing anti-communist 
panic in the later Forties. President Truman’s Executive Order 9835, issued March 22, 1947, 
created the federal Loyalty Review Board. Hoover’s files had continued to multiply in the 
darkness after the Red Scare of 1919, and Attorney General Tom Clark used them to produce 
an official federal list of subversive organizations that spelled doom to countless Americans. 
Millions came quickly to regret their activism in the Thirties and even their urgings toward a 
peaceful postwar world in the dark days of the World War just ended, and the casualty-count 
was considerable. 
Over the next five years, about 20,000 government workers 
were investigated, some 2,500 resigned “voluntarily,” and 400 
were fired. Between 1945 and 1952, the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee, and other legislative committees conducted 
over eighty inquiries into domestic subversion.31 
President Eisenhower amped up the loyalty-oath apparatus after his 1952 election, 
issuing Executive Order 10450. His administration reported soon after that its 
implementation had required the dismissal of another 1,456 federal employees due to 
perceived loyalty issues. A kaleidoscope of state, municipal, and private-sector loyalty 
programs mirrored federal action: even private businesses instituted loyalty procedures, 
including the regional Bell companies and the Arthur Anderson financial organization. It has 
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been estimated that 13.5 million American workers — one in five — were directly involved 
in loyalty programs in 1955.32 
Cold War Stories 
 To understand the human impact of these loyalty programs, one must attend to the 
experience of citizens caught up in the resulting paranoid bureaucracy. Post-Sixties activism 
and later historic research brought many of these stories to the fore through oral history 
programs. World War II veteran James Kutcher’s story provides one example: 
Ever since I was discharged from the army, my parents and I 
had been living in a federal low-rent housing project in Newark 
… A few days before Christmas in 1952, my father got a letter 
from the Newark Housing Authority directing him to sign a so-
called loyalty oath within three days as a condition for living 
there. Congress had just passed an amendment that required all 
persons in federal low-rent housing to sign an oath that no one 
living in their apartment belonged to any of organizations on 
the attorney general’s “subversive” list. Failure to sign would 
mean an eviction. 
My father felt terrible. He didn’t belong to any of those groups, 
and he was perfectly willing to sign the oath. But he could not 
do that without perjuring himself because of my membership in 
the Socialist Workers Party. The price for keeping the 
apartment would be to break up the family. 
The Kutcher family decided to try both to comply with the law and to stay together, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit on their behalf. After three long years of 
litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court finally ruled that the family could not be evicted, 
but it refused to rule on the constitutionality of the loyalty requirements. Nevertheless, the 
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Kutchers’ unusual pursuit of litigation brought attention to what was going on behind closed 
doors throughout the United States: 
The hearing was the first time the press was allowed to attend a 
loyalty proceeding. The Washington Post reported on 
December 31, 1955: “The press saw a type of proceeding 
unlike anything that has come into public view. In this hearing 
there were no rules of procedure, no witnesses (except for the 
accused, Jim Kutcher), nor any facts to back up the charges 
against him except the charges themselves.” Early in 1956, the 
committee decided in my favor, but not in such a way as to 
clear me completely. 
“Through all this,” Kutcher pointed out, “the government never produced any evidence that I 
ever did anything unconstitutional.” 
 This housing-authority process was by no means Kutcher’s sole interaction with the 
government around loyalty-program requirements. In fact, even more serious actions had 
already taken place: 
Just about that time, in 1955, the government decided to cut off 
the disability pension that was my sole income. Again, it was 
said there were reasonable doubts about my loyalty. Now I was 
faced with the difficult task of disproving statements attributed 
to me by persons I couldn’t cross-examine. The government 
refused to produce them. 
The Kafkaesque quality of Kutcher’s experience with the loyalty program came into sharpest 
focus when he was asked if he had used force and violence at any time at his life. “Yes,” he 
admitted. “In the United States Army.” After landing in North Africa and “a year and a day” 
of combat in the Allied invasion of fascist Italy, Kutcher was wounded in a 1943 incident 
that took the life of a fellow soldier, earning him the Purple Heart but ending his active 
combat. After being released from Washington’s Walter Reed Hospital, he was hired by the 
Veterans Administration. “And that’s where I was fired from” in 1949, Kutcher later 
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recalled: he received a peremptory termination letter citing his membership in the Socialist 
Workers Party. The notice, he said, “stunned me more than anything I experienced during the 
war.” 
Kutcher decided to fight his Veterans Administration termination, but “What I had to 
do was prove I was not disloyal. This,” he observed, “reversed the normal judicial 
procedure.” He compared it to the Salem witches’ trials — “only they didn’t execute me. 
They just took my job away.” Kutcher’s fight wound up taking him to various cities to speak 
to local committees opposing the loyalty program —even to university audiences at Harvard 
and Yale — with the result that he was able to mobilize such well-known supporters as 
Eleanor Roosevelt, who wrote on his behalf to Attorney General Tom Clark, the creator of 
Truman’s first list in 1947; but even this high-level support did not short-circuit his job-
termination process with the VA: 
After an adverse decision before the branch loyalty board, we 
went to the VA loyalty board of appeal in Washington; then we 
appealed to the VA administrator, Carl Gray, Jr.; then to the 
top Loyalty Review Board of the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission. That exhausted all the administrative procedures. 
In 1950, we went to the federal district court in Washington. … 
The district court ruled against me, but the three-judge court of 
appeals handed down a unanimous decision in my favor. They 
didn’t rule on the constitutionality of the loyalty program …, 
but they said that on technical grounds the government had no 
right to fire me. 
Still, Kutcher did not thereby regain his job; he was merely added to the VA’s list of 
“suspended employees.” Kutcher and his ACLU attorneys decided to start over, reentering 
the federal court system again from the district level: 
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And the second time we came to the court of appeal, it was a 
two-to-one decision in my favor. The Veterans Administration 
had to give me back my job. Altogether this took about eight 
years. It took another two years, until 1958, to get some of my 
back pay.33 
How many other U.S. citizens found themselves in similar situations? There is no 
definitive count. Surely only a small percentage were able, as Kutcher was, to assemble for 
himself a “national nonpartisan committee” —including such luminaries as John Dewey, C. 
Wright Mills, and Linus Pauling — and a team of SWP legal advisors and ACLU lawyers to 
aid in his lengthy defense. Multiplying Kutcher’s experience by this unknown factor, the 
human cost, quite apart from the victims’ financial loss, is incalculable. 
 The Socialist Workers Party of which Kutcher was a registered member was an 
official political party that ran candidates in public elections. Others — like Philadelphia 
postal worker Arthur Drayton — had joined some local organization on Attorney General 
Tom Clark’s subversive-organization list for other reasons, personal and practical. Drayton 
had enrolled in the Philadelphia branch of the International Workers Order (IWO) in order to 
gain access to favorable insurance programs (as a black man in postwar America, Drayton 
had had difficulty finding fair and affordable life insurance, even as a federal employee), and 
also because he relished the kind of multi-ethnic, cross-racial socializing that went on there, 
all too rare at the time. The IWO was the only place where Drayton’s first plays, written after 
hours as a postal worker, were receiving readings before a community audience; the IWO 
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had also initiated an annual “Negro History Week” observance, and the Harlem Renaissance 
poet Langston Hughes once visited and spoken at the club. 
In response to a federal requirement that affiliations be listed when signing the oath, 
Drayton voluntarily listed his IWO membership. To Drayton’s surprise, when his 
Philadelphia post office job was threatened, this organization turned out to be included on the 
subversive-organization list. At his first hearing, 
They told me, “Well, if you got out, you wouldn’t be in this 
trouble,” which I took to mean that if I quite the IWO, they’d 
just let this thing go by. But later on I found out that if I had 
done that, if I hadn’t kept to my principles, I’d still be on the 
outside. 
Drayton was not as well connected as Kutcher became through his own very public legal 
struggle. Drayton did not have a supportive family to house him, and so tried relocating 
several times during his extended unemployment, moving from Philadelphia to New York 
City and back again. In retrospect, he said, “[M]y ‘stubbornness’ saved me. Although I was 
weak at times, I had the necessary strength to survive, thank God.” Drayton worked through 
the entire administrative bureaucracy more than once between his 1948 dismissal and the 
eventual restoration of his job in 1956; but the experience soured him on government service, 
and he retired as soon as he was able, in 1959. Nevertheless, he reported, “[T]he 
[government’s] harassment continued all through the sixties and seventies. … They were 
really intimidating me. … Mr. Hoover was a vengeful man, you know.”34 
 What Arthur Drayton was told by his first local hearing board — “If you got out, you 
wouldn’t be in this trouble” — conveys the implicit cultural learning and some of the cultural 
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impact of the loyalty program regime: any freedom one might theoretically possess in one’s 
associations had to be tempered with awareness of unknown but potentially fearsome future 
consequences. This was a message reinforced by other events and in such social movements 
as existed during the postwar period — civil rights activism being the most notable example 
— where local police, angry mobs, and even anonymous killers might be incited by another 
citizen’s decision to sit at a lunch counter or to attempt registering to vote. 
It is hard for anyone not alive at the time to imagine the extent and daily-life detail of 
conformist forces in the late Forties and Fifties; but these represent the greatest impact of the 
McCarthy era witch-hunts: a pervasive, stifling conformity in the nation’s cultural life. The 
social-change movements that came to characterize the Sixties and Seventies, and those that 
have continued since, are rooted in later generations’ efforts to override the enormous despair 
lurking beneath the American way of life. 
Criticizing Loyalty 
Loyalty programs did not go uncriticized, though opposition was slow in arising, 
considering the 1947 vintage of Truman’s decree. Journalist Edward R. Murrow televised a 
critical piece in October 1953 that focused on the case of Lieutenant Milo Radulovich, 
charged because of his sister’s and father’s perceived communist vulnerabilities: Radulovich 
was a weatherman — and not in the Sixties sense: a meteorologist in military service. His 
eloquence on Murrow’s show in discussing his loyalty-program problems, as well as the 
program’s depiction of his family’s anger and his own community’s support, shamed the 
Secretary of the Air Force into rescinding Radulovich’s security-justified sanction. But 
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Radulovich was but one exceptional case among many others, unique in winning public 
attention and redemptive action. 
Congressional Democrats began to resist when Eisenhower’s Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell subpoenaed former President Truman in the Fifties to address the charge 
that he should have been firing suspects of disloyalty from federal service as early as 1946: 
Truman refused to appear, but opposition to loyalty-review programs and outrage at abuses 
finally inspired the first congressional investigation in 1955. Since the actual domestic 
influence and threat of communism was so minuscule, loyalty-review programs had come to 
rely upon charges made by a sociopathic group of late-blooming former Communists 
(including infiltrators employed by law-enforcement agencies themselves) whose lack of 
credibility caused both the perceived threat and the loyalty apparatus itself to quickly wither 
in the heat and light of open examination.35 
The Supreme Court finally stepped in to unhinge the working parts of the loyalty 
apparatus after Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as Chief Justice. In 1955, the court ruled 
out congressional investigations that lacked an actual legislative aim — a slippery standard, 
but a standard nevertheless in a terrain previously completely vulnerable to grandstanding 
demagogues. In 1956, the court began questioning the extent of that terrain, holding that a 
fired food-and-drug inspector’s job was not “sensitive” in the national-security sense 
required by the 1950 enabling legislation upon which the current loyalty apparatus had been 
constructed. Further, the Court undermined state sedition laws rooted in the post–World War 
I Red Scare that were still on the books, on the basis that national security was properly a 
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federal function, thus precluding enforcement action by individual states. This ruling 
naturally aroused political reaction from the Right, among “states’ rights” advocates also 
exercised at the prospect on intervention in matters of race. 
 By 1957, the court recovered the Fifth Amendment rights of those who refused to 
testify in earlier witch-hunts, restored evidentiary standards precluding the use of “secret” 
files or condemnation by ex-communist “witnesses” in legal proceedings, and ruled out 
Smith Act provisions that framed mere political belief as any basis for establishing “clear and 
present danger” to the state (the judicial standard set during the nation’s first Red Scare). 
This ruling effectively ended the era of government prosecution by dismissing pending cases 
against eighty-one Communist Party leaders.36 
This historic moment can be seen as the middle ground of an important plank of the 
“new” American rights platform. Chief Justice Warren was targeted for blame, and agitators 
pressed for his impeachment. This reaction was not merely a fringe sentiment: President 
Eisenhower himself later confided that his biggest error while in office had been the 
appointment of “that dumb son of a bitch Earl Warren” to the Court. Though it had taken 
years to unfold, the Supreme Court had finally arrived by 1957 at that jurisprudential day that 
dissenting Justice Hugo Black had predicted in a 1951 dissent: “in calmer times,” he 
hopefully predicted, the court would “restore the First Amendment liberties to the high 
preferred place where they belong to a free society.”37 
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DOMESTIC SPYING & DIRTY TRICKS 
Just as the loyalty apparatus was coming unhinged, however, and public attention 
began to relax about the phantom of domestic American communism in favor of happily 
pursuing “the American Way,” a more sinister apparatus was being put in place. Richard M. 
Fried describes this as the historical moment at which “federal government agencies 
undertook a set of clandestine activities worthy of the secret police of the czars”: 
[W]hile anti-Communist extremism receded from outward 
public life, it had not ended. Indeed, the activities of the FBI 
and other intelligence agencies escalated sharply.38 
These were the sources of the harassment to which Arthur Drayton referred in telling his 
personal story, extending well into the Sixties and Seventies, and Drayton was by no means 
the only American targeted. In fact, he happens to be one of its victims who was nevertheless 
able to maintain a life of integrity and whose story was published, finally, in 1989. The FBI 
and its extensive national network of police agencies and surveillance programs — dating 
back to Hoover’s ascendance in the Palmer Raids — became notorious as the Fifties yielded 
to the much more activist climate of the Sixties and Seventies under its FBI code-name: 
COINTELPRO. 
 COINTELPRO was an acronym for the Counter Intelligence Program formally 
launched in August 1956, with agent William C. Sullivan in charge, which aimed to 
“increase factionalism, cause disruptions and win defections” from within the Communist 
Party U.S.A., already a negligible threat, but its framework steadily expanded to encompass 
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other forms of anti-establishment threat. In October, Director Hoover reclassified his 
agency’s ongoing surveillance of black activists as falling within COINTELPRO. After the 
1963 March on Washington, Sullivan focused even more relentlessly and specifically on 
Martin Luther King, Jr., writing internally, “In the light of King’s powerful demagogic 
speech … [w]e must mark him now, if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous 
Negro of the future in this nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national 
security.”39  
Urban rioting in the summer of 1967 upped the FBI ante further, though, widening 
into BLACK HATE, which aimed to “disrupt, misdirect, or otherwise neutralize the activities 
of black nationalist hate-type organizations.” The next year NEW LEFT was added, when 
Columbia University protested Dr. King’s assassination, widening as New Left activism 
mounted against the undeclared war in Vietnam.40 
The program was finally exposed fifteen years after it was begun, after a break-in at a 
Media, Pennsylvania, FBI field office in 1971. COINTELPRO was formally brought to an 
end after legal cases brought further information to light. A major investigation by the Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 
— called the “Church Committee,” after its chair, Senator Frank Church of Idaho — 
condemned the enterprise in its1976 report, stating that 
intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, 
exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power 
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which are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and 
traditions. … We have seen segments of our Government, in 
their attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a 
democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of 
totalitarian regimes.41 
The Report’s opening “Summary of Main Problems” offers a fit summary of what 
went on in COINTELPRO — each area of action, in the Committee’s view, carried to 
excess: 
Too many people have been spied upon by too many 
Government agencies and to [sic] much information has been 
collected. The Government has often undertaken the secret 
surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, 
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal 
acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, 
operating primarily through secret informants, but also using 
other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps, microphone 
“bugs,” surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in 
vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, 
and associations of American citizens. Investigations of groups 
deemed potentially dangerous — and even of groups suspected 
of associating with potentially dangerous organizations — have 
continued for decades, despite the fact that those groups did not 
engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals have been 
harassed and disrupted because of their political views and 
their lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague 
standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. 
Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed — including 
anonymous attempts to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, 
ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke target 
groups into rivalries that might result in deaths. Intelligence 
agencies have served the political and personal objectives of 
presidents and other high officials. While the agencies often 
committed excesses in response to pressure from high officials 
in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally 
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initiated improper activities and then concealed them from 
officials whom they had a duty to inform. 
For a time in the mid-Seventies, post-Watergate, a critical spirit reigned in regards to 
domestic intelligence: “in the conduct of intelligence activity, … the ‘eternal vigilance’ 
which is the ‘price of liberty’ has been forgotten,” the Senate lamented. This spirit was not 
long to last: the Reagan administration quickly returned to a disinhibited use of intelligence 
agencies and covert activities, and the declaration of an open-ended War on Terror has thrust 
us into a whole new realm. 
Even at the time, the practical significance of COINTELPRO’s dissolution could not 
actually be known. The program had merely sought to centralize and coordinate domestic 
spying and covert operations that had been going on for decades. But the significance of all 
that was condemned by the Church Committee, once openly examined, could not be more 
important to our national cultural policy. The aggressive use of federal resources to pervert 
the course of history in cultural development constitutes a kind of criminal intervention by 
the state in the affairs of its citizens that lies beyond reproach. 
THE “AMERICAN WAY” IN THE FORTIES & FIFTIES 
 Despite the growth of anti-communism in the late Thirties, much more widespread 
attention was then being directed toward cultural diversity as a unique source of U.S. 
strength. Historian Wendy Wall cites the eight-month run of George Kaufman and Moss 
Hart’s play, The American Way, at New York’s Rockefeller Center as exemplary of 
predominant celebratory feeling about the nation’s diversity at the end of the decade. 
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 Wall’s account of this phenomenon is balanced by her detailed treatment of a 
countervailing concern: that emphasizing respect for cultural diversity not interfere with the 
assimilation if immigrants to American life, nor undermine a sense of national unity — 
especially as World War II broke out. Such popular writers as Louis Adamic and social 
scientists as Margaret Mead voiced such concerns in the late Thirties and early Forties. 
Despite his general emphasis on the U.S. as a “nation of nations,” Adamic frequently warned 
in his 1939-40 lecture tours that “Groups are pulling apart into various corners, away from 
one another.” The specter of European fascism and its active domestic correlates in the 
United States, combining older strains of racism and xenophobia against which these 
progressives were working, defined the contrary fear of forced homogeneity. Promoting 
intergroup harmony emerged as the balancing concept that inspired the efforts of such 
organizations as the Common Council for American Unity (CCAU), the National Conference 
of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), the Council Against Intolerance, the Committee for National 
Morale, the Committee for Democracy, the Institute for American Democracy, and many 
others as America approached World War II. The war itself brought special urgency to the 
idea of national unity, addressed in Margaret Mead’s 1942 book, And Keep Your Powder 
Dry.42 Revelation of the atrocities of fascism kept these impulses in place after the war as 
well, though the fiery furnace of domestic anti-communism enforced a level of conformism 
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that Mead described, introducing the 1965 update of her 1942 book, as “the apprehension and 
apathy of the dismal 1950’s.”43 
The “American Way” campaign ripened in the postwar era. Historian Wendy Wall 
summarizes the process through which a strong sense of national consensus was forged: 
Ultimately, three broad groups played central roles in the effort 
to shape the public consensus on national values between the 
mid-1930s and the mid-1950s. Many governmental officials 
and cultural affiliates … sought to unify Americans and steel 
them to withstand first the Fascist and then the Communist 
threat. Meanwhile, industry, public relations, and advertising 
executives worked to reassert the authority of business, to halt 
or roll back the New Deal, and to restore a political culture 
conducive to the exercise of corporate power with minimal 
government control. Finally, a loose coalition of individuals 
and organizations sought to defuse “intergroup” tensions and 
promote a more religiously, ethnically, and racially tolerant 
society.44 
Wall summarizes their consensus on national values as follows: 
Diverse as they were, all these individuals and groups invoked 
national unity and shared values, largely rejecting the language 
of progressive struggle that had propelled social movements for 
decades. For divergent reasons, they also emphasized 
individual freedoms rather than majoritarian democracy. 
Business groups stressed individual rights in order to shore up 
free enterprise, while many intergroup liberals did so to protect 
religious and ethnic minorities…45 
But she also observes “a chasmal divide” among “those who preached and appealed to a 
unifying set of American values”: 
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Some Americans — economic conservatives, many cold 
warriors, and those intergroup liberals who hoped only to 
create or preserve social harmony — presented the U.S. as 
comparatively perfected. In their eyes, America was an intact 
model of political, religious, and economic freedom, blessed by 
nearly universal affluence. All that Americans needed to do… 
was to learn to pull together, to get along. In preaching 
consensus, these groups denied or minimized power 
imbalances and emphasized civility across class, religious, and 
other lines. By marginalizing dissenters — by casting those 
who disrupted national unity as somehow un-American — they 
shored up the social, economic and political status quo.46 
The strength of this dominant position rendered those on the other side of the divide — no 
matter how idealistically committed to “American values” — dissenters deserving of 
marginalization. 
All Aboard the Freedom Train 
Mead’s dismal Fifties took root soon after the War, as advocates of Americanism 
created a Freedom Train they expected all real Americans to board. 
The [Freedom T]rain was the brainchild of Attorney General 
Tom C. Clark, who hoped it would “be the springboard of a 
great crusade for reawakening faith in America.” … In 1947, 
the attorney general embarked on a nationwide anti-
Communist speaking tour reminiscent of the itinerant preachers 
and circuit riders who fomented the Second Great 
Awakening.47 
 Clark’s assistant director of public information, William Coblenz, could actually take 
credit here, inspired by a lunchtime stroll from Justice to the National Archives, where the 
United States’ foundational documents were reverently displayed: why not a traveling 
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exhibit, has asked himself, so all Americans could be illuminated by their glow? His boss 
loved the idea, and Coblenz and Archives staff began assembling an exhibit of facsimile 
documents that would fit neatly into a refurbished train car, featuring “the story of the 
establishment, growth, and defense of rights and freedoms that belong to each one of us as 
American citizens.”48 
 From Clark’s first phone call on the matter, however, the planning process ballooned 
and veered off in new directions. An attorney friend happened to be travelling on the West 
Coast with Paramount Pictures honcho Barney Balaban, to whom he handed over the phone 
when Clark reached him. Balaban loved the idea, too, but thought it belonged in the private 
sector, offered to bankroll it, established an entity to house it — the American Heritage 
Foundation — and hired a staffer, Louis Novins, to organize toward a December lunch at the 
Justice Department for various business and media types. 
 These interests were already circling the White House, making Clark’s invitation a 
timely one. The National Association of Manufacturers “American Way” project had led to 
creation of the War Advertising Council, which was renamed simply the Advertising Council 
after V-J Day. Their agenda, however, remained unchanged: 
The very existence of the Advertising Council testified to both 
the continuing strength of anti–New Deal sentiment in 
America’s business community and the conviction on the part 
of Madison Avenue executives, federal officials, and others 
that such an institution could help shape public attitudes about 
issues of national importance. 
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The Council lost no time in working to maintain the collaborative relationship its members 
had developed in wartime propaganda:  
Beginning in 1946, [the Advertising Council] organized regular 
White House conferences on pressing national issues that 
brought together administration officials, Advertising Council 
directors, and influential individuals who served on the 
Council’s various advisory committees. … Such conferences 
bolstered the reputation and influence of the Advertising 
Council, while giving the administration an opportunity to 
garner elite support for its programs. …  
Under Balaban’s influence, the Freedom Train looked like a perfect framework for a multi-
dimensional national campaign. As it happened, ad executive Thomas D’Arcy Brophy was 
retailing a similar idea in New York, but for radio: a “super-radio program” modeled on “I 
Am an American” Day. He jumped aboard the Freedom Train, too, and he and Novins 
became key players in making it real, as an official project of the Advertising Council.49 
 Historian Wendy Wall tells the fascinating Freedom Train story in detail. Advancing 
the scientific method of the advertising industry, wealthy donors to the American Heritage 
Foundation effort became a kind of “focus group” for Freedom Train content. A hand-picked 
Who’s Who group of 175 stars of media, socioeconomic, and civic worlds were assembled to 
partake of a kind of “first draft” of the campaign, heralded by Attorney General Clark as 
being all about the motto: “Work at democracy to make democracy work.” This theme 
proved simply too alarming for those in attendance: promising henceforward to downplay 
“democracy,” Brophy proposed falling back on NAM’s slogan from the Thirties — 
“Freedom Is Everybody’s Job.” “Freedom” quickly replaced “democracy” as the meme of 
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the historical moment, contrasting to the evil of totalitarianism — which such political 
economists as Friedrich A. von Hayek had recently argued could arise as easily from 
democratic majoritarianism, by insisting on national economic planning that could in turn 
lead to “totalitarian serfdom.” The Freedom Train came to focus on the “heritage of 
individual freedom.”50 
 The curatorial process soon escaped the control of Archives historians as the traveling 
exhibit was winnowed to death by a thousand cuts — a numerical exaggeration, perhaps, but 
those cuts were significant: the 14th and 15th amendments and the Emancipation Proclamation 
disappeared, as did William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator from the display on freedom of 
the press, and Woodrow Wilson’s first inaugural address — deemed too emphatic about 
“Democratic victory” — and FDR’s fireside chat describing the U.S. as the “arsenal of 
democracy.” Nothing was included to credit the labor movement as part of the American 
Heritage version of America. The entire section on “Economic Rights” was axed wholesale. 
Of equal interest to what was cut were the donor-dominated selection committee’s additions 
to the display: Robert E. Lee’s 1865 address encouraging the healing of the nation after Civil 
War, hanging alongside the Gettysburg Address; and key documents from Alexander 
Hamilton.51 
 By the time the Freedom Train left the station in September 1947, historian Wall 
concludes, “it bore almost no resemblance to the exhibit the National Archives staffers had 
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labored on the previous year.” Its first stop was in Philadelphia commemorated the 160th 
anniversary of the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention. A celebrity-studded crowd 
of 1,000 partook in what became a set-piece of Freedom Train appearances: group recitation 
of the “Freedom Pledge.” Each host city drew on a fat publicity packet to stage this and other 
events designed to trigger a “patriotic chain reaction” everywhere the train stopped. 
Much to its organizers’ chagrin, the 37,000-mile whistle-stop tour called for the 
Freedom Train to pull into some of America’s racially-segregated train stations, creating an 
embarrassing question of whether and how black Americans could board the Freedom Train 
in cities were they were in fact not free. Memphis had to be dropped from the schedule 
altogether. A gag order respected by the national press prevented the nation from learning 
that other southern stops fed viewers into the Train through racially segregated lines — 
sometimes, as in Birmingham, Alabama, in blocks of twenty, to minimize mingling between 
racial groups.52 
 The final stop of the Freedom Train was Washington, DC, was timed to coincide with 
the weeklong celebration of Truman’s only formal inauguration. Some thought that more 
fundraising might keep the Freedom Train on track longer, but a fire broke out in one of the 
cars while it was sidetracked in San Bernardino. Though no priceless documents were lost, 
the will to continue was apparently extinguished along with the flames. The message had 
been crafted, transmitted, and received, however: “Freedom [not democracy] Is Everybody’s 
Job.” 
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The Covenant Nation: Sacralizing the American State 
 Attorney General Thomas Clark was notable not only for his embrace of the Freedom 
Train. Historian Jonathan P. Herzog describes Clark as exemplary of those leading 
Americans who “could see that religious conflict was inseparable from the Cold War…” and, 
in 1946-47, as the Truman administration’s “chief proponent for American sacralization.” 
Clark used his position to advocate a strand of Americanism 
premised upon religion. He understood America faced not just 
hostile nations but “violent foreign ideologies.” Clark … 
viewed Communism as a hostile religious faith that drew 
strength from a “black Bible.” … [Clark told a Catholic 
audience in Cleveland,] “It is imperative that our people and 
our children return to God and walk in His ways”…53 
Faced with challenge of distinguishing itself from the Soviet Union, the United States 
failed to define itself as a secular democracy and to articulate its unique values in cultural 
policy terms. Instead, it settled for the values represented by organized religion. The 
interpretations being made by U.S. opinion leaders and policymakers who were getting 
worked up about the Soviet threat led naturally back to religion: 
American leaders recognized that Communism was an “armed 
doctrine,” a disease of the psyche and spirit that arms alone 
could not defeat. Intellectuals, journalists, and theologians who 
studied Communism in the decades after the Russian 
Revolution began to conclude that it stood for more than 
atheism and the destruction of organized religion. They saw it 
also as a powerful religion of materialism, complete with its 
own scripture, prophets, and eschatology.54 
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But the invocation of religion was also strategic. Psychological warfare — hugely important 
in the global Cold War arena, as we will soon discuss — begins at home. Securing consent to 
the cultural policy values implicit in early Cold War maneuvering required proselytization. 
… American leaders understood … that the Cold War would 
be won or lost not only at the barrel of a gun but also within the 
conflicted souls at home and around the world. … They did not 
hesitate to call the Cold War a holy crusade. They fought faith 
with faith. Religion in America, having had its political, social, 
and cultural meaning circumscribed for the preceding several 
decades, could fulfill a function no other institution could. … 
In speeches and advertisements, in pledge drives and military 
training facilities, in schools and movie theaters, the engineers 
of spiritual mobilization set out to create a citizenry.55 
Public cultural policy in modern democracies is almost uniformly expressed in 
secular terms and formally distanced from religious affairs, except to the extent that attitudes 
toward particular religious traditions are interfering with their cultural rights or those of their 
adherents. Rather than crafting such a secular statement, though, policymakers in the United 
States in the late Forties and early Fifties framed its values forthrightly in religious terms. 
Ignoring the First Amendment, U.S. policymakers resorted to contrasting an atheistic 
Communism with a God-infused “free world” along conventional lines of religious belief. 
Prominent anti-communists were trying on religious raiments some time before they were 
imposed upon the Army. Father Walsh of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service had done 
so since the Twenties. Eisenhower’s future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles identified 
communism as the greatest threat to world peace in a speech before the World Council of 
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Churches in August 1948, lamenting the fact that “secularization” had divorced political 
action from its presumed religious foundations: 
Once the connection is broken between faith and practices, 
practices … lose their moral significance and seem to be 
matters of expediency. As such they are vulnerable to attack by 
those who inject strong belief into different practices. 
Quoting Dulles to this effect, Jonathan Herzog points out the unspoken fear that “If the 
religious foundations of Western society disintegrated, the spiritually formidable and perilous 
Communist philosophy might fill the moral vacuum.”56 
 Herzog’s argument dovetails with Wendy Wall’s account of the augmentation of 
“American Way” definition to include “Judeo-Christianity” in the postwar period. Herzog 
posits that a “spiritual-industrial complex” constructed in the late Forties and early Fifties has 
dominated American politics ever since. He argues that “American leaders thought that 
secular institutions and beliefs alone were insufficient to meet society’s Cold War needs.” He 
explains the meaning of the rubric he coined for their creation as follows: 
The term is vague, but each word encapsulates an important 
truth. “Spiritual” emphasizes the fact that just as America 
mobilized for the Cold War in body, its leaders sought to 
energize the soul. … The word “industrial” underscores the 
factory-made approach and contrived feel that emblematized 
some of the spiritual rhetoric and policies of the early Cold 
War. [It] was the beneficiary of state sanction and commercial 
talent. It worked to foment a religious revival that was 
conceived in boardrooms rather than camp meetings, steered 
by Madison Avenue and Hollywood suits rather than traveling 
preachers, and measured with a statistical precision that old-
time revivalists … would have envied. … Finally, the word 
“complex” highlights the efforts interwoven motives, actors, 
and actions. Leaders formed a series of committees, 
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organizations, and advisory boards that put the resources of 
American Bureaucracy behind religious revival and spiritual 
rededication.57 
A great historic irony resides in the timing of this development, for at the very time 
that political leaders were brokering this marriage between state and religious belief, 
idealistic Americans were playing a lead role in defining the set of secular values that 
became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This might have been the moment for 
the United States to embrace this new, expanded bill of cultural rights as its core of national 
identity. Instead, it drew back to more conventional notions of God and godlessness. 
Rather than cite the UDHR, Truman drew from more traditional Sunday-morning 
sermonizing for his 1948 State of the Union address: 
The elements of our strength are many. They include our 
democratic government, our economic system, our great 
natural resources. But these are only partial explanations. The 
basic source of our strength is spiritual. For we are a people 
with a faith. We believe in the dignity of man. We believe that 
he was created in the image of the Father of us all. We do not 
believe that men exist merely to strengthen the state or to be 
cogs in the economic machine. … We have a profound 
devotion to the welfare and rights of the individual as a human 
being. The faith of our people has particular meaning at this 
time in history because of the unsettled and changing state of 
the world.58 
The central point of this quotation — that “We believe in the dignity of man” — did not 
require religious framing, and in fact is the central theme of the UDHR. But this was the 
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frame Truman chose for the picture he wanted to paint. What happened in the decade that 
followed made the religious connection explicit and binding. 
In that same year, the House Un-American Activities Committee published an 
organizing tract that installed religion at the center of the U.S.’s ideological arsenal. Having 
defined Communism itself as a religion, anonymous HUAC writers assert that, “Communism 
cannot dominate family life, until it has first fought its way past the influence of religion 
upon the family.”59 Herzog’s study describes a raft of subsequent actions that confirmed this 
consensus, and he concludes that a sinister connection thus was forged in America’s national 
identity: 
… [T]he process by which religious faith has been fused with 
popular conceptions of Americanism was not brought about by 
some movement of destiny’s hand. … [F]or millions constantly 
bombarded with the message that the religious could not be 
Communists, it was a short logical step to the authoritative 
axiom that the irreligious could not be true Americans.60 
Jonathan Herzog opens his description of what he calls the “spiritual-industrial 
complex” that emerged mid-century by describing what U.S. Army instructors told new 
recruits about the world being faced by the country they were defending, or even fighting for, 
in Korea. The U.S. was a “covenant nation”: 
There were “demonic” nations that attacked both organized 
religion and belief in higher powers. There were “secular” 
nations that enforced a strict separation of church and state. 
And then there were “covenant” nations that recognized their 
dependence upon God. … [I]t would be reasonable to assume 
that the U.S. Army considered America secular. After all, the 
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Constitution regulated state interference in religious affairs, 
and tax dollars were not a church prop. But … [a]ccording to 
the Army, secular nations were places like France — lands of 
spiritual indifference, ennui, and rising rates of skepticism. … 
not opposed to their demonic counterparts [like the Soviet 
Union, which offered a substitute system of belief in the 
“Promethean man” and “scientific atheism”]. Frankly, they did 
not care enough. No, the United States was a covenant nation.61 
Repositioning the United States among the nations as a forthright advocate of religion 
was made a priority among leading anti-communists. John Foster Dulles, who became 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State five years later, described communism as the greatest threat 
to world peace at a meeting of World Council of Churches in 1948, arguing that only in the 
twentieth century had political action been separated from presumably religious foundations: 
Once the connection is broken between faith and practices, 
practices … lose their moral significance and seem to be 
matters of expediency. As such they are vulnerable to attack by 
those who inject strong belief into different practices. 
It was of course the strong belief of communist philosophy that Dulles and his fellow 
travelers feared might seem expedient.62 
Putting the Nation Under God 
This was not allowed to remain merely a philosophical exercise. Congressional 
figures saw to it that hallmark legislation was adopted and public rituals were established to 
confirm this revision of the national cultural consensus. As Herzog describes in detail, 
Beginning in 1946, a handful of representatives began the 
Congressional process of sacralization that would culminate 
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eight years later with a series of resolutions that inserted God 
into currency, the national motto, and the Pledge of 
Allegiance.63 
“In God We Trust” was adopted as the official national motto, replacing the more prevalent, 
though informal, E Pluribus Unum. The new motto began to be printed on postage stamps — 
tellingly, first only on foreign airmail denominations, before domestic stamps were affected. 
Then it found prominent placement in America’s “Holy of Holies”: our currency. And 
finally, “under God” was made part of the Pledge of Allegiance that most U.S. students 
recited together at the start of each school day. (Eventually, litigation established a right not 
to make this recitation; but such refusal, before or after this court ruling, risked vilification in 
the classroom and on the playground.) 
 So central to American cultural identity was this sacralization of the state that it was 
considered problematic that General Eisenhower had been elected President without benefit 
of formal baptism. On the first Sunday after his Inauguration, Eisenhower thus became the 
first (and so far, last) President to be baptized while in office.64 
 For a time in the early Fifties, the same social dynamics that brought religion to the 
fore politically also carried more Americans to church each Sunday than had been the case 
before or since. By the later Fifties, this ardor had cooled; but the words remained on our 
currency, in our Pledge, and in our political lexicon. Sixties sophistication and activism 
brought religious observance to a new low point in American life, but this sacralization of 
American national values left a lasting mark on U.S. national identity:  
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The most visible signs of national piety so evident in the 1950s 
may have disappeared in the social turmoil of the 1960s, but 
the social and cultural residue of the spiritual-industrial 
complex proved far more indelible. Cold War leaders did not 
invent this connection between religion and nationalism, but 
they reified it. The statutes, monuments, and sentiments live on 
as bulwarks against secularism and reminders that the nation 
rests upon the groundwork of religious faith. They help explain 
the growth of religious and political conservatism and continue 
to serve as valuable tools for those defending the place of 
religion in American life.65 
Rewritten History 
The crucial difference for contemporary times is that what was an innovation in the 
early Fifties now stands as a seemingly lasting part of America’s national legacy. Tea Party 
activists today invoke a timeless heritage that denies the historic facts of life in America: 
religiosity as an aspect of American cultural identity was not born in our Revolution, but in 
the witch-hunting Fifties. As Herzog accurately notes, 
When Americans now bristle at the thought of courts rewriting 
their cherished national history, they have in mind a more 
distant past, not occurring within the lifespan of most baby 
boomers.66 
 The “timeless tradition” of America was, like me, born in the Fifties. It’s not too late 
to reconsider its significance and change course. Characterizing the nation according to its 
civic and political values could be accomplished through a more straightforward cultural 
policy, leaving religious belief to the realm of personal choice, safeguarded constitutionally 
as it always has been, at least in theory. Conscious as we now are that Judaism and 
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Christianity are but two of the world’s great religions presently ascribed to by our citizens, 
such an adjustment would fit the culturally diverse composition of our population in the 
twenty-first century. 
 Wall notes that questions of national identity were not put to rest by the “American 
Way” campaign she describes in her monograph: 
Since the mid-1990s, and particularly since 2001, there has 
been a resurgent interest in the kinds of questions that 
preoccupied Americans between the mid-1930s and the early 
1960s. During the Clinton years, debates over multiculturalism 
and the eruption of racial tensions on the streets of Los Angeles 
and Cincinnati spurred widespread discussion of America’s 
common ground and public values. Questions of national unity 
and identity took on additional urgency after the controversial 
2000 presidential election and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. In the wake of those attacks, the nonprofit 
Advertising Council launched an “I am an American” 
campaign, which depicted individuals of many ages, races, and 
religions. Still, a December 2001 cover story in the Atlantic 
Monthly of “red” and “blue” America asked, “Are We Really 
One Country?” 
 Wall implies that “nostalgia for an earlier age” lay behind this renewed questioning, 
suggesting that the period from the New Deal through the civil rights movement would be 
the age for which this nostalgia was felt, though her study caused her to conclude “that the 
story is a bit more complex.”67 
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The Religion of Capitalism 
 The “free enterprise” definition falls short of describing cultural consensus today, at 
least when one digs beneath its surface to examine the widening economic gap between rich 
and poor. The current economic collapse has brought considerable attention to favoritism in 
public policy vis-à-vis corporations whose practices do not respect the economic and cultural 
values of their own workers, much less those of the general public. 
In fact, “free enterprise” was a contested notion even at the time of its coinage. 
Educator Horace Kallen wrote in 1949, 
Business and industry profess a true religion they call free 
enterprise, and the public relations experts and the 
propagandists who are its home missionaries … preach it 
diversely up and down in the land. Their preachment, however, 
neither describes the national economy nor offers a program 
for its reform. It impresses the innocent bystander rather as a 
demand that the government shall refrain from any and all 
interference with the trend of business enterprise for 
centralization and monopoly. This terminus is the polar 
opposite of free enterprise. Enterprise is free when all 
individuals are equally protected by law in their efforts, and 
equally assured by society of the opportunity to use their 
powers to do what they want to do, so far as doing so does not 
diminish the equal right of any. The criteria of free enterprise 
inhere in the range and diversities of self-possession, self-
support and self-rule, of initiatives of faith and works among 
the multitudes of man, employing their knowledge and skills to 
act on their personal beliefs at their own risk. The economy of 
free enterprise is measured by the number and variety of 
businesses that constitute it. … They are institutions of free 
enterprise when their form and function excludes monopoly 
and assures equal liberty to all their members. … On the 
record, enterprise is in fact anything but free. For the 
multitudes of farmers, workers and small businessman, free 
enterprise is an illusion. The mechanisms of the market and the 
price system no longer so work as to preserve to each his 
marginal profit. They have been replaced by the administrative 
decisions of the planned economies of trust and cartel. These 
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latter dominate the nation’s business… Their form is 
hierarchical. Their structure repeats that of an army or an 
authoritarian church.68 
The tendencies Kallen described have not only proven perennial, but have increased in more 
than six decades of corporate consolidation and the polarization of wealth in the Reagan era. 
Placing economic freedom in a context defined by democratic political aspirations 
would clarify the confusion created by the decades-long transaction of the corporate driven 
campaign to define our culture in terms of “free enterprise.” Surely the United States’ “true 
religion” has more to do with the values outlined in the Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution than with a “capitalism” that did not exist at the time that our nation-state was 
created. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 Clearly, much was done within the United States to domesticate anti-communism. 
But to understand how new official understandings of American cultural identity were forged 
as the Cold War began, we must drop back into that crucial postwar effort to take the nation’s 
anti-communism to global scale. It was out of this effort that the view of culture embraced by 
the domestic cultural apparatus of the Sixties emerged.
                                                
68 Horace M. Kallen, The Education of Free Men: An Essay Toward a Philosophy of 
Education for Americans (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949), 91-93. 
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CHAPTER 9 
GLOBALIZING ANTI-COMMUNISM 
 On a parallel path to domestic anti-communism, the U.S. government pursued 
international policy arrangements from the late Forties that not only defined national cultural 
policy in international affairs, but also contained the aesthetic seeds from which the leading 
federal domestic cultural agencies of the present sprang up in the mid-Sixties. Positioning the 
United States as “the leader of the free world” ultimately relied on presenting an elitist 
construction of the high-art European culture as integral to American national cultural 
identity. 
GETTING STARTED: THE ROOTS OF U.S. CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
 The United States’ first interest in cultural diplomacy was piqued not by the 
perceived threat of communism, but by Latin American incursions of European fascism. 
Historians Thomson and Laves describe a “Nazi drive during the 1930s to win the favor of 
the countries of South and Central America, allied with similar efforts by the Italians and 
Japanese … [as] making a cultural program on the part of the United States an urgent 
priority.”1 
                                                
1 Charles A. Thomson and Walter H. C. Laves, Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), 35. 
  186 
This led to the creation of two entities in 1938, which continued working through 
World War II. The first was the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the 
American Republics (ICCAR), originally established in response to FDR’s oral instructions 
in February 1938, and then formally authorized in August 1939 (P.L. 355). ICCAR 
comprised representatives from twenty-five federal agencies involved in piecemeal technical 
exchange and bilateral projects. The second was the State Department’s Division of Cultural 
Relations, which oversaw cultural and educational exchange programs. The Division’s first 
advisory group was constituted in October 1938, then convened four larger advisory 
conferences in the fall of 1939, the largest attracting over six-hundred educational leaders 
from forty-six U.S. states. Government funding for the new Division was meager (just 
$28,000 for five staff in the first year) and was primarily passed on to private entities that 
became involved in later years. In 1940, though, with the international situation rapidly 
deteriorating, Nelson Rockefeller was appointed to fill a newly created post as Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), and his division grew rapidly through the war, commanding 
budgets of $60 million and $38 million in 1943 and 1944, respectively. The first American 
cultural attachés or cultural officers were appointed in 1941, all to Latin American posts at 
first, but a few were later dispatched outside the Western Hemisphere. Scientific attachés, 
always fewer in number, began to be posted in 1951.2 
In his introduction to the catalog for one of the nineteen shows produced by the 
Museum of Modern Art for the CIAA, artist-critic Barnett Newman articulated Rockefeller’s 
ambition in presenting the ground-breaking1943 “First Exhibition of Modern American 
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Artists” by saying, “We have come together as American modern artists … to present to the 
public a body of work that will adequately reflect the new America that is taking place today 
and the kind of America that will, it is hoped, become the cultural center of the world.”3 This 
spirit anticipated the postwar motivation on foreign-policy leaders in projecting a better 
image of the United States image abroad. 
Propaganda, Cultural Exchange and the Multilateral Moment 
Even so, early State Department planners were obsessed with keeping cultural 
exchange free of “ulterior” foreign-policy objectives. Participants in a 1943 advisory 
committee meeting held that “Any implication of a tie-in between cultural interchange and 
foreign policy invalidates the effect of cultural activities.”4 This was a difficult and 
contentious distinction for Foreign Service personnel to maintain, both at the time and in 
decades to come, as both federal and national political priorities shifted, and as actors outside 
the State Department began to act on interests of their own. 
Regardless of this stance, World War II quickly brought propaganda to the fore. The 
Office of War Information, established in 1942 with journalist Elmer Davis at its helm, 
operated in other parts of the worlds than Latin America, mainly carrying on information and 
propaganda activities classed as “psychological warfare” through mass media (press, radio 
and motion pictures). The OWI “backed into” cultural activities through journalists’ 
exchanges (which actually were one-way, bringing foreign journalists to the U.S.), providing 
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books and magazines to supplement its presswork, and establishing twenty-eight information 
libraries abroad. Cultural activities were eventually extended to the Near East and China 
during the war, in the latter case, largely by extending study grants to 1,700 Chinese students 
stranded in the U.S. at the outbreak of fighting in Asia.5 
 Whether and how international cultural diplomacy might continue remained uncertain 
in the years immediately following World War II, with the Cold War only beginning to take 
shape. The early consensus was that propaganda (associated with providing information 
internationally) should be left behind, and that cultural activities should not be allowed to 
mix with this ulterior purpose. As Thomson and Laves sum up the thinking of the time: 
[I]nternational information activities were viewed as tied up 
with “power politics.” They were employed as an instrument 
“to implement the diplomatic policies of the Department of 
State.” As channeled through radio, press, and motion pictures, 
they were largely unilateral in character, and might smack of 
imposition. … Cultural activities should be kept clear of 
propaganda, otherwise they might be viewed as cultural 
imperialism designed to impose the culture of the United States 
on other peoples. … [T]he basic distinction in the minds of this 
group seems to have been whether an activity sought to serve a 
unilateral nationalism or a multilateral partnership.6 
 President Roosevelt, in his final inaugural address in 1944, articulated his vision of 
the multilateral role he wanted the United States to play in the postwar world: 
We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our 
own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other 
nations, far away. … [The American people] have learned to be 
citizens of the world, members of the human community. We 
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have learned the simple truth. As Emerson said, that, “The only 
way to have a friend is to be one.”7 
Historian Elizabeth Borgwardt described Roosevelt’s vision as “a New Deal for the world,” 
rooted in the wartime Atlantic Charter, embodied in the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and dramatized in the Nuremberg trials. She describes 
all of these as “mechanisms for promoting collective security, for stabilizing and 
coordinating international currency transactions and economic development, and for 
advancing ideas about international justice” and as expressions of commitment to the “four 
freedoms” Roosevelt had described in his State of the Union message in January 1941: 
The first is freedom of speech and expression — everywhere in 
the world … 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his 
own way — everywhere in the world … 
The third is freedom from want …  — everywhere in the world 
… 
The fourth is freedom from fear …  — everywhere in the world 
… 
Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. 
Our support goes to those who struggle to gain these rights or 
keep them. 
Carrying this thinking into the Atlantic Charter, FDR made it clear that the aspirational 
statement he and Winston Churchill had framed was truly global in its intentions: 
We of the United Nations are agreed on certain broad 
principles in the kind of peace we seek. The Atlantic Charter 
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applies not only to parts of the world that border the Atlantic 
but to the whole world.8 
And these principles were widely applied, in ways that would inspire action among 
and within nation-states for years to come, regardless of changing strategies in U.S. foreign 
relations. Borgwardt cites Nelson Mandela’s later assessment: 
The Atlantic Charter of 1941 … reaffirmed faith in the dignity 
of each human being and propagated a host of democratic 
principles. … Inspired by the Atlantic Charter and the fight of 
the allies against tyranny and oppression, the ANC created its 
own charter … We hoped that the government and ordinary 
South Africans would see the principles they were fighting for 
in Europe were the same ones we were advocating at home.9 
Borgwardt argues that this vision belonged not only to President Roosevelt, but 
became the prevailing spirit of “many ordinary Americans [for whom] the New Deal at home 
and the prospect of victory abroad had kindled optimism and hope, even as their world had 
been turned upside down …” The politically transformative experiences of economic 
suffering and total war “served to prepare the minds of Americans for expanding the New 
Deal — with all its contradictions and limitations — to the rest of the world.”10 The keystone 
institutions of this “New Deal for the world” were put in place, but official American 
resistance to giving up hegemonic power began to kick in at their very creation. 
                                                
8 Ibid., 36. 
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84. 
10 Borgwardt, 86. 
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Backing Away from UNESCO and Multilateralism 
The shift from New Deal multilateralist thinking to the unilateral approach that 
characterized the Cold War is revealed most clearly in changing U.S. attitudes toward 
UNESCO. The United States had championed a democratic paradigm in the early days of 
birthing this new international cultural agency, defeating the more elitist French model with 
which it contended at the design stage: 
The word “peoples” was interpreted in two senses. The French 
and other Europeans held that the important element was not 
the ordinary citizen but the elite of intellectuals. … The 
Americans and others maintained that the word meant the 
whole people, in the broadest democratic sense; Unesco’s 
major object was the “common understanding of the masses of 
the people in this world.”11 
This was the paradigm that prevailed in UNESCO’s design, and such leading American 
figures as former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary of State Archibald 
MacLeish maintained this idealistic intention in shaping it and the U.N. generally. Writing 
for the State Department in January 1945, H. S. Vilard explained their guiding philosophy: 
Without the intellectual tools to which our civilization has 
become accustomed, economic and social disorganization is 
intensified and moral despair easily sets in … [T]his 
Government should participate in an international program to 
help the war-torn countries … in repairing the moral, spiritual 
and physical damage.”12 
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But the New Deal spirit of democratic multilateralism that motivated U.S. leadership 
in organizing the United Nations quickly withered in the heat of post-war domestic politics, 
bringing forward fears and reservations held by the American Right at the United Nations’ 
very creation. Members of the U.S. Congress early in debate raised states’ rights concerns 
over the formation of the United Nations, leading to some significant revisions in the U.N. 
Charter itself, between its idealistic conception at Dumbarton Oaks and its delivery in San 
Francisco. Article 2 of the Charter reassured the powers-that-were that the new entity would 
lack any authority to pierce the armor of national sovereignty. The threat that some universal 
human rights principle or another might legitimate critique, if not transformation, of the 
nation’s cultural status quo — styled by conservatives as “clawback” provisions — or that 
bringing national attention to aspects of human rights previously left to sub-national states by 
the federal government alarmed the emerging coalition of Southern Democrats and anti–New 
Deal Republicans trying to abort or defang the U.N. at its conception. Here, ironically but 
tellingly, anti-democratic elements of U.S. political leadership had common cause with 
Stalin. Borgwardt concludes that Article 2’s provisions to assure national sovereignty were 
“transparently aimed to help with the politics of US Senate ratification as well as Soviet 
sensitivities to foreign scrutiny or intervention.” Conservatives were placated by these 
changes: 
John Foster Dulles, advising the Republican members of the 
US delegation [to the 1945 founding UN Conference on 
International Organization in San Francisco], indicated that 
domestic jurisdiction was “a basic principle of the 
organization” and drew an analogy with “federalism in the 
United States.” The analogy was quite apt. American 
federalism promoted local control and governance that was 
responsive to popular sovereignty. But in the southern states in 
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particular, it also sheltered racist regimes from the reach of the 
US Constitution.13 
It was only with this reassurance and reservation that the UN Charter was signed in San 
Francisco.  
The appointment of British national Julian Huxley as UNESCO’s Director-General 
over the ill-qualified American candidate Truman put forward, to pay off a political debt, 
excited concern that Washington was losing control of the agency. The “acerbic” Huxley was 
“left-wing in his political sympathies” and also an atheist, exacerbating disappointment 
among the Americans, whose fears were amplified by his early staff appointments. Then, at 
the agency’s first General Conference in Paris in November 1946, the Yugoslavian delegate 
attacked the assertion in the preamble to UNESCO’s Constitution that “wars are made in the 
minds of men” as contradicting the deep truth of historical materialism, and warned that 
international co-operation stood little chance if the Soviet Union did not join. This mingling 
of politics with cultural affairs shocked American delegates and gave birth to suspicions and 
an urgent desire for greater control in the State Department. 
A February 1947 memo to President Truman from General Hoyt Vandenberg, 
director of his Central Intelligence Group, warned of communist sympathizers in UNESCO, 
which occasioned a State Department reassessment. Mistrustful of the U.S. National 
Commission on UNESCO as a body that could be inattentive to official U.S. positions and 
directives, one Foreign Service penned an angry memo after observing the Commission’s 
September 1947 annual conference, arguing that 
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[f]or a group of citizen to bypass the Department to represent 
the people of United States to the people of other nations is 
actually usurping the function of the Government and is setting 
up an institution with no responsibilities to Government, 
although supported by Government, which might follow 
policies frustrative of foreign policies of Government. If they 
wish to indicate their voice as free citizens of a democracy, 
they may do so, but such a voice… should not be heard in a 
United Nations organization in which other participants are 
governmental organizations. 
Historian Frank Ninkovich, summarizing this sequence of events, states that “The State 
Department now took the position that universality would have to reflect American national 
values, and not the reverse.” He describes a State Department briefing session for delegates 
to UNESCO’s second General Conference in Mexico City in December 1947 as requiring its 
members “to swallow their castor oil in the form of a full briefing on the dangers of 
Communist influences in UNESCO.” The Conference brought accusations of U.S. cultural 
imperialism from the Polish delegation, cementing official fears that the democratic “town 
meeting” U.N. architects had envisioned would bring too many nasty surprises: “[T]he 
unexpected emergence of cultural politics vitiated the idealist premises upon which 
UNESCO had been founded.”14 
By the Fifties, after the Soviet Union had joined UNESCO, and former colonial 
nations were winning independence and joining the U.N., U.S. disaffection with UNESCO 
ran even deeper. What came out in the “town meeting” that its General Conference 
resembled, organized on a one-nation, one-vote the U.S. had actually fought for, proved to be 
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not to our official liking at a time of virulent ideological conflict within the United States 
itself, due to the growing plurality of developing countries in its membership. 
As a consultant to the U.S. National Commission wrote decades later, briefing 
delegates for yet another UNESCO conclave in Mexico City in the early Eighties: 
U.S. influence waned in part because its interest faltered, 
beginning relatively early in UNESCO’s history and no later 
than the mid-1950’s. This was the result of disenchantment 
with the resistance to U.S. views of UNESCO’s role …; the 
domestic climate of uncertainty engendered by the 
witchhunting of the 1950’s, symbolized as “McCarthyism”; 
unhappiness over, and reluctance to be associated with, the 
broad lines of policy which emerged in UNESCO as its 
composition changed; and constant frustration over what were 
seen as UNESCO’S inefficiencies … Consequently, the United 
States generally abandoned the effort to lead in UNESCO 
beginning in the 1950’s.15 
 Resistance, criticism, and defensive withholding of resources — all against a 
backdrop of unilateral action as the world’s primary superpower — have dominated U.S. 
relations with the United Nations for most of its subsequent history. Unilateralism became 
the primary force in U.S. international cultural policy, as has continued into the present. 
Polarizing the Globe 
 From the moment the Truman Doctrine was born, proclaiming the geopolitical 
bipolarity of the Cold War world, the U.S. foreign policy establishment took measures to 
create a strongly ideological anti-communism in the socio-cultural realm. In a very real 
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sense, the American Way campaign described earlier was thus taken to scale internationally, 
casting the USA as the global champion of freedom and of God-fearing, Judeo-Christian 
religiosity, in relentless opposition to the “totalitarian,” godless world of communism. 
Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, argued that 
fascism and communism were identical in their devotion to “radical evil,” enforcing 
ideological norms instead of valuing diversity. That Arendt also feared the totalitarian 
tendencies she observed in American politics was apparently missed by most readers at the 
time, caught up in the hothouse atmosphere of domestic anti-communism. Historian Giles 
Scott-Smith concludes, “The motto of the Western Cold Warriors became ‘free world versus 
totalitarianism.’”16 
 The sacralization of American identity described earlier transformed the Cold War 
into a holy one, extending Manifest Destiny to global, if not celestial, scale. Historian 
Frances Stonor Saunders observes that 
during the height of the Cold War … America discovered how 
useful the invocation of the highest hosanna could be. God was 
everywhere: … in 10,000 balloons containing Bibles … floated 
across the Iron Curtain … “Why should we make a five-year 
plan for ourselves when God seems to have had a thousand-
year plan ready-made for us?” asked [historian Daniel 
Boorstin]. … By invoking the ultimate moral authority, 
America acquired an unanswerable sanction for her “manifest 
destiny.” 
Saunders quotes Paul Nitze, speaking in retrospect years later, about what “Destiny’s elect 
had been taught” in relation to the anti-communism of the period: 
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In history, every religion has greatly honored those members 
who destroyed the enemy. … Of course, here are some 
restraints on ends and means. If you … read Thucydides, there 
are limits to what you can do to other Greeks … But there are 
no limits to what you can do to a Persian. He’s a barbarian. The 
Communists were barbarians. 
The historian then concludes that 
with the religious imperative insinuating its way into every 
major Cold War policy plank, the whole edifice of American 
power in the 1950s seemed to rest on one fundamental, monist 
proposition: that the future would be decided [in the words of 
Whittaker Chambers] “between the two great camps of men — 
those who reject and those who worship God.” “We must not 
be confused about the issue which confronts the world today,” 
President Truman had warned. “It is tyranny or freedom … 
And even worse, communism denies the very existence of 
God.”17 
Mirroring the Soviet Union 
Already by 1949, Archibald MacLeish, the State Department Assistant Secretary for 
Public and Cultural Affairs in 1944-45 and then US representative to UNESCO, saw 
bipolarity as a pattern of reaction that effectively ceded power to the Soviet Union, 
describing official U.S. policy as being “under a kind of upside-down Russian veto.”18 
Whatever Moscow advocated must by definition be opposed to liberty-loving American 
aspirations. As Borgwardt summarizes this phenomenon, it came to be believed that 
“economic, social and cultural rights [were] anathema to free enterprise and limited 
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government, since these ideas had been tainted by their association with the Soviet system.”19 
The foundational values of human rights that had guided American idealists through the dark 
days of the war quickly disappeared. 
That “free enterprise,” rather than democracy, was taken up as the United States’ 
standard reflects the inside influence of the same corporate interests who stood behind the 
American Way campaign, then just more than a decade old, upon U.S. policymakers in the 
international arena. Mirroring their constructions of what was wrong with the Soviets 
produced seemingly compulsory opposites — capitalist “free enterprise” (an economic idea) 
against totalitarianism (a political one), religiosity against godlessness. Historian Frances 
Stonor Saunders observes that the ideological polarization of this period “reduced the 
complexity of world relations to a struggle between the powers of light and darkness — [and] 
meant that the rhetoric of American foreign policy had come to rest on distinctions which 
resisted the processes of logic or rationality.”20 
The immense international cultural project of global positioning on the part of the 
U.S. foreign-policy establishment was shaped and its message projected through a variety of 
means and methods, overt and covert: through active propaganda, directed toward foreign 
audiences inside the communist bloc and elsewhere; through cultural exchange showcasing 
an officially framed version of American culture; and very importantly to U.S. cultural policy 
at home and abroad, through the construction of an anti-communist elite rooted in the United 
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States and Western Europe, constructed and lavishly subsidized largely by our government’s 
intelligence apparatus, using covert means. 
Anti-communism, Foreign and Domestic  
That these international efforts can be described as parallel to the domestic anti-
communism — not often intersecting — is the result of real intention. Considering the 
goings-on in the U.S.A.’s foreign-policy establishment, one might say that Joe McCarthy was 
right in his paranoid obsession about left-friendly forces being present within the State 
Department — and also in theorizing that espionage was involved. He was mightily 
mistaken, however, about the intentions and even the direction of this espionage, for culture 
was understood in the State Department and among its covert spawn in the blossoming 
“national security” apparatus as a core component of the Cold War arsenal and a means of 
projecting the United States as a respectable, world-class leader of the “Free World.” 
That so much of what was to follow in the international arena took covert form was 
actually attributed to Joe McCarthy’s domestic crusade by a number of the participants in the 
world of U.S. foreign-policy operatives. As Arthur Schlesinger stated in a 1994 interview, 
One of the oddities of the CIA’s venture in cultural politics was 
that what it did should have been done openly and publicly 
through the United States Information Agency, or some other 
such body. The reason it couldn’t be was because of Joe 
McCarthy, because if Joe McCarthy knew that the U.S. 
government was funding Non-Communist Left magazines, and 
socialist and Catholic trade unions [in Europe], that would have 
caused great trouble. So it was in order to avoid McCarthy that 
the CIA did these things in a covert way.21 
                                                
21 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and 
Letters (New York: The New Press, 1999), 197. 
  200 
 The sharp turn in the United States’ international cultural policy from New Deal 
multilateralism to Cold War unilateralism occurred very quickly in the years following 
World War II. The foreign-policy establishment began to position the USA as a world-class 
leader in culture, fully justifying in their minds its geopolitical dominance. The “class” in 
“world-class” reflects something of significance here, for the State Department’s agenda was 
very much focused on projecting an image of America as fully capable of producing elitist, 
“high-art” culture, and therefore finally freeing it of European influence. With the Marshall 
Plan well in place and NATO emerging to cement a Western zone in Europe, U.S. foreign-
policy players sought to represent a nation that was no longer the unsophisticated “outlier” to 
superior continental cultural traditions and institutions: the United States was therefore 
worthy of its global leadership role for deeper reasons than its ability to wield brute force as a 
means of coercion. The U.S. foreign-policy establishment represented elite interpretations of 
culture, its advocates being highly self-conscious of the condescension of European leaders 
toward U.S. culture and politics, whose continuing disdain reinforced by the extensive, 
proliferating influence of commercial mass media and growing hordes of American 
tourists.22 
The primary leaders of domestic U.S. anti-communism embodied many of the very 
detriments that underlay America’s bad image abroad contrast, especially in the view of the 
elites driving the nation’s international image-projection. The witch-hunters’ ignorant 
interpretations of art — whether social-realist, as in the Thirties, or abstract, as in the postwar 
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period — exemplified the very image of the unsophisticated, materialist, “uncultured” 
America that most Europeans dismissed as shallow and stupid, compared to continental 
artists and intellectuals, who stood on the foundation-stones of Europe’s centuries-old 
cultural traditions. Noting that “many Americans linked experimental, and especially abstract 
art to degenerate or subversive impulses,” historian Frances Stonor Saunders quoted 
Missouri’s Republican Representative George Dondero as typifying the “cultural 
fundamentalism” that “declared modernism to be quite simply part of a worldwide 
conspiracy to weaken American resolve.” Dondero warned that 
All modern art is Communistic. … Cubism tends to destroy by 
designed disorder, Futurism aims to destroy by the machine 
myth … Dadaism tends to destroy by ridicule. Expressionism 
aims to destroy by aping the primitive and insane. 
Abstractionism aims to destroy by the creation of brainstorms. 
… Surrealism aims to destroy by the denial of reason.23  
That domestic anti-communist leaders were also not incidentally racist, and 
conspicuously led by committed defenders of segregation and “states’ rights,” instead of 
internationalist sentiments, reinforced the very problems that the U.S. Foreign Service faced 
in managing the image of the nation abroad. Their emerging global propaganda campaign 
tried to erase the strength of anti-democratic and racist forces in cultural life back home. 
Tom Braden, who was to head up the CIA’s International Organizations Division in 
the Fifties, later reflected on the challenge faced by those like himself belonging to the elite 
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who came to manage the national image abroad: “You always have to battle your own 
ignoramuses, or, to put it more politely, people who just don’t understand.”24 
The American Image Abroad 
Anti-communist intellectual Sidney Hook summed up the problematic European view 
of the United States for Partisan Review readers after attending a “World Congress of Peace” 
convened in Paris in April 1949: 
[The French public’s] picture of America is a composite of 
impressions derived from reading the novels of social protest 
and revolt (Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath is taken as a faithful 
and representative account), the novels of American 
degeneracy (Faulkner) and inanity (Sinclair Lewis), from 
seeing American movies, and from exposure to an incessant 
Communist barrage which seeps into the non-Communist 
press. The informational re-education of the French public 
seems to me to be the most fundamental as well as the most 
pressing task of American democratic policy in France, 
towards which almost nothing along effective lines has been 
done.25 
A less art world–oriented rendition of popular French anti-Americanism was offered by 
historian Richard Kuisel: 
Interwar observers like Georges Duhamel and André Siegfried 
announced the major themes that succeeding generations of 
America-watchers elaborated. They contrasted French 
civilization with the wasteland of American mass culture and 
Gallic individualism with American conformism. Americans 
… might be wealthy and powerful, but they were dominated by 
businessmen like Henry Ford who trained their fellow 
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Americans to be mass producers and consumers — creating a 
society of comfortable conformists and cultural philistines. 
Kuisel notes that until World War II, “the New World had been of marginal interest,” but that 
“postwar … the French could no longer ignore America because the United States began to 
exercise a certain hegemony over France,” which had “social, economic, and cultural, as well 
as politico-strategic, features.”26 
Such attitudes toward the United States were not unique to Europe. Tracing the 
history of international cultural relations prior to World War II, Charles Thomson and Walter 
Laves describe Latin American attitudes prior to the Thirties as follows: 
[T]o the people of Latin America the United States seemed 
distant and alien. At best it appeared indifferent. The current 
image of the North American was not that of the scholar, the 
artist, the humanitarian, or even the ordinary, understandable 
human being. It was in the popular view that of a vigorous 
people, but rude and crude, avid for money and material goods. 
Too prevalently it was symbolized by the invading marine with 
his trampling boots or the exploiting and corrupting capitalist.27 
Countering such impressions of the United States became an obsession of those 
Americans having some official concern for validating their nation’s standing in world 
opinion as the Cold War got underway. International relations scholar John Ikenberry wrote 
of three options facing the hegemonic victor of global war: it can dominate, or it can 
abandon, or it “can try to transform its postwar power position into a durable order that 
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commands the allegiance of other states within the order.”28 This last aim became the 
obsession of U.S. policymakers and their supporters, as they locked themselves into a stance 
of unilateral action in a bipolar Cold War world. 
The main challenge in legitimating the United States as the world’s most enlightened 
cultural leader, not merely its strongest brute, was characterized years after the fight began by 
George Kennan in a 1955 address at New York’s Museum of Modern Art: 
We have … to show the outside world both that we have a 
cultural life and that we care something about it. That we care 
about it enough, in fact, to give it encouragement and support 
here at home, and to see that it is enriched by acquaintance 
with similar activity elsewhere. If these impressions could only 
be conveyed with enough force and success to countries 
beyond our borders, I for one would willingly trade the entire 
remaining inventory of political propaganda for the results that 
would be achieved by such results alone.29 
This legitimation effort was focused mainly through the strong identification felt by 
American elites with European high-art culture, where postwar geopolitical lines were 
quickly being redrawn and heavily reinforced. 
Dividing Europe, East and West 
 The growing perception of anti-communist bipolarity after World War II has already 
been described. Against this same backdrop came a set of key events that set the USA’s 
foreign-policy priesthood in motion on their worldwide cultural crusade. That crusade began 
and for our purposes — examining cultural policy — remained focused mainly in Europe, 
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despite the importance of the Korean War in the Fifties and Vietnam in the Sixties and 
Seventies as centers of American military engagement with communist forces. 
 The crucial backdrop of U.S. involvement in Europe was what British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill called the “iron curtain” in a speech in Fulton, Missouri in 1946, 
dramatizing the threat perceived in Stalin’s address earlier that year, urging his domestic 
audience in the USSR to rebuild and prepare for the next war, which the contradictions of 
capitalism would surely bring.30 It was in 1947 that the imaginary line known as the Iron 
Curtain — capitalized forever after — was drawn across the geopolitical map of Europe and 
etched deeply in the minds of people throughout the world, quickly becoming the iconic 
symbol in the “free world” for the totalitarian reign of terror its citizens imagined were being 
carried out on the other side. 
The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) — the Marshall Plan — was announced in 
Secretary of State George Marshall’s historic Harvard commencement speech at on June 5th, 
1947, climaxing a very short development timeline. George Kennan, newly appointed as the 
Department of State’s first Policy Planning Staff director, had been charged with creating the 
plan on April 29th. His first policy proposal — identified as PPS/1 — was completed on May 
23rd, discussed on the 28th and adopted in time for Gen. Marshall’s speech. Clearly, many 
details were yet to be worked out, and authorization and appropriations would have to won 
from Congress before anything could actually be done. At Kennan’s recommendation, Soviet 
foreign minister Molotov was among those European leaders summoned to Paris on June 27th 
to be offered participation in what was described as a European-directed program of 
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American aid to reconstruct Europe: Molotov’s expected refusal, after walking out of that 
meeting, saved the Plan’s chances for Congressional support, though this required the better 
part of a year to achieve.31 
Cascading events speedily ensued, creating what Cold War historian John Lewis 
Gaddis describes as “an ever-deepening whirlpool of distrust” in which each nation’s leaders’ 
“suspicions become self-reinforcing.”32 The dissolution of the Comintern during World War 
II had seemed a reassuring indicator to some Americans that Stalin had abandoned visions of 
promoting international communism; but the ERP spurred Stalin to create the Cominform.  
In July 1947 the Soviets withdrew from the three-power 
conference in Paris considering Marshall Plan assistance. The 
Cominform was established in October. Belief was spreading 
that a new war was inevitable. The year 1948 saw the 
Communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia, and Soviet 
blockade of West Berlin. Tito broke with Stalin. The Middle 
East was torn by Arab-Israeli conflict. Cooperation within all 
United Nations agencies seemed threatened.33 
As Charles E. Bohlen, Marshall’s aide in establishing the Recovery Plan and the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA) that carried it out, put it in 1947, a new global order had 
been constructed: “There are, in short, two worlds instead of one.”34 Battle lines had been 
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drawn for the culture war that explicitly dominated world politics for more than four decades, 
then implicitly shaped U.S. responses to terrorist threats into the twenty-first century. 
In October 1947, the Association for the Cultural Restoration of Germany convened 
Berlin’s first major intellectual gathering after the city’s destruction and occupation — a 
German Writers Conference. This was also “the first event where the tactics of the 
Cominform came into play.” It was here that multi-national American Melvin J. Lasky — “a 
volcano in near-permanent eruption” — stepped up to defend the allegedly “war-mongering” 
United States, deploying tropes that would become familiar in the intellectual Cold War, 
challenging the Soviets to join the “Kampf um die kulturelle Freiheit” (the struggle over 
cultural freedom).35 
Apparently alarmed at the Soviets’ new propaganda initiative, George Kennan 
warned early Cold War strategists and operators at Washington’s War College two months 
later that a “necessary lie” was called for, because of what he described as the Communists’ 
strong position in Europe, so immensely superior to our own 
… [attained] through unabashed and skillful use of lies. They 
have fought us with unreality, with irrationalism. Can we 
combat this unreality successfully with rationalism, with truth, 
with honest, well-meant economic assistance? 
He evidently thought not, for he asserted that the United States needed to carry out a covert 
form of warfare to advance its objectives.36 
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THE CIA IS BORN 
The very month of Kennan’s War College lecture — December 1947 — the 
apparatus for this covert war was being created across town by State Department planners, 
through NSC-4 and its top-secret appendix NSC-4A, calling for “covert psychological 
activities.” NSC-4 was superseded in June 1948 by the more explicit NSC-10/2, which called 
for 
propaganda, economic warfare, preventative direct action, 
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation 
measures; subversion against hostile states including assistance 
to underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugee 
liberation groups … so planned and executed that any U.S. 
government responsibility for them is not evident to 
unauthorized personnel, and that if uncovered the U.S. 
government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for 
them.37 
This quickening resolve reverberated throughout Washington. Stalin’s activation of 
Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau), quickly followed by a political 
clampdown behind the proverbial Iron Curtain; large-scale communist-supported labor unrest 
in France and Italy, suggesting that Communists might do well in upcoming elections; and a 
Czech coup in March 1948 spurred members of Congress who had dragged their feet in 
funding the Marshall Plan into suddenly changing their positions, lest the Soviets succeed in 
playing the political cards it apparently still possessed.38 Thus the Marshall Plan and the new 
apparatus for covert operations came into being simultaneously. 
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It was also this perceived threat that won passage for the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, 
which “provided a legislative basis for the increasingly structured and activist intentions that 
cultural diplomacy was framed around,” granting the Secretary of State “[t]he authority to set 
up a world-wide program of international information and educational exchange….”39 
Congressional authorization for creating the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
(USIE) also gave cover to “psych ops” (psychological operations); except for such simple 
cultural exchange efforts as the Fulbright fellowships, it was “psych ops” and more overt 
propaganda efforts that effectively took priority in the State Department and its spin-offs 
until the mid-Fifties, when more formal performing-arts touring began. 
The politically tendentious way that even “information and educational exchange” 
were understood is summed up in the words of Rep. John Davis Lodge (R-CT): “The 
important thing is to bring the foreigners in here and work them over” — to which the bill’s 
Senate co-sponsor, H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), replied, “That is the point in sending our 
boys over there.” In reporting these remarks at the time of the Act’s creation, historian Frank 
Ninkovich concludes, “Once the fundamentalist perspective was ideologized, so to speak, its 
elements of nativism and antiradicalism became prominent aspects of the new programs” that 
the State Department launched under its authority.40 
Newly authorized covert operations were directed in their early days by Frank 
Wisner’s State Department Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the institutional seed from 
which the Central Intelligence Agency grew. Following the CIA Act of 1949, the OPC 
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rapidly grew from 302 staff members and a budget of $4.7 million to 2,812 staff and $82 
million by 1952. About half of these personnel — 1,400 operatives, including many ex-Nazis 
— were based in OPC’s Templehof Air Base station, aiming to create a network of Germans 
spying on Russians. The Agency became home for many intelligence operatives who had cut 
their teeth during the war, such as Michael Josselson, an émigré first from Tsarist Russia, 
then from Nazi Germany, who served in the Army’s Psychological Warfare Division, but 
ultimately become the longtime head of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.41 
It would take another couple of years to flesh out the legal foundations, structure, and 
nature of the United States’ global cultural strategy, but Wisner and OPC staff went to work 
immediately. Wisner’s special assistant for labor and émigré affairs, Carmel Offie, famous 
for lavish entertaining as soon as he began working in the European Foreign Service in the 
Moscow embassy in the Thirties, was an important OPC liaison to participants on both sides 
of the Atlantic: his 1943 arrest in Washington’s Lafayette Park lavatory (later leaked by the 
CIA to Joe McCarthy as a back-door means of dealing with accusations of sexual harassment 
in the OPC office) and wartime involvement in illegal currency transfers had jeopardized his 
career, but friends in high places urged Wisner to take him on. His near-comeuppance did not 
occasion much change in Offie’s personal style: historian Frances Stonor Saunders notes that 
“he taunted other men with his homosexuality by tweaking their nipples at staff meetings.”42 
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Agency writer Michael Warner settles for characterizing Offie as “flamboyant and 
ubiquitous.” Offie played a key role in the years that CIA action in Europe took shape.43 
The CIA was to become a hidden cornerstone of the nation’s international Cold War 
effort, channeling tens of millions of dollars to collaborators in Europe. Saunders highlights 
the cultural policy significance of the new agency: 
With this kind of commitment, the CIA was in effect acting as 
America’s Ministry of Culture. … This was an entrepreneurial 
coalition of philanthropic foundations, business corporations 
and other institutions and individuals, who worked hand in 
hand with the CIA to provide the cover and the funding 
pipeline for its secret programmes in western Europe.44 
Defining the Cultural Cold War 
The covert war launched at this time was importantly a cultural one. In December 
1947, the same month that Kennan addressed his War College audience and NSC-4 was 
issued, Army occupation officer Melvin Lasky delivered a paper to General Lucius Clay, 
governor of the American zone in Germany, proposed the kernel of an idea that was to 
become Lasky’s job after leaving the Army: 
We have not succeeded in combating the variety of factors — 
political, psychological, cultural — which work against U.S. 
foreign policy, and in particular against the Marshall Plan in 
Europe. [What is needed is] an active truth [bold enough to] 
enter the contest … [The Cold War is] cultural in range. And it 
is here that a serious void in the American program has been 
most exploited by the enemies of American foreign policy. … 
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The void … is real and grave. … [the failure] to win the 
educated and cultured classes — which, in the long run, 
provide moral and political leadership in the community. … [A 
new journal would] serve both as a constructive fillip to 
German-European thought [and also] a demonstration that 
behind the official representatives of American democracy lies 
a great and progressive culture, with a richness of achievement 
in the arts, in literature, in philosophy, in all the aspects of 
culture that unite the free traditions of Europe and America.45 
Lasky’s paper sketches out a concern that became central to the Unites States’ Cold 
War cultural efforts to stem the feared communist tide in Europe. As Lasky remarked later, 
in a 1951 letter, “we know you can’t fight Karl Marx with Coca-Cola.”46 
Uncle Sam Courts Europe’s Non-Communist Left 
From the halls of the State Department and of course the White House itself grew a 
formal but covert program of international support, financial and otherwise, for the “non-
communist left” (NCL) in other countries. This program contrasted sharply with McCarthy’s 
and other domestic campaigners’ efforts to eradicate “left” tendencies altogether in the 
cultural life of the United States itself. With Southern Democrats and McCarthyesque 
Republicans ruling the roost at home, this was a challenging script to construct and maintain, 
especially when McCarthy emerged with his “commies in the State Department” theory. Part 
of the rationale for keeping so much of this international cultural work covert was to protect 
it from scrutiny by domestic witch-hunters whose taste and character many of the 
international policymakers disdained. 
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The sophisticated liberals who largely steered these efforts understood that European 
socialism and its adherents’ concerns for economic justice could not be merely suppressed 
without seeming fascistic, reinforcing the U.S. image as, at best, a slap-happy, adolescent 
hick (reinforced by first encounters with U.S. servicemen in two world wars, and with 
American tourists who seemed more interested in shopping and carousing than deeper 
cultural experience) or, worse, an arrogant, self-possessed, materialist brute, undeserving of 
global leadership.  
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., author of The Vital Center, summed up what became the 
strategy of supporting the “non-Communist Left [as] the standard to rally the groups fighting 
to carve out an area for freedom … [and] the restoration of the radical nerve [leaving] no 
lamp in the window for the Communists.” In a 1996 interview, Schlesinger added, “We all 
felt that democratic socialism was the most effective bulwark against totalitarianism. This 
became an undercurrent — or even undercover — theme in American foreign policy during 
the period.”47 
These efforts began earliest in occupied Germany. A former City College Trotskyist 
long since alienated by Stalin, the volcanic Lasky became editor of Der Monat, just the 
German-language journal his paper for General Clay had described, which was launched in 
October 1948 with financing from the American High Commission’s “Confidential Fund.”48 
The journal later became the first of several produced in various European languages with 
covert CIA support. 
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Lasky’s journal was launched in conjunction with a formal organizational initiative 
conceived and backed by the CIA that is described in the Agency’s more or less official 
history of the era as “one of the CIA’s more daring and effective Cold War covert 
operations”49: the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). The CCF grew out of a sequence of 
events that alarmed anti-communist intellectuals about the American hegemon’s 
vulnerability to charges suddenly being issued, to some effect, by the Soviet Union and its 
fellow travelers. But it took all of 1949 and much of 1950 for the CCF to be conceived and 
born. 
War of the Words 
The threat perceived in a more actively propagandizing Soviet Union was enlarged, 
ironically, through a series of international events devoted to peace. A constellation of some 
800 artists and intellectuals gathered for a “Cultural and Scientific Conference for World 
Peace” at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria in March 1949, in which the United States was 
consistently cast as a “war monger” by some of the nation’s leading lights: 
Playwright Clifford Odets denounced the “enemies of Man” 
and claimed the United States had been agitated into “a state of 
holy terror” by fraudulent reports of Soviet aggression; 
composer [Aaron] Copland declared “the present policies of 
the American Government will lead inevitably into a third 
world war.”50 
The conference host — the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions — was a 
communist front organization, right-wingers warned, and the conference did in fact later 
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prove to have been a Cominform initiative. A similar “World Congress of Peace” quickly 
followed in Paris, also with communist backing. 
With covert support from the other side, a small cadre of anti-communist intellectuals 
— including Sidney Hook, Dwight Macdonald, Mary McCarthy, and Nicolas Nabokov — 
speedily organized themselves as “Americans for Intellectual Freedom” (AIF) and installed 
themselves and ten phone lines in the Waldorf’s Bridal Suite for the weekend to monitor, 
cover, and intervene in the March event as best they could. OPC’s Wisner sent Michael 
Josselson, a Templehof operative who was to figure prominently in later CIA organizing, and 
Lasky attended as well. AIF members issued various critiques of the event and staged a 
counter-demonstration in Bryant Park. According to the CIA’s commissioned account, 
“Hook and his friends stole the show,” though the tone in all other renditions of this history 
recalls that cadre members and OPC’s operators were panicked at the thought that Stalin 
might claim the high ground of peace, casting the U.S. as the world’s greatest geopolitical 
threat. This inchoate group began urgently to discuss how Americans and like-minded 
Europeans might better position themselves and best respond to Soviet initiatives.51 
This conversation continued as opponents gathered alongside the Paris meeting in 
April, which was the occasion for Sidney Hook’s earlier quoted remarks about French views 
of American culture. French Resistance fighter and Buchenwald survivor David Rousset and 
Franc-Tireur, his non-communist left circle, quickly organized an “International Day of 
Resistance to Dictatorship and War” later the same month, in an effort to counter the two 
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communist-sponsored conferences,52 but American officials deemed it “too radical and 
neutralist.” Not incidentally, while anti-Stalinist, the meeting also featured the anti-
Americanism of which Hook complained, along with his resentment of “the use which [Jean-
Paul] Sartre makes of [African American writer Richard Wright] as a kind of club against 
American culture analogous to the use the Communists make of [American singer Paul] 
Robeson.”53 Thus was Wright, one of the six contributors to The God That Failed, rendered 
suspect and drummed out of the government’s anti-communist corps. 
Much jockeying for position can be and has since been traced by historians 
throughout this gestation period, with interpersonal issues and relationships apparently 
jostling alongside intellectual, political, and strategic ones. Frances Stone Saunders sums up 
the shift occurring at this time as follows: 
In effect, what [Hook] was advocating was the purging of those 
expressions of American life that he judged to be in conflict 
with the government’s “democratic policy” abroad. This was a 
monumental distortion of the very principles of freedom of 
expression, irreconcilable with the claims of liberal democracy 
under whose auspices it was proposed.54 
 Concrete plans began to emerge from the dialogue begun the previous winter in 
August 1949, when a small planning group brought together by Melvin Lasky in Frankfurt 
proposed convening a “Congress for Cultural Freedom” in Berlin — that island of Western 
authority in the midst of the Russian zone of occupation, blockaded for nearly a year until 
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earlier that summer. In September, Michael Josselson discussed the idea with the covert 
operator who had recruited him, Lawrence de Neufville, then serving on the OPC’s Paris 
labor desk, who in turn “pouched” Carmel Offie on it. Offie referred the matter to Wisner’s 
OPC deputy Frank Lindsay, and it finally reached Wisner in January 1950. Agency approval 
and funding for the conference were finally granted on April 7th, with Wisner’s proviso that 
Lasky and James Burnham be kept out of sight; but for Lasky, at least, it was too late: he had 
already gone ahead and secured the blessing of the Mayor of Berlin and had begun to invite 
people to the event in their names. Organizers and eventually an American delegation flew 
into Berlin at OPC expense (the last leg, aboard military aircraft) in time for the Congress to 
convene on June 26th. 
The Anti-Communist Manifesto 
 News that communist-backed North Korean troops had crossed the 38th parallel 
reached delegates on the morning of the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s opening ceremony 
in Berlin, lending urgency and weight to its deliberations. The Berlin Philharmonic’s 
performance of Beethoven’s portentous “Egmont Overture” and Mayor Ernst Reuter’s 
invitation that the ceremony’s 4,000-strong audience stand for a moment of silence, in 
memory of those who died fighting for freedom, opened the way for four days of panel 
discussions, tours, press conferences, cocktail parties, concerts, and speeches.55  
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 The stridency of the affair “appalled” British delegate Hugh Trevor-Roper, who 
complained, “There was very little in the way of serious discussion,” noting also that the 
proceedings weren’t “really intellectual at all”: 
I had expected and hoped to hear the western point of view put 
forward and defended, … [b]ut instead we had denunciations. 
… I felt we were being invited to summon up Beezlebub in 
order to defeat Satan. 
Ex-Communist Americans Arthur Koestler and James Burnham and Franz Borkenau of 
Germany delivered especially polarizing addresses against there being any neutral ground in 
postwar Europe, a sentiment echoed by Lasky (“Neutralism was, as an idea and as a 
movement, sponsored by the Soviets”) and actor Robert Montgomery (“There is no neutral 
corner in Freedom’s room!”). Vocal dissent from the floor was strong enough that Congress 
managers, Lasky notable among them, began to avoid giving the floor to extremists.56 
 Wisner, infuriated at hearing of Lasky’s prominent role in Berlin, cabled from 
Washington that he should be removed, due to his known connection to the U.S. government. 
On the eve of the Congress, the East German propaganda chief Gerhart Eisler had issued a 
press statement blaming “American policy spy Melvin Lasky” with the recent failed attempt 
to set fire to Berlin’s Communist House of Culture. Wisner’s eagerness to avoid any 
appearance of connection was beside the point for many of those in attendance: Trevor-
Roper reminisced that “the whole thing was orchestrated on so grandiose a scale … that I 
realized that … it must have been funded by some powerful government organization.”57 
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 Arthur Koestler mounted the podium one last time, before a public audience 
numbering 15,000 in a sports stadium, to read out the fourteen-point “Freedom Manifesto” 
that became the ideological foundation for the Congress for Cultural Freedom as an 
organization — mainly the rejection of neutralism in the fight against totalitarianism.58 
Troublesome British attendees had compelled revisions and amendments to Koestler’s 
original draft, such as the elimination of language intolerant of Marxist thought: article 6 
instead asserts that “No political philosophy or economic theory can claim the sole right to 
represent freedom in the abstract,” introducing “the extent and quality of freedom” as the 
criteria by which “the historical contribution of any society is to be judged.”59 But the 
Manifesto’s main thrust remained: asserting the primacy of both intellectual freedom (article 
1) and freedom of expression (articles 2 and 5), while distinguishing between democratic 
societies (articles 3 and 4) and totalitarian ones (articles 8, 9, and 11).60 Article 4 squarely 
addressed the Cominform’s attempt to lay claim to peace as its unique international aim, 
noting that “wars can be prepared and waged under [a] slogan … of peace,” which it 
denounced as “counterfeit currency circulated for dishonest purposes.”61 
More difficult to perceive across the distance of time are revisions made in Koestler’s 
draft Manifesto at the insistence of delegates not sharing the urgency he and James Burnham, 
then among the harshest critics of Kennan’s “containment” stance, felt that liberation of 
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Soviet bloc countries should be the free world’s goal. For his part, Wisner worried that the 
Congress not become a more militant organization, which might repel elements of the 
European non-communist left that the U.S. government meant to involve. Article 10 was the 
stage for this minor but energetic drama, opening with, “We hold that there can be no stable 
world so long as mankind, with regard to freedom, remains divided into ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots.’” The draft’s either/or struggle between “the defence of freedom” and the “reconquest 
of lost freedoms” was augmented to include “the creation of new freedoms.” This subtle 
amendment placated the mainly-British delegates who bristled at the suggestion that the 
actually existing West already represented some kind of apotheosis of freedom. This same 
spirit inspired the Congress to add an entirely new final article 13: “The defense of 
intellectual liberty today imposes a positive obligation: to offer new and constructive answers 
to the problems of our time.”62 
The Congress for Cultural Freedom Is Established 
The OPC Project Review Board had already secretly approved the CCF’s continuance 
as an organization early in 1950, months before the Berlin Congress, under the codename 
QKOPERA. Wisner’s demand that Lasky be put out (at least officially) led to Michael 
Josselson’s becoming the Congress organization’s director, and CCF’s planned headquarters 
being moved from Berlin to Paris. Josselson, who would nevertheless rely on Lasky’s 
counsel throughout his tenure, was to report to his original CIA recruiter de Neufville. 
Composer and bon vivant Nicolas Nabokov (cousin of Vladimir) became General Secretary 
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of the CCF, serving under Josselson. A contested choice, mostly because of support for other 
candidates, Nabokov had the ardent backing of Josselson and a critical mass of New York 
intellectuals, as well as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen.63 
Nabokov had spoken stridently in Berlin of his urgent wish that “out of this Congress 
we must build an organization for war.” He began planning right away to bombard Paris with 
a display of sophisticated American taste, in the form of a festival.64 But much more quickly, 
Europe seemed in need of shoring up against communist advances. It took partnerships to 
carry out this campaign; but of partners, there were plenty.  
Public-Private Propaganda Partners 
Already gestating by this time were private-sector initiatives that prepared the ground 
and quickly became implicated in the U.S. government’s global Cold War apparatus. 
Historian Giles Scott-Smith summarizes the significance of this constellation of forces: 
The conception of the American ruling class in the late 1940s, 
that Western Europe had to be transformed according to the 
productivist corporate-liberal synthesis to prevent economic 
stagnation from leading to socio-political disorder, found many 
supporters among European elites feeling threatened by the 
possibilities of post-war upheaval. … [T]his transnational 
configuration of elites operating in big business, trade unions, 
in politics and in institutions of civil society would be the basis 
for American hegemonic leadership in the West until the early 
1970s.65 
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An important and early component of this emerging constellation — “the paradigm 
for the CIA-led ‘corporatization’ of the foreign policy machinery in the Cold War period” — 
was the National Committee for a Free Europe. NCFE’s first president, Allen Dulles, was 
replaced upon his transfer to the CIA by C. D. (General Charles Douglas) Jackson of the 
wartime OSS and managing director of Time-Life in the late Forties, who would become 
advisor to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. The NCFE’s fundraising arm, the “Crusade 
for Freedom,” provided both a stage and a launching pad for future President Ronald Reagan, 
the Crusade’s leading spokesman and publicist. The Committee launched Radio Free Europe 
in 1949, and caused countless thousands of balloons carrying propaganda pamphlets to rain 
down upon Soviet satellite countries in the early Fifties.66 
American trade unions were also early, active participants in the East-West alignment 
of Europe. Having already carefully distanced themselves from communist associations back 
home, as domestic anti-communism grew, leaders of both the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) built on the patriotic pattern set in 
World War II in their approach to organizing: “working alongside management in a 
collective bargaining arrangement … [in keeping with] the ‘politics of productivity’” then 
being extended to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. This spirit was taken up by 
union leaders who fit the post-war American mold as ex-communist anti-communists: 
Within the AFL, an aggressive drive against communist 
influence in the European unions was being planned well 
before the end of 1947. … The foremost influence on this 
policy direction was Jay Lovestone, up until 1929 the Secretary 
of the American Communist Party and one of its founder 
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members, but thereafter increasingly a critic of Stalin’s 
dictatorial methods. … Lovestone, along with fellow socialists 
[David] Dubinsky and Irving Brown, became the prime movers 
of post-war AFL foreign policy through the Free Trade Union 
Committee (FTUC) … set up in 1944… to aid the rebuilding of 
democratic institutions and union organizations in post-fascist, 
postwar Europe.67 
Irving Brown played a central role from early on in the Cold War. 
… [Irving] Brown, as FTUC European representative, became 
the main AFL anti-Communist trouble-shooter abroad for 
several decades after the war. … Under the Marshall Plan 
Brown was principal union coordinator for the State 
Department and thus worked closely with Paul Nitze on the 
Technical Assistance Program. Then, in 1948, the FTUC 
agreed a formal arrangement with the OPC to act as a financial 
conduit to European anti-Communist groups, and up to 1958 
the committee received $464,167 from the CIA for a whole 
range of different activities. This is surely the thin end of the 
web, and other sources have pointed to a budget of between $1 
million and $2 million dollars provided for Brown by the 
agency.68 
 Brown and company were most urgently concerned that the center-left coalition 
governments likely to be elected in France and Italy not include Communist Party 
participation. Distancing French and Italian unions from communism was their approach to 
achieving separation of European communist parties from other parties on the left. 
Particular focus was placed on France (with the formation of 
the non-communist Force Ouvrière by Brown) and Italy to 
prevent the communist unions from undermining the Marshall 
Plan, and the solidification of a broad non-communist union 
front by pursuing the break-up of the Soviet-led World 
                                                
67 Scott-Smith, 73-74. 
68 Scott-Smith, 74-75. 
  224 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which had included the 
CIO and the British Trades Union Congress, in 1948-9.69 
 As Cold War patterns crystallized, these early entities were joined by others, 
including pre-existing and new elements in what was known as the European Movement. 
That elite movement had roots in the Twenties, when Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi 
began agitating for a pan-European union, and in World War II, when Joseph Retinger, a 
Polish exile, built a wide network among exiled European leaders and American business and 
government interests.  
The wish to formalize and direct these elite, pan-European networks from across the 
Atlantic led to William Donovan’s formation of the American Committee on United Europe 
(ACUE) in April 1948. Former head of the wartime intelligence service, Donovan had at that 
time rallied “an elite corps which hailed from America’s most powerful institutions and 
families” to occupy wartime espionage posts, and leaving him well-positioned to create this 
new organization.70 Though the ACUE never grew very large — there were fewer than 400 
members two years later — the organization comprised “a remarkable cross-section of 
intelligence and big business personnel,” including Allen Dulles (then secretary of the 
Council on Foreign Relations and advisor to the creators of the CIA, which he would head 
throughout the Eisenhower administration), Thomas Braden, David Dubinsky, Walter Bedell 
                                                
69 Scott-Smith, 75. 
70 Saunders, 16-17 and 34-35. 
  225 
Smith (CIA Director, 1950-53), Charles Hook (chair, Armco Steel Corporation), and Lucius 
D. Clay (former commander-in-chief of U.S. Forces Europe).71 
Retinger convened another influential coalescence of transatlantic elites later on, in 
May 1954. The Bilderberg Group took its name from the Dutch hotel where it first met, and 
its secret meetings regularly brought together top-level business and government leaders 
from the U.S. and Western Europe for discussion and planning in order to define common 
political and economic objectives. Walter Bedell Smith and C.D. Jackson, both top-level 
confidants of President Eisenhower, attended in 1954; but American participation lagged 
until the proposed European Defense Community faltered later that year, exciting fear that 
the presumed trans-Atlantic military alliance would not take shape and spurring more 
Americans to take part. 
Tracing all these elements and actors, historian Giles Scott-Smith lays out a 
convincing argument that postwar American hegemony comprised the coalescence of these 
networks: 
This, then, was Atlanticism — the creation of a solid consensus 
among the elites in Europe and the USA that worked towards 
first the acceptance of an American role in European affairs, 
and then its solidification. Institutions such as ACUE, NCFE, 
and Bilderberg demonstrate the alignment of significant 
economic and political interests with the maintenance of this 
hegemonic framework.72 
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THE COLD WAR HEATS UP 
 In the years immediately following World War II, some Americans questioned 
whether there was any need for the United States to “sell itself” to the rest of the world. As 
Rep. John Bennett argued in 1947, 
For more than 200 years — even to the remotest corner of the 
earth — people have known that the United States meant 
freedom in the fullest connotation of the term. … Things that 
are self-evident require no proof. 
Historian Frank Ninkovich, quoting the Congressman, adds that these resistant politicians 
also feared that “selling America” might attract unwanted buyers, warning that the country 
might be “swamped by invaders from Europe,” carrying “alien ideologies.” Besides, they 
observed, displaying their mistrust of the New Deal state, national action of this kind might 
constitute “a subtle, sinister way to Federal control.”73 
 As the late Forties yielded to the Fifties, however, world events seemed to lend 
credence to U.S. fears that communism was aggressively on the march throughout the world. 
The victory of Chinese communists put Chiang Kai-shek in retreat on Formosa, and wider 
communist ambitions in Asia were feared. News of the first Soviet atomic explosion 
suggested that America’s geopolitical dominance might be undone. The worsening situation 
climaxed in aggressive armed action from both sides in Korea in June 1950. 
 Thomson and Laves describe this historical moment as an important shift in the U.S. 
cultural relations: 
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Shortly after the first Soviet atomic explosion the National 
Security Council decided in January, 1950 … that the 
international situation confronting the United States was 
perilous, and … called for enlarged and harder-hitting 
propaganda activity. In April President Truman underlined this 
proposal in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, urging a world-wide “Campaign of Truth.” This 
proved to be not entirely realistic. In the atmosphere of crisis, 
truth suffered more than formerly from partisan fact and 
slanted information. 74 
 William Benton, elected Senator in 1948 after serving as Assistant Secretary of State 
from 1945-47, expressed his alarm at the state of communist propaganda in 1950: “There has 
never been anything like it, anything so skillful and so effective in its mass impact.” He listed 
five themes as central to Soviet attacks: 
First. The United States is headed for a cataclysmic economic 
crash. 
Second. The rulers of the United States are Fascists, 
warmongers, and monopolists. 
Third. Although the rich in the United States are getting richer, 
everybody else is getting poorer and there is starvation, unrest, 
and growing sympathy for the Soviet Union among the masses. 
Fourth. America’s vaunted freedom is a fraud, and our doctrine 
of equality is belied by racial and religious discrimination. 
Fifth. Our character is bad — we are culturally barbarous, 
money-mad, lawless, crime-ridden, and effete.75 
Plans laid by Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett to campaign against 
these Soviet messages won support from Benton and twelve other senators, who called for a 
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“world-wide Marshall Plan in the field of ideas,” involving radio and film, bringing foreign 
students to the US, and support through the U.N., acceleration of the work of UNESCO, and 
U.S. diplomacy for world-wide freedom of information. Finally, their aim was that “the 
international propagation of the democratic creed be made an instrument of supreme national 
policy.”76 
Benton’s invocation of UNESCO fit within the evolution away from multilateralism 
described earlier. At the November 1949 meeting of the U.S. National Commission, he called 
for expansion of UNESCO’s program and budget to achieve “objectives which are also the 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy.” After opposition was expressed to nationalist use of the 
agency, Benton stated at the Commission’s next meeting in January that his purpose was not 
to make the organization an instrument, but rather “an ally, an adjunct, an assistance to our 
foreign policy.”77 
The Campaign of Truth 
 The Truman Doctrine was operationalized in the cultural realm of international 
relations through the President’s Campaign of Truth. 
[I]t had gradually become clear that Soviet hostility was the 
fruit not of ignorance but of deliberate intent. … In 
consequence the “Campaign of Truth” was to be a 
psychological offensive against Soviet propaganda activities 
and in favor of a more positive attitude on the part of other 
peoples toward the United States. Its stated objectives were to 
strengthen cohesion among the countries of the free world, to 
present the United States as a worthy partner with whom to 
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cooperate, to deter Communist aggression, and to help roll 
back Soviet influence.78 
Much of this psychological offensive was obscured from public view, at least as to its 
relation to the campaign’s largely hidden structural and financial infrastructure. The overall 
task was ultimately handed to the CIA, after being launched by precursor groups following 
Smith-Mundt’s 1948 passage. Yet some notable products of this covert work did reach 
sizable public audiences. Particularly well known was The God That Failed, a collection of 
six essays by American and European anti-communist ex-communists — Ignazio Silone, 
André Gide, Richard Wright, Arthur Koestler, Louis Fischer, and Stephen Spender. This 
project was conceived and the resulting book edited by Richard Crossman, former head of 
the Psychological Warfare Executive’s German section, who wrote Truman advisor C.D. 
Jackson and Melvin Lasky about the idea. Lasky translated and published all but one of these 
essays in Der Monat, and the collection was published in 1950 by Hamish Hamilton 
(Koestler’s publisher) in the United Kingdom and by Cass Canfield (later Allen Dulles’s 
publisher) in the U.S.79 
Truman’s Campaign lasted into 1952, by which time any aversion within the Foreign 
Service establishment to mixing cultural or informational activities with the nation’s 
geopolitical interests was apparently long forgotten. Reflecting in retrospect upon his role as 
director of State’s Office of Educational Exchange from 1948-52, William C. Johnstone said: 
It is basically a political job, for this program is an effective 
arm or instrument of American foreign policy. In its simplest 
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form, the job of this program is to implant a set of ideas or 
facts in the mind of a person. When this is done effectively, it 
results in action favorable to the achievement of American 
foreign policy. It can help unite the free nations on the road to 
peace.80 
That this was also understood at the time is borne up by a September 1951 report to Congress 
from the Bureau of the Budget on State Department programs: 
The objectives of so-called information and cultural activities 
are the same; no cultural activity is presently being continued 
which does not, through its own methods, encourage the unity 
and strengthening of the free world, increase trust in the United 
States as a leader of the free world, or expose the evils of 
Communism. … Culture for culture’s sake has no place in the 
United States Information and Educational Exchange Program. 
The value of international cultural exchange is to win respect 
for the cultural achievements of our free society, where that 
respect is necessary to inspire cooperation with us in world 
affairs. In such a situation, cultural activities are an 
indispensable tool in propaganda.81 
As to practical impact, Thomson and Laves see these early years in the Cold War as 
bringing cultural diplomacy in line with other impulses in federal policy: 
“Mutual understanding” continued to be a watchword, but was 
given such unilateral content as to obscure any real top-level 
concern with reciprocity. Immediate political objectives more 
and more shaped cultural as well as informational programs, 
and their aims were defined as countering Soviet propaganda 
attacks… The Point Four program … gave technical assistance  
… to help less developed countries. But as it was drawn into 
closer association with military and economic aid, it was 
increasingly viewed as an instrument of mutual security to 
oppose the spread of Communism.82 
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By this time, Foreign Service personnel and other U.S. participants in international relations 
were becoming aware of problems with early propaganda, which boasting of the comfort 
enjoyed by citizens of the young global hegemon — not only uniquely unscathed, but 
strengthened, by the War mobilization: 
Previously … the story presented had overwhelmed and 
disconcerted foreign peoples, and by its portrayal of American 
prosperity and of the superior comfort and well-being of the 
American standard of living had stirred resentment.83 
As time wore on, government propagandists also came to understand that the alarmist tone of 
the Campaign of Truth — too unsubtle and baldly self-interested — was backfiring: 
[T]he “Campaign of Truth” … provoked a reaction. The view 
had emerged that the character of the whole United States 
information and cultural programs had become “too direct, too 
shrill, too polemical and, in a sense, too patronizing.” Any 
attempt, it was argued, to manipulate for nationalistic ends the 
minds and loyalties of our actual and potential friends abroad 
was contrary to American principles, and was naturally 
resented by those whose confidence and help we were seeking. 
… [T]he program should be honest, calm and moderate, and 
intellectually mature and directed toward the fundamental 
attitudes and values of foreign peoples.84 
This early experience helped shape projections of the United States by the considerable 
propaganda apparatus being deployed first in Europe, and then throughout the world. 
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Propaganda and Mass Media 
Along with intensifying anti-Soviet feeling in the United States came a sea change in 
popular and Congressional attitudes toward propaganda. 
In the 1946 Congressional debates, the Voice of America was 
subjected to more serious attack than any other activity; in 
1947 it proved to be “the most popular, the most wanted, the 
most understood, and the least vulnerable.”85 
Walter Hixson observed that “as East-West tensions mounted, radio emerged as virtually the 
only viable means of disseminating anti-communist propaganda.”86 
Radio was by no means the only medium employed: tens of thousands of balloons 
were floated over Eastern Europe, bearing propaganda messages, for example; and popular 
postcard-writing campaigns were mounted between immigrant populations of United States 
and citizens of Italy, to encourage anti-communist voting in the crucial election of 1948. But 
radio was definitely emphasized, not only through the government’s Voice of America 
broadcast operations, but also by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation, non-
governmental entities working in consort with government interests. 
Radio broadcasts were undeniably effective. From the summer of 1948 through May 
1949, foreign listeners posted close to ten thousand letters each month in response to VOA 
programming, which estimated its audience at eight million, with listeners affecting others 
through word-of-mouth. In the winter of 1948, Moscow started jamming VOA broadcasts to 
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Europe and the Pacific, an effort that intensified and continued for some time to come, 
requiring construction of hundreds of new transmitting stations by the war-ravaged and hard-
strapped USSR. In 1950, the Soviets charged that the United States was “unceremoniously 
interfering with the radio services of the Marshall Plan countries, rebuilding them on the 
American pattern, and grabbing radio frequencies belonging to European broadcasting 
networks.” The Soviets never officially banned listening to Western broadcasts, apparently 
thinking this would constitute too profound an admission of their impact, though in 1951 the 
regime did forbid amateur radio operators from contacting people outside the USSR.87 
Soviet jamming was used as evidence of VOA’s effectiveness, in order to secure 
domestic support for radio propaganda. After retiring from forty-seven years of work in 
Soviet broadcast operations in 1994, Victor Franzusoff reported that “many Soviet officials 
admitted to us that VOA had considerable influence on listeners.” VOA’s own costs were 
increased considerably by the Truman administration’s commitment to counter Soviet 
jamming. The administration never seriously considered abandoning broadcasts to Eastern 
Europe, and Sen. Benton advised that it redouble its efforts to penetrate jamming. Many 
techniques were tried: material was broadcast at two frequencies, requiring twice the number 
of jammers; VOA engineers shifted signals, requiring Soviet jammers to monitor them 
constantly; directional antennas and filters were deployed; the audio spectrum was “clipped,” 
cutting out lower tones of the human voice and reinforcing the more penetrating higher ones; 
VOA broadcasts were positioned immediately next to regular Soviet frequencies, so Soviet 
jammers could not block VOA broadcasts without blocking their own. All of this required 
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heavy U.S. investment in both equipment and personnel, but Congress was ready to pay the 
price: in 1950, it allocated more than twice the regular VOA operating budget in start up 
funds for a “ring plan” to surround the Soviet Union with new transmitters. Martin Dies’ 
fears of A Trojan Horse in America are ironically echoed by the handle assigned to the group 
that produced this plan: Project TROY was the State-financed effort to involve academics at 
MIT and Harvard in devising strategies to infiltrate the Soviet empire with U.S. 
propaganda.88 
Lavish support seemed even more urgent after war broke out in Korea. VOA 
dramatically expanded its operations worldwide, rapidly developing a potential audience of 
300 million. By 1951, VOA went from producing daily programming in twenty-four 
languages to forty-five. By 1953, broadcasting in forty-six languages, VOA employed 2,000 
personnel, one quarter of whom were foreign-born.89 
Captivating VOA’s Audience 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, celebrating the launch of two new minority-
language broadcast services targeting republics in the Soviet Union, stated his hope that 
listeners would “maintain their religious traditions, their own way of life, despite the efforts 
of the communist regime to replace religion with godlessness, to replace the glorious 
histories of the peoples of the Soviet Union with the folklore of Stalinism.”90 
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But Voice of America’s daily programming was less measured than Acheson’s 
official pronouncement: one Voice employee said, “[A]nything more subtle than a bludgeon 
was considered ‘soft on communism.’” Walter Hixson described VOA propaganda, 
especially by émigré broadcasters, as “often crude. Much of it undoubtedly proved offensive 
rather than persuasive, especially among those committed communists who viewed émigrés 
as little more than traitors.” 
VOA broadcasts described the United States as “the Promised Land to refugees from 
communist tyranny,” and featured a relentless menu of anti-communist themes: 
refuting the misrepresentations of official Soviet history and 
the state-controlled press; emphasizing the regime’s refusal to 
grant citizens the right to travel abroad; “slave labor” and 
collectivization; low wages and long working hours of men and 
women; privileges granted to CP members; limitations on the 
intelligentsia; denial of freedom of religion; and subjugation of 
ethnic minority groups. … A constant theme of VOA 
propaganda to Eastern Europe and the Baltic states was Soviet 
collaboration with Adolf Hitler in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
… VOA offered regular features such as the programs “Life 
Behind the Soviet Curtain” and the satirical “Communist 
Paradise” to expose “the sham and hypocrisy of communism’s 
pretense of a better life.” … VOA often asked authors, 
including the most prominent exiles and dissidents, to read 
excerpts from their work attacking communism. … While 
condemning the denial of religious and political freedom in 
Eastern Europe and the USSR, VOA emphasized the existence 
of democratic government in the United States. It glorified the 
U.S. electoral process… 
A 1954 VOA broadcast claimed that “the Communist Party, on equal terms with other 
parties, enjoys all the rights and opportunities existing in a free country,” neglecting entirely 
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the widespread purging of suspected communists and “fellow-travelers” from public life then 
in progress throughout the United States.91 
 Strategically, VOA focused especially on Soviet intellectuals, professionals, 
technicians, writers, and artists in the major cities, contrasting Western freedoms for artists 
and intellectuals with the stifling, repressive climate of the USSR and its satellites. Its 
“Communism and Russian Culture” series detailed the privations of artists and the 
intelligentsia in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the VOA ignored strife between management 
and labor in the U.S., as well as income and social inequalities between men and women and 
people of differing races, cultural backgrounds, and politics. Typical was the Czech service’s 
series “America, A Classless Society,” which argued "that capitalists — and especially 
American capitalists — are not so ruthless and selfish as communist propaganda describes 
them.” In foreign affairs, Moscow was portrayed as seeking “world domination,” while the 
considerable overseas activities of the U.S. at the time were framed as “purely defensive 
reactions to Soviet aggression.”92 
VOA’s Cultural Programming 
 There was more to the VOA schedule than relentless haranguing, however. Radio 
programming was picked up from domestic sources — “The Telephone Hour,” “Hit Parade,” 
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“University Theater,” and “Adventures in Science” — and much was made of American 
music. Especially popular was jazz.93 
 The popularity of American music during World War II had prepared receptive 
ground for this particular expression of U.S. culture at war’s end. Louis Armstrong’s music, 
banned in occupied Europe, “came to symbolize the freedoms associated with Allied culture 
… clandestinely distributed and imitated in live performances by attaching ‘coded’ titles to 
the songs,” according to British-born jazz critic Leonard Feather, host of the first Voice of 
America jazz programs (Jazz Club USA, which first aired in 1952). Feather observed that 
jazz audiences in Paris and Berlin in the early Thirties had “elements in common with 
membership in a resistance movement.”94 
Apart from its projection of racial harmony, others heard some expression of the 
American spirit in jazz, even seeing it as an enactment of U.S. political culture. Buffalo 
native Willis Conover, whose VOA program Music USA began to air in 1955, believed that 
jazz was “structurally parallel to the American political system”: 
Jazz musicians agree in advance on what the harmonic 
progression is going to be, in what key, how fast, and how 
long, and within that agreement they are free to play anything 
they want. … Jazz is a cross between total discipline and total 
anarchy.95 
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Conover’s enormous celebrity behind the Iron Curtain, where his show eventually reached an 
audience of 30 million in 80 countries, was the fruit of steady work in using mass media to 
provide a Voice of America heard throughout the world.  
Finding “Communism” in Agencies of Anti-Communism 
 The stridency of VOA in its early years and the aggressive anti-communist feeling 
that fueled its rapid expansion make it especially ironic that Senator Joe McCarthy unleashed 
his team to attack it in February 1953, soon after Eisenhower’s inauguration. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles promised cooperation, as long as he — so newly installed in office 
— would be held harmless for anything that might come out. Meanwhile, Dulles ordered 
officials of the International Information Administration (IIA), established by Truman, to 
oversee “information activities” somewhat independently of the State Department.96 
McCarthy also extended his witch-hunting into book selection for the government’s 
overseas libraries, having an immediate impact on government policy. A State Department 
directive, based on a special study by the Committee on Books Abroad completed in May 
1952, was issued in January 1953. Reflecting the wariness of the anti-communist era, it 
warned that “materials produced by a person whose ideologies and views are questionable or 
controversial” should be used only when the balance was “clearly and strongly in favor” of 
their usefulness — rejecting the notion that anything written by a controversial author should 
be banned, regardless of content. Barely two weeks later, though, this directive was 
withdrawn; and one week further on, officials of the newly installed Eisenhower 
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administration banned all materials by “Communists, fellow travelers, and so forth” from the 
libraries and any of their programs. There was no authoritative list of “communists and 
fellow travelers”; but of course the phrase “and so forth” aroused the greatest consternation. 
As shelves were cleared of suspect material, some books were burned, enabling Soviet 
propagandists to compare U.S. censorship with Nazi book-burnings. Protests within the U.S. 
led to the third new directive in as many months, in mid-March, eliminating the phrase “and 
so forth,” but upholding the ban on books by Communists and members of “Communist 
Fronts” and magazines “which often print Communist propaganda.” Further, single issues of 
“responsible and reputable” magazines that contained “anything detrimental to this country’s 
objectives” were to be withheld. Yet another supplemental directive came in April, requiring 
the removal of books by anyone who refused to testify before Congressional committees 
concerning their alleged Communist affiliations.97 
Finally, in its fifth month, the Eisenhower administration appeared to take charge of 
the situation by sending its Reorganization Plan No. 8 to Congress at the beginning of June. 
Eisenhower’s plan established an independent United States Information Agency (USIA) as 
of August 1st, granting it jurisdiction over libraries abroad.98 The President tried to 
distinguish himself from McCarthyist elements, then in their full flood, by urging a 
commencement audience at Dartmouth, 
Don’t join the book burners. Don’t think you are going to 
conceal faults by concealing evidence that they ever existed. 
Don’t be afraid to go in your library and read every book, as 
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long as that document does not offend our own ideas of 
decency. That should be the only censorship.99 
Writing in the Saturday Review years later, in 1975, as CIA investigations were 
beginning to climax, Tom Braden tried to remind a more cynical audience of post-Watergate 
readers of the “respectability of what people then called ‘the cause’ of anti-Communism”: 
Eisenhower had said that book-burning “was the bad way to fight Communism. That good 
way was the CIA.”100 
The Strategy of Freedom: NSC-68 
 At the same time the Campaign of Truth was being launched, the government’s 
covert apparatus ascended to a higher plateau. Paul Nitze replaced George Kennan as the 
head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in 1950. In response to perceptions of a 
growing international communist threat, and specifically to President Truman’s request for a 
re-examination of the nation’s foreign-policy objectives, Nitze delivered NSC-68 — “The 
Strategy of Freedom” — in April 1950.101 This National Security document has been called 
“the quintessential US Cold War document.” Historian Walter LaFeber stated that “NSC-68 
proved to be the American blueprint for waging the Cold War during the next 20 years.”102 
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NSC-68 can be credited with advancing the most forthright statement of national 
cultural policy at the time. The section headed “Fundamental Purpose of the United States” 
states: 
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in 
the Preamble to the Constitution: “… to form a more perfect 
Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” 
In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity 
and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the 
dignity and worth of the individual. 
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our 
determination to maintain the essential elements of individual 
freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our 
determination to create conditions under which our free and 
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination 
to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in 
the Declaration of Independence, “with a firm reliance on the 
protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”103 
NSC-68’s framers contrasted these values with those imputed to Stalin’s Soviet Union: 
The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union 
and the international communist movement is to retain and 
solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and 
second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the 
Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires 
the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate 
elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. 
The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or 
forcible destruction of the machinery of government and 
structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world 
and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient 
to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts 
are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land 
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mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the 
non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet 
expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality 
must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the 
Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.104 
NSC-68’s framers concluded that “Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic 
values,” must “take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to 
protect those values.”105 
 On the question of raw geopolitical power, State Department planners were not 
sanguine: 
[T]he actual and potential [military] capabilities of the United 
States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, 
will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. … A 
building up of the military capabilities of the United States and 
the free world is a pre-condition to … the protection of the 
United States against disaster.106 
Weighing alternatives, NSC planners rejected negotiation, since “the terms of agreements … 
would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the 
United States and the rest of the free world.” The longer historic tendency of the United 
States toward isolationism — which planners warned would not necessarily require a 
deliberate decision, but would naturally arise “from a failure to take the actions necessary to 
bring our capabilities into line with our commitments” — would, in the Cold War 
environment they perceived, lead to “imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our 
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belief in ourselves and in our way of life…” And despite “the provocativeness of recent 
Soviet behavior,” planners admitted that “a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union … would 
be repugnant to many Americans.” They thought “the American people would probably rally 
in support,” but concluded that “the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be 
morally corrosive.” In an explanation that bears contemplation decades later, they admitted, 
“It goes without saying that the idea of ‘preventive’ war — in the sense of a military attack 
not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies — is generally unacceptable to 
Americans.” NSC-68 thus concludes that the only solution was “A more rapid build-up of 
political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is 
now contemplated…”107 
 No budget was estimated for the massive build-up of military capabilities called for in 
NSC-68 — including the development and deployment of the hydrogen bomb — and 
expanded military aid to “free world” allies. Secretary of State Acheson “later stated that this 
would only have directed interest away from the real issues at stake,” according to historian 
Giles Scott-Smith, “but the estimate was that the military budget alone would need to 
increase from $13.5 billion to somewhere around $50 billion a year.”108 
The “Strategy of Freedom” stated that over the long term,  
… the only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin 
design by the steady development of the moral and material 
strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet 
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world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the 
Soviet system.109 
And it is here that Scott-Smith locates the greatest significance of NSC-68: 
[T]he real significance in this document was its explicit linkage 
of these overt measures with the covert dimension “in the fields 
of economic and political and psychological warfare.” If the 
contest was about values rather than simply military capability, 
all areas of society had to be targeted to promote the message 
of the free world against tyranny, and all methods were 
therefore justifiable. Freedom, in other words, needed a 
strategy for it to triumph, and every effort to influence civil 
society towards recognising the natural moral and rational 
supremacy of the principles of freedom, tolerance, the 
importance of the individual was now given the official seal of 
approval. Such a projection of values also required that 
channels other than the government had to be supported or, 
perhaps, created, in order to emphasise the general concern for 
these issues across civil society. Thus, through the utilisation of 
the state–private network of elites across the political, 
economic and socio-cultural fields, the Gramscian “enlarged 
state,” crossing the boundaries of the political/civil society 
divide, was coming into official existence.110 
With NSC-68 in place, Allen Dulles joined the CIA as Deputy Director of Operations in 
December 1950, and Tom Braden joined the Agency to set up International Organizations 
Division under the OPC’s Wisner, but reporting directly to Dulles.111 
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THE CIA IN BLOOM: AMERICA’S SHADOW CABINET FOR CULTURE 
It was in aid of securing the “moral and material strength of the free world” that the 
CIA undertook sponsorship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. While Truman’s 
Campaign of Truth was unfolding, CCF organizers were organizing themselves and starting 
to produce public programs with covert backing. But further refinements in Cold War policy 
and strategy, made as Eisenhower replaced Truman, affected how programs in the CIA and 
State Department evolved. 
Psychological Strategizing 
In the final year of Truman’s administration, a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) 
was formed to create a “policy blueprint” for covert operations. This move was urged upon 
Truman by C.D. Jackson, president of the NCFE and, by 1951, “an ‘outside’ director of CIA 
covert operations through The Truth Campaign.” Jackson was disturbed at “the absolute 
paucity of policy in Washington,” perturbed over organizational disputes and interpersonal 
rivalries among “professional amateurs,” and eager to tackle “an opportunity and a problem” 
he perceived as an ad-man for Time in the Thirties: 
The opportunity is to recapture our world dynamic, which is 
not dollars but ideas. Our dynamic up to now — self-protection 
and dollars — must be replaced by the earlier American 
dynamic of dedication to an ideal. Here we are faced with the 
possibility of a resurgence of the American proposition 
throughout the world. 
Truman issued a secret directive establishing the PSB in April 1951 as a joint effort of the 
Department of Defense and the CIA. Kennan’s backing of the idea overrode State 
Department resistance, as far as the President was concerned. In May 1952, the PSB took 
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over supervision of the CIA’s program of psychological warfare, code-named “Packet.”112 
Two PSB reports were commissioned that fall and issued in May 1953, one focusing on the 
efficiency of psychological operations and the other providing strategic frameworks: they 
urged Cold Warriors to “portray U.S. policy as a ‘truly Christian approach … characteristic 
of the American people’” — framing bipolar global conflict as a holy war, rather than one 
waged over economics or politics.113 
This doctrinal paper, appearing in draft form as a document labeled PSB D-33/2, 
inspired a detailed response from an alarmed PSB officer, Charles Burton Marshall, who 
asked, 
How [can] a government interpose with a wide doctrinal 
system of its own without taking on the color of 
totalitarianism? The paper … accepts uniformity as a substitute 
for diversity. It postulates a system justifying “a particular type 
of social belief and structure,” providing “a body of principles 
for human aspirations,” and embracing “all fields of human 
thought” — “all fields of intellectual interests, from 
anthropology and artistic creations to sociology and scientific 
methodology.” … “a machinery” to produce ideas portraying 
“the American way of life” on “a systematic and scientific 
basis.” … It anticipates “doctrinal production” under a 
“coordination mechanism.” … It asserts “a premium on swift 
and positive action to galvanize the creation and distribution of 
ideas” … It foretells a “long-term intellectual movement” as 
growing out of this effort and having the aim not only to 
counter communism but indeed to “break down worldwide 
doctrinaire thought patterns” providing an intellectual base for 
“doctrines hostile to American objectives.” … That is just 
about as totalitarian as one can get. 
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Marshall expressed particular alarm over the PSB’s emphasis upon elite groups — the very 
basis for the CIA’s entire non-communist left strategy — instead of the individual: 
Individuals are relegated to tertiary importance. The supposed 
elite emerges as the only group that counts. The elite is defined 
as that numerically “limited group capable and interested in 
manipulating doctrinal matters,” the men of ideas who pull the 
intellectual strings “in forming, or at least predisposing, the 
attitudes and opinions” of those who in turn lead public 
opinion.114 
The ironies doctrinal freedom and anti-communist correctness were real, and would 
be frequently and passionately criticized when the CIA’s intervention in Atlanticist cultural 
affairs was revealed in the mid-Sixties. But there was no wont of emphasis upon individual 
freedom among those driving the coordination mechanism that emerged. 
The Congress for Cultural Freedom Goes Public 
 After the Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CCF’s Steering Committee met 
in the conference hall of the anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU)115 in Brussels in November 1950 to agree on structure and program. The 
Committee worked from one paper prepared by Lasky in July, and another from Koestler 
entitled “Immediate Tasks for the Transition Period.” Koestler himself had already been 
removed from the core group, due to his strident pontificating in Berlin — more in keeping 
with the domestic spirit motivating HUAC and McCarthy, and therefore offensive to 
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Europeans being targeted on the non-communist left. Arthur Schlesinger, Averell Harriman’s 
aide at the Marshall Plan’s ECA office in Paris, had persuaded honorary co-president 
Bertrand Russell not to resign as a Congress figurehead after Berlin (Russell remained in post 
until 1956): Russell and fellow co-presidents Benedetto Croce (d. 1952, replaced by Don 
Salvador de Madariaga), John Dewey, Karl Jaspers, and Jacques Maritain lent prestige to the 
effort (Isaiah Berlin declined to serve); and Swiss writer, theorist and European federalist 
Denis de Rougement agreed to serve as president of the CCF’s Executive Committee. With 
$170,000 in start-up funding from Irving Brown’s Free Trade Union Committee, the 
institutional phase of the CCF began.116 
Speaking of the purpose of his CIA Division in 1994, Tom Braden articulated the 
underlying aims driving covert support to the CCF as the Agency’s hallmark project: 
We wanted to unite all the people who were artists, who were 
writers, who were musicians, and all the people who follow 
those people, to demonstrate that the West and the United 
States was devoted to freedom of expression and to intellectual 
achievement, without any rigid barriers as to what you must 
write and what you must say and what you must do and what 
you must paint, which was what was going on in the Soviet 
Union. I think we did it damn well.117 
 A flotilla of CCF projects was soon launched, continuing with covert aid from the 
CIA and its fellow-traveling U.S. funders until Ramparts magazine’s embarrassing 1967 
disclosure of the Agency’s secret support. Michael Josselson, CCF director from 1951-1967, 
and general secretary Nicolas Nabokov established the Congress’s Paris operations and to 
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“intellectualize” and “culturize” its programs, focusing on areas of perceived Soviet 
weakness: 
The cultural initiatives in international communism were to be 
countered not at the level of crude propaganda of the kind the 
[American Congress for Cultural Freedom] had been calling 
for; instead Nabokov and Josselson developed a “high-
cultural” program that proved very successful.118 
Hoping to be perceived as acting in a genuinely entrepreneurial way, the CCF Secretariat 
proceeded with an program that would gradually expand throughout Western Europe and 
beyond for the remainder of the Fifties and into the early Sixties. 
[T]he Congress … through its prominent journals, large-scale 
conferences and seminars, and sometimes lavish festivals … 
was to proclaim consistently … that freedom of the intellect 
and of culture … was a prerequisite for any … progressive 
democratic society. In other words, no intellectual or cultural 
activity worth its name could be carried out, and no claim of 
cultural excellence could be made, without the assurance of 
complete independence from political interference.119 
Publications for Cultural Freedom 
A small but significant intellectual publishing industry grew out of the CIA-backed 
Congress. Preuves became the first CCF journal, launched in 1951, with the German-Swiss 
François Bondy as its editor. Published monthly in French, Preuves provided what Australian 
politician and journalist Peter Coleman described as a “measured liberal anti-Communist 
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perspective into French debates, opposing the neutralism of L’Observateur, the pacifism of 
Esprit and the ‘co-existentialism’” of Sartre’s Les Temps Moderne. The journal was read not 
only in France, but also in francophone Africa and within intellectual circles in central and 
eastern Europe.120 
Three more Congress-backed journals were introduced in 1953, in Spanish, German, 
and English. Cuadernos, published in Paris but read throughout the Spanish-speaking world, 
was edited by Julian Gorkin (née Gomez), founder of the Communist Party in Valencia in 
1921 and a Comintern official, who emerged as a Trotskyist during the Spanish Civil War 
and went into exile in Mexico during World War II. Forum was launched the same year, 
edited in Vienna by Friedrich Torberg, a Jewish exile to the U.S. after the fall of France, not 
only to fill gaps perceived between communist and Catholic publications in Austria, but also 
to reach German-speaking intellectuals in Hungary. The English-language Encounter was 
third, quickly becoming influential within the United Kingdom’s anti-communist, pro-
American Liberal-Labor community and distributed by the British Council to 
Commonwealth countries.121 
Relying on covert support from the British Foreign Office’s Information Research 
Division (IRD) as well as from the CIA, co-editors were required for their joint operation of 
Encounter. Arrangements began with a 1951 meeting between Wisner with his counterparts 
in the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), accompanied by the notorious CIA-MI6 liaison 
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Harold Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby (in fact a double agent, who defected to Russia in 
1963). Josselson and de Neufville met with Philby at the Royal Auto Club to strategize. 
Subsequent negotiations were brokered by British spymaster Christopher Monty Woodhouse 
(who was simultaneously helping engineer the CIA/SIS-backed overthrow of Iranian premier 
Mohammed Mossadegh in favor of the ultra-right Shah). Stephen Spender was chosen to 
serve as Encounter’s British co-editor, while Irving Kristol, executive director of the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom and later hailed as the “godfather of modern 
conservatism,” became his American counterpart.122 
The last of the major Western European languages was finally brought into the 
Congress family of publications in 1956, when the Italian-language Tempo Presente was 
launched under the joint editorship of Ignazio Silone and Nicola Chiaromonte.123 
In 1955, the Congress backed historian Walter Laqueur, the CCF’s official 
representative in Israel, in creating Soviet Survey, a monthly newsletter focused on 
intellectual, political and artistic life in Eastern Europe. That same year, the Congress 
extended its publication program beyond Europe with Quest, an Indian journal produced in 
English, an administrative language there more than a literary one: John Kenneth Galbraith 
complained that “it broke new ground in ponderous, unfocused illiteracy.” Quadrant was 
established in Australia, and the most heavily subsidized of all CCF publications, Jiyu, was 
later established in Japan. By the mid-Sixties, the Congress had extended its reach to the 
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Arab world, Africa, and China. Transition appeared in Uganda, continuing operations until 
its offices were raided and editors imprisoned in 1968.124 
The last of the Congress journals was Censorship, launched from London in 1964 and 
continuing through the CCF’s demise in 1967. Stephen Spender used it as his model when he 
launched Index on Censorship in 1972, with a generous grant from the Ford Foundation.125 
Though central to the entire CCF enterprise, Lasky and his journal Der Monat had to 
be kept at arms-length in the early years, even within the context of “plausible deniability” 
that accompanied CIA support overall. When Der Monat’s original occupation funding was 
lost, Lasky’s journal was picked up by the Ford Foundation’s Intercultural Publications 
program, launched in 1952 by Shepard Stone, who had also worked with Lucius Clay in the 
German occupation government.126 At the end of 1953, Josselson finally succeeded in 
bringing Der Monat officially under the Congress umbrella, making it one of the CCF’s 
flagship publications, along with Encounter and Preuves. Lasky himself could then formally 
be included as a member of a “Tri-Magazine Editorial Committee,” comprising the editors as 
well as Josselson, Nabokov, and de Rougement; but Josselson and Lasky were in charge. As 
Diana Josselson explained,  
Michael was publisher and editor-in-chief. Lasky was vice 
president, and, to a certain extent, Michael’s mouthpiece. 
Michael tried to arrange periodic meetings between the various 
editors, and Lasky was understood to be the main guy if 
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Michael wasn’t there. They were in close contact, and saw 
things similarly.127 
 By 1956, Lasky reported that the magazines had become “symbols of the cultural life 
of two ancient nations of free, humane, and democratic international (and transatlantic) 
exchange.” Though he was referring to all the journals, Lasky’s reference to “two nations” 
only works if Europe as a whole were considered one of them; but it may also reflect the 
Anglo-American preference for the English-language Encounter. Historian Saunders notes 
that “Back at CIA headquarters in Washington, Encounter was regarded proudly as a 
‘flagship,’ … even … a kind of calling card for CIA agents.” She recounts one agent telling 
another, before their first clandestine meeting, “I’ll be carrying a copy of Encounter, so 
you’ll know who I am.”128 
 Apart from their steadfast anti-communism, these journals also shared an aversion to 
criticizing the United States. This was so firmly established that Lasky had to caution his 
fellow editors against taking it too far, by “insisting, in the matter of American material, that 
the USA be constantly projected ‘positively,’ that all the European anti-American stereotypes 
being made short shrift of”: 
Let’s not always be forcing the matter. (And-what-have-we-
done-today-to-stop-people-thinking-of-us-as-Barbarians?) We 
— not unlike everybody else — have too many problems 
(including materialism, cynicism, corruption, violence) 
consistently to come out with a positive word of cheer for the 
Stars-and-Stripes forever. Let European writers grumble. Let’s 
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grumble about ourselves (paradoxically, one of our most 
sympathetic sounds).129 
Anti-American feeling was still swelling in Europe, inflamed by disgust at racist 
resistance to the U.S. civil rights movement, demagogical domestic anti-communism, and 
what became known for quite some time as “the Americanization of culture,” both literal and 
figurative. As Saunders documents, anti-Americanism was expressed in many ways, but was 
“a psychological necessity to many Europeans.” Historians of this era, like participants at the 
time, see the most telling sign of Americans in the drivers’ seat in these periodicals’ failure to 
acknowledge any dark side or drawbacks in The American Way. But one might as easily see 
this in the bland uniformity of the Euro-American brand of high-art culture being peddled by 
the Congress and its CIA backers, the exceptions merely proving the rule. 
American Festivals in Europe (and Beyond) 
The first major public event hosted by the Congress for Cultural Freedom took place 
in May 1952, almost two years after the Berlin conclave, this time in Paris. Oeuvre de 
Vingtième Siècle (“Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century”) was devoted to the significance 
of modernism in the arts — once attacked by the Nazis as “degenerate,” then after the war, 
by Stalin’s cultural theorists, who favored “socialist realism.”  Nicolas Nabokov eagerly 
embraced this project, mounting a month-long program larded with panel discussions and 
lectures that drew out significant Cold War content, along with church services “for the 
victims of totalitarian oppression.” An exhibition of 150 modernist French and American 
paintings and sculptures was mounted, competing with a communist-backed show of 
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Mexican art then on view at the Paris Museum of Modern Art. Alban Berg’s Wozzek received 
its Paris premiere in a performance by the Vienna Opera, as did Benjamin Britten’s Billy 
Budd by Covent Garden, Gertrude Stein and Virgil Thompson’s Four Saints in Three Acts, 
and Arnold Schoenberg’s Die Erwartung. Igor Stravinsky conducted his Oedipus Rex before 
a set designed by librettist Jean Cocteau. The New York City Ballet appeared, as did the 
Boston Symphony, conducted for the occasion by Charles Munch of France. William 
Faulkner, Katherine Anne Porter, and Allen Tate appeared in literary debates. And Nabokov 
pointedly arranged performance of works by Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitri Shostakovich, both 
then banned in the USSR.130 
Most prominent intellectuals in Paris steered clear of associating with the event: of 
those enjoying an international reputation, only André Malraux played an active part. Sartre 
refused even to attend, explaining that he was “not as anti-Communist as all that.” And press 
response ranged from tepid, among conservative papers, to downright hostile from those 
farther to the left. L’Humanité expressed disgust for the CCF’s effort to recruit a “cultural 
army,” and Combat labeled the event “NATO’s Festival,” pointing out that it was staged by a 
“nation that lynched blacks and hounded anyone accused of ‘un-American activities.’” Even 
back in the States, the New Yorker discounted the Festival as “an extremely popular fiasco.” 
Nabokov blamed the French the negativity of this response, ruling the event “a psychological 
success in the … depressingly morbid intellectual climate of France,” asserting that “in any 
other country … we would … have had … a finer press reaction.” But he also felt that only 
such an event could have established the CCF as a “positive, and not only a political 
                                                
130 Berghahn, 135; Saunders, 117. 
  256 
organization,” and concluded that it had succeeded on this score, reporting that “intellectuals 
who were afraid of us before have come to us now as friends and colleagues.”131 
The Paris festival also occasioned the debut of the Farfield Foundation, a “dummy” 
foundation first set up by the CIA to manage the $130,000 it had pledged for the Paris 
festival, mainly to underwrite the costs of including the Boston Symphony, then widely 
regarded as the best in the U.S. (Of course, the CIA was not listed as a patron: its support was 
listed as deriving from “prominent individuals and associations.”) Because the festival 
coincided with the BSO’s lucrative Pops season, IOD chief Tom Braden had to intercede 
personally to secure its participation, working through C.D. Jackson, a member of the 
Orchestra’s board, by then on leave from his Time-Life post to work on Eisenhower’s 
presidential campaign. Farfield long outlasted the Paris festival, becoming the “principal 
conduit for Agency funds to the Congress.”132 
Farfield’s first president was Julius “Junkie” Fleischmann, heir to a yeast and gin 
fortune and trustee for a variety of major U.S. cultural institutions. Michael Josselson praised 
Fleischmann — as his job would repeatedly require him to do — as the “American Maecenas 
of the cultural world.” Historian Frances Stonor Saunders called Junkie “the CIA’s most 
significant single front-man.” Fleischmann had personally hung out in the sheds on the 
National Mall where Wisner’s OPC was being born in the late Forties and relished his role in 
obscuring the new agency’s covert funding, initially through the Fleischmann Foundation. 
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But tensions emerged after Braden’s IOD came into being. Decades later, Braden complained 
to historian Saunders, 
[Fleischmann] began to think he was the boss of these fronts. 
They were just using his name, but he started to believe it was 
for real. … [H]e started telling me what he wanted. … And that 
was the last thing I needed … In the end, we offered him the 
Farfield as a kind of substitute. … The Farfield Foundation was 
a CIA foundation and there were many such foundations. … 
We used the names of foundations for many purposes but the 
foundation didn’t exist except on paper. 
Diana Josselson, who was actively involved in the CCF (codename “Jena Ensinger”) after 
her 1953 marriage to its director, explained to Saunders years later,  
It was good to have a patron to display, and [Fleischmann] 
loved his role. But the relationship became a chore and a bore, 
because it diverted Michael from more substantive things while 
he made a big show of being deferential to the big patron. … 
The whole relationship was farcical, in a way, because we just 
played it straight. They would just pass on a set of pre-prepared 
actions. 
For his part, Nabokov denied any knowledge of CIA support: “Curiously enough, not 
for a moment did the question of money cross my mind.” He apparently thought his funding 
derived from Brown’s labor organizations. “Not in my wildest dreams could I have expected 
that my ‘dream festival’ would be supported by America’s spying establishment.”133 
The Congress produced two more festivals after the CCF’s Paris debut, the next 
taking place in Rome in May 1954: the International Conference of Twentieth Century 
Music. This event, too, was planned by Nabokov, not incidentally a composer himself, in 
order to position the Congress as a vanguard promoter of avant-garde composition — a press 
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release stated it was “designed to prove that art thrives on freedom” — presenting music that 
had been expressly forbidden by Stalin. Apparently Nabokov had taken in Herbert Read’s 
criticism that the Paris event had been “a complacent look at the past,” for he announced to 
the press “ a composers’ contest … unlike any … ever held”: a dozen “promising but 
internationally unknown composers” would be brought to Rome, their scores performed, and 
a winner selected by a jury “democratically elected by all those attending the conference.” 
The advisory board Nabokov assembled for his music festival included luminaries of the 
international music scene: his first invitation went to Igor Stravinsky, lately a convert to 
dodecaphonic music, who was granted the lordly sum of $5,000 for his expenses, 
accompanied by his wife and secretary. Nabakov installed himself for the duration in Rome’s 
lavish Palazzo Pecci, donated to serve as the festival’s offices by his friend Count Cecil 
Pecci-Blunt (née Blumenthal, a well-to-do American whose title was a wedding present from 
Pope Benedict XV), a colorful character long active in European art circles.134 Nabokov 
personally programmed a group of atonal and twelve-time composers quite beyond the 
expected bent of his advisory group. Art critic and theorist Susan Sontag reminisced in a 
1987 New Yorker piece about the “squawks and bumps” of the resulting musical experience, 
toward which “we were deferential”: she explained, “[W]e knew we were supposed to 
appreciate ugly music … (we had enormous appetites and strong stomachs).” Not so Pierre 
Boulez, who penned an outraged letter afterwards, accusing Nabokov of encouraging a 
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“folklore of mediocrity” and suggesting that the Congress next undertake something “in 
better taste” — perhaps a conference on “the role of the condom in the Twentieth Century.” 
Nabokov responded by ordering Boulez never to write to him again.135 
One final Congress-sponsored festival took place in Tokyo in 1961, reflecting 
growing interest in Japan as a regional counterweight to China, but no further large-scale 
European festivals were staged. Nevertheless, the CCF continued to convene a variety of 
other large conferences and specialized meetings, large and small. 
Meeting Freely, at Agency Expense 
Frequent conferences and scholarly meetings generated new material for various 
Congress periodicals, contributing to the further articulation of an Atlanticist perspective on 
cultural freedom, defining culture quite broadly. Science, for example, became a focus of 
CCF concern, responding in part both to HUAC’s attacks upon Manhattan Project scientist 
Robert Oppenheimer and to the Soviet espousal of “Lysenkoism,” according to which the 
pursuit of science would be subjected to state planning dictates and social priorities. Michael 
Polanyi, a Hungarian exile from Nazism then serving as professor at Manchester University, 
was prominent among the Congress’s science advisors, advocating acceptance of a diversity 
of methods as against “scientific Marxism.” Staking out the field of science as a terrain for 
cultural freedom provided strategists in the East-West culture wars an escape hatch from the 
inferiority complex generally besetting Americans in the arts. A 1953 conference on 
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“Science and Freedom” in Hamburg crystallized this discourse, leading to creation of yet 
another CCF publication by that name, edited by Polanyi.136 
Typical of the CCF’s more generalist conferences was one held in Milan in 1955, 
ambitiously entitled “The Future of Freedom.” By this time, McCarthy had been defeated 
back home, and the Congress was thus relatively untroubled in its liberal consensus by 
American hard-liners. Younger European social democrats with solid commitments to 
reformism, welfare-state economics, and a softer line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union emerged at 
this meeting of 140 intellectuals. The Milan conference also featured attendance of the first 
significant group of all-expenses-paid participants from the non-Western world — 
increasingly important in the year when the Bandung Conference focused the “nonaligned 
movement,” a movement of “third world” countries that by its very definition challenged the 
United States’ Manichean East-West global agenda.137 
In keeping with its more global audience, a full day was devoted to discussions of 
nationalism and colonialism in Milan, heralding increased CCF interest in the non-European 
world that was to continue into the Sixties. The conference was generally less plagued by 
anti-communist dogmatism than earlier Congress gatherings had been, aided both by the 
growing anticolonial movement and by increased awareness among all participants of 
growing social ferment within the Eastern bloc, which climaxed in the following year with 
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uprisings in Hungary and Poland.138 In all, however, participant Hannah Arendt declared the 
whole affair “deadly boring.”139 
By this time, Irving Kristol was exhausting the last of his Encounter colleagues’ 
patience, and this came to a head in Milan. Saunders’ history of The Cultural Cold War 
summarizes “fiery” exchanges between Josselson and Kristol, as well as the tensions 
between Kristol and co-editor Spender. There was much “boudoir politicking” in the Milan 
conference hotel, which “steamed with intrigue” surrounding the move afoot among 
Congress insiders to replace Kristol with Dwight Macdonald. Sidney Hook hosted dissenters 
to the idea in his room: the impulse to retain Kristol seemed to be prevailing with 
Encounter’s “central control — the apparat.” Meanwhile, Arthur Schlesinger’s room became 
a center for Macdonald advocates. Schlesinger dug in his heels on Macdonald’s behalf, along 
with the CIA, which succeeded in pressuring Josselson to accept Macdonald as “contributing 
editor” for a year, while allowing Kristol to stay on (which he did until 1958, when Josselson 
finally replaced him with the ubiquitous Melvin Lasky). Macdonald repaid the favor with a 
review of the Milan conclave that criticized its luxurious accommodations and delegates’ 
lack of concentration on substantive debate.140 
Despite continuing intrigue, endemic to CIA control and operation, and Macdonald’s 
public accusation of profligacy, extensive meeting did go on for many more years among 
various Congress-convened groups. Josselson regularized harvesting these elite gatherings 
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for published product by creating the CCF’s Forum Service in October 1957. The 
Mayflower-descended venture capitalist John Hay “Jock” Whitney provided the front for this 
undercover initiative, incorporating the organization in Delaware under his own name. Later 
renamed “Forum World Features,” the service provided “background information and 
analysis” to subscribers all over the world, becoming “the most widely circulated of CIA-
owned news services.”141 
CIA Projects and Projections 
The trans-Atlantic cultural network created and sustained under CIA auspices began 
to generate many projects less clearly identified as Congress-related, though many resulted 
from active encouragement by Josselson and other CCF participants. 
By 1958, the CCF had established a clearinghouse and international distribution 
service for its growing output, but also benefiting a battery of other cultural publications 
deemed worthy of its support. These included Partisan Review, Kenyon Review, Hudson 
Review, Sewanee Review, Poetry, The Journal of the History of Ideas, and Daedalus, among 
others. Grants were made through various CIA conduits to the Council of Literary Magazines 
for the same purpose before the Council and the Congress jointly began awarding 
fellowships to approved artists. Unbeknownst to each other, both Partisan Review and the 
New Leader began receiving Agency support through Farfield grants in 1953, as well as from 
other funding agencies involved in the CIA’s back-channel network.142 
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Quite a few Agency personnel got directly involved in cultural projects of their own. 
Many became authors on the side, consistently presenting themselves as “freelancers”: James 
Michener and Peter Matthiessen both wrote books while in the CIA’s employ. E. Howard 
Hunt (of Watergate fame), who ran Agency training in political and psychological warfare, 
was another, eventually winning a Guggenheim. Books held a special place in the pantheon 
of cultural products for many in the CIA network. As the Agency’s former director of covert 
operations testified before a Senate committee in the 1970’s,  
Books differ from all other propaganda media, … primarily 
because one single book can change the reader’s attitude and 
action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single 
medium [so as to] make books the most important weapon of 
strategic (long-range) propaganda. 
James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s Associate Deputy Director of Operations for 
Counterintelligence from 1954-75, might have published more poetry, his chosen art form as 
a young man, had his obsession with flushing out communist moles inside the world of 
covert operations not consumed him: his editorship of Yale’s literary magazine Furioso 
(coincident with his membership in the notorious Skull and Bones clique) had introduced 
him to William Carlos Williams, E. E. Cummings and Ezra Pound, with whom he continued 
to palaver throughout his tenure at the CIA, keeping some element of his identity as a poet 
alive. He was surely furious for having been duped by the revealed double-agentry of his 
close friend and collaborator Kim Philby.143 
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 More significantly, the Agency established its own clandestine books program. The 
program’s 1961 aims were summarized for Senator Church’s 1976 Senate investigation as 
follows: 
Get books published or distributed abroad without revealing 
any U.S. influence, by covertly subsidizing foreign 
publications or booksellers. Get books published which should 
not be “contaminated” by any overt tie-in with the U.S. 
government … Get books published for operational reasons, 
regardless of commercial viability. Initiate and subsidize 
indigenous national or international organizations for book 
publishing or distributing purposes. Stimulate the writing of 
politically significant books by unknown foreign authors — 
either by directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact is 
feasible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers. 
The New York Times estimated that the Agency has been involved in publishing at least one 
thousand books.144 
Freedom’s Forge Hits Hollywood 
 New covert initiatives were also undertaken in Hollywood, building on the rubble of 
HUAC’s early witch-hunting there and taking advantage of the industry’s slavish self-
censorship. Soon enough, the CIA became a producer, bringing Orwell to the big screen. 
Carleton Alsop, a Hollywood producer and agent (though not yet in the CIA sense) 
since the Thirties, played a starring role. Alsop joined Wisner’s Psychological Warfare 
Workshop under the tutelage of E. Howard Hunt. Hunt later dispatched him and Finis Farr, a 
Hollywood writer, to meet with George Orwell’s widow in order to clear rights for the CIA-
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financed and -distributed animated version of Animal Farm, which the two accomplished by 
promising her a personal meeting with Clark Gable. 
With rights secured, Denis de Rougement oversaw Animal Farm production by a 
British firm that had produced scores of films for the British Central Office of Information. 
“Spinning” Orwell’s work to suit the CIA’s propaganda purposes required changes in 
Orwell’s ending, in which communist pigs and capitalist men became indistinguishable. This 
simply wouldn’t do. In the CIA’s cartoon version, humans were eliminated altogether: only 
animals remained, and it was the sight of the reveling pigs that incited rebellion among the 
other barnyard animals. The Agency apparently assumed that the audience by that time 
would understand just which pigs they had in mind. 
Pleased with this product, the CIA went right to work on Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four, produced at its behest by Hollywood’s Motion Picture Capital Corporation, newly 
founded by Peter Rathvon, a friend of director John Ford who had previously financed other 
films through the CIA’s Motion Picture Service. Once again, Agency personnel had 
problems with Orwell’s ending, finding his depiction of totalitarianism simply too hopeless. 
In his search for a more upbeat finale, Rathvon sought advice from writer Sol Stein, then 
serving as director of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, after having worked as 
chief editor of the Voice of America’s Ideological Advisory Staff.145 Separate endings were 
ultimately produced for U.S. and British audiences — the British one having protagonist 
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Winston Smith cry out “Down with Big Brother!” before he is gunned down. The end. But of 
course, the Agency’s name did not appear as the credits rolled.146 
Alsop continued as an undercover agent for the CIA after he was hired by Paramount. 
There, he generated regular secret reports to the Agency on communists and fellow travelers 
in Hollywood, as well as on his progress in spearheading a covert pressure group to make 
sure that specific themes were being addressed, however subtly. For example, the Agency 
wanted to make sure that Hollywood films included “well-dressed negroes as part of the 
American scene.” This resulted in certain departures from reality (and anachronisms, when 
these films are viewed today) — like including well-dressed black people in crowds of golf-
tournament spectators in the Jerry Lewis film Caddy, at a time when they would not have 
been allowed into the golf clubs where that picture was shot. The CIA also wanted to 
suppress projects that presented unflattering portraits of the nation in film, leading Alsop to 
kill a Paramount script that featured “[u]nflattering portrayal of rich, uncouth, ruthless 
Americans, … racial denigration of Mexicans” and the “[i]mplication [that the] wealth of 
Anglo-Texans [was] built by exploiting Mexican labor.” He killed the project at his own 
home studio, but could not stop Warner Brothers from producing and releasing Giant in 
1956.147 
 In the midst of this ongoing CIA activity, the Eisenhower administration focused 
fresh attention on Hollywood in its early months. Cecil B. DeMille was recruited as a special 
consultant on cinema, working directly with C.D. Jackson in the White House until Nelson 
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Rockefeller replaced Jackson in the summer of 1953. DeMille advised the Agency’s Motion 
Picture Service (MPS), which in turn used 135 U.S. Information Service (later, USIA) posts 
as a distribution network for public showings of films that addressed “the objectives which 
the United States is interested in obtaining” and reaching “the pre-determined audience … 
we must condition.” The MPS also regulated American participation in foreign film festivals, 
which previously had been left to the industry itself, though the Russians fielded an official 
delegations to Cannes in 1951, headed up by their deputy minister of cinema. Here, too, the 
MPS sought to exclude “American motion pictures and producers which do not support 
foreign policy, [and] which in some cases are harmful.”148 
DeMille and the MPS also began to advise the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB, 
which had replaced the Psychological Strategy Board149) on its use of film, generating a list 
in the summer of 1954 of thirty-seven films to be shown behind the Iron Curtain. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff launched a top-secret campaign in 1955 under the banner of “Militant 
Liberty,” involving the Pentagon, the Navy, the National Security Council, and the OCB in 
efforts to insert the theme of “freedom” into Hollywood pictures. In the summer of 1956, the 
Joint Chiefs convened several meetings including such prominent Hollywood anti-
communists as Ward Bond, Merian Cooper, John Ford, and John Wayne. Participants at one 
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of these meetings targeted Jock’s cousin, Cornelius Vanderbilt “Sonny” Whitney, to receive 
a briefing.150 
Sonny Whitney had enjoyed success as the producer of such Thirties films as A Star 
Is Born and Gone With the Wind, and had also already allowed the Whitney Trust to be used 
as a CIA conduit. Sonny set up his own production entity, C.V. Whitney Pictures, in 1954 to 
undertake production of what he called an “American Series” — “to show our people their 
country and also to make certain that the rest of the world learns more about us.” John Ford’s 
The Searchers (1956) was the first of the series to be released; followed by The Wings of 
Eagles (1957), in which Ward Bond appears in the role of the Ford character, the fictitious 
director “John Dodge”; and finally, The Missouri Traveler (1958).151 
Grantmaking for Cultural Freedom 
Besides subsidizing participants in its own programs and underwriting its growing 
network of collaborating journals and publishers, the Congress for Cultural Freedom also 
began issuing grants to other groups and conferring fellowships upon artists in the U.S. and 
Europe, mainly at Michael Josselson’s discretion. Josselson also oversaw a “special 
discretionary fund” at the Farfield Foundation for the same purposes. Some of these grants 
were for general support, while others enabled special projects — for instance, a second 
European tour by the Boston Symphony in 1956, centered around a memorial concert for 
exiled Romanian musician Georges Enesco. Celebrating the success of the BSO tour 
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especially, its Trustee C.D. Jackson trumpeted the “strange” success of the CIA’s cultural 
campaign:  
“Culture” is no longer a sissy word. A nation like ours can be 
virile. A nation like ours can be fantastically successful 
economically. But in a strange way the glue that holds things 
together is the nation’s coefficient of idealism … The tangible, 
visible and audible expression of national idealism is culture. 
Of all the expressions of culture, music is the most universal. 
Of all the expressions of present-day musical culture, the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra is the best. 
A first European tour of the Metropolitan Opera also took place in 1956. The PSB had 
directed Junkie Fleischmann to amass the $750,000 needed to finance this tour in 1953, 
working in conjunction with Jackson. In the end, most of this sum “appears to have come 
from the CIA.”152 
 As time wore on, and Congress officials became more concerned about obscuring the 
source of its primary funding, efforts were made to diversify the operation’s base of financial 
support. Backroom deals with the CIA brought other foundations into the mix. Together, the 
Farfield Foundation and other CIA conduits made hundreds of grants to various cultural 
organizations and many artists, writers, and scholars.153 
Americans for Abstract Expressionism 
New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) occupies a special place in the 
CCF/CIA pantheon of Cold War cultural programming. Its personal connections to the 
official U.S. foreign-policy apparatus go back to the cradle: Nelson Rockefeller, who called 
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MoMA “mommy’s museum” — in honor of the driving force behind its founding, Abigail 
Aldrich Rockefeller — relied upon its curators to produce no fewer than nineteen touring 
exhibitions for Latin America under CIAA auspices. But Nelson was hardly alone: multiple 
MoMA Trustees and staff had significant personal connections with covert agencies.154  
Most prominent among them was MoMA’s powerhouse director, Austrian-born count 
René d’Harnoncourt, an early collector of Latin American work who directed art programs 
for Rockefeller at CIAA before being recruited as MoMA’s director in 1949. There, he 
quickly became the United States’ most strident campaigner in favor of embracing modern 
art as the “foremost symbol” of democracy, openly lobbying Congress in 1950 to finance a 
cultural campaign against communism. He went on to advise the State Department and the 
bewildering, shifting array of covert operators throughout the Fifties and beyond. 
D’Harnancourt ruled the roost at MoMA until 1967.155 
MoMA-trustee connections to covert agencies were numerous. Rockefeller’s close 
friend Jock Whitney (manager of the Whitney fortune) directed the CIAA’s motion-picture 
division before he joined the OSS; his business partner, William H. Jackson, later became 
Deputy Director of the CIA. (Lawrence de Neufville gave Whitney some strategic credit in 
creating MoMA’s substantial role in the government’s covert operation: “I do remember 
hearing that Jock Whitney and Allen Dulles agreed they had to do something about modern 
art after the State Department caved in.” This debacle — the “Advancing American Art” 
exhibition — is discussed later.) Vanderbilt-descended William Burden, also a Rockefeller 
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protégé at the CIAA, became a proud “front man” for CIA-funded projects in the Fifties. And 
fellow MoMA trustee William Paley, heir to a cigar fortune and owner of CBS, was a close 
personal friend of Allen Dulles, in whose home and offices CBS correspondents were 
annually entertained and briefed on CIA affairs. A number of MoMA trustees also served as 
directors for the CIA’s Farfield Foundation: not only Junkie Fleischmann, discussed earlier, 
but also Joseph Vernon Reed, Gardner Cowles, and Cass Canfield. Oveta Culp Hobby, a 
MoMA co-founder, sat on the board of Radio Free Europe, and allowed the CIA to use her 
family foundation as a conduit for covert funding; later appointed by Eisenhower as the first 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Hobby’s HEW assistant was Joan Braden 
(Tom’s wife). Tom Braden himself had worked with Rockefeller at MoMA from 1947-49, 
serving as executive secretary before assuming his position as head of the CIA’s 
International Organizations Division.156  
This elite network shared MoMA’s and the CIA’s common aesthetic commitment to 
modernism, and to abstract expressionism in particular — and not incidentally to the artists 
whose work these trustees were collecting. Not only did this reflect their more sophisticated 
understanding of art than that prevailing among Congressional witch-hunters; it also 
presumably carried Cold War content. 
[F]or [America’s cultural mandarins, Abstract Expressionism] 
spoke to a specifically anti-Communist ideology, the ideology 
of freedom, of free enterprise. Non-figurative and politically 
silent, it was the very antithesis to socialist realism. It was 
precisely the kind of art the Soviets loved to hate. But it was 
more than this. It was, claimed its apologists, an explicitly 
American intervention in the modernist canon. … 
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“independent, self-reliant, a true expression of the national 
will, spirit and character. … US art is no longer a repository of 
European influences …”157 
This modernist sentiment was also brewing in the art-critical world. In 1948, critic 
Clement Greenberg celebrated his sense that U.S. cultural hegemony had finally risen to 
match postwar geopolitical reality: 
When one sees how much the level of American art has risen in 
the last five years … the conclusion forces itself, much to our 
surprise, that the main premises of Western Art have at last 
migrated to the United States, along with the center of gravity 
of industrial production and political power.158 
No wonder President Eisenhower singled MoMA out in a speech in which he described 
artists as a kind of indicator species, useful in distinguishing between conditions of tyranny 
and freedom: 
As long as artists are at liberty to feel with high personal 
intensity, as long as our artists are free to create with sincerity 
and conviction, there will be healthy controversy and progress 
in art. … How different it is in tyranny. When artists are made 
slaves and tools of the state; when artists become chief 
propagandists of a cause, progress is arrested and creation and 
genius are destroyed.159 
MoMA’s advocacy of modern American art — specifically the “New York School” 
of abstract expressionists — provided the definitive aesthetic for Cold War cultural 
policymakers. Wyoming-born Jackson Pollack provided a photogenic face for the movement, 
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archetypally American, dribbling and spraying paint on his large and larger canvases. 
Frances Stonor Saunders’ account of The Cultural Cold War enumerates many fascinating 
details about MoMA’s CIA-backed exhibitions160 — among them, diverse critical response 
to those huge canvases. Some European critics felt queasy at the tendencies revealed by 
MoMA’s exhibition of  “The New American Painting,” for example. It was 
“The Biggest in the World,” announced La Libre Belgique, 
which worried that “this strength, displayed in the frenzy of a 
total freedom, seems a really dangerous tide. Our own abstract 
painters, all the ‘informal’ European artists, seem pygmies 
before the disturbing power of these unchained giants.” 
References to the size, the violence, the Wild West abounded, 
“as if the critics had got hold of the wrong catalogue, [a 
defender complained] and thought the pictures were painted by 
Wyatt Earp or Billy the Kid.”161 
The Museum’s curators produced a steady stream of exhibitions to confirm and 
explicate modern (American) art’s progress in taking in and taking over the world. Eva 
Cockcroft’s famous 1974 Artforum article, “Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold 
War,” traced the roots of MoMA’s narrow Seventies aesthetic to its Cold War work: 
Links between cultural cold war politics and the success of 
Abstract Expressionism are by no means coincidental. … They 
were consciously forged at the time by some of the most 
influential figures controlling museum policies and advocating 
enlightened cold war tactics designed to woo European 
intellectuals. … In terms of cultural propaganda, the functions 
of both the CIA’s cultural apparatus and MoMA’s international 
programs were similar and, in fact, mutually supportive.162 
                                                
160 See especially Saunders, 263-271. 
161 Saunders, 274. 
162 Saunders, 263. 
  274 
Saunders concludes her summary of MoMA’s staging of modern American art with 
her assessment of the institution’s role and impact, converting freedom to conformity: 
The Museum of Modern Art … held tenaciously to its 
executive role in manufacturing a history for Abstract 
Expressionism. Ordered and systematic, this history reduced 
what had once been provocative and strange to an academic 
formula, a received mannerism, an art officiel. Thus installed 
within the canon, the freest form of art now lacked freedom. 
More and more painters produced more and more paintings 
which got bigger and bigger and emptier and emptier. It was 
this very stylistic conformity, prescribed by MoMA and the 
broader social contract of which it was a part, that brought 
Abstract Expressionism to the verge of kitsch. … One of the 
extraordinary features of the role that American painting 
played in the cultural Cold War is … that a movement which 
so deliberately declared itself to be apolitical could become so 
intensely politicized. 
The ever-critical Jason Epstein weighed in on this art-world phenomenon, viewed with an 
outsider’s eye: 
It was like the emperor’s clothes. You parade it down the street 
and you say, “This is great art” … Who’s going to stand up to 
Clem Greenberg and later to the Rockefellers who were buying 
it for their bank lobbies and say, “This stuff is terrible”?163 
Saunders cites two critics on the predominance of abstract expressionism within the 
New York art world. Adam Gopnick, for example, states that “oversized abstract watercolors 
[had become] the single style of the American museum, forcing two generations of realists to 
live in the basements and pass still-lifes around like samizdat.” John Canady observed that by 
1959, abstract expressionism was so popular that “an unknown artist trying to exhibit in New 
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York couldn’t find a gallery unless he was painting in a mode derived from one or another 
member of the New York School.”164 
On the political front, considering the place of content in modern art, critic Harold 
Rosenberg explains how he saw post-war art as entailing “the political choice of giving up 
politics”: 
[I]n its politically shrewd reaction against politics, in its 
ostensible demonstration that competing ideologies had 
depleted themselves and dissipated adherents … the new 
painters and their supporters had of course become fully 
engaged in the issues of the day. 
They did so by emptying their work of content.165 
This socially disengaged notion of art was to reign among the new federal arts 
agencies created in the mid-Sixties. Challenging this postwar art-world orthodoxy became 
the inspiration and irritation of multiple alternative arts and cultural movements ever since. 
Feasting for Freedom, Footing the Bill 
 Intentionally hidden as it was, it remains difficult to assess the amount or reach of 
CIA money invested in its myriad cultural initiatives. But even within the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom itself, there was rankling over lavish spending in its various programs. 
Nabokov’s festivals provided the most obvious targets. Melvin Lasky considered the Paris 
festival “trivial” and bristled, “The Boston Symphony Orchestra cost a packet.” (Saunders 
counts the BSO price tag rather precisely at $166,359.84.) Lasky later complained, “[T]o 
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spend such large sums on this kind of spectacular hype — it didn’t make sense.” Even Diana 
Josselson, who considered “Nicolas’s festival … thrilling,” admitted that in its extravagant 
Paris staging of large companies imported from all over Europe and the United States, “[I]t 
gave more weight to the idea that America [meaning the U.S. government] was behind the 
Congress.”166 
 Histories of the Congress feature extensive disavowals that anyone knew at the time 
that the CIA was paying for everything. Equally extensive are the number of participants 
who scoff in retrospect that it would have been naïve to think otherwise — especially in a 
Europe recovering from the war and still extremely stressed financially. As editor and critic 
Jacob Epstein recalled, 
Suddenly there were limousines, parties with lashings of 
smoked salmon … and people who couldn’t normally afford 
the bus ticket to Newark were now flying first class to India for 
the summer. 
Malcolm Muggeridge wrote, “In the heyday … the airlines were crowded with dons and 
writers carrying branded culture to every corner of the habitable globe.”167 “Who do you 
think’s paying for this?” became a topic of speculative conversation over countless multi-
course meals hosted by the CCF in Western Europe’s finest salons. 
Revolving Doors 
Multiple entities helped obscure the CIA’s direct financial support of the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom’s undertakings. Funding relationships were reflected in and primed by 
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revolving-door patterns in staffing among the academy, the foundation world, the U.S. 
foreign-policy establishment, and the various think tanks that brought them all together for 
strategic conversation, aside from the Congress itself. Key figures and the relationships they 
maintained provided personal bridges among these apparently separate worlds, and were 
carried seamlessly into the nation’s domestic cultural affairs from the Fifties on. 
  John McCloy is a good example. Former Assistant Secretary of War, then president 
of the World Bank and High Commissioner of Germany, McCloy became president of the 
Ford Foundation (still headquartered in southern California) in 1953, the same year he 
assumed the chair of the Rockefellers’ Chase Manhattan Bank and of the nonprofit Council 
of Foreign Relations. Throughout, McCloy served as the Wall Street attorney of the seven 
largest U.S. oil companies and sat on numerous other corporate boards. Once ensconced at 
Ford, McCloy established a secret three-man committee, including himself and the two 
program officers he had specifically assigned to the matter, to oversee the Foundation’s work 
as a pass-through or cover for CIA funds and a substantial contributor itself to programs and 
initiatives growing out of it.168 
The Rockefeller family and its various philanthropies and think tanks offer the 
longest through-line in our story of Twentieth Century U.S. cultural policy — even longer 
than J. Edgar Hoover’s, he being disadvantaged by absence of fortune or heir. The 
unparalleled fortune built by John D. Rockefeller through Standard Oil from the late 
nineteenth century fell first to JDR’s son “Junior” Rockefeller, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
first president. Junior also funded start-up for the Council on Foreign Relations and donated 
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real estate for construction of the Museum of Modern Art, whose creation was spearheaded 
by his wife, Abby.  
The five male siblings in the third generation of Rockefeller wealth spawned and 
supported countless initiatives in business, politics, government, and the nonprofit sector. 
Nelson was most directly and centrally involved in covert operations, replacing C.D. Jackson 
as Eisenhower’s special advisor on Cold War strategy and coordinating covert operations in 
1954-55. He left the White House and Washington in frustration at not getting the Defense 
post he wanted, and situated himself at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a family think tank 
established in 1940. There he launched the Special Studies Project, an ambitious effort to 
define central problems and opportunities facing the United States, headed up by a young 
associate professor from Harvard, Henry Kissinger.169 Nelson became a key figure in laying 
the groundwork for domestic American cultural policy, when as governor he established the 
New York State Council on the Arts.170 
Nelson’s brother David was active as a financier of Cold War initiatives, through his 
control of the Chase Manhattan Bank Foundation’s donations committee and personally 
connected with many cultural-policy players. When fellow Council on Foreign Relations 
director Allen Dulles feared that incoming President Eisenhower might not like him staying 
on at the CIA, Rockefeller assured him over lunch that were this the case, he might expect to 
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land gently as President of Ford, the post that eventually went to McCloy instead. Tom 
Braden took care to brief David frequently on Agency matters, with Allen’s blessing, and 
later reminisced, “He was of the same mind as us … Sometime David would give me money 
to do things that weren’t in our budget. … David just have me the cheque … The CIA never 
came into the equation.”171 
Junior’s eldest son JDR III, also vitally interested in international relations, became 
best known for his work in nonprofit philanthropic sectors: he chaired the Rockefeller 
Brothers’ panel on the performing arts, staffed by the future chief of the National 
Endowment for the Arts; and spearheaded efforts in the Fifties that led to construction of 
New York City’s Lincoln Center in the Sixties, which inspired similar centers, often twinned 
with “urban removal” programs, to such an extent that the obsession quickly came to joked 
about in cultural development circles as “the Edifice Complex.”172 
Shepard Stone was another frequent flyer through the revolving door of Cold War 
action, philanthropy, and think-tankery. Following wartime intelligence and occupation-
government service, Stone returned to the New York Times, where he had worked as a 
journalist in the Thirties. But John McCloy soon called him back to Germany; and from 
there, Stone followed McCloy first to California, then to New York City, as the Ford 
Foundation’s Director of International Affairs from 1952-67, where he was deeply involved 
in CIA collaboration. Leaving Ford, Stone returned to Europe as President of the 
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International Association for Cultural Freedom, the successor group to the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom, after disclosure of CIA funding in a 1967 Ramparts article brought the 
CCF down, and Michael Josselson’s directorship of the IACF’s predecessor group along with 
it.173 
The fascination of America’s ruling class with the Atlanticist agenda and its frenetic 
activity in the United States’ foreign-policy establishment represented the coming of age of 
American power and the triumph of the U.S. power elite. The backdoor channels these 
figures cut under CIA auspices were sometimes justified as an escape from garden-variety 
anti-communists that ruled the roost back home. The tone of covert-agency initiatives 
reflected the rarefied culture of Board and clubrooms, and the pervasive postwar penchant for 
power and global intrigue. Saunders succinctly quotes other observers of the intellectual 
elite’s romance with covert ops: 
“… a certain sort of intellectuals have always had a romance 
about intelligence services,” observed [historian] Carol 
Brightman. “It’s a kind of coming of age experience, … 
especially on certain campuses such as Yale.” For novelist 
Richard Elman …, there was also a shared aesthetic concern: 
“It’s worth considering what these people had in common. 
They were all Christians, in a non-sectarian, T.S. Eliot kind of 
way. They believed in a higher authority, a higher truth which 
sanctioned their anti-Communist, anti-atheist crusade. T.S. 
Eliot, Pound, and other modernists appealed to their elite 
sensibilities. … These were men, as much as Shaw and Wells, 
for whom the socialist ‘century of the common man’ was 
unwelcome — they wanted the Uncommon Man and High 
Culture. So, they weren’t just putting money into culture willy-
nilly.”174 
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In the end, this notion of elite culture was to permeate domestic policymaking as well. 
The Impact of Covert Support 
 Frances Stonor Saunders’ insider interviews with Agency network veterans in the 
1990’s brought forward surprisingly few critics of the covert approach to U.S. cultural policy 
in international relations: how can it be said that the CIA did anything but support a great 
deal of interesting work? After all, the U.S. government derived no direct geopolitical 
objective through its covert culture war. The Psych Ops impresarios were driven to operate 
covertly by the benightedness and low cultural standing of the Typhoid Mary’s of anti-
communism in Congress and the mass media. 
Regardless of these denials, there was no joy in Mudville when the 1977 Ramparts 
article came out, publicly exposing the CIA’s cultural campaign for the first time. Jason 
Epstein, whose co-founding of the independent New York Review of Books in 1964 had 
scared the Cold War elite of the Fifties a little earlier, offered Saunders a critical perspective 
as he described how censorship worked in the Congress for Cultural Freedom:  
This CIA claimed that it was sponsoring freedom of 
expression. Of course that wasn’t true. When Dwight 
Macdonald wrote his article for Encounter [criticizing 
American culture upon his return to the States], the editors of 
the magazine … refused to publish it. That doesn’t say much 
for promoting freedom of expression. The CIA was promoting 
a policy and a political line: that was what it was paying for 
and that’s what it expected to get. Freedom of expression had 
nothing to do with it.175 
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Saunders herself concluded her impressive study by stating that in this instance, the CCF’s 
journal “Encounter suspended that most precious of western philosophical concepts — the 
freedom to think and act independently — and trimmed it sails to suit the prevailing winds.” 
(Macdonald’s rejected article was published by Dissent in 1958, and eventually managed to 
get past the editors of CCF’s own Tempo Presente.)176 
But historian Peter Steinfels saw the Agency’s gatekeeping function as operating at a 
much deeper level than in the mere censorship of content:  
The pertinent question about Encounter’s independence was 
not whether there were instructions cabled to the editors from 
Washington, but who chose the editors in the first place, and 
who established the clear bounds of “responsible” opinion 
within which differences were uninhibitedly explored. 
Epstein agreed, seeing CIA impact in the very infrastructure of the intellectual community — 
by virtue of the Agency’s “setting up an arbitrary and factitious system of values by which 
academic personnel were advanced, magazine editors appointed, and scholars subsidized and 
published, not necessarily on their merits … but because of their allegiance.”177 The price of 
entry into the CIA-financed community was to sign on the Cold War dotted line, as Epstein 
concludes: 
[T]he CIA and the Ford Foundation … had set up and were 
financing an apparatus of intellectuals selected for their correct 
cold-war positions, as an alternative to what might call a free 
intellectual market where ideology was presumed to count less 
than individual talent and achievement, and where doubts 
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about established orthodoxies were taken to be the beginning 
of all inquiry …178 
Journalist Andrew Kopkind describes the paradox created by the general climate of 
anti-communism, once it became established: 
The distance between the rhetoric of the open society and the 
reality of control was greater than anyone thought … Everyone 
who went abroad for an American organization was, in one 
way or another, a witness to the theory that the world was torn 
between communism and democracy, and anything in between 
was treason. The illusion of dissent was maintained: the CIA 
supported socialist cold warriors, fascist cold warriors, black 
and white cold warriors. The catholicity and flexibility of CIA 
operations were major advantages. But it was a sham 
pluralism, and it was utterly corrupting.179 
 This “sham pluralism” can revealingly be considered not only in its political sense, 
but also even more productively by the aesthetic conventions it established. Allen Ginsberg 
captured this subjective bias in a 1978 sketch entitled “T.S. Eliot Entered My Dreams,” 
writing about the paranoid poet and CIA mole-hunter James Jesus Angleton’s notion of 
“literary conspiracies” and how they manifest through the Agency’s cultural operations and 
sensibility: 
[I]t secretly nourished the careers of too many square 
intellectuals, provided sustenance to thinkers in the Academy 
who influenced the intellectual tone of the West … After all, 
Intellectual tone should be revolutionary, or at least Radical, 
seeking roots of dis-ease and Mechanization and dominance by 
unnatural monopoly … And the Government through 
foundations was supporting the whole field of ‘Scholars of 
War’ … The subsidization of magazines like Encounter which 
held Eliotic style as a touchstone of sophistication and 
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competence … failed to create an alternative free vital 
decentralized individualistic culture. Instead we had the worst 
of Capitalist Imperialism.180 
The conformist requirements in culture ran much deeper, in the taste biases of the 
gatekeepers and theorizers as they took on the traditionally European mantel of high-art 
leadership, to the exclusion of the cultures of those whom we might today call “the 99%.” 
These biases ran deepest in relation to the many non-European cultural traditions then 
present in U.S. culture, echoing the threat perceived in alien ethnic or politically inspired 
artwork earlier, in the Red Scare of 1919. All were diminished by the elite Atlanticist 
aesthetic that prevailed throughout the Cold War era. 
 The deadening hand of ideological conformism fell not only upon the art world, but 
throughout the culture. George Kennan noticed it by the time he spoke at MoMA in 1955, 
decrying anti-communism itself as having become a kind of totalitarianism: 
In recent years, there has grown up among us a most 
reprehensible habit, a totalitarian habit in fact, of judging the 
suitability of cultural contributions by whatever political 
coloration we conceive their creators to have acquired, I know 
of nothing sillier than this. … After all, cultural events are not 
political livestock exhibits in which we put forward human 
figures to be admired for the purity of their ideological 
features.181 
We will shortly turn to examining how these forces have manifest in the domestic arena. But 
the international picture must first be rounded out by considering the overt cultural initiatives 
undertaken by the White House and the State Department in the later Fifties. 
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Bringing the Geopolitical In 
 Before leaving the murky world of covert action, however, it is important to 
acknowledge that the CIA did much more to exert influence on the political culture of the 
world during the Cold War than by acting as a Shadow Cabinet for U.S. culture. Historian 
John Lewis Gaddis inventories U.S. interventions he saw as contradictory to, even 
destructive of, stated American values during this era: in Berlin, Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Iran, Italy, the Middle East, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and Vietnam.182 
Penny Von Eschen’s account of State Department cultural programs brushes up against many 
of these, adding the Central African Republic, The Congo, Ghana, and many more. 
The United States’ cultural policy in the global arena — steadfastly insisting that we 
had none — has had enormous impact throughout the world, sometimes to deadly effect, 
through our raw geopolitical might, often covertly deployed. Our interventions reveal greater 
concern for the economic interests of U.S.-based multinational corporations than for 
fostering democracy.  
Though the glove of covert action has often hidden our hand, we the people are 
responsible for the defeat of countless democratic initiatives abroad, as our nation has sought 
to install and stabilize regimes favorable to our most powerful capitalists. The denial of 
cultural policy is the fabric from which this glove was cut. Spelling out our preference for 
capitalist-friendly order over democracy in explicit terms would surely violate most 
Americans’ sense of even-handedness and fair play, embarrassing our sense of political 
                                                
182 Gaddis, Cold War, 162-174. 
  286 
democracy by revealing the close relations that have evolved between the government and 
powerful corporate interests. 
STATE DEPARTMENT SHOWCASES FOR U.S. CULTURE 
 Muscular propaganda dominated the public face of U.S. cultural relations in the early 
Cold War. Overt programs of cultural exchange were slower to develop and to win support. 
Cultural exchange in a Europe devastated by World War II had fallen first to Allied 
Occupation forces. It was not until 1949 that the Army’s cultural program was officially 
transferred to the State Department, and it took even longer to secure federal financing in 
these quarters. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 authorized the Secretary of State to undertake 
cultural exchange initiatives, but “psych ops” and direct propaganda efforts took priority in 
Washington until the mid-Fifties, when more formal performing-arts presentations began. 
President Eisenhower finally established an Emergency Fund for International Affairs in 
1954, empowered to support cultural presentations abroad; and the International Cultural 
Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act established a more permanent place for this 
approach to cultural diplomacy in 1956.183 
 Historian Penny Von Eschen wrote that postwar “State Department cultural policy 
was often as improvised (though not as skillfully) as the solos of jazz artists.”184 The 
Department’s arrangements and priorities shifted a great deal, depending upon American 
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foreign policy priorities and resources. The clearest expressions of State Department policy 
aims emerged in its relatively high-profile public programs. 
The first big initiative undertaken by State came quite soon after the end of World 
War II, but had to be written off as a “learning experience” for the foreign-policy 
establishment in dealing with an increasingly bellicose Congress. “Advancing American Art” 
— a bold depiction of abstract expressionism practically at its birthing moment — opened 
briefly at New York’s Metropolitan Museum late in 1946, to critical acclaim, before being 
shipped off to the first venues in extended State Department tours of European and Latin 
American cultural centers. It was this exhibit that inspired George Dondero’s speech, quoted 
earlier, defining the aim of “abstractionism” as destruction “by the creation of brainstorms.” 
The exhibitions were unceremoniously and rather publicly yanked back to Washington and 
ingloriously auctioned off at rummage-sale rates. Congress commanded that no further 
exhibitions could be mounted without securing its explicit prior approval. This guaranteed 
that most visual arts programs would be handled through private agencies, and most often, 
through the covert channels already described. Clearly, projecting America’s elite cultural 
leadership abroad would prove a difficult balancing act, at a time of virulent reaction and 
resistance to cultural democracy at home. Thomson and Laves end their 1963 discussion of 
this episode with the observation that 
The hostile attitude in the Congress led to disregard and neglect 
of the fine arts in general; and to a specific injunction against 
government-financed exhibitions of paintings that had not 
received individual, prior approval from the legislative body. 
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Thomson and Laves could not yet have known of the extensive, expensive alternative paths 
found and funded by the C.I.A. precisely in order to avoid public scrutiny, though some 
investigations of covert action were by that time already underway by the time they wrote.185 
Jazzing Up America’s Image Broad 
 More successful than “Advancing American Art” were the State Department’s later 
forays into performing-arts touring, and most successfully of all, the jazz tours of the Fifties 
and Sixties. The Department’s first major foray took advantage of the commercial success of 
producers Bievins Davis and Robert Breen’s 1953 London staging of Porgy and Bess, 
starring Cab Calloway and Leontyne Price. The State Department took the company on what 
turned into a four-year tour throughout Europe, South America, the Middle East, and the U.S. 
itself. The tour reached the apogee of propaganda success when it opened in Moscow in 
December 1955, with Truman Capote in tow, reporting on this artistic adventure for the New 
Yorker and publishing his account as a book in 1956.186 
Eisenhower singled out Porgy and Bess in asking Congress for a special 
appropriation to carry out similar projects in July 1954. An initial $5 million was authorized 
in August, to be spent at the President’s discretion, with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
maintaining “close personal contact.”187  
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Part of the appeal of Porgy and Bess to the White House and State Department was 
its elevation of down-and-out African-American culture to the high-art stage. This same 
appeal lay in jazz — and at much lower production and transportation cost. As soon as 
Eisenhower’s emergency fund was secure, jazz tours quickly became centerpieces of U.S. 
efforts to present American culture as racially harmonious and respectful of African-infused 
cultural traditions. Historian Von Eschen notes that “Eisenhower’s … well-honed sense of 
expediency superseded his well-documented condescension toward African-Americans and 
‘the race question’” in this enterprise.188 
These tours were used extensively in Europe and became hallmarks of U.S. 
diplomacy in Africa in the Fifties and Sixties, as former European colonies were gaining 
national independence. Not infrequently, and certainly not entirely by coincidence, State 
Department tours landed artists in cities where the CIA had recently toppled some nearby 
government. The government underwrote tours by jazz ensembles that were barred from 
performing in segregated cultural facilities in many parts of the United States. Racialized 
perceptions of jazz were not uncommon, either — as when the White Citizens Council of 
Alabama condemned the form in the April 1956 issue of Newsweek as “a plot to mongrelize 
America” by forcing black culture on the South through “be-bop ‘Rock and Roll,’ and all 
Negro Music.”189 
State Department programmers could not trumpet their successes in retailing 
projections of U.S. racial harmony without fanning the flames of disharmony already actually 
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burning back home. VOA programmer Leonard Feather reminisced about his discovery that 
there was a “white curtain which hung over an Afro-American art form lest someone on 
home ground become aware of its importance.”190  
Feather’s colleague Willis Conover idealistically believed in the assertion that jazz 
“corrects the fiction that America is racist.”191 The idealism of this belief was belied by 
images being televised at the time of police brutality and White Citizen mob action against 
peaceful civil rights demonstrators. News coverage completely undermined official U.S. 
efforts to project images of racial harmony from the stage. And American “jazz 
ambassadors” often spoke not only far afield of official policy, but sometimes openly, angrily 
condemned the dominant racist order in the U.S. before foreign audiences numbering in the 
tens of thousands. 
In this context, Dulles and Eisenhower were soon made to learn the impossibility of 
employing America’s leading African American artists without opening the Pandora’s box of 
racism and segregation in the U.S. culture. 
Shamed into Action: Dealing with Domestic Reality 
 Ultimately — crucially — concerns about the nation’s image in the international 
arena forced the federal government to intervene in domestic racial confrontations in some 
ways that would be equally visible to the wider world — first and most dramatically in the 
fall of 1957, when mobs of white racists tried to block school integration in Little Rock, 
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Arkansas. Federal intervention was forced in part by our having effectively anointed one 
particular cultural ambassador, who acted on the claim made by the government that he was 
an artist free of its control and spoke out against that government. 
A sensation in his first official African tour the previous year, Louis Armstrong was 
about to tour the Soviet Union and Latin America on the State Department’s behalf when the 
Little Rock confrontation began. He angrily canceled his tour, proclaiming, “The way they 
are treating my people in the South, the Government can go to hell!” Armstrong added that 
black people in the United States had no country and denounced Arkansas Governor Orval 
Faubus as “an uneducated plow-boy.” This did Satchmo become quite a different kind of 
cultural ambassador: for the principle of racial equality and social justice among his own 
people. 
International attention to U.S. hypocrisies quickly became so widespread that this 
incident could not be ignored, even by the most conservative foreign-policy “realists” of the 
time. Secretary of State Dulles confided to Attorney General Herbert Brownell that he was 
“sick at heart” over Little Rock, and that it was “ruining our foreign policy.” Intervention 
became necessary to saving America’s reputation abroad. Quickly responding, once federal 
troops were finally sent to enforce Little Rock school integration in October, Armstrong 
declared that Washington’s response was “just wonderful,” and he telegraphed his support to 
the White House. Armstrong’s own independent Latin American tour that November — 
booked commercially, immediately after he left the State Department high and dry — was 
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exploited for propaganda value by U.S. Foreign Service officers in Latin America, despite 
the fact that no State Department money was involved.192 
Taking World Stages by Storm 
Von Eschen’s Satchmo Blows Up the World offers a fascinating, detailed account of 
many of the most important State Department jazz tours, tracking shifts in agency structure, 
funding, sponsorship, and priorities from the Fifties into the Seventies. Overall, her account 
demonstrates that it was in fact because cultural policy was so ill-defined that insurgent 
artists and their ideas were able to have an impact: 
The United States has been relatively indifferent to culture and 
cultural policy. Instead, government policy has often promoted 
the idea that the market itself is the highest cultural value… [I]t 
was precisely the absence of a coherent cultural policy that 
created a space for a unique alliance of artists, supporters of the 
arts, and liberals within the State Department to project the jazz 
vision of America throughout the globe.193 
Summing up that impact, Von Eschen sees plenty of positive accomplishment, harking back 
to jazz as a quintessentially democratic form: 
[A]rtists, State Department personnel, and supporters of the 
arts crafted programs that related to the world through a wide 
cross-section of America, including its most creative artists. … 
[who] represented hope and possibility, not a smug claim to a 
perfected democracy. … [who] articulated their connection to 
the world as artists and humans, not a sense of uniqueness or 
superiority. … [A] jazz combo … symbolize[d] the qualities of 
a vibrant democracy. … expressed individual excellence within 
a profound dependence on and accountability to a collective. 
… celebrated the unexpected, and hence the possibilities of 
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democracy and global citizenship rather than the scripted 
power of empire. 194 
The jazz tours became especially important because these ensembles, by their very nature 
and practice, suggested the potential of progressive, anti-racist ideas in an American culture 
that not only included, but had actively embraced African American influence: 
Intended as a color-blind promotion of American democracy, 
the [State Department jazz] tours underscored the importance 
of African American culture in the Cold War redefinition of 
America. … [B]lackness and race operated culturally to 
redefine an image of American nationhood more inclusive and 
integrated than the reality. … [T]he promotion of American 
culture abroad led just as often to the fostering of collaboration 
and solidarity throughout the African diaspora … served to 
promote diasporic and transnational relationships … [and 
helped] to nurture the development of oppositional 
transnational and Afro-diasporic sensibilities. The tours … 
acted as a catalyst for the internationalization of jazz … [T]hey 
helped to transform popular music.195 
Even dispositionally, these artists embodied an American spirit much freer than that 
communicated by our official representatives, better-heeled tourists, or corporate promoters 
— though transference of these positive associations among audience members to the official 
face of the nation was strictly limited. Writing of this era decades later, in 2004, Von Eschen 
was able to set her critique not only against the global climate of the Fifties, but also in light 
of what was yet to come: 
The jazz ambassadors projected the opposite of the arrogance 
and belligerence that many in the world had come to associate 
with U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War. … [T]heir 
brilliant creativity, their irreverence, and their wit, and for all 
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of the ways in which they voiced their affinities with people 
struggling for freedom in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the 
Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. … [A]udiences never 
confused or conflated their love of jazz and American popular 
culture with an acceptance of American foreign policy.196 
On the aesthetic front, musicians and critics strove to elevate the image of jazz in the 
art world through the prominent role they played in State Department tours; but despite its 
programmatic value to official promoters of America’s image abroad, jazz remained a 
stepchild to the elite construction of American art that came to the fore in the Fifties and 
Sixties. Efforts to force its acceptance in the socially disengaged terms of the postwar art 
world risked alienation from the real cultural roots of jazz. 
In the quest by musicians and critics to have jazz recognized as 
legitimate art, the subsequent canonization of jazz as high 
modernism proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it countered the … condescending view that jazz was a 
simple folk form. On the other hand, it abstracted jazz from its 
origins in African-American working-class culture… [G]iven 
the widespread adherence to a color-blind liberalism that 
assumed “black” and “modern” were incompatible, many 
critics could only elevate jazz to modernism by a dissociating it 
from black culture. 
Von Eschen draws out a parallel bias embedded in elite cultural-policy thinking from the 
Fifties on: jazz was consistently disparaged as “mere entertainment,” and “insisting on the 
separation of art from entertainment led to myriad contradictions.” She observes, “There was 
constant tension between the view of jazz as high modernist art and the view of jazz as 
popular culture meant to appeal to the masses.”197 
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The jazz tours eventually petered out after the late Seventies, especially after this 
responsibility was shifted out of the State Department: 
Jazz and performing-arts tours continued under a reorganized 
USIA after the cultural presentations moved out of the State 
Department in 1978, but they were not as high-profile, and … 
they lacked the ambition and urgency of the earlier tours.198 
This reorganization created the International Communication Agency,199 which drew all U.S. 
cultural initiatives together from 1978-1999, when these were either transferred back to the 
State Department or relegated to a new independent agency, as part of a rangy mess of 
legislation providing “omnibus consolidated and emergency appropriations for the fiscal  
year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.”200 
It was the very elitist view of culture held by these actors, like their undercover CIA 
colleagues, that would guide creation of the United States’ domestic public cultural agencies. 
The emerging aesthetics of State Department officials and other international operators, overt 
and covert, were mirrored in the values articulated and enacted by the National Foundation of 
the Arts and Humanities from its creation in 1965. And many key personnel — Nelson 
Rockefeller being the most prominent example — were actively and centrally involved 
throughout the process.  
For this reason, the schizophrenic quality of cultural leadership and its impact in the 
Cold War era is especially crucial and interesting, in all its contradictions. The politics of the 
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artists and intellectuals involved had to conform to those of economic, political and military 
elites, whose dogma was decidedly and determinedly anti-communist. 
American Materialism on Display 
 With the jazz tours still building steaming, the United States hatched a separate 
cultural initiative more directly revealing of its identity and values in the Cold War contest 
with the Soviet Union. In January 1958, a new bilateral agreement was signed between the 
contending powers  that opened the way for a variety of new cultural exchanges. Hollywood 
got the right to distribute its first limited number of films since the mid-Forties, for instance. 
Many student exchanges were haggled over. And a young Texan, Van Cliburn, won the 
Tchaikovsky International Piano Competition in 1958. Later that year, though under 
surveillance back home, Paul Robeson toured the Soviet Union under official U.S. auspices 
— though drawing smaller crowds than the Harlem Globetrotters, Bob Hope, and “Holiday 
on Ice,” all of whom followed Robeson in 1959.201 
 Most storied of the Eisenhower administration’s ventures into international display in 
this period, however, was the massive exposition of American consumer culture thrown up in 
Sokolniki Park, a wooded, 1,500-acre tract once used by Russia’s aristocrats for falconry, 
just a fifteen-minute subway ride from the center of Moscow. The American National 
Exhibition was coordinated by George Allen of the USIA and directed by Harold Chadwick 
“Chad” McClellan, former president of the National Association of Manufacturers. The U.S. 
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government saw this as a prime opportunity for “propaganda and cultural infiltration” of the 
USSR. 
A classified planning document laid out the Exhibition’s aims: to “increase the 
knowledge of the Soviet people about the United States,” and thus to counter “communist 
fiction.” “Freedom of choice and expression” — defined as the “unimpeded flow of diverse 
good and ideas” — was to be the exposition’s main theme.” To demonstrate freedom of 
thought, planners initially thought that they would present examples of shortcomings — to 
reveal and deal with the nation’s social problems — as well as boasting of its predominant 
blessings. This seemed important, since the Exhibition was seen as targeting an audience of 
“the politically alert and potentially most influential citizens of the Soviet Union.” But the 
blowback from a similar effort at the Brussels World’s Fair in 1958 soon put an end to that 
idea.202 
 The U.S. pavilion in Brussels featured a section called “Unfinished Work,” recalling 
that phrase in Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, comprising exhibits dealing with race relations, 
urban renewal, and conservation — in each case, identifying the problem, explaining what 
was being done, and making optimistic projections for the future. A separate exhibit, “The 
American Negro,” drew the greatest heat, however, in stating that vis-à-vis the “one 
American in ten descended from African slaves,” America was united behind the goal spelled 
out on exhibition signage — of working toward “not utopia, but larger freedom, with more 
justice. Democracy is our method. Slowly, but surely, it works.”  
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Once the content of these exhibits became known to domestic politicians, protests 
immediately erupted from the American right. “[T]his exhibit could not have been more 
designed to reflect against the American nation,” cried South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston, 
“if it had been made in Moscow by the Kremlin.” Officials quickly began to pick at the 
exhibition itself — removing photos of mixed-race groups and situations, police actions, and 
mob violence, always taking care to post a guard first, so the press could not witness their 
removal. But curatorial spot-editing couldn’t stop the powerful momentum coming from 
above. President Eisenhower, relenting to calls for censorship, compared the situation to high 
school students wanting to choose their “best clothes” for graduation. These controversial 
World’s Fair displays were replaced in toto with a bland exhibit on public health.203 
 Once officials at the U.S. embassy in Moscow reviewed Washington planners’ early 
aims, and with “Unofficial Business” being removed from public view in Brussels, the 
Sokolniki Park exhibition took a more practical turn. Ambassador Llewellyn “Tommy” 
Thompson thought the main thrust should be “to make the Soviet people dissatisfied with the 
share of the Russian pie which they now receive and make them realize that the slight 
improvements projected in their standard of living are only a drop in the bucket to what they 
could and should have.” This is the direction that prevailed. With government underwriting 
of only $3.6 million, Chad McClellan fell in line and, drawing on his NAM connections, 
rallied corporate support at a White House luncheon for a special 51-member advisory 
committee. His efforts lassoed extensive contributions from business and industry to show 
off state-of-the-art American consumerism. Four-hundred fifty companies contributed freely 
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to this massive display of their wares, building and equipping a model home, installing 
IBM’s huge RAMAC “electronic brain” computer, and much, much more. Enclosed in a 
30,000-square-foot, gold-anodized geodesic dome designed by Buckminster Fuller, a 50,000-
square-foot glass pavilion, and the 360-degree Circarama film theater shipped in from the 
prior year’s World Fair, the resulting exhibition was decidedly longer on goods than ideas, 
especially since reaction against its truth-telling intentions quickly nipped those ideas in the 
bud.204 
Even so, censorious reaction flared up in Washington. Rep. Francis E. Walter, chair 
of HUAC at the time, caught wind of the art show being installed in the Sokolniki Park 
exhibition and trumpeted his warning that fully half of the artists “have records of affiliation 
with communist fronts and causes.” Once the White House caught wind of the show’s 
content, chosen by a panel of curators assembled by MoMA, Eisenhower became alarmed 
that it “represented an extreme form of modernism.” Vice President Nixon recommended 
yanking the art exhibit completely. But the President and Secretary of State Christian Herder 
on second thought agreed that this might look like censorship, which “would invite 
consequences considered more likely to impair the effectiveness of the exhibition.” Instead, 
the USIA’s George Allen saw to it that “some good examples of nineteenth century art” were 
thrown in before the show opened, to moderate its modernist bent. So the show did go on, 
still drawing pointed criticism of its modernist works from Nikita Khrushchev on his final 
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visit to the exhibition: “People who paint like that are obviously crazy, but people who think 
it’s art are crazier still.”205 
 Other objections to the American National Exhibition reflected the changed state of 
the anti-communist consensus at the end of the Fifties. Senator Barry Goldwater criticized 
the absence of religiosity in the exhibition; but McClellan, Allen, and Thompson all argued 
back that consumerism was a better focus, since a display of religious feeling in the heart of 
the godless USSR would be read as overtly propagandistic. In the end, advocates of religion 
took pride in the scores of Bibles being pilfered by visitors from the 20,000-volume library 
that McGraw-Hill had supplied, which were faithfully restocked throughout the run.206 
 That organizers shied away from any frontal display of race issues did not prevent 
these from intruding on the Sokolniki exhibition. An extravagant fashion show, featuring 
forty-seven models in a variety of scenes, included the staged wedding of an African 
American bride and groom, actually engaged to each other in real life. The fact that the 
attendees of this mock wedding included a majority of white models drew venom from 
Senator Strom Thurmond, and a protest petition signed by forty-one U.S. fashion editors. The 
scene was quickly scratched, allegedly because of “time constraints,” not segregationist 
pressure.207 
 More than 2.7 million visitors flocked to the Sokolniki exhibition, a record 130,000 
on the final day alone. The USIA concluded it had been “the largest and probably the most 
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productive single psychological effort ever launched by the U.S. in any communist country,” 
though the agency bemoaned the fact that the “preoccupation with consumer goods was 
somewhat too great, with too little on either actually living in America … or on the essentials 
of democracy” and “too little about the life and spirit of America.”208 
 It was in the “all-electric kitchen” of the six-room model ranch house on the 
exhibition grounds that Vice President Nixon and Premier Khrushchev conducted their 
famous “kitchen debate” while Nixon was in town for the exhibition’s opening. Eager to 
establish his presidential timbre in advance of the 1960 election, Nixon had briefed himself 
thoroughly for this nervous-making event. Later describing it as one of his life’s “six crises,” 
Nixon boasted, “I had never been better prepared for a meeting in which I was to 
participate.” Sipping Pepsi-Cola, the exhibition’s official drink, Nixon managed to rile the 
Soviet premier in a barbed exchange over their nations’ continuing confrontations in Berlin, 
but then finally apologized, “I’m afraid I haven’t been a good host.”209 
Pepsi won Soviet distribution rights soon after the “kitchen debate.” Scrambling to 
document results from the Sokolniki Park affair, the USIA found evidence in “an unusual 
number of announcements, decrees, and official actions designed to assure the citizen that his 
material existence is improving.” More processed foods, increased attention to customer 
service, brighter colors and new styles in fashion and consumer goods, the introduction of 
installment credit — these were the impacts on Soviet culture in which the USIA’s took 
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greatest pride: an “increase in official acknowledgement that drastic improvements must be 
made in the quality and variety of goods and consumer services.”210  
The materialism evident in this assessment contrasts ironically with the charges that 
had been leveled at the Soviet Union ten years earlier, as Cold War battle lines were first 
being drawn: that over there, religion had been replaced by materialism. We thus see one 
anti-communist stance having come full circle in that decade when “democracy” was subtly 
being replaced by “free enterprise.” By the end of the Fifties, the State Department seemed 
not to be as interested in making the world safe for democracy as it was in creating global 
demand for consumer capitalism, American-style. 
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CHAPTER 10 
DOMESTICATING CULTURAL POLICY 
The United States’ crusade against communism, conducted both in our midst and 
around the world, deeply altered our national culture by the late Fifties. A postwar elite 
emerged whose leaders, while distancing themselves from Joe McCarthy and his ilk, had 
internalized a set of values shaped by their excesses. Their subsequent actions brought the 
Cold War home, institutionalizing anti-communism’s greatest collateral damage. 
Anti-communist campaigning narrowed the nation’s collective definition of what was 
acceptable in American thought and culture. Exaggerated perceptions of a geopolitical 
communist threat helped reorient American political thought in conformance with a 
pervasive anti-communist ideology. Muscular, insistent, and intrusive in its suspicious 
impulses, the forces of anti-communism were felt in all aspects of American life, as well as 
in the domestic affairs of other nations, challenging fundamental ideas of national 
sovereignty in favor of securing some order favorable to the most powerful U.S. interests. 
The business of America was business, and other nations or points of view that challenged 
this assumption did so only at their own considerable risk. 
The resulting consensus was quite different from what motivated public cultural 
enterprise in the Thirties. The same cultural assumptions that had driven foreign policy in the 
late Forties and Fifties were to be extended into the architecture of a developing federal 
cultural support apparatus in the Sixties. 
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CULTURAL POLICY: A STATE OF DENIAL 
Early Fifties policymakers had relegated all matters of deepest significance to the 
church (or the synagogue, with a tip of the hat to assimilating Jews) rather than taking the 
trouble to create a secular definition of national cultural identity and purpose  — that is, a 
cultural policy. To have done so might have honored the longer Constitutional tradition of 
separation of church and state. Instead, anti-communists successfully asserted that anyone 
who thought the state had any definitional obligations in the realm of cultural life was a 
communist — or had fallen some other “alien influence” — and was therefore thinking in a 
manner that was “un-American.” The nation was thereby deprived of the forum and 
foundation needed to work out the complex, subtle challenges of defining cultural freedom in 
the secular framework appropriate to a diverse, democratic society. The world’s leading 
multicultural democratic society was thus poorly equipped to lead the way toward any kind 
of cultural democracy. 
This challenge remains with us in the twenty-first century, manifest in the radical 
polarization so evident in U.S. political culture.  The landscape of politics can now be 
mapped geographically in Red and Blue states, ideologically by a Tea Party opposing 
everybody else, and economically by the one versus the ninety-nine percent. In the unifying, 
inclusive language of a whole nation, we remain mute. 
But failure to declare its cultural policy does not mean that a nation does not have 
one. Even when policy is formally declared, examination of actual practice is necessary to 
discover the dissonances that emerge through power politics. When none is stated, policy 
must be deduced almost entirely from action. 
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DOMESTIC CULTURAL POLICY AT THE DAWN OF THE SIXTIES 
Having focused so closely on anti-communism, we have yet to summarize the major 
federal initiatives that effectively defined cultural policy in the postwar United States. 
Insisting on the primacy of individual freedom and the private sector, the nation moved 
forward in various areas of social action and concern, according to goals and standards set in 
a variety of specialized arenas, according to the wishes of the most powerful interests 
involved. A half dozen of these seem key: the G.I. Bill, highways and housing, 
suburbanization and urban renewal, militarization, and education, all carried out against the 
backdrop of a mass-mediated view of the American Way of Life, Cold War edition.  
The G.I. Bill  
Arguably the keystone of postwar cultural policy, “the G.I. Bill” had huge cultural 
impact. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 entitled World War II veterans to 
educational opportunities, transforming family economics nationwide and installing a 
financially stable, suburbanizing middle class. The Veterans Administration Web site boasts, 
“The World War II GI Bill, signed into law on June 22, 1944, is said to have had more 
impact on the American way of life than any law since the Homestead Act of 1862.”1 It was 
the most impressive extension of New Deal thinking in the period following World War II, 
though it fell significantly short of FDR’s more inclusive vision of securing the Four 
Freedoms for everyone, not only for returning veterans and their families. 
                                                
1 See http://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory.asp (accessed September 3, 2013). 
  306 
The resulting flood of veterans seriously strained the capacity of U.S. educational 
institutions. Nearly nine million Americans sought higher education and other training 
opportunities through the Act, which also subsidized home mortgages, extended business 
loans, and guaranteed unemployment benefits for veterans.2 Housing provisions 
complemented those introduced by the New Deal’s Federal Housing Authority: 
By the end of its first twenty-five years of operation in 1958, 
FHA had helped nearly five million families to own houses, 
had helped provide housing for nearly 800,000 families in 
multi-unit projects, and had helped more than twenty-two 
million families improve their properties. In those years, the 
percentage of American families living in owner-occupied 
dwellings rose from 45 per cent to 62 per cent. The main 
beneficiary was suburbia, where approximately one-half of all 
housing could claim FHA or VA financing in 1962. In the 
process, the American suburb was transformed from a rich 
man’s paradise into the normal expectation of the middle 
class.3 
Highways and Housing 
Suburbanization was further enabled by massive federal intervention in the nation’s 
highway system authorized by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, celebrated by 
Secretary of Commerce Bertram D. Tallamy as “the greatest public works program in the 
history of the world.” The Eisenhower administration’s “Yellow Book” mapped out the 
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general plan for the Interstate highways: an expensive, 42,500-mile federal system, sold in 
part as being essential for the nation’s Cold War defense.4 
The vision of building some massive national highway system arose in a 1938 
brainstorming session between President Roosevelt and Thomas H. MacDonald, director of 
the federal Bureau of Public Roads. They sketched out a scheme of arterial highways that 
would not only connect the nation’s cities, but would also cut through and clear out blighted 
housing areas in the cities they linked. Excited by the concept, Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace literally went to town, writing, “There exists at present around the cores of 
the cities, particularly of the older ones, a wide border of decadent and dying property which 
has become, or is in fact becoming, a slum area.” Planners exulted that taking over these 
areas for highway construction and urban redevelopment would lead to “the elimination of 
unsightly and unsanitary districts where land values are constantly depreciating.” This 
ambition was reaffirmed in a major highway report prepared in 1944 by Roosevelt’s National 
Interregional Highway Committee, again emphasizing modern slum clearance and urban 
reconstruction as an important fringe benefit.5 
Not everyone thought that highway construction would automatically benefit urban 
culture, however — notably MacDonald. Though he joked that his first job as an Iowa 
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highway engineer was to “get the farmer out of the mud,” MacDonald had developed a 
sophisticated understanding of the interrelationship between urban highways and housing in 
the decades since becoming the first federal director of highways in 1919. He steadfastly 
emphasized the importance of modernizing and reconstructing housing along with roads in 
the American city. But after thirty-four years of federal service, MacDonald was not 
reappointed by the Eisenhower administration in 1953, and he was retired before the Yellow 
Book was assembled. At that point, historian Mark I. Gelfand writes, the BPR seemingly 
“lost its interest in the broad implications of the highway in the city and concentrated its 
attention exclusively on making travel by automobile and truck quicker and less expensive.” 
MacDonald’s broader conception, linking urban expressways with housing and 
redevelopment, disappeared from public discussion.6 
Architectural historian David Monteyn argues that suburbanization itself also 
represented a conscious response to Cold War threat: 
Architects endeavored to support civil defense in a number of 
ways especially suited to their expertise. They would promote 
the planning and dispersal of cities that might become enemy 
targets.7 
The village did not have to be bombed before it was saved. Abandonment preceded and 
proceeded alongside the destruction of inner cities. 
Passage of the Highway Act of 1956 also cemented the automobile’s status as the 
national transport of choice, effectively completing the campaign begun by General Motors 
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in 1926 to replace urban rail systems with buses and to assure sufficient public infrastructure 
for cars and trucks.8 Officially renamed in 1990, the “Dwight D. Eisenhower System of 
Interstate and Defense Highways” became the warp and woof of the national fabric.9 
Urban Renewal and Urban Removal 
As described above, the destructive consequences of highway construction to urban 
culture were consciously conceived as benefits by system designers. The impact of massive 
federal highway construction was profound, and the devil dwelt in its details. Most funding 
was federal, but “state highway departments working with local officials selected the actual 
interstate routes.” This meant that urban expressway construction 
could be used to carry out local race, housing, and residential 
segregation agendas. In most cities, … the forced relocation of 
people from central-city housing triggered a spatial 
reorganization of residential neighborhoods. Rising black 
population pressure on limited inner-city housing resources 
meant that dislocated blacks pressed into neighborhoods of 
transition, generally working-class white neighborhoods on the 
fringes of the black ghetto where low-cost housing 
predominated. These newer second ghettos were already 
forming after World War II, as whites began moving to the 
suburbs and increasing numbers of blacks migrated out of the 
South to the urban North. However, interstate expressway 
construction speeded up the process … helping to mold the 
sprawling, densely populated ghettos of the modern American 
city.10 
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State and municipal officials’ routing decisions uprooted many poor, but culturally 
dynamic neighborhoods, while the settled landscapes of the rich and powerful lay safely 
distant from what was declared eminent domain. Commercial development was boosted in 
some locations, urban and rural, and effectively shut down in others.  
No prior environmental review was required, much less any cultural one. In fact, 
environmental organizing in the late Sixties and Seventies was in part spurred by the errors 
later perceived in this era of quick-and-dirty public planning: the National Environmental 
Policy Act, passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority and signed by President Nixon, 
“was prompted in part by concerns from communities whose members felt their views had 
been ignored in setting routes for the Interstate Highway System…”11 Nor were any 
provisions made for the many communities dispersed or irrevocably injured by pre-
construction clearance. By the time the damage was done and public concern was aroused, 
there was already no longer any there there: public action had already dispersed community 
members willy-nilly, with little provision for relocation. 
Many detailed and interesting stories can be and are now being told about 
redevelopment efforts in American cities. Massive urban renewal projects catalyzed 
significant citizen participation and substantial grassroots cultural organizing all over the 
United States. In the meantime, cleared tracts of urban land lay fenced off for years as 
controversy swirled over what might eventually be built. San Francisco’s Yerba Buena 
project offers a prime example.  
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Three thousand single residents and two-hundred-eighty families lived in a multi-block 
area of just south of downtown San Francisco studded with SRO (Single Room Occupancy) 
hotels, including a significant community of ageing Filipinos, stranded in an America that had 
long since throttled off further immigration from their home country. Once Yerba Buena 
clearance was complete, with no provision for resident-relocation, citizen activism shifted to the 
lost cause of saving San Francisco’s last outpost for this ageing Filipino population, Chinatown’s 
International Hotel, finally condemned and de-populated in the late Seventies and torn down in 
1981. It was not until the Eighties that Yerba Buena development finally began, first by 
implanting an underground convention center, then followed later by Yerba Buena Gardens, with 
its space-age mall and Center for the Arts, and then by the new San Francisco Museum of Art. A 
burgeoning community of high-tech start-ups exploded in the Nineties, spurring proliferation of 
restaurants, coffee shops, and watering holes.  
Nearby, another protracted slum clearance project in San Francisco’s Western 
Addition displaced four thousand from the multicultural, working-class neighborhood. 
“Rather stunningly, most of the area then laid vacant for a quarter century, leading to further 
alienation and decline in the African American community.”12 By this time, of course, urban 
development — when and where it happened —occurred more in the spirit of the Reagan-era 
Enterprise Zone than that of the late–New Deal Great Society that had leveled the 
neighborhood in the first place. 
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Taken together, highway, housing and urban-redevelopment policies helped produce 
the much more racially segregated urban landscapes we see in the United States today, 
surrounded by suburban rings dependent upon private automobiles as our primary means of 
transportation. Understanding the cultural impact of these federally sanctioned initiatives 
ultimately requires studying these matters from the ground up — taking in countless local 
stories, incorporating detailed interactions of state- and local-level interests alongside those 
operating federally and nationally, and charting factors overlooked at the time. Such a 
massive, decentralized project of cultural analysis could occupy scholars, students, 
policymakers, and activists for decades to come; but the effort might help us figure out how 
to structure and manage inclusive democratic approaches to urban planning for the future that 
avoid the blind spots and short-sightedness of the Bad Old Days.  
Peacetime Militarization of America 
The military-industrial costs of the Cold War are literally incalculable, even though 
they are almost exclusively dependent on the federal purse. There was no standing down 
after World War II, compared to what followed previous national war emergencies. Vast new 
military projects were undertaken under the postwar banner of Defense, not War, a rhetorical 
shift made officially by the 1949 rechristening of the department in charge. 
Despite President Eisenhower’s famous farewell warning in 1961, the resulting 
corporate-military complex has continued in decades since to monopolize the attention of a 
nation mesmerized by threats to our “national security.” The enormous costs of national 
“defense” have skewed public perceptions about the affordability of domestic initiatives of 
any other kind. Military bases, manufacturers, and suppliers became mainstays of local 
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economies throughout the nation, creating psychological as well as literal investment and 
even dependence upon the perpetuation of government-subsidized war-preparation as a 
primary emphasis in national cultural life. Military assumptions became central to both U.S. 
culture and economics.13 
Cold War militarization was enlivened through various forms of popular cultural 
participation. “Duck and cover” drills in the Fifties, readily reminiscent of recently ended 
wartime, gave way to more extensive preparations for nuclear attack in the early Sixties. 
Cool official U.S. response to the Castro regime, after Bautista’s long U.S.-backed 
dictatorship was finally overthrown in 1959, pushed Fidel into the camp of global 
communism, providing a perfect ploy for propagandists to fuel alarm over a Soviet outpost 
being built ninety miles off our shores.14 The botched Bay of Pigs “invasion” in 1961 was 
quickly followed by the actually hair-raising Cuban missile crisis of 1962.15 Combined with 
disclosure that upper-atmosphere nuclear testing by the two nuclear powers had caused 
radioactive pollution, being brought measurably to earth in rain and snow, propagandists’ 
alarums impelled nationwide action, as communities across the land rushed to establish and 
supply networks of public fallout shelters. This effort quickly decentralized to the home, as 
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American families were frightened into finding and supplying their own shelters. As one 
historian convincingly argues, “the American home had been put on the front lines of the 
Cold War.” More than a few householders installed fully equipped underground chambers in 
their single-family backyards. Extensive national surveys helped other homeowners identify 
the safest places to huddle in their basements.16 
In a timed, citywide civil-defense drill in Sioux Falls, my sisters and I managed to 
make the mile-and-a-half walk home from our elementary school in something like twelve 
minutes, thereby earning the privilege of joining our family for what would surely have been 
a hellish week or two in our windowless, oversized basement shower stall, in the event of 
nuclear holocaust, rather than being confined in our school’s boiler room. Nuclear 
nightmares were no mere metaphor. Fear was planted deep in our national psyche, where it 
reigns through the present. 
Education for Modern America 
Education was the most consciously “cultural” of core federal policy concerns, before 
federal agencies focusing on the arts and humanities were brought into being. Though control 
of school systems, facilities, curriculum, and requirements is still mainly understood as being 
decentralized to state and local authorities, the Cold War brought the federal government 
more squarely into the front lines of the nation’s educational battle: 
[I]n 1958 Congress passed the National Defense Education Act 
(NDEA) in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik. To help 
ensure that highly trained individuals would be available to 
                                                
16 Kenneth David Rose, One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture 
(New York: New York University Press, 2001), 4. 
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help America compete with the Soviet Union in scientific and 
technical fields, the NDEA included support for loans to 
college students, the improvement of science, mathematics, and 
foreign language instruction in elementary and secondary 
schools, graduate fellowships, foreign language and area 
studies, and vocational-technical training.17 
The primacy of science and technology in Cold War competition provided the backdrop 
against which advocates of the arts and humanities have fought for attention and respect 
since the Fifties.18 
President Lyndon Johnson’s call to create and sustain a Great Society spurred 
Congress to pass the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the mid-Sixties. 
From 1965-70, ESEA’s Titles I and III provided $347 million to arts-related programs in 
schools, and Title IV contributed another $75 million. This support largely disappeared, 
however, when ESEA authority was later devolved to the states, retained or restored only 
where state and local arts advocates were well organized and connected.19   
 The gathering national movement for civil rights across racial lines also brought 
deeply cultural concerns into the nation’s schoolhouses throughout the Cold War. The 
Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling shook the very foundations of the 
                                                
17 “Overview: The Federal Role in Education,” U.S. Department of Education, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (accessed September 6, 2013). 
18 The length and ongoing nature of this struggle is important to remember. Horace Kallen’s 
arguments are very much like those still being brought in the twenty-first century. See 
Kallen’s The Education of Free Men: An Essay toward a Philosophy of Education for 
Americans (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949).  
19 Straight, Hanks, 94. 
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nation’s educational institutions in multiple ways that remain contested today.20 
Embarrassing inequalities in educational quality and opportunity nationwide compelled 
federal investment in education from the Fifties through the Seventies: 
The anti-poverty and civil rights laws of the 1960s and 1970s 
brought about a dramatic emergence of the [Education] 
Department’s equal access mission. The passage of laws such 
as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibited discrimination 
based on race, sex, and disability, respectively made civil rights 
enforcement a fundamental and long-lasting focus of the 
Department of Education. In 1965, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act launched a comprehensive set of 
programs, including the Title I program of Federal aid to 
disadvantaged children to address the problems of poor urban 
and rural areas. And in that same year, the Higher Education 
Act authorized assistance for postsecondary education, 
including financial aid programs for needy college students.21 
Similarly, the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) of 1972 was used to support local cultural 
initiatives in schools throughout the nation “to meet special problems incident to 
desegregation, and to the elimination, reduction, or prevention of racial isolation in 
elementary and secondary schools.”22 These programs lasted until the Reagan administration 
                                                
20 Again, there is a vast literature focusing on this topic. The most comprehensive historical 
treatment I have found of the ruling — and the decades of work that brought it about — is 
Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1976). 
21 “Overview: The Federal Role in Education,” U.S. Department of Education, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (accessed September 6, 2013). 
22 Hearings Before the House General Subcommittee on Education and Labor, “Emergency 
School Aid Act,” 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (March 15-16,1971), cover text. Accessed 5 November 
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slashed non-military spending in favor of an expensive, apparently last-gasp battle against 
the Evil Empire.  
 THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE, REVISED STANDARD VERSION 
Meanwhile, the long, steady agenda of corporate image–reclamation begun in the late 
Thirties by the National Association of Manufacturers had become the national wallpaper by 
the early Sixties, aided not only by Hollywood, but also by the rapid proliferation of 
commercial television in the Fifties. The American Way of Life lay at the very heart of such 
TV perennials as Father Knows Best and Leave It to Beaver. Wrapped and packaged with 
consumer advertising, we were well on the national road to what I have long described as 
“the commercialization of absolutely everything.” What had once been a propaganda 
campaign was now institutionalized in popular culture, offering idealized and entertaining 
images of what might be called the sub-urbanity taking root throughout the United States. 
The strength of U.S. commercial cultural industries assured that these images were 
distributed throughout the world, carried everywhere on the wings of fast-proliferating 
electronic mass media.  
The Advertising Council — still active today — was thus freed up to undertake more 
specialized “public service” initiatives that became part of our mass-mediated legend as 
Americans: Smokey the Bear was cuddled by millions of children, while preaching 
individual responsibility as a means of preventing forest fires, just when clear-cutting was 
transforming the timber industry. An aged Indian wept at seeing litter muck up the place, 
years before the American Indian Movement took root. Most significant of the Council’s 
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campaigns in national cultural policy was “Just Say No,” in support of the Reagan 
administration’s declaration of the “War on Drugs.” Political and social philosopher Cornel 
West describes it has having authorized “the massive use of state power to incarcerate 
hundreds of thousands of poor, black, male (and, increasingly, female) young people.”23  
Still, reflecting years of adjustment to the actual diversity of people in the United 
States, the Advertising Council’s post–9/11 “I Am an American” campaign displayed a much 
more varied portrait of those we include as “American” than the one it began with in the late 
Forties and early Fifties, forged by the National Association of Manufacturers in the 
Thirties.24 Even in the heat of the Cold War, the cresting civil rights movement had brought a 
very important critique to the stereotypical picture being projected by NAM and the 
Advertising Council. It would take another twenty years before the results showed up on TV, 
even in token ways; but this movement brought activist challenge to issues of inclusion and 
social justice nationwide and locally. Principled reliance upon the fundamental ideas of the 
United States as a nation — as stated in the Declaration, the Constitution, and the Gettysburg 
Address — challenged the nation’s citizens to work toward overturning repellent aspects of 
the status quo that most obviously contradicted American national ideals. The Justice 
Department’s intervention in Little Rock set a new precedent, and expectations about the 
federal government’s role changed. A climate of responsibility seemed to emerge, 
authorizing genuine, heartfelt efforts to more consciously create a better world. Rebellion 
                                                
23 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
Foreword by Cornel West (New York: New Press, 2010).  
24 The Advertising Council presents its own sense of its “classic” campaigns at 
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against the conformist consensus depicted in early American television, legitimated by the 
civil rights movement, helps explain the impetus and force of the later Sixties’ “counter-
cultural” movements and their widespread impact on the nation since the Seventies, even 
after reactionary trends in federal cultural policy came to the fore, from the Reagan 
administration on.  
For the time being, however, the Father Knows Best cultural consensus stood at its 
highest tide in the early Sixties, and so it remained for most of the decade. Its homogeneously 
assimilated “modern” American cultural values prevailed at the time when the current 
generation of public cultural agencies came into being in the mid-Sixties. The cultural elite 
that created and managed these new agencies — insisting upon the value of high-art 
refinement, as against an oceanic tide of commercial mass media — mirrors that which 
reigned in the halls of State and CIA a decade and more before. In fact, as we shall see, a 
good number of the same people played leading roles in both settings. 
FOCUSING ON THE ARTS & HUMANITIES 
The arts and humanities are core concerns in cultural policy discussions throughout 
the world. Their value, their values, and the manner and extent of their support are 
understood as perhaps the most purely revealing aspects of national cultural policy. Among 
the nations of the world, the United States found itself unique in lacking any kind of “cultural 
ministry” — in our system’s language, a Cabinet-level department involved in articulating 
cultural values, establishing policy, and leading the way in national cultural affairs. 
  320 
The cultural elite that took charge of U.S. foreign policy as the Cold War were clearly 
embarrassed by this absence. George Kennan’s 1955 address at the Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA), quoted earlier, captured the elite sensibility that infused efforts in the Fifties and 
early Sixties to establish a domestic public infrastructure to support the nation’s cultural life: 
We have … to show the outside world both that we have a 
cultural life and that we care something about it. That we care 
about it enough, in fact, to give it encouragement and support 
here at home…25 
U.S. propagandists in the State Department, the CIA, and the White House could not 
wait for this domestic picture to change before launching their international campaigns. 
Absent any domestic cultural apparatus, as Francis Stonor Saunders argued, the Central 
Intelligence Agency stood in for our absent ministry of culture, defining and projecting a fine 
art–centered national culture for the United States, lest we be written off abroad as the brute 
with the Bomb. Naturally following their own tastes, the cultural elites who created and 
worked around the CIA focused on the work of only those most professional artists and 
scholars who also passed the anti-communist litmus test.26 The CIA’s definitions of culture 
were never seriously questioned as postwar efforts finally succeeded in establishing new 
federal domestic cultural agencies in the Sixties. 
A number of efforts were made in the Fifties to authorize or study the establishment 
of a federal cultural agency, but each one died on the vine. President Truman asked the Fine 
                                                
25 Saunders, 272. 
26 Saunders, 129. 
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Arts Commission (established during the Taft administration27) to study potential federal 
support for the arts, and its report was delivered soon after President Eisenhower’s election. 
The ubiquitous Nelson Rockefeller tried to follow up, as chair of Eisenhower’s Advisory 
Committee on Government Organization, but his proposal was sidelined. It did provide his 
template for the New York State Council on the Arts in 1960, however, after his election as 
Governor.28  
Meanwhile, various Congressmen introduced bills to create a federal cultural agency 
in the Fifties — Hubert Humphrey and a group of liberal senators introduced Senate Bill 
1109, for example, also in 1953 — but each bill failed. In 1960, stepping in to arbitrate a 
strike against the Metropolitan Opera, Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg realized the 
settlement’s impact on that deficit-ridden institution’s budget and argued, “We must come to 
accept the arts as a new community responsibility.” He called on government to step in, 
focusing its resources on physical plants and meeting deficits.29 Still, the decade ended 
without any clear indication that we cared enough about the arts and humanities to include 
their direct support in the nation’s domestic budget. 
                                                
27 August Heckscher, “The Arts and the National Government,” Report to the President, May 
28, 1963. Presented by Sen. Claiborne Pell to Sen. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
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The Cultural Agencies of the Sixties 
Finally, after the nation passed its torch to a new generation, personified by the upper-
crust Kennedys, the New Frontier opened a window for the cultural elite’s sophisticated 
understanding of the arts to find a home in government. President Kennedy recruited August 
Heckscher III, a veteran of MoMA’s CIA-backed International programs division, as his 
Special Consultant on the Arts late in 1961 “to survey and evaluate the impact of existing 
government programs and policies affecting the arts and to make recommendations for future 
action.” Heckscher’s enthusiasm over his appointment echoed the same concern about the 
nation’s international status that George Kennan had expressed in 1955:  
There has been a growing awareness that the United States will 
be judged … not alone by its military or economic power, but 
by the quality of its civilization. The evident desirability of 
sending the best examples of America’s artistic achievements 
abroad has led to our looking within, to asking whether we 
have in fact cultivated deeply enough the fields of creativity. 
We have come to feel as a people not only that we should be 
stronger but that we should have a higher degree of national 
well-being in proportion as the arts come into their own. 
Heckscher expressed his hopeful belief, stated as fact, that there was “a rapidly developing 
interest in the arts” in the country. He cited increased attendance at museums and concerts 
and growing numbers of orchestras, theaters, and other cultural institutions, in numbers that 
“would have been thought impossible a generation ago.” But therein lay the problem that 
Heckscher saw for traditional, rich patrons of the arts, which summed up for the White 
House: 
The very demands which changing public tastes have made 
upon established artistic institutions have strained the financial 
resources available to them. Older forms of patronage have not 
in all cases been adequately replaced. A long-standing 
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weakness … in cultural infrastructure has led to institutions 
inadequately supported and managed… [O]ften, inadvertently, 
government has imposed obstacles to the growth of the arts and 
to the well-being of the individual artist. 
After an extended period of fact-finding and hobnobbing with arts leaders and patrons, 
Heckscher called for creating an Advisory Council on the Arts within the President’s 
Executive Office. Kennedy did so in June 1963 with his Executive Order 11112.  
Heckscher also recommended establishing an “Arts Foundation, on the model of the 
existing foundations in science and health,” to provide “ grants-in-aid, generally on a 
matching basis, to states and institutions of the arts.” Heckscher warned, however, that 
“government’s role in the arts must always remain peripheral, with individual creativity and 
private support being central.”30 After Kennedy’s assassination, this notion was taken up as 
part of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society program. Johnson created a National Council on the 
Arts in his Executive Office in September 1964 “to advise local, state, and federal agencies 
on methods of fostering artistic and cultural activities.”31 One year later, in September 1965, 
this White House Council was replaced by a new, independent agency — the National 
Foundation of the Arts and Humanities (NFAH).32 Congressional approval of the National 
Cultural Center came at the same time — rechristened as the Kennedy Center for the 
Performing Arts. With new museums beginning to proliferate along the National Mall, 
heightened commitment to “the arts and humanities” (if not “culture” in its wider sense) 
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seemed to be crystallizing at the federal level, as well as in a number of state and municipal 
governments. 
The National Foundation for the Arts & Humanities 
The NFAH was essentially a bureaucratic shell containing twin federal agencies — 
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the 
Humanities (NEH) — each advised by a Presidentially appointed National Council. Though 
described as a “Foundation” comprising two “Endowments,” these agencies operated almost 
exclusively on Congressional appropriation, dispensing grants to arts and humanities 
institutions and to individual artists and scholars.33 
Twenty percent of each of Endowment’s appropriations (increased to forty during the 
Reagan administration) were earmarked for officially designated state arts agencies (SAAs) 
and humanities committees from 1973 on. Prior to that time, a similar proportion of the 
Agencies’ budgets was allocated for that purpose, but without a percentage being specified in 
the legislation. Though initial allocations to the states were small (just $25,000 from the Arts 
Endowment, as “a special nonmatching Federal study grant to examine the cultural needs of 
the State and establish an official state arts agency”). Forty-one states took the bait, and by 
the end of 1967, “all of the States, except one” had established state arts agencies (SAAs). 
Twenty-eight of these agencies applied right away for another $25,000 each to start making 
grants of their own, collectively underwriting 295 projects. Through these grants were small 
(really, token), this federal-state network of public agencies began spinning budget straw into 
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project gold, boosting the arts (or, less flamboyantly, the humanities) with matching grants, 
yielding impressive private-sector donations and inspiring results for annual reports.34 
Notable among the states that already had state arts agencies before 1965 was New 
York, where Governor Nelson Rockefeller established one in 1960, having completed his 
migration from international to national and then to state affairs. For quite some time, with 
Rockefeller as its champion, the New York State Council for the Arts (NYSCA) stood out 
among the SAAs for deriving the lion’s share of its funding from state legislative 
appropriations, not limiting itself to what was on offer from the NEA. Even a decade later, 
NYSCA’s legislative budget surpassed the aggregate of all the other fifty-five state arts 
agencies’ taken together. 
Public Broadcasting  
 Public broadcasting had been of interest since radio’s proliferation in the Twenties, 
discussed earlier, though the concept was rather soundly defeated by Paley & Co. in the 
Thirties. The proliferation of television brought this interest back to life in the Fifties, though 
— first in the rather drab dressage of educational TV, but then in the Sixties, in the somewhat 
hipper garb of public television: something that might be watched by general viewers, not 
only by students and teachers in classroom or distance-learning settings. 
 Private-sector intervention played a directly catalytic role in public broadcasting, 
through the Carnegie Foundation–funded Commission on Educational Television, 
established in 1965. The Carnegie Commission’s landmark report, Public Television: A 
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Program for Action, was published early in 1967, in conjunction with President Johnson’s 
State of the Union call for the legislation passed later that year — the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1967, which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).35 
 CPB became entangled in Washington politics from Day One, though its status as a 
presumably independent agency was meant to ward off White House and Congressional 
interference. The Corporation was designed to serve as a funding entity only. Distribution 
remained contested until another new entity was devised: the Public Broadcast Service (PBS) 
began operating in 1970, designed and operated in collaboration with local stations and 
production centers.36 
 National Public Radio (NPR) was formed at the same time as PBS, also at CPB’s 
instigation. But NPR, dealing with a less expensive and longer established medium, was 
much more strongly identified with and driven by its networks of experienced local stations 
than was PBS. NPR’s institutional and on-air tone expressed public radio’s more democratic 
roots: one commentator in the Nineties argued, “In fact, NPR’s roots are populist, growing 
out of the same total, self-reliant, self-improving soil as the Chautauqua Movement or the 
Grange.”37  
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The Cold War Intelligentsia Comes of Age 
A significant number of those who, like Rockefeller, cut their teeth in State 
Department and CIA cultural initiatives of the Fifties went on to shape and administer the 
new federal cultural agencies formed in the Sixties.  
Miss Nancy Hanks 
Rockefeller’s assistant at the time of NYSCA’s creation was Nancy Hanks. Even 
after becoming the powerhouse “Chairman” of the National Endowment for the Arts from 
1969-78, “Miss” Hanks continued to enforce these pre-feminist designations, though the 
women’s movement had simultaneously begun to challenge and transform these titles’ sexist 
construction. Even farther back, in the Fifties — long before feminism reawakened from its 
Great Depression — Hanks had been not only Rockefeller’s personal staff assistant, but also 
his lover. Little known, though rumored, during her lifetime, their affair was disclosed by 
Hanks’ Deputy Chairman at the NEA, Michael Straight, in his 1988 biography of his former 
boss. Straight wrote of the couple’s time together in the early Fifties: 
At work, Nelson and Nancy were wholly discreet. The salary 
she draws as his assistant is what any assistant would expect. 
The rules that are set for others she obeys. Beyond the office 
walls Nelson lavishes presents upon her: drawings and etching 
by Degas and Picasso, a portfolio of securities worth $200,000. 
Rockefeller also paid to create a lake on Hanks’ parents’ summer-home property in the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, equipping them with a couple of boats to cruise around in when he and 
Nancy vacationed there.38 
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Their relationship began in 1953, when Hanks was a recent Duke graduate, still in her 
20’s. Rockefeller was then in the thick of his most direct involvement in Eisenhower’s new 
administration, first taking stock of overall Governmental Operations, then acting as the 
President’s advisor in covert Cold War strategies. This early experience was formative to 
Hanks’ approach to public administration. She found herself in unusual positions as the only 
woman on Rockefeller’s small staff at this moment in Cold War history: working behind the 
scenes at the Geneva summit of 1955, for instance, where Rockefeller’s Open Skies plan was 
floated — proposing that the United States and USSR openly share information about their 
military capabilities, really not plausible in the mutually mistrustful Cold War climate of the 
time.39  
From there, failing to win the Defense Department post he wanted, Rockefeller 
bristled at the humiliations of non-elective office, and left federal service to seek some 
elective office, where he imagined he might find greater independence. For the short term, 
though, Nelson returned to New York City to launch and direct six Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund studies — convening panels of experts in foreign policy, international economic policy, 
military policy, economic and social issues, the “pursuit of excellence,” and the democratic 
idea — each tasked with producing some agenda for the future. Hanks administered these 
projects as Rockefeller’s Executive Secretary, but proximity to his first wife (whom he would 
soon divorce) ended the intimate phase of their relationship. When Nelson declared 
candidacy for New York’s governorship, his brother Laurence replaced as chair of 
Rockefeller Brothers, and Nancy stepped up as vice chairman, where she remained until 
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1969 — except for the few months she served as Nelson’s aide in Albany, during the time 
that NYSCA was born.40 Nixon appointed her chair of the NEA in 1969. 
The Straight Story 
Hanks was not alone in having direct experience with the rarified world of anti-
communist cultural elites before getting involved with the new federal arts and humanities 
agencies. Even before revealing his boss’s secrets, Michael Straight — who served as the 
NEA’s Deputy Chairman during the Hanks regime — felt compelled to tell some secrets of 
his own. 
Straight was scion of the Whitney fortune, raised and schooled in England from the 
age of ten. Eventually graduating to Cambridge, he fell into orbit around the “Cambridge 
Five,” a tight circle of British agents for the Soviet Union centering around the flamboyantly 
homosexual Guy Burgess (a double agent in the Britain’s MI6 intelligence service, recruited 
by Kim Philby). In 1937, having joined the circle, Straight was ordered back to America, a 
country he hardly remembered, to await further instructions. Arriving in Washington, he 
socialized with Eleanor Roosevelt and used his family’s White House connections to position 
himself inside the State Department. But no orders ever came: clandestine meetings took 
place, but nothing was ever assigned. Straight soon joined the Air Corps instead of becoming 
the Cambridge Sixth, but his flirtation with Soviet communism haunted him after the war: 
toying with a run for Congress from an adopted district in Connecticut, Straight was warned 
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of rumors about his past. He quickly abandoned electoral fantasies in favor of editing the 
family magazine — The New Republic.41  
Years later, in 1963, anticipating trouble getting clearance to direct the cultural 
agency then being discussed, Straight consulted Arthur Schlesinger at the White House 
before turning himself over to the F.B.I.to fully confess his stymied spy career, then 
continuing to consult with the agency on “loose ends” for another four years. Straight 
benefited from the cooler brand of domestic anti-communism prevailing in the early Sixties, 
compared to the Fifties Red Scare. A friend he consulted before going to the FBI (not 
knowing the full details) pooh-poohed the notion that Straight’s political past would 
interfere: “Oh hell! We’ve all been radicals; the president knows that!”42 Though fully 
cleared, both Kennedy and Johnson administrations would pass away before Straight finally 
received his consolation-prize appointment as the NEA’s Deputy Chair, second to Nancy 
Hanks. His nomination issued ultimately from the White House of Richard Nixon — the 
veteran Cold Warrior who would soon open the doors to Red China. 
 Straight’s confession was not without casualty, though it took another decade to 
materialize. Heating to debate in Parliament in 1978, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
revealed that the previously unidentified “fourth man” of the Cambridge Five was none other 
than Sir Anthony Blunt, art historian, who since 1945 had served as Surveyor of the King’s 
(then the Queen’s) Pictures, a curatorial role for which he was knighted in 1957. Blunt was 
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summarily stripped of his knighthood and driven from public life. Journalists soon ferreted 
out Straight as the source of this intelligence, thus also revealing his connection to the 
Cambridge Five: it was the controversy that followed, in those early days of Reagan’s raging 
against the Evil Empire, that inspired Straight to publish his memoir After Long Silence in 
1983, though he had already retired from public office five years earlier. 
Filling Out a Generation 
The NEA was not the only Sixties cultural agency headed up by veteran Cold War 
adventurers. Barnaby Kenney, first Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities 
(1966-70) and of its precursor group, the National Commission on the Humanities, worked in 
Army intelligence during World War II, continuing on covertly for the CIA while he served 
as president of Brown University (1955-66).43  
In the public-broadcasting arena, James R. Killian, Jr., who chaired the Carnegie 
Commission before becoming chair of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), had 
been the first chair of the President’s Council on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956, a 
post he held under President Kennedy as well, through the spring of 1963. Killian’s CPB 
associate Henry Loomis worked for the Department of Defense’s Research and Development 
Board from 1950-51, then served as a consultant to the Psychological Strategy Board before 
moving on, under Eisenhower, to head up the USIA’s Office of Research and Intelligence. 
Loomis then became director of the Voice of America from 1958-65.44 
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 Many other senior staff in all the federal cultural agencies were drawn from the 
professional, academic, and government circles out of which this sampling of leadership 
arose in the Fifties. Their attitudes and values were naturally shaped by the anti-communism 
to which they pledged allegiance and had become accustomed. 
 “Quality,” “Excellence,” and Democracy in Public Cultural Affairs 
The idea of democracy was terrifying to the elite leadership of postwar U.S. cultural 
institutions. Democracy was usually perceived and framed as an attack upon the idea of 
quality, which took center stage in these circles. The Rockefeller Panel Report on the 
Performing Arts opened by articulating this fear, as a subtext to its ambivalent optimism: 
Observers of American society, since the establishment of the 
Republic, have proclaimed the incompatibility of democracy 
with the attainment of high standards of excellence in the arts. 
A significant minority, however, has never accepted this 
judgment. This minority has sought to prove two things: that 
democracy is as capable of fostering works of artistic 
excellence as any aristocracy and, more important, that it is 
capable of creating a far broader audience for them than any 
other form of society.45 
Democracy was carefully contained by this elite group of policymakers, “the people” being 
more likely the source of “broader audience” than of a widening pool of legitimate producers 
of cultural work. Democracy had to be given lip-service; but the Rockefeller Panel’s rubber 
immediately met the road in a hairpin turn back in the direction of artistic quality: 
The panel is motivated by the conviction that the arts are not 
for a privileged few but for the many, that their place is not on 
the periphery of society but at its center, that they are not just a 
form of recreation but are of central importance to our well-
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being and happiness. In the panel’s view, this status will not be 
widely achieved unless artistic excellence is the constant goal 
of every artist and every arts organization, and mediocrity is 
recognized as the ever-present enemy of true progress in the 
development of the arts.46 
 In the decades since, democracy itself has usually been parodied in arguments against 
it by defenders of the cultural status quo. Some defenders supposed — however rhetorically 
— that democracy would require baroque new systems of voting, by some ill-informed mass 
plebiscite, in place of reasoned, reasonable review by art experts. Arguments often feature 
preposterous extremes — “throwing the money out of a plane” — as if this is what 
democratic distribution of cultural resources might require. Implicit in the defenders’ 
aesthetic was the assumption that cultural traditions other than those enshrined in the 
institutions foregrounded by the Rockefeller Panel simply are not sufficiently interested in, 
much less characterized by “quality,” settling instead for mediocrity. 
 The idea that “quality” might be understood differently in other cultural contexts than 
that of the European-derived fine arts was an argument that had to be brought from outside 
the new cultural agencies’ inner circles, years later. Viewing diversity as a cultural strength 
suggests that we might speak about “qualities” in the plural — as the contending argument 
emerged in the Seventies — varying from one cultural context to another, rather than 
reserving legitimacy to the elusive discernments of taste around which established high-art 
worlds revolve and patrons mobilized or repelled.  
Though federal cultural agencies might be conceived as serving the needs of the 
entire citizenry, as the leaders of New Deal agencies did, the Sixties cohort of cultural 
                                                
46 Ibid., 11-12. 
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policymakers relegated the public at large  — and certainly “non-professional” artists and 
scholars — to supporting roles as consumers and appreciators (though the benighted majority 
was actually expected to be neither). Agency boosters heavily documented the educational 
and economic byproducts and impact of professional cultural production in order to make a 
case for public benefit. New audience members and donors would always be welcome, but a 
seat in the audience is all most people are good for, in their orthodox view; and as things 
stand, too many seats remained empty and unpaid for, due to insufficient prior exposure and 
aesthetic education.  
The extent of the alarm generated by even bland proposals to decentralize aesthetic 
decision-making is reflected by the response of two members of the National Council on the 
Arts to one made by a liberal Republican consultant to the NCA’s Policy & Planning 
Committee in October 1980, just prior to Reagan’s election. Due diligence in his research 
had introduced David B.H. Martin to cultural democracy, which he considered “a beautiful 
idea” and included in his preface to a proposal calling for pilot funding for sub-granting by 
municipal arts agencies, whose lobbyists had taken pains to show that they supported exactly 
the same kinds of high-quality art underwritten by the Endowment. Theo Bikel, thought to be 
one of the more liberal of Council members, as president of Actors Equity, intoned: 
When I took, as we all did, the oath of office … swearing that I 
would defend the United States of American against all 
enemies, foreign of domestic … I didn’t think I’d have to ward 
off domestic enemies until today. 
Fellow Council member Martin Friedman, director of Minneapolis’s reputedly progressive 
Walker Art Center, took Bikel’s assertion that it was “a pernicious document” somewhat 
further, suggesting that one might “surreptitiously sell it to the KGB, because I think it would 
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do far more than any kind of powerful strategic missile system… to erode a culture.” Bikel 
explained, 
I resent “cultural democracy” as a term because it seems to use 
the word “democracy,” which we all swear by to our flag and 
to our faith; it subverts democracy into an autocracy of the 
uninformed — cultural democracy meaning that we have to be 
dictated to by those for whom we toil … 
The monies and the efforts of this agency are not meant for the 
people of the United States of America — they are meant for 
the artists of excellence, the fruit of whose labor is meant for 
the people. 
Goaded to greater rhetorical heights, Friedman again chimed in, speaking on behalf of the 
people: 
People don’t want double standards. They don’t want to be 
fooled. They’re smarter than we’re giving them credit for: they 
understand education; they understand amateurism; they 
understand community events; but they don’t for a minute 
confuse what they’re participating in with art itself. … Are we 
really in the business of supporting amateurism? … Where 
does it all end? The neighborhoods? With the streets? … The 
result can only be dilution, confusion, and chaos.47 
Needless to say, this proposal was killed in committee, though a similar one was to pass 
some years later. 
Federal arts and humanities policymakers not only ignored amateurs, but also turned 
away from artists working in commercial contexts. Among many cultural minorities, 
gathering in commercial venues or public spaces, rather than in high-arts institutions, 
provided the only available path to cultural survival. Jazz, for example, thrived largely by 
                                                
47 Don Adams and Arlene Goldbard, “Round Two with the High Chiefs of Arts,” NAPNOC 
notes (Washington, DC), Issue 6, November 1980, pp. 1 and 3. 
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virtue of its popularity in drinking establishments. That there might have been value in 
serving these artists’ needs was overlooked by the new agencies, so singular was their focus 
on the “fine arts.” Normalizing major cultural institutions’ forms and practices in public 
cultural policy diverted attention from the cultural-development concerns of those working 
commercially, however marginally, effectively punishing artists who had found such niches 
for themselves, in the absence of any substantial philanthropic interest or support.  
Experience abroad has shown many ways that public support might ameliorate the 
pressure of finding commercial work and in fact facilitate it, developing new audiences in 
non-commercial as well as commercial settings. Artists representing various cultural 
traditions and working in all kinds of milieux benefit from the same kinds of artist-exchange 
and mentoring, opportunities to focus on creating new work, and such other measures more 
often taken to support the more limited constituency of artists involved in major “fine arts” 
institutions.48 
The President as Minister of Culture 
There is no Minister of Culture to whom we in the United States of America can 
appeal if our cultural rights are being restricted or if our cultural-development needs are 
being ignored. We have the judiciary, but they are only reactive, not agencies of cultural 
development, and communal cultural rights are virtually unestablished in U.S. law. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the United States was a signator, remains 
                                                
48 One example from a vast documentary literature: Unesco CC.77/WS/34, Support for the 
creative arts: The examples of Poland and Hungary, Unesco Cultural Development 
Documentary Dossier 11-12 (Paris: Beugnet, S.A., 1977). 
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little known nearly seven decades later and worthless as a standard of practical appeal — 
especially since the entire U.N. apparatus is scoffed at by so many U.S. pundits today. This 
effectively leaves the President’s role as policymaker-in-chief as the sole site of potential 
integrative cultural leadership in the American political cosmology. If and when this comes 
to questioned — as it has been in the virulent Tea Party response to the election of President 
Obama, on the basis of “dog whistle” racism — even this integrative potential is endangered, 
without form commitment to the principles of cultural democracy. 
Presidential leadership has played a central role throughout our story, and this 
continued in the Sixties and since. Soon after stepping down as the NEA’s Deputy Chair, 
Michael Straight wrote, “The development of a coherent federal policy for the arts requires 
principally a commitment on the part of the White House.”49 On that score, our presidents 
have been generally less than attentive to cultural policy as such, more interested in the 
patina of refinement conferred by supporting the arts and the political advantages of 
association with the cultural elite. 
The Kennedy administration brought an air of sophistication to the White House, and 
some early action. But it fell to that unpolished Texan, Lyndon Baines Johnson, to take 
practical action, to the extent that he could before the misadventure in Vietnam brought his 
presidency to an inglorious end. Richard Nixon, working primarily through his Special 
Assistant Leonard Garment — once a clarinetist in Woody Herman’s band, then director of 
communications for Nixon’s 1968 campaign — saw the arts as a means of playing “offset 
                                                
49 Michael Straight, Twigs for an Eagle’s Nest: Government and the Arts: 1965-1978, Vol. 4 
of In Great Decades series (New York/Berkeley: Devon Press, 1979), 96-97. 
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politics” within his general “mid-America route” in domestic affairs: cutting back Great 
Society programs in favor of tax and deficit reductions.  
Such tiny federal expenditures as were involved in the NFAH could generate useful 
political support from the small, but influential arts constituency at little cost.50 Even years 
later, the numbers involved were small by international standards and disappearingly so as a 
percentage of federal expenditure. 
The combined 1998 appropriations for the two national 
endowments is $.78 per person in the United States, while the 
total government (including state and local) spending on 
culture in this country is $6.25. In other Western countries the 
government share of spending on culture is much higher: 
$27.40 per person in the United Kingdom and $97.70 in 
Finland, the biggest spender in Europe. The combined budgets 
of the NEA and the NEH will amount to approximately 1/100 
of 1% of the 1999 federal budget of $1,751 billion.51 
Nixon’s direct support contributed to several years in which the NFAH multiplied, within 
this limited scale. 
The Carter administration’s populist bent affected NEH grant-making, which 
supported a number of “people’s history” projects, feeding on appetites rediscovered in the 
national bicentennial of 1976; but perhaps the most visible advocate at that time was the vice 
president’s wife, Joan Mondale, who used her position as honorary chair of a redeployed but 
                                                
50 Straight, Twigs, 24-25; Straight, Hanks, 102-104. This strategy derived from a post-
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51 Cynthia Koch, “The Contest for American Culture: A Leadership Case Study on The NEA 
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essentially powerless Federal Council on the Arts & Humanities as a bully pulpit for national 
arts boosterism. “Joan of Art,” she was called for awhile.52 
It was not until Reagan’s election that U.S. voters installed an administration reading 
from a tightly focused cultural-policy script — one that was aggressively opposed to cultural 
democracy. Spelled out in tendentious simplicity, the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for 
Leadership — widely considered the “blueprint” for the Reagan administration’s policies — 
asserted that federal cultural agencies had fallen under the influence of questionable Sixties 
people whose political agendas had blinded them to the primacy of “enduring artistic 
accomplishments.”53 That the “Arts & Humanities” were included as one of fourteen major 
domains of federal policy addressed in the Heritage Foundation’s rendition of Reagan’s 
Mandate for Leadership was considered strange and remarkable in a capital city struggling to 
comprehend the substantial changes being made by Reagan’s transition team (which featured 
a 100-strong “kitchen cabinet” of executives on loan from U.S. corporations through the 
passage of Reagan’s “Black Book” budget by Memorial Day. Having had to struggle for 
access to ardently conservative federal agencies, the claim that those in charge had yielded 
much to Sixties pressures and had fallen away from emphasizing “serious art for art’s sake” 
seemed laughable; but the shifts Regan’s appointees made were real. 
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Reagan initially proposed deep cuts in federal arts and humanities budgets, and triage 
planning ensued in the threatened agencies; but proposed budget reductions never 
materialized. The simple fact that the boards of grantee institutions overrepresented wealthy 
donors supportive of Reagan’s overall program — especially those on the shortened lists 
created when cuts were threatened —made these proposed cuts (minuscule by federal-budget 
standards) unlikely. In the end, overall budgets remained relatively unchanged, but the 
Endowments’ grantee lists were reduced, strategically and selectively so, and programs were 
reoriented in more conservative directions. The influence of Reagan’s appointments 
cemented these shifts. The percentage going out to state and local agencies was soon 
doubled, though in a climate of reassurance that these agencies’ values and patterns of 
grantmaking were very like those of the federal agencies. 
FROM THE THIRTIES TO THE SIXTIES: ANTI-COMMUNISM’S CULTURAL IMPACT 
The federal cultural agencies established in the Sixties contrast sharply with the 
federal cultural programs of the New Deal. The assumptions made and values held by the 
White House, Congress, organizers and executives of these new agencies expose several key 
shifts in cultural-policy thinking, significantly attributable to the Cold War anti-communism 
of the intervening thirty years:  
• the primacy of the private sector in the nation’s cultural affairs; 
• a Euro-centric definition of culture, focused primarily on established cultural 
institutions’ aesthetics;  
• a substantially changed attitude toward the nation’s cultural diversity; 
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• an aversion to cultural work that deals with fundamental social issues;  
• a disavowal of democracy in cultural policy; and 
• U.S. non-participation (or interference) in international cultural-policy 
discourse.54 
I will discuss shifts from the Thirties to the Sixties in each of these six key areas, 
using the rubric “The McCarthy Effect” as shorthand for the impact of anti-communism on 
U.S. cultural policy. It is important here to remember, however, the distinction between 
McCarthy the Man vs. McCarthyism the Movement. This is especially important in tracking 
anti-communism’s extension into in the less charged domestic atmosphere of the Sixties, and 
even further: into its resurgence in new clothes in the Eighties and the ongoing Reagan era. 
By the Sixties, it was convenient for self-styled “moderates” to blame eccentric 
ideologues like Joe McCarthy for the excesses of the feverish anti-communist impulses of the 
Fifties: McCarthy’s own weakened liver and early death made him a handy puppet for the 
most excessive manifestations of anti-communism. McCarthyism has entered the language to 
signify the kind of exterminating ideological zeal from which cultural elites wished to 
distance themselves. This offered a way for the nation’s cultural elite to contain, displace, 
and deny any such impulse in themselves, laughing off McCarthy’s zealous obsessions while 
also providing a means to divert general awareness from the lingering impact of anti-
communism. The deep internalization of anti-communist values in the policymaking class in 
                                                
54 Only after submitting my thesis for review did I realize my omission of a seventh 
“McCarthy Effect”: “the sacralization of the state,” which opened the door for what has 
become the disproportionate influence of fundamentalist fringe groups in U.S. politics, post-
Reagan. This is discussed on pp. 174-184, but I should have included it in this summary list. 
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Sixties Washington forestalled self-examination of what I am calling these half-dozen 
“McCarthy effects” in U.S. cultural policy. 
The McCarthy Effect, Part One: The Primacy of the Private Sector 
As we have already seen, fear of undue government influence in the nation’s 
domestic cultural life drove discussions of federal involvement from the Fifties on. Public-
sector action must respect the primacy of private initiative in culture, according to the 
architects of emerging postwar policies. The public sector should follow, supplement, and 
support private philanthropy in cultural affairs. 
This orthodoxy — along with general fear of engagement with social issues, 
discussed later — explains the paradoxical assertion consistently made by erstwhile U.S. 
cultural policymakers from the Sixties on: that the nation not only has no cultural policy, but 
that having one would be inappropriate in the United States. Our official contribution to 
UNESCO’s series on national cultural policies opened with this assertion, locating our 
disability (tellingly undercut by the writer’s adverbial “almost”) in the Constitution’s 
construction of the federal system: 
“The United States has no official cultural position, either 
public or private” … This is simply a statement of fact 
affecting a federation form of government. It is not possible for 
the United States to adopt officially a policy to govern any 
social enterprise without enormous effort involving almost the 
modification of the Constitution.55 
To cultural policymakers in other countries, the suggestion that cultural policy could 
not be articulated without constitutional amendment would become just one laughable (or 
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deplorable) aspect of the ill-informed U.S. non-participation in international cultural-policy 
dialogue — or in entering into open dialogue about domestic cultural policy, for that matter. 
The fact of American cultural hegemony meant that this international dialogue would 
inevitably and necessarily address the huge impact of our globalizing commercial cultural 
industries have had on cultural life throughout the world. All of this has transpired with little 
interest or participation by any Americans except for Hollywood and record-industry trade 
associations, naturally opposed to any measures to taken curtail their global reach.  
Surface explanations for our official denial of cultural policy took on their fuller, 
underlying anti-communist coloration in a spontaneous utterance by Librarian of Congress 
Daniel Boorstin, attempting to dismiss the topic out of hand at the start of a 1982 Washington 
roundtable on cultural policy convened by New York Times editors: “The countries that have 
cultural policies on the whole are, of course, totalitarian countries.” In the moment, Boorstin 
was called on his specious assertion, and a contentious dialogue ensued; but his 
characterization of the specter of state control remained typical of most U.S. policymakers’ 
resistance to talk about the issues. Expert authority was presumed necessary to comment on 
basic cultural-policy questions: Boorstin refused comment of core questions raised in the 
roundtable by reminding his interrogators, “I’m not a economist.”56  
Adamant refusal to admit to the nation’s having any cultural policy — keeping it 
inexplicit, observable only by analyzing its actions and effects — has effectively short-
circuited public discussion and influence in cultural policymaking. The cultural terrain has 
been left to dominant commercial interests, with a small territory reserved for privately 
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patronized high-arts and public-media institutions. When cultural interests are directly 
affected — as when foreign governments have tried to guarantee that some percentage of 
domestic film is produced and screened, for example — the U.S. has interpreted these as 
trade issues, affecting “product” and “market” alone. In their ascendancy with Reagan in the 
Eighties, spokesmen for U.S. cultural industries crafted the most cultural of our arguments 
against foreign-national efforts to control the flood of American product filling their screens: 
they held that such controls impinged upon the “free speech” of U.S. corporations that 
manufacture and distribute cultural goods. 
When the United States “plays dumb” about the impact of the onslaught of U.S.–
produced commercial cultural product upon other nation’s cultures, it is because we made 
ourselves dumb when it comes to matters of cultural policy. Those in charge have steadfastly 
striven to keep us ignorant of this crucial sector of public policymaking concern. As a nation, 
we have absented ourselves from international forums where these concerns are discussed 
more intelligently and where constructive engagement around the issues involved becomes 
possible. 
From a domestic point of view, opening to global issues would strengthen the basis 
for understanding and addressing our nation’s unsatisfied domestic cultural development 
needs, our unaddressed media vacuums and capacities, aside from those of our burgeoning 
commercial cultural industries and pre-existing nonprofit cultural institutions. Independent-
media fields have sprouted up at the margins of public broadcasting, for example, thanks to 
decades of organizing by indie producers themselves since the Seventies; but community-
based media centers have been on their own, and many have gone under, in post-Reagan 
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America. The democratic cultural-policy aim of enabling and encouraging real freedom of 
speech for those whose voices not represented in mainstream media is rarely considered by 
the elites who have held cultural-policy–making authority for the nation. 
The most pervasive cultural impact of the lionization of the private sector versus the 
public is what I earlier referred to as “the commercialization of absolutely everything.” 
Ideological capitalism has neutralized our critique of the downsides of unregulated profit-
taking as a means of “taking care of business” in the nation’s cultural life. (Even that 
pervasive market metaphor is telling — since, for example, taking care of the sick, or holding 
prisoners, is not necessarily a business, though each has increasingly become one.) This has 
narrowed and confined our thinking about alternative approaches to such vital areas of social 
concern as healthcare and our criminal justice system, transforming these into rich veins of 
profit at public expense.  
In healthcare, only two historical moment moments have arisen in recent decades — 
the first, in the campaign leading up to President Clinton’s first election, and the second, with 
President Obama’s — when our nation’s privatized paradigm of healthcare not only came to 
be questioned, but when public consensus had somehow shifted toward the goal of providing 
healthcare for all. On both occasions, experts acknowledged that a “single-payer” approach 
would be most cost-effective and sensible, as had been proven in enlightened countries with 
worthy public systems. But on both occasions, this option was peremptorily dismissed as 
unrealistic and therefore unworthy of serious consideration in a post-Reagan political climate 
that favors inclusion of all commercial interests involved as central to any solution. 
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That climate has been defined by a general delegitimation of government as a 
respectable, effective means of responding to social issues. While this may appear not to be a 
direct result of anti-communism, it surely reflects the long-term success of the fellow-
traveling campaign begun by National Association of Manufacturers and continued under the 
aegis of the Advertising Council. Decades later, with the Cold War definitively won by 
capitalism, and communism no longer officially a credible global threat, one of the NAM’s 
core ideological products — “free enterprise” and “the American Way of Life” — have 
continued to direct politicians’ attention to corporate interests’ wish to reduce governmental 
regulation or constraint. Calvin Coolidge’s definitive pre–New Deal assertion that “the 
business of America is business” could not have been more fully realized. 
Only since the 2008 economic collapse has popular attention returned to issues of 
economic injustice in a nation now more economically polarized than it has been in 
generations.57 Occupy Wall Street and the 99 percent movements have reawakened this 
critique, but few positive, comprehensive, democratic visions of economic justice — much 
less of practical political action to move us closer to realizing such visions — are currently 
available to focus general discussion, much less to mobilize public action. Facing chronic 
employment, underemployment, and sub-poverty pay for many who do have work 
(simultaneously collecting welfare, or holding down multiple jobs in their struggle to make 
ends meet), official attention from the Obama White House has remained tightly focused on 
                                                
57 See “Table 4: Share of wealth held by the Bottom 99% and Top 1% in the United States, 1922-
2010,” G. William Domhoff, “Wealth, Income, and Power” (updated February 2013). Accessed 21 
November 2013 at http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html. 
  347 
the business sector, excluding any serious discussion of public programs such as those that 
defined the New Deal and existed as recently as the Seventies. 
The collateral damage of this long-term economic campaign can be seen in 
“homelessness,” hopelessness, cynicism, drugs, and crime. The plurality of American voters 
today, like the President himself, came of age during the Reagan era, lacking any personal 
experience of what came before, however frustrating it was to deal with those in charge of 
the flawed programs that the Reagan administration eliminated.  
The active intervention of corporate interests in shaping today’s political culture is 
most egregiously evident in the decline of the Grand Old Party of Lincoln as it placated and 
encouraged Tea Party ideologues, but also in the Democratic Party’s dependence upon 
corporate support and accommodation. This has produced a generation of young cynics with 
few apparent political options besides disengagement or, more formally, “libertarianism” as a 
response. It will take extraordinary measures for political action to attract a critical mass of 
people, all heading in the same direction, tolerant of each other’s diversity, and ready to 
restore working government. Meanwhile, the possibility of focusing democratic initiative 
toward community cultural development comes up not at all. 
Repairing this aspect of collateral damage must begin with the culture of politics 
itself, digging down to its very foundations. Is our national cultural identity rooted in the kind 
of ideological capitalism that has dominated federal policy since Reagan? Are our national 
cultural values only manifest and expressed by self-styled religious leaders, as was officially 
established during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations? Are there no other aspects of 
national identity or values left unexpressed by business and religious interests? 
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National cultural policy would provide the framework within which more definitive 
statements could be proposed and discussed in response to these fundamental cultural-policy 
questions. Despite official retrenchment to a pre–New Deal consensus on the assumed 
relations between private and public sectors, we have continued to see enormous changes in 
popular sentiment on questions of cultural identity, requiring even the Advertising Council to 
reorient its campaigns. These substantial shifts have not, however, been expressed in formal 
statements of cultural policy. At this moment in our highly polarized situation, finally finding 
inclusive, secular language that defines unifying national values — regardless of cultural 
background, religion, profession, or class — seems essential to finding ways forward. 
The McCarthy Effect, Part Two: Euro-centric Bias 
 As we have also discussed, the same Atlanticist aesthetic mantle the CIA used to 
clothe our naked empire — woven warp and woof out of the European fine arts— was 
adopted by arts and humanities boosters back home. It might be said that this was “natural,” 
given who they were and what they’d been through. The leadership group establishing our 
current generation of public cultural agencies featured a significant cadre of veterans of the 
United States’ international campaigns. But their choices in cultural policy, however 
unexamined, constitute choices nonetheless, and need to interrogation in light of the values 
of cultural democracy. 
The same groups of artists and institutions that were spotlighted to legitimate U.S. 
standing abroad — exemplars of our national accomplishments in the traditionally European-
dominated fine arts — became the core constituency for domestic cultural policymakers, ten-
to-twenty years on. The aims of cultural support were “re-purposed” for the domestic 
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context, but fully reflected the Cold War consensus: internationally, our anti-communist 
artists and intellectuals served as bait for European artists and intellectuals of the “non-
communist left” to join the United States’ anti-communist culture camp; on the home front, 
the output of their work was prescribed as beneficial to an incipient domestic audience that 
might be awakened, through “exposure,” to the supreme quality of great works of art. 
Though an actual accounting is impossible, certainly more attention was paid, and probably 
more money was spent, to satisfy the tastes and preferences of European intellectuals than 
has ever since been paid to promote participation along the American people, in all our 
diversity and declassées cultural preferences. But the same unquestioned hierarchies of 
cultural definition and taste held by apparatchiks of the CIA and its precursor agencies, years 
before, would prevail among the Cold War generation of cultural leaders who established in 
federal domestic policies.  
The values and needs of existing major cultural institutions and anti-communist 
artists and intellectuals came strongly to the fore as the domestic cultural policy agenda was 
formed. This viewpoint was quite unlike that held by federal policymakers in the Thirties, 
who examined a similar cultural status quo, but concluded that existing major cultural 
institutions were more or less taken care of by their wealthy audiences and patrons — thanks 
largely to tax-deductibility of charitable contributions (which as we have discussed, 
effectively authorize private donors to allocate federal cultural funds directly, according to 
their tastes, and generally to their own social credit). Instead, those in charge of New Deal 
programs focused their attention on democratic aims and outcomes in cultural life to those 
Americans whose cultural needs were not addressed by the cultural status quo. 
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The new generation of cultural leaders in the Fifties and Sixties took the opposite 
tack, viewing existing cultural institutions as primary. Focusing on established institutional 
clients also served their strategic, short-term political ends — mobilizing these institutions’ 
definitively well-connected publics on behalf of the new agencies’ budgets. Nancy Hanks’ 
success as a control-oriented administrator and lobbyist in the Nixon years multiplied the 
NEA’s budget from a paltry $8 million in Fiscal 1969 to a slightly less paltry $115 million by 
1978.58 Hanks was a cagey political operator, who secured large increases in her agency’s 
budget by forging agreements with various classes of institutions, starting with the symphony 
orchestras, which had actively opposed the NEA until their wooing was complete. The 
orchestras’ operators, encouraged and coordinated through their national organization, then 
launched lobbying campaigns to mobilize their substantial, well-connected patron bases on 
the federal agency’s behalf. Their rewards were direct: a 1969 budget of $869,000 for Music, 
producing only five grants to orchestras, grew to $4 million in 1971, with $3 million 
specifically reserved for orchestras.59 
This pattern was repeated within of the Arts Endowment’s funding-program 
constituencies, supported by the NEA’s simultaneous funding of communication and 
networking carried out by national service organizations in each artistic field or discipline — 
museums, theaters, dance companies, arts councils, and organizations in literature and the 
visual arts. Hanks’ ability to switch from tough-as-nails political operator to Southern belle, 
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as the situation demanded, was legendary, as was her command of the facts, being well 
briefed on grants made in every congressional district. Her growing staff came to represent as 
many as forty percent of the entire agency’s by the mid-Seventies, all as obsessed with detail 
in monitoring all agency communication for conformance to her official positions as she 
demanded. 
Operating within the narrow world of Euro-centric cultural institutions, the NEA 
relied on numbers to depict impact. A “Fact Sheet” delivered to the White House in October 
1976 for release with President Ford’s pre-election “Statement on the Arts” compared 
Rockefeller Panel numbers with 1975 figures ginned up by Hanks’ staff: the field of 58 
professional orchestras had grown to 110; opera companies by that time totaled 45, up from 
27; dance companies, 157 compared to only 37 a decade earlier; professional theaters, 
dramatically multiplied from a measly 23 to 145; and so on. Michael Straight weighed in 
against this emphasis after his retirement, observing, “Nelson, in his exuberant way, had led 
Nancy to believe in expansion as such.” Straight suggested that “Nancy was in danger … of 
losing sight of our underlying purpose. Expansion was becoming not a means to aesthetic 
enrichment but an end in itself.”60 
Either way, this is a distinction without a difference in considering the federal 
agencies’ overall aesthetic and institutional bias: Straight’s sole concern was how well this 
“underlying purpose” was being served. Pressures to diversify away from the Atlanticist 
high-culture paradigm, with its limited constituency of major cultural institutions and the 
artists whose work they preferred, were felt more gradually, emanating almost entirely from 
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outside the halls of these agencies. Social activism in the late Sixties and Seventies led to 
shifts that were ultimately impossible to resist; but this did not stop the older generation in 
charge from giving it their college try. 
Euro-centric definitions of culture drove cultural programming in public 
broadcasting, too. When PBS began distributing material to CPB-supported stations in the 
early Seventies, its foundation and corporate underwriting model quickly emerged. American 
corporate sponsors like Xerox bought rights to BBC productions like Kenneth Clark’s 
Civilisation series for primetime broadcast in the United States. Mobil’s acquisition of 
various dramatic series for the Masterpiece Theatre strand reinforced an Anglo-American 
connection that fit right into the Atlanticist paradigm, though now the flow of import-export 
was reversed, from Europe to the elite American audience to which PBS aspired. Over time, 
the Masterpiece model broadened to include Theater in America and Dance in America, both 
underwritten by Exxon, and Arco’s In Performance at Wolf Trap — and both produced in 
America, but very much in the high-art Atlanticist tradition already established in public 
broadcasting.61 
That these keystone strands of PBS programming were underwritten by oil companies 
was no accident: the rise of national programming in public television coincided with the 
1973-74 “oil crisis,” when gas prices quadrupled, presenting a serious public relations 
problem for the American petrochemical industry, addressed in part by showy association 
with not-for-profit cultural enterprise. So prominent did oil-company underwriting become 
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— accounting for over seventy percent of prime-time PBS programs by 1981 — that some 
critics of the system sarcastically called it the Petroleum Broadcast Service.62 
Conflict around cultural bias flared up in the “culture wars” of the Nineties, most 
heatedly in the academy, where independent thought comes more cheaply than in lavish arts 
productions. There, as the Heritage Foundation had prematurely warned in 1980, post-Sixties 
scholars had really begun to challenge older generations’ approaches to key disciplines. 
Attacks upon “the canon” — official versions of history (parodied as the story of “dead white 
men”) and hierarchies of taste (like the elevation of English literature above all others) built 
into college curricula — spurred angry reaction from older defenders like Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., joined by a small but flamboyantly outspoken group of “young Turks” like Dinesh 
d’Souza and various students of Milton Freidman. 
Relatively bland, once non-controversial augmentations of United States history thus 
came under attack from the academic Old School. Historians and social scientists 
documenting Native American influences upon the Founding Fathers, for example, which I 
first read about as a grade-schooler, in an American Heritage coffee-table book published in 
196163 — and already integrated into New York State curriculum due to grassroots cultural 
organizing in the Seventies — drew heavy fire from defenders of conventional canonical 
thought in the “Culture Wars” of the Nineties. Schlesinger’s The Disuniting of America 
offers one the most coherent expressions of this spate of reaction, reasserting the “smelting 
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  354 
pot” theory of assimilation in American culture he claimed was being threatened by “sullen 
and resentful minorities” involved in a “filopietistic commemoration” that “puts the old idea 
of the coherent society at stake.” That coherent society — which he proclaimed was 
practically “a new race” — was, “For better or worse, the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
tradition [that] was for two centuries — and in crucial aspects still is — the dominant 
influence on American society.” Schlesinger chose a statement attributed to Stanley 
Hauerwas of the Duke Divinity School faculty to characterize the position of his opponents: 
“The canon of great literature was created by high Anglican assholes to underwrite their 
social class.”64 
This was essentially the position already presented at the dawn of the Reagan era. 
Like a broken clock, the Heritage Foundation was twice-daily right about one thing in what 
they decried prior to Reagan’s 1980 election. The “threatening,” “new” ideas they feared — 
questioning Anglo-centric assimilation as the normative ideal in U.S. culture — had indeed 
gained ground through publicly-subsidized cultural projects in the Seventies. Culturally 
diverse initiatives found support mainly through non-arts agencies like the departments of 
Labor, the Interior, Justice, HUD, HHS and the like. But also, and uniquely among federal 
cultural agencies, NEH Chair Joseph Duffey’s enthusiasm for “Public Programs” in history 
had begun to confer Washingtonian legitimation to community-based history projects during 
the Carter administration. Many academics of the Nineties cut their teeth and launched their 
careers pursuing the “hidden histories” that such community-based programs brought to 
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public attention for the first time. This NEH interest drew Mandate for Leadership’s most 
relentless fire to the Humanities Endowment, which Reagan tried at first to hand over to his 
pal Melvin E. “Mel” Bradford, whose “paleoconservative” defense of the Confederacy 
proved too offensive for Congressional approval. William J. Bennett filled the void left by 
Bradford’s retreat, the NEH being his stepping stone to service as Reagan’s second-term 
Secretary of Education and Bush père’s drug czar, before his canonization as Neocon pundit 
and recovering high-stakes gambler. The NEH post went to Lynne (Mrs. Dick) Cheney as 
soon as Bennett moved on to Education.65 
The threat to status quo thinking of turning multicultural cannons on historic 
institutional insensitivities to cultural diversity, targeting the canon itself, is real — if one 
considers diversity itself to be a threat. To me, moving ever closer to democracy values, in an 
ever more inclusive and culturally diverse society, has always seemed the very essence of our 
nation-state’s original dream; and shoring up the cultural values and preferences of the 
powers-that-be, its very opposite. Defining and expressing a national cultural policy would 
require us to talk about these values and aspirations openly and publicly, and to agree in 
unifying, inclusive new ways. 
The McCarthy Effect, Part Three: Diversifying from the Ghetto 
 The obvious Euro-centrism that reigned in professional cultural institutions could not 
be condoned without any effort to include — well, others. Once federal civil rights acts were 
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signed, we had to show that there is room for the previously marginalized, lest our way of 
life be threatened by frustration and anger, which at that point was not only abstract and 
theoretical: President Johnson’s administration ended with U.S. cities literally aflame, the 
incoming Nixon administration’s dour focus on law and order representing the federal 
government’s first line of defense. So efforts to do so were drummed up as soon as possible. 
At the NEA, for example, “Expansion Arts” was born. 
Expansion Arts was introduced at the height of the Black Power movement and was 
mainly a supporter of cultural projects in minority communities. This was not made explicit 
in the program’s official description, which blandly referred to “various professionally 
directed community arts programs,” which would involve “people on the track of a new 
sense of personal and community expression.” And they would somehow mean something 
“very different from the traditional approach of ‘cultural enrichment.’” That Expansion Arts 
was nevertheless launched quite frankly and was commonly considered a parallel program 
for artists of color (to use a descriptor not in use when it was created) was evidenced by the 
first project example given in the NEA’s earliest annual report after the program was begun, 
where it was reported that NYSCA had spent some of its own money (not the NEA’s) to 
direct a similar funding program, operating under the more forthright title of “Ghetto Arts.” 
Vantile Whitfield was already at work as Expansion Arts’ program director.66 Reminiscing 
about these days in 1982, Whitfield told me he’d proposed “Ghetto Arts” as the name for the 
NEA’s new department, too, but that higher-ups thought this had to be softened. 
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The ghetto that Expansion Arts served grew out of generations of exclusion, ratified 
by institutional funding categories (e.g., there were and are today no African American 
symphony orchestras, at least as these are defined and qualified by the NEA). But this was 
true also where institutional standardization was absent or weak: Black or Latino companies 
that might have been funded through Dance, for example, were instead shunted by guidelines 
and connections into Expansion Arts when they applied to the NEA. And there they 
remained, rather than “graduating” into the usual arts-discipline funding categories. To top 
policymakers, “Expansion Arts” surely evoked the sense that outreach work was being done 
for the same high-quality arts — hoping that audience members would be elevated to arts 
appreciation, having entered through side doors opened by Expansion Arts grantees. But the 
general attitude among policymakers inside the Endowment are reflected in Chairman Nancy 
Hanks’ offhand observation in a that NEA support was directed to ‘support only the highest 
quality professional activity … [t]hroughout the Endowment” — “except Education [which 
placed resident-artists in schools in all the states in a program that eluded NEA control] and 
Expansion Arts…”67 
These were also early days in the post-Sixties reexamination and reconfiguration of 
racial politics. Elder leaders of the federal agencies, preoccupied by the pressures brought 
upon them by their power, had not yet fully grasped pervasive aspects of internalized belief 
that underpin the culture of racism.68 A revealing “tell” emerges in Michael Straight’s 
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reminiscence of an unofficial celebration of Van Whitfield’s work, right after his NEA 
resignation was announced. The party was held in Washington’s “splendid” old mansion, 
Decatur House on Lafayette Square, where Straight had literally played parlor games as a 
Russian spy awaiting orders in the late Thirties, when Washington socialite Mrs. Truxton 
Beale lived there. Remarking on the unusually “crowded room … the shouting and the 
laughter” and music by various jazz artists, Straight remember how much “more exuberant” 
everyone grew “as the trays of drinks continued on their rounds.”  
As we left, we passed Mrs. Beale’s aged butler. He 
remembered me from forty years back — he looked at me with 
imploring eyes. He spoke in whispers, glancing at the polished 
floor, the delicate card tables, the ancient Chinese vases, all the 
irreplaceable bric-a-brac that had been left by Mrs. Beale in his 
care. 
 Not to worry, I told him, not to worry.69 
Straight places himself in the best liberal light here — bridging the butler’s racist fear and the 
consensus then abroad in late-Seventies Washington, observed from the patrician distance 
evident in his own multiple memoirs. Whitfield withdrew after rumors he was on incoming 
NEA Chair Livingston Biddle’s “hit list” for audaciously critical statements made to the 
National Assembly of State Arts Agencies. And in Biddle’s first appearance on the agency 
side of NEA reauthorization hearings in 1980, the only problem in the national arts 
landscape, he reported to Congress, came from “those who rock the boat” which happened to 
be my new job at the time. 
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Parallel contradictions — reflecting unexamined biases held by the elites in charge — 
were evident throughout the creation of the NFAH. Jazz was a latter-day addition, and a 
relatively small one, to a Music Program diet dictated by symphony orchestra programmers. 
Even after a measure of funding had begun to flow, National Endowment for the Arts writers 
diminished its significance within the world of “serious” music (and specifically in the 
NEA’s funding hierarchy) with faint and oddly measured praise: “We have … in jazz a major 
folk art. … We have a population … terrifyingly addicted to it.”70 Folk Arts itself came even 
later, in 1975, and largely because longtime advocates in the Library of Congress and 
Smithsonian were moving toward creation of some federal crafts agency beyond the NEA’s 
control.71 
Issues of cultural diversity have arisen throughout our story of Twentieth Century 
anti-communism, along the anti-immigrant and racist feeling that has accompanied it. All are 
relevant in considering where we stand and where we might head in national cultural policy. 
One point that bears emphasis arises from the generational problem we face in the post-
Reagan era: those culturally specific communities that have taken root or grown significantly 
since 1980 have arrived at time when very little public funding has available to support new 
cultural initiatives based in lower-income communities. Newer immigrant communities have 
been left to deal with issues of cultural continuity and the inevitable conflicts and 
misunderstandings faced by every arrival to the United States on their own. Latin American, 
Southeast Asian, and Islamic communities, to name a few, have sprung up all over the 
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country during this time. While today’s younger majority and cultural democrats of all ages 
have proven more fully accepting of the United States’ multicultural reality than could have 
been said in the twentieth century, we have simultaneously seen an upsurge in anti-immigrant 
hate groups and relentless repetition of anti-immigrant fears in right-wing media. 
This core manifestation of changing cultural identity in our archetypally diverse 
nation is offers rich terrain for cultural development. E pluribus unum, though never made 
official, was our de facto national motto until Cold Warriors placed the nation under God, in 
whom we now officially trust, in the Fifties. Assuring an atmosphere of mutual respect, 
protection, and promotion for cultural diversity — recognizing diversity as among our 
greatest national assets, irrespective of religious belief or multicultural identity — and 
healing the deep wounds of centuries-old racism remain our primary challenges as a nation. 
The challenge of articulating an inclusive social vision that could address the nation’s 
fundamental cultural issues and articulate a more inclusive vision and agenda was effectively 
left to insurgent movements for social change. The human impulse to break out of conformist 
straitjackets explains the eventual proliferation of these movements in the later Sixties and 
Seventies, as the Baby Boom generation came of age. Regardless of political and 
governmental resistance and interference, these movements would have profound impact, 
reaching well beyond the activist communities where they originated. 
The women's movement offers the best example: since the Sixties, the status and role 
of women in national culture was raised as a vital issue and irreversibly changed. This was 
not due to any more focused statement of cultural policy than had already been set into the 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution, but because activists’ changing consciousness 
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reached critical mass and resonated with the general public — especially with women and 
girls. The centuries-old idea that all men are created equal thus came to encompass women as 
well. Ever since, the very words we use to describe our social goals have had to be chosen 
more carefully, to convey our national commitment to the welfare and equal standing of 
women as well as among men. Countless changes have been made in policy, to reduce their 
sexist valence. Though many people today do not think of themselves as “feminist,” society 
has shifted to the point where we are all walking and quacking much more like the feminists 
of the Sixties and Seventies than had this popular movement not taken place. 
The civil rights movement also exemplifies the more or less continuous fours for 
Democratic change. Despite the muscular efforts of federal officials like J. Edgar Hoover and 
Southern Democrats of the Fifties (now Reagan Republicans) to cast civil rights leaders as 
communist, they were not. Anti-communism had successfully pushed actual communism 
beyond the margins of the acceptable in American life. Democratic leaders of the postwar era 
had been affected, too: their sales have been trimmed to weather the harsh anti-Communist 
wind. But these activists were quite consciously positioning themselves as threats to the 
status quo, and its defenders tried to stop them by any mean necessary. But it fell largely to 
the younger generation to resurrect Marxist analysis as an intellectual tool, if not (except in 
extreme cases) its perspective on social change. But social change requires some attention on 
its own. 
The McCarthy Effect, Part Four: Aversion to Social Content 
By the time the Sixties cultural agencies came into being, social aims in the arts and 
humanities had long since been flung out the postwar window, demonized in the anti-
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communist fever of the late Forties and early Fifties. By the early Sixties, a post-McCarthy 
sanction had fallen over the art world: modernism reigned in visual art, the European classics 
dominated the world of “serious” music, and pure anti-communist Americanism was 
assumed in intellectual pursuits and institutions. It was in the matter of social content and 
context that the strictures of the early NEA most significantly reflected the ethos of postwar 
anti-communism. 
Michael Straight’s thumbnail sketch of New Deal cultural programs epitomizes their 
dismissal by even the liberal wing of postwar cultural elitists: 
[P]ublic patronage of the arts under the New Deal was 
instituted for two primary reasons: employment and 
propaganda. … The use of artists to advance the social 
programs … came to an end when these programs were phased 
out, leaving a legacy of distrust in the postwar world. … 
Republicans and conservatives assumed that artists were 
radicals, and equated public patronage of the arts with social 
programs that they were pledged to oppose.72 
Arts-supporters sought a safe stance by couching policy as a value-neutral, specialist concern 
of the professional arts and humanities, divorced from social action and ideally insulated 
entirely from “political interference” of the governmental kind. By the mid-Sixties, outright 
government interference was unnecessary to assuring compliance with the de facto ban on 
social engagement. Qualifying grantee institutions performed and presented work that was 
safely status quo. Self-censorship sufficed to marginalize critical intelligence in academic 
contexts as well as among individual artists. One might best understand censorship as the 
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most successfully and thoroughly decentralized of all the aims our de facto cultural policy 
comprises. 
Disdain has consistently been expressed for the consideration of any factor other than 
artistic or scholarly “quality” or “excellence” — a highly loaded, incredibly complex, and 
ultimately subjective standard, defined practically by the tastes and interests of those doing 
the funding. “Peer panels” were dispatched to deflect attention from the NFAH agency 
Chairmen, in whose sole charge the enabling legislation placed grant-making authority. The 
lion’s share of funding decisions have been ground out in a mill of panel meetings, supported 
by often highly influential staff review, then approved — generally unchanged — by a 
National Council whose Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed members (except 
Council Chairs and Deputies, who act as chiefs of staff) serve as uncompensated but nicely 
wined-and-dined citizen-volunteers. Focused, but diffuse taste-based decision-making thus 
became a core element of the federal agencies’ architecture and of all the state and local 
agencies that followed their lead. The entire apparatus operates comfortably within the 
demographic confines of the arts as the U.S. postwar cultural elite conceives them. 
Here, the contrast between federal cultural officials of the Thirties and those of the 
Sixties is profound. In describing the constituency she envisioned for the Federal Theatre 
Project, Hallie Flanagan quoted a Stage magazine advertisement that described the people in 
the first ten rows of a theater as those who “possess the gowns, the jewels, the furs, the 
country estates, the town cars — in short, all the appurtenances of fine living around which 
the smart world of the theatre revolves.” She then flatly states, “[T]he first ten rows … were 
not our audience,” insisting that her federal program aimed instead to serve the “larger 
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public.” She and her WPA colleagues thought the way to reach that larger public was to 
present “ideas for penetrating and illuminating our own age, finding quicksilver ways in 
which to express the mercurial present.”73 The very topicality of New Deal cultural projects 
and their brilliance at capturing attention from diverse new publics were of course what drew 
attacks from anti-communists in Congress, leading to the FTP’s abrupt and early termination 
and the toning-down of its surviving sisters. 
Especially as the generation gap between Cold Warriors and Baby Boomers widened, 
young organizers focused their counter-cultural work on marginalized community cultures, 
and socially-engaged cultural activism became ever more widespread throughout the 
Seventies. Only slowly did our younger generation discover and pursue still-living 
connections with unrepentant veterans of the New Deal cultural programs — many of whom 
were delighted, even tearful, at being rediscovered by eager young people who cared not a 
whit about their shameful consignment to some blacklist, when many of them still lay in 
bassinets. 
Even after Nixon took the White House, Great Society and New Deal aspirations of 
addressing social issues through government continued, and social activism did eventually 
flower among rebels against Cold War values, even as the postwar civil rights movement 
dissipated. Fear of urban unrest growing out of this rebellious spirit — still actively inflamed 
by COINTELPRO, one must remember — motivated even Nixon to invest federal funds in 
keeping young people employed and off the streets.  
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Building on the extensive organizing of the era — the movements against the 
Vietnam War and for the rights not only of blacks, but also native Americans, farmworkers, 
women, gay people and others — a growing cadre of young people became adept at securing 
federal support to launch community cultural projects. As in FDR’s first term, a flotilla of 
experimental programs had been launched under the flag of Johnson’s Great Society, housed 
in the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Department of Labor, but all eventually 
landing in Labor when Nixon terminated the OEO, consolidated and massively enlarged with 
CETA’s passage in 1973 (the Comprehensive Employment & Development Act). Cultural 
organizers quickly began using CETA to employ cultural workers in new community cultural 
projects — the first time since the WPA when this has happened. CETA and many other 
federal programs of the Seventies operated through 460 state and municipal agencies whose 
staff and Board members focused on wider social concerns like community development, 
economic revitalization, integration of previously marginalized minority communities, crime 
prevention, health promotion, and social services. For young artists, social engagement was a 
plus, not a minus. National leadership encouraged community-based cultural projects, 
primarily through national network of community-based organizations (CBOs), The DOL’s 
active encouragement emanated mainly from the office of Assistant Secretary of Labor 
Ernest G. Green, a sociologist who was one of the eight African American students involved 
in integrating Little Rock’s Central High School in 1957.74 
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Supported by sophisticated technical assistance — initially provided by nonprofit 
organizations staffed through CETA, though later amplified by the Department of Labor — a 
new generation of cultural organizers became expert in utilizing non-arts funding sources for 
cultural purposes. Many leaders of these well-timed efforts were able to build alternative 
cultural institutions and to sustain their creative work consistently enough to produce projects 
not only unique in content, but mind-blowing as art.  
Especially in rural regions, where the urban elites still running the federal cultural 
agencies were few and farther between, the initiatives taken by younger artists using these 
means were of special interest to state and municipal arts agencies, who in some cases 
responded by opening their granting programs to socially-engaged projects in the arts, 
community history, and other cultural pursuits. In the aggregate, funding for cultural 
initiatives from non-arts sources came to exceed federally appropriated cultural budgets: in 
1979, it was estimated that some $200 million in CETA funding alone was employing artists 
in community-based projects — a third again of Congress appropriated to the National 
Endowment for the Arts in that year. 
In some cities, CETA arts programs drew political fire reminiscent of HUAC’s 
charges against the WPA — even from staff of the arts agencies having CETA artists 
working under their jurisdiction. San Francisco Arts Commission personnel, for example, 
revealed to the political reporter of a local paper that “employees … attempted to organize 
along ‘socialist or leftist lines,’ going so far as to draw an organizational chart calling for a 
politbureau, commissars, and workers’ cells.” The Commission had 127 artists at work on 
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community projects in the city, but administrative staff anonymously complained, “They 
acted like they weren’t working for the commission at all.”75  
Attempts also arose to censor work funded by the federal agencies — as when the 
state arts agency in Tennessee was pressured into cutting funding for The Play Group, a 
Knoxville theater company ten touring a show based on the region’s interracial Southern 
Tenant Farmers Union organizing. In the tenor of the times, such cases were isolated and 
could be used to promote their work. (The Play Group was advised to book and promote its 
show as “the play the Tennessee Arts Commission doesn’t want you to see.”) Public arts 
grants were generally small anyway, and instances of censorship could also be harnessed to 
help raise funds from other sources.  
Occasional Congressional critics of federal grantmaking were easily silenced — until 
Jesse Helms riled up wider opposition to the NEA in 1989, building on a protest launched by 
the American Family Association against an NEA-funded exhibition in North Carolina that 
included Andres Serrano’s now-notorious “Piss Christ.” By targeting a handful of 
controversial artists from among the thousands who’s received federal fellowship grants, 
members of Congress succeeded in adding an anti-obscenity clause to the NEA 
appropriations bill that to ban federal funding of anything that might be considered “obscene, 
including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual 
exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a 
whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” That the federal 
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cultural agencies had operated primarily as specialist professional preserves deprived them of 
the broad-based political support that the New Right networks seemed to enjoy. They had to 
live with this language, despite the constitutional issues at play with regard to freedom of 
expression. 
As in the late Thirties, socially engaged cultural activism inspired successful efforts 
among anti-democratic forces to deprive them of support. Cutbacks in public cultural funding 
began in California with passage of Proposition 13, the property-tax limitation initiative, in 
June1978, then nationally with Reagan’s election at the end of 1980. An estimated 450,000 
CETA job slots76 were eliminated within months of his election  — some prior to his 
inauguration, when his transition team advised the hundreds of state and local “Prime 
Sponsor” agencies involved that they might best instantly re-budget CETA funds to cover 
unemployment benefits that would be owed to laid-off workers. Many projects disappeared 
practically overnight. 
Those relatively few alternative cultural groups that managed to survive the Eighties 
by finding private-sector support were able to so primarily as experienced producers of high-
quality art, not generally because of the content and context of their work. Community 
engagement had been their lead argument in winning support from municipal, state, and 
federal non-arts officials in such strange quarters as the Bureau of Prisons, the Economic 
Development Administration, and most importantly the local “Manpower” Authority (a piece 
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of sexist language that was slow to change). Token grants usually had come from arts-agency 
programs like Expansion Arts, or for a few years, larger grants from the Duffey NEH, but 
most often from state and local agencies whose interest in minority cultures and community-
wide cultural participation was genuine, making diversity and social engagement real 
priorities for them. 
Helping people retool themselves from the late New Deal that was the Seventies to 
catch the “rising tide” of Reaganism is how my consulting work began — stem-to-stern 
overhauls for groups established and developed through public funding programs, but 
challenged to survive on private philanthropy, driven in its very nature by the interests of 
those with wealth. This required revisiting basic questions of identity, purpose, direction, 
organization, public engagement, and financial support, all at once. Our nation is today the 
beneficiary of the continuing work of many of these cultural institutions, born of Seventies 
activism. But most of this generation of cultural organizations was lost. And there has not 
been another time of democratically accessible, public-sector investment in culture since 
Reagan took office. 
My conscious commitment ever since, explicitly shared with colleagues working 
throughout the United States and abroad, has been to keep these new traditions of cultural 
activism alive until conditions improve and a new generation of cultural workers arises. We 
will be able to help them, we have assured ourselves, assuring that the nation will not suffer 
the discontinuity of experience and practice that the McCarthy era created between the 
Thirties generation and that those of us who came of age in the Sixties. It was our hope that 
President Obama’s election heralded this time of renewed investment in democratic cultural 
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development; but instead we have seen resurgent pressure from the right to roll back New 
Deal notions of government for the people and many of the substantive cultural gains made 
vis-à-vis diversity and democracy in national cultural life. 
The McCarthy Effect, Part Five: Disavowing Democracy in U.S. Cultural Policy 
The postwar generation of cultural agencies was built on a foundation defined by the 
“freedom-totalitarian” opposition set up in the anti-communist era, limited in scope to the 
same conceptions of U.S. culture that reigned in the corridors of the CIA. Democracy 
irritated the elites who drove this process. Ironically, this distanced the U.S. ideologically 
from the leading idea in international cultural-policy discourse at the time: “cultural 
democracy,” which on its face would seem to be a very American idea. We’ll discuss how 
we behaved on the global stage next, but first we must attend to perhaps the most sinister of 
the McCarthy effects: the disavowal of democracy in U.S. cultural policy here at home. 
Why not use the prevalent commercial coinage to describe our loss? The nation has 
paid a tremendous opportunity cost by favoring “free enterprise” over “democracy” in the 
nation’s political culture, and in adopting Cold War values in domestic policy. The collateral 
damage in cultural policy could not be more obvious: what happens to cultural democracy 
when democracy itself is problematized and put on the back burner in favor of commercial 
development, and the ideology of capitalism? 
 The damage here lies in our failure to address the inadequacy of cultural 
infrastructure for the vast majority of the American people. Grassroots cultural activists did 
succeed in using federal resources to address this need in the Seventies, as discussed in the 
emergence of socially-engaged artwork; but these efforts were quashed   But this terrain is as 
  371 
significantly damaged in its immaterial dimension: in our ability to raise the largest questions 
of community well-being, state our intentions, and agree on programs of cultural 
development? 
This question of democratic capacity might read is overly idealistic, but cultural 
infrastructure did improve, despite the official inaction and heel-dragging — and the active, 
covert suppression and interference, already discussed — actually did improve as the nation 
as the nation prospered economically and, simultaneously, a generation of conscious counter-
cultural activism blossomed. But even earlier, postwar circumstances had sometimes and in 
some settings required public-sector leadership and investment in community cultural life. 
California provides the best large-scale example: entirely new communities were popping up 
everywhere, requiring that public facilities be installed more or less instantly. The state’s 
public educational system at this time was outstanding; cultural centers and various 
accessible community facilities were incorporated into schools and parks, and into an 
extensive, expanding statewide community college system, where community-services 
offices were often the community’s primary “presenting organization” — having staff to 
program concert series, festivals, and all manner of cultural activities. Many California 
cultural programs derived their main financing from municipal sources. All were hit by the 
radical impact of the nation’s first important right-wing electoral victory: the passage of 
Proposition 13 in June 1978.77 
                                                
77 Don Adams and Arlene Goldbard, “California Community Arts Under Proposition 13,” 
NAPNOC Reports (Washington, DC/San Francisco: NAPNOC, 1978). 
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Addressing and undoing this I visible damage by anti-democratic forces in the 
nation’s culture would require substantial reinvestment in noncommercial community 
development and in public-service employment for cultural workers. After four decades of 
professional work and study of cultural policy and development practice throughout the 
world, I have seen no other way. And why should this be surprising? Government offers us 
the sole, all-inclusive, and presumably accountable social mechanism for democratic change, 
aided by the countless non-for-profit community enterprises upon which cultural democracy 
relies. If the United States does believe in some other values than the unbridled pursuit of 
profit, we will have to invest in them. They are by definition not-for-profit, and must be 
sustained by the public sectors of government and community-based, nonprofit 
organizations. 
From a cultural-policy point of view, I am convinced by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s conclusion, published in the year of his assassination: that there will be no hope of 
redress from the cult of racism plaguing the country — our deepest injury in relation to 
cultural diversity — without a strong, continuing commitment to universal social justice and, 
as its foundation, full employment. If business finds it profitable in to lay off workers, their 
creativity and energy must be harnessed for public service, compensated with a living wage 
that enables liberty and justice for all.78 
                                                
78 Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (New York: 
Harper & Rowe, 1968). 
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The McCarthy Effect, Part Six: The U.S. Takes the World Stage 
The heyday of the CIA’s cultural program ended in the late Sixties, just about the 
time that UNESCO launched its substantial international study of national cultural policies, 
which continued in various forms for the better part of two decades. The U.S. choice to 
remain at the sidelines in UNESCO in the early Fifties brought chickens home to roost. The 
international discussion that ensued naturally focused on the commercial cultural industries 
and electronic mass media, each dominated by U.S.-based producers and distributors. A 
virtual Animal Farm of imagery came to the fore as foreign policymakers sought to put a face 
of the forces of cultural hegemony they saw at work in the world: “the fox in the hen house,” 
French cultural minister Jack Lang called the United States at UNESCO’s 1982 General 
Conference in Mexico City; “the bull in the china shop” was often heard. But the ultimate 
bestial metaphor comes from Africa or Asia, well beyond the barnyard fence: the elephant in 
the room. The global reach of U.S.–based commercial mass media brought charges of 
cultural imperialism from all over the globe — echoed in rumblings from marginalized 
communities and regions here at home — as their products implicitly marketed the American 
way of life to potential consumers everywhere. The “Americanization of culture” anticipated 
concerns taken up by late Nineties “anti-globalization” activists whose analysis included 
concern for corporate culture’s impact in the United States as well as abroad. 
In retrospect, things were best for UNESCO and the family of nations while the U.S. 
sat out, from the Fifties through the Seventies. When the Kraken awakened, it was with a real 
vengeance. The Hollywood-connected White House of Ronald Reagan launched an attack on 
UNESCO that climaxed with U.S. withdrawal from the agency in 1984. 
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Ironically, the deeper forces that concerned world cultural minsters were identified 
with the United States because they manifest here first. What people on the planet have been 
more affected by these forces than Americans? Rapid urbanization, the proliferation of 
electronic mass media, and considerable displacement were disrupting traditional cultural 
patterns here long before and to a much greater extent than they were being felt in, say, 
Africa, Asia or Latin America — even in Europe.  
It was realization of the common situation we faced that inspired what political 
scientists now call “transnational activism” on the part of U.S. cultural workers. Official 
documents published by UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of African 
Unity and in various other international networks provided language missing from the U.S. 
political lexicon to describe our cultural development activism. Through the networks of 
other nation’s ministries, we were able to find our colleagues abroad, many of whom were 
benefiting from much greater acknowledgement and support on the part of their own national 
cultural policymaking apparatus they we were in the United States (however secondary they 
remained in relation to their own nations’ major cultural institutions, whose predominance is 
also a worldwide phenomenon). Foreign governments often provided travel bursaries that 
brought cultural development workers to the U.S., though our own government would not 
reciprocate; and many artists did come, curious about the challenges implicit in cultural work 
“in the belly of the beast.” We benefited from their inspiration and guidance, when they 
inevitably discovered those of us doing similar kinds of community-based work in this 
country. 
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Reagan’s withdrawal from UNESCO, and the bureaucratic gyrations it caused in the 
international community, effectively ended this era of cultural-policy dialogue. Only one 
UNESCO General Conference has taken place since the 1982 conclave in Mexico City, 
convened in Stockholm in 1998. Young activists involved in the huge NGO conference 
attached to the official ministers’ meeting in Sweden frequently characterized cultural 
democracy “an American idea,” though they were also critically aware of the U.S. as the 
archetypal nation-state, which by the main flow of NGO enthusiasm in that year’s sessions 
would surely soon wither away. 
Obviously, it has not. Bush fil’s global War on Terror still lay beyond anyone’s 
imagination.  U.S. isolation from international cultural policy thinking continues to damage 
us. It has deprived us of the sense of standards, aspirations, and critical practice generated by 
the rich transnational discussion that took place over several decades. Our domestic dialogue 
about the forces being felt worldwide, and a cultural-policy embrace of cultural development 
in its inclusive sociocultural sense, might have been enriched, nourished, and challenged by 
our open participation. Our official action instead supported the perception that the United 
States of America doesn’t real care about culture at all: only about its military might and 
economic domination. Regimes unfriendly to our corporate interests were at risk, and we 
were not above outright invasion or bombing. Since we present ourselves abroad as a 
democracy, it is commonly assumed that we all voted on the sometimes horrifying measures 
our government has undertaken on foreign shores and resource-rich hinterlands and supply 
routes worldwide. Meanwhile, our propagandists tout the United States as “the envy of the 
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world,” apparently without consciousness that pride and narcissism are perhaps not our 
greatest national virtues. 
The standard apparatus of international relations functions better and more 
muscularly than any other aspect of U.S. cultural policymaking. We have long been 
projecting a definite national image to the world, and our interventions on behalf of our most 
powerful interests are clear, though many are cloaked. Our foreign policy has been inspired 
and shaped by what international relations scholars call “realism” — a steadfast belief in the 
inevitability of war. “Realists” prescribe constant attention to geopolitical concerns, and 
counsel relentless work investment to assure military superiority and readiness. The 
motivating threat has shifted from global communism to global terrorism, as the twentieth 
century passed into the twenty-first; but for the other nations of the world, what greater threat 
is there than the United States of America? 
“Someone has to be the world’s policeman,” became a litany in the Eighties and 
Nineties among younger people who grew up with the Iran hostage crisis on their minds, 
rather than the civil rights or anti-Vietnam War movements, or later, after the Reagan era 
began. As if we weren’t already seen that way. The War of Terror declared by President 
George W. Bush created a prospect of endless threat and struggle, and state intervention 
strongly reminiscent of the Twentieth Century history summarized here.  
Meanwhile, the Right continues to benefit from the ideological machinery established 
in 1936 by the National Association of Manufacturers, working in close collaboration with 
government since World War II, and cresting with the Reagan Era, which lingers to this day. 
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They have manufactured and marketed a mentality obsessed by threat and anxious to find 
armed defense against worst-case threats.  
We might instead have been working things out, here at home and in the global arena, 
striving to devise better-case approaches, aiming to achieve the best, and supporting cultural 
development efforts toward clear, agreed-upon goals. This would be the subject of cultural 
policy, were we to find the courage to declare one.
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION: HEALING OUR COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
 Historian Walter Hixson closes the curtains in his examination of propaganda, culture 
and the Cold War from Truman to Kennedy with this insight, referring to Carl von 
Clausewitz, the great Nineteenth Century German-Prussian political theorist of the 
inevitability of war — the archetype of “realist” thinking in international affairs:  
The Cold War stood Clausewitz on his head: in an age of 
mutual assured destruction, war was no longer a viable means 
to solve political conflict among superpowers. … If the Cold 
War was, at its core, a battle for public opinion — a struggle 
for hearts and minds — its outcome could only be decided on 
cultural ground. 
But Hixson also observes that “the men who conducted the Cold War, in both Washington 
and Moscow, failed to grasp the essence of the struggle.” What followed instead were heavy, 
decades-long investments in arms and military systems, despite President Eisenhower’s 
famous farewell warning against the military-industrial complex. Rather than apprehending 
that a different kind of struggle was taking place — instead remaining “[o]bsessed with 
military preparations —Washington squandered enormous energies and resources in 
preparation for a conventional ‘hot’ war,”  when what was actually on the table was quite 
cold.1 
                                                
1 Hixson, 232-233. 
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 Much of the collateral damage suffered by U.S. culture because of the Cold War lies 
in the militarization of our national culture, heightened since 2001 by our War on Terror. 
Throughout the postwar period, a feeling of threat has spurred development of a national 
security state that might have shocked the Founding Fathers. Even “conservatives,” as they 
have been styled since Reagan’s election — those who profess to wanting government 
generally to wither away — consider social control to be the core function of federal power 
and obligation. Meanwhile, new technology is allowing concentrated power to make ever-
deeper incursions into what were once considered private matters, whether personal or 
communal. 
Huge practical implications arise from this obsession with military affairs, beginning 
with the monopolization of governmental resources that might otherwise be used to sustain 
the national commonwealth and contribute to global stability, if not peace. The United 
States’ hegemonic power from the end of World War II, carried into the twenty-first century, 
confers great potential for positive influence, were we able to abandon habits of twisting our 
thinking around possible threats. Might we rather imagine a harmonious, free world not 
obsessed with geopolitical threat, and committed to democratic values? 
 Our ability to do so is crucial to overcoming what is perhaps the most profound 
damage done in the century since anti-communism cropped up: the gross polarization that 
characterizes habituated thinking in politics today. Decades — generations — of Americans 
have been urged to think in terms of good and evil, black and white — Manichean dualisms 
drawn along practically any line that can be imagined in our diverse society. Polarization of 
political thought and ideology has been exploited along communist/free enterprise lines, and 
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American/un-American ones, and countless other either-or distinctions that affect not only 
political strategy, but our very patterns of perception and preconception in culture — most 
crucially in our political culture itself.  
The institutionalization of political gridlock in today’s Red/Blue parsing of politics 
ignores the importance of defining a foundation in national cultural policy that is more truly 
consensual, democratic, and inclusive than the one to which we have grown accustomed 
through the Cold War. Cultural diversity requires acceptance of a multiplicity of viewpoints 
as well as attention to complexity and detail as a basis for encompassing policies and 
structures that will serve everyone, not only powerful elites. And here, we return to the policy 
requirements of cultural democracy and its simple principles: protecting and promoting 
cultural diversity, encouraging and supporting cultural participation by all citizens, and to the 
greatest extent possible (while safeguarding the first two aims), decentralizing cultural 
decision-making to our communities, our families, and in keeping with our Constitution, our 
individual selves. 
 The very idea of cultural policy was nipped in the bud by the politics of anti-
communism. Our resulting multi-generational silence makes it that much harder for us today 
to imagine, much less to have thought through, its unifying potential. Cultivating unifying, 
inclusive political leadership, inspired by some inclusive vision of cultural democracy is 
vital. The easy out taken by Truman and Eisenhower in sacralizing the American state must 
be undone, separating church and state in a constitutionally conscious way, free of any 
Judeo-Christian cult — recognizing that our sense of propriety was shifted by leaders who 
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blurred the line between public values and religious stricture, and between private morality 
and public justice. 
The forces that carried Reagan into office in 1980 focused more strategically on “the 
base” of their power rather than on Us, the People. Meanwhile, what might be described as 
“political opinionating” has increasingly fractured democratic choice into a vast, confusing, 
black-and-white mosaic of binary bits, broken down into yes/no options by status quo 
interests. The emergence of domestic propaganda, recast as the emergent science of “public 
relations” in the late Thirties, coincides nicely with anti-communist campaigning against the 
un-American and the rollout of NAM’s voter-as-consumer version of “the American Way.”  
Conventional ways of thinking and understanding determine our choices, offering no 
clear channel for integrative visions of political culture to emerge — the kind that could lead 
to inventive, culturally democratic action, extending from the federal level to the local and 
even individual. This would properly be considered the work of a public service–oriented 
cultural development program, had we a cultural policy to define and focus attention toward 
its democratic purpose and values. 
 The Civil Rights movement that crested in the Sixties helped rid us of many of the 
worst obstacles thrown up by the bad old world: segregated facilities, or racist barricades to 
voter registration. But the movement’s energy diffused before much had been done to start 
building the better world we could create in its place. Reagan’s puppeteers saw to it that the 
nation would be deprived of democratic cultural infrastructure when its importance was 
being recognized and discussed all over the world. And we have seen resurgent efforts to 
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create elements of the bad old world of official racism in voter-suppression efforts, racist 
law-enforcement and incarceration regimes, and relentless corporate brainwashing. 
A climate of mutual respect has grown in many Americans’ private lives and cultural 
circles, in spite of the diffusion of viable democratic movements. The impact of past 
movements towards democratic ends lives on. The civil rights movement is now celebrated 
in holidays and history books (except by crabby right-wingers). Popular attitudes toward 
cross-cultural relationships and unconventional gender or sexual identities have changed in 
ways that were marginalized and suppressed in the Cold War world. A surviving remnant of 
the many alternative cultural institutions that grew out of Sixties movements and took root in 
the Seventies has continued to encourage us as individual and communities to honor diversity 
in new ways, in a general climate quite more welcoming. 
Against this general social shift, new ways have been invented to maintain old orders 
in new political contexts. The lion’s share of investment here is “naturally” from the wealthy-
friendly right. The Tea Party movement has been “astroturfed” with the same blend of solid 
financial support, skilled messaging, and capital-intensive organization that launched and 
sustained domestic propaganda throughout the twentieth century: starting with the NAM 
campaign in the Thirties, continuing with the Advertising Council in the Fifties, refocusing 
after the Goldwater defeat in 1964 to build the ideological foundation of think-tankery that 
produced what was called the “Reagan revolution.” 
Cynical activists laughed at the pretensions of describing the repackaged Spam of the 
New Right as any kind of revolution; but thirty years later, revolutionary changes have 
indeed been made in the very framing of our cultural politics. Very real collateral damage 
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was done by incorporating what Washington activists in 1981 called “the new Reagan 
rhetoric” into our political discourse and culture. We replaced “public service” and “social 
need” with “enterprise zones” and “social problems.” Aspiration for cultural development 
was gone altogether. Over time, this has changed our ways of thinking about government, 
privileging corporate interests over democratic ones in Washington, as they are in so many 
other centers of power. 
The old New Deal consensus is largely lost to those who came to full consciousness 
after the Reagan era began. (One might, in fact, date this from the Iran hostage crisis, as 
Reagan’s storm gathered.) With the election of Barack Obama, we have the first 
representative of this generation in the White House. Public-service employment has been 
notably absent from his administration’s political lexicon, and completely so in the practical 
program it proposed at a time of national economic emergency. The corporate sector’s active, 
focused, and well-financed propaganda campaigns seem to have successfully reframed public 
issues and limited democratic threats to powerful interests. 
 The intergenerational transmission of ideological capitalism is the fattest fruit of this 
century of anti-communism. It helped bust unions. It associated social-change activists as 
against the nation. It justified the creation of state control apparatus, both overt and covert.  
I had only one close friend among the Reaganistas, and he practically defined the 
Thirties-to-Fifties mold. The son of immigrants, he became an idealistic Young Communist 
League organizer in the late Thirties. After wartime military service, he signed up to fight in 
the Irgun after wartime service. Then, shocked at revelations of Stalin’s tyranny, he 
converted to Fifties conservatism, using his YCL experience to help form Young Americans 
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for Freedom and other right-wing outreach initiatives, in company with William F. Buckley. 
(It was his devotion to the Buckley family that inspired his eventual conversion to 
Catholicism, no small matter for a fellow Jew.)  Like many in the New Right of the Reagan 
era, my friend credited his success as a “conservative” organizer to methods he learned from 
democratic organizing in the Young Communist League of the late Thirties.  
By these means, along with the strategic use of the medium of advertising, have anti-
democratic interests successfully held us in the polarized, confused state that has warped U.S. 
political culture since World War II. The grandfathers on whose knees we sat were already 
affected by this thinking, as were our parents, and ourselves, and now already a generation or 
two since, bringing us still broken into the second decade of the next century. 
 Concluding her account of the State Department jazz tours, historian Penny Von 
Eschen summed up some of the major changes from those days to these: 
Today, the American nation is represented abroad by 
McDonald's, Baywatch, Nike, Microsoft, and Britney Spears. 
… [T]he shift from state sponsorship to predominantly market-
driven and corporate images is striking. The reductive logic of 
the market … reminds us of what is lost when a potentially 
democratically accountable government does not assume an 
active role in supporting the arts and promoting its culture 
abroad.2 
 Can we recompose our vision not only of arts support and cultural promotion, but 
more fundamentally, of national cultural identity and democratic commitment in the twenty-
first century United States? Out of the rubble of the Cold War and its terrorizing extension 
since the Berlin Wall was brought down, can we construct a cultural policy that is truly 
                                                
2 Von Eschen, 258. 
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inclusive of — in fact, inspiring to —us all? Can we keep our heads about us as we try to 
replace diversionary thinking and divisive tactics with something that at this point would be 
revolutionary, in the best American sense of that word: a great leap forward into great, more 
effective and satisfying democratic lives for us all?  
We the People can. The question is whether We the People will — and what we can 
do to bring about some authentic form of cultural democracy in the United States in the 
twenty-first century. 
THE FIRST LADY’S RENDITION OF CULTURAL POLICY 
 As we close the book on anti-communism’s impact — our Cold War’s collateral 
damage to U.S. culture — it’s time to make good on my promise at the start: that statement 
Michelle Obama made to formally introduce the President as a candidate for re-election in 
the Democratic national convention in 2012.  
After a couple of extra viewings with friends who’d missed it live, I realized that the 
First Lady’s speech could be read as a statement of cultural policy. Simple, direct language 
like this can and must be used to convey an integrative, more fully inclusive vision in U.S. 
cultural policy. 
“[H]ow blessed we are to live in the greatest nation on Earth!” the First Lady began. 
Speaking of her own and her husband’s experience, she described public service as “an honor 
and a privilege” that  
reveals who you are. … [A]t the end of the day, when it comes 
time to make that decision, … all you have to guide you are 
your values and your vision, and the life experiences that make 
you who you are. 
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She proceeded to assert that protecting and promoting healthy families is central to the 
cultural vitality of the nation, because our values are rooted there. She drew upon her own 
and the President’s family heritage to identify its deeper values and aspirations, describing 
these as common to all American families: 
[F]amilies who didn’t have much in the way of money or 
material possessions but … something far more valuable — 
their unconditional love, their unflinching personal sacrifice, 
and the chance to go places they had never imagined for 
themselves. … 
…American families … weren’t asking for much. They didn’t 
begrudge anyone else’s success or care that others had much 
more than they did — in fact, they admired it. They simply 
believed in that fundamental American promise that, even if 
you don’t start out with much, if you work hard and do what 
you’re supposed to do, you should be able to build a decent life 
for yourself and an even better life for your kids and grandkids. 
… [We value] dignity and decency — that how hard you work 
matters more than how much you make; helping others means 
more than just getting ahead yourself. [We value] honesty and 
integrity — … the truth matters — … you don’t take shortcuts 
or play by your own set of rules; and success doesn’t count 
unless you earn it fair and square. [We value] gratitude and 
humility — … so many people had a hand in our success, … 
[a]nd we … value everyone’s contribution and treat everyone 
with respect. … That’s who we are [as a people]. … 
[I]n the end, more than anything else, this is the story of this 
country — the story of unwavering hope grounded in 
unyielding struggle. That is what has made … so many other 
American stories possible. … If farmers and blacksmiths could 
win independence from an empire; if immigrants could leave 
behind everything they knew for a better life on our shores; if 
women could be dragged to jail for seeking the vote; if a 
generation could defeat a depression and define greatness for 
all time; if a young preacher could lift us to the mountaintop 
with his righteous dream; and if proud Americans can be who 
they are and boldly stand at the altar with who[m] they love. 
Then surely, surely we can give everyone in this country a fair 
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chance at that great American Dream. … [T]hat is the story of 
this country — the story of unwavering hope grounded in 
unyielding struggle. … 
[I]f we want to give all [our sons and daughters] a foundation 
for their dreams and opportunities worthy of their promise, that 
sense of limitless possibility — that belief that here in 
America, there is always something better out there if you’re 
willing to work for it — then we must work like never before.  
… [W]e must come together and stand together … [in] trust to 
keep moving this great country forward … with patience and 
wisdom, and courage and grace, recognizing that change is 
hard and slow, and it never happens all at once, but that we will 
eventually get there. We always do, because of men and 
women who said to themselves, “I may not have a chance to 
fulfill my dreams, but maybe my children will, maybe my 
grandchildren will.” We stand as the beneficiaries of their 
sacrifice, and longing, and steadfast love, as they swallowed 
their fears and doubts and did what was hard. 
When the challenges we face start to seem overwhelming — or 
even impossible — we will never forget that doing the 
impossible is the history of this nation. It is who we are as 
Americans. It is how this country was built. Just as our parents 
and grandparents toiled and struggled for us, we will keep on 
sacrificing and building for our own kids and grandkids. Just as 
so many brave men and women have sacrificed their lives for 
our most fundamental rights, we promise, each and all, to do 
our part as citizens of this great democracy to exercise those 
rights. 
[We who are its beneficiaries] know the American Dream 
because we’ve lived it.  We want everyone in this country -—
everyone — to have that same opportunity, no matter who we 
are, or where we’re from, or what we look like, or whom we 
love.3 
                                                
3 Remarks by the First Lady at the Democratic National Convention, Time Warner Cable 
Arena, Charlotte, North Carolina, September 4, 2012 Accessed at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/05/remarks-first-lady-democratic-
national-convention (18 November 2013). 
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 Without using “policy language” — in fact, speaking so directly and simply, and 
apparently from the heart, she’d moved every delegate caught by TV cameras to tears of 
patriotic pride and joy. Michelle Obama evoked deep connections with my own sense of 
what the American people would really stand for, could we clear the smoke and focus back 
on what unites us, not rather than what worsens our divisions. Her speech reminds us that it 
is possible to describe ourselves as the people we are, to state our aspirations and values — 
the basis of our national consensus, maximizing freedom while improving our ability to use 
government as our primary tool toward democracy. Declaring our cultural policy — and 
revisiting and refining it progressively for decades to come — is essential to our making a 
start. 
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